xref: /titanic_52/usr/src/uts/common/inet/ip/ip_sadb.c (revision 47911a7d5f24c2fc37e7b5bcc696fe32e750c16c)
1 /*
2  * CDDL HEADER START
3  *
4  * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
5  * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
6  * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
7  *
8  * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
9  * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
10  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
11  * and limitations under the License.
12  *
13  * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
14  * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
15  * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
16  * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
17  * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
18  *
19  * CDDL HEADER END
20  */
21 /*
22  * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
23  * Use is subject to license terms.
24  */
25 
26 #pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
27 
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <sys/stream.h>
30 #include <sys/sunddi.h>
31 #include <sys/ddi.h>
32 #include <sys/strlog.h>
33 
34 #include <inet/common.h>
35 #include <inet/mib2.h>
36 #include <inet/ip.h>
37 #include <inet/ip6.h>
38 
39 #include <net/pfkeyv2.h>
40 #include <inet/ipsec_info.h>
41 #include <inet/sadb.h>
42 #include <inet/ipsec_impl.h>
43 #include <inet/ipdrop.h>
44 #include <inet/ipsecesp.h>
45 #include <inet/ipsecah.h>
46 #include <sys/kstat.h>
47 
48 /*
49  * Returns B_TRUE if the identities in the SA match the identities
50  * in the "latch" structure.
51  */
52 
53 static boolean_t
54 ipsec_match_outbound_ids(ipsec_latch_t *ipl, ipsa_t *sa)
55 {
56 	ASSERT(ipl->ipl_ids_latched == B_TRUE);
57 	return ipsid_equal(ipl->ipl_local_cid, sa->ipsa_src_cid) &&
58 	    ipsid_equal(ipl->ipl_remote_cid, sa->ipsa_dst_cid);
59 }
60 
61 /*
62  * Look up a security association based on the unique ID generated by IP and
63  * transport or tunnel information, such as ports and upper-layer protocol,
64  * and the inner and outer address(es).	 Used for uniqueness testing and
65  * outbound packets.  The outer source address may be ignored.
66  *
67  * I expect an SA hash bucket, and that its per-bucket mutex is held.
68  * The SA ptr I return will have its reference count incremented by one.
69  */
70 ipsa_t *
71 ipsec_getassocbyconn(isaf_t *bucket, ipsec_out_t *io, uint32_t *src,
72     uint32_t *dst, sa_family_t af, uint8_t protocol)
73 {
74 	ipsa_t *retval, *candidate;
75 	ipsec_action_t *candact;
76 	boolean_t need_unique;
77 	boolean_t tunnel_mode = io->ipsec_out_tunnel;
78 	uint64_t unique_id;
79 	uint32_t old_flags, excludeflags;
80 	ipsec_policy_t *pp = io->ipsec_out_policy;
81 	ipsec_action_t *actlist = io->ipsec_out_act;
82 	ipsec_action_t *act;
83 	ipsec_latch_t *ipl = io->ipsec_out_latch;
84 	ipsa_ref_t *ipr = NULL;
85 	sa_family_t inaf = io->ipsec_out_inaf;
86 	uint32_t *insrc = io->ipsec_out_insrc;
87 	uint32_t *indst = io->ipsec_out_indst;
88 	uint8_t insrcpfx = io->ipsec_out_insrcpfx;
89 	uint8_t indstpfx = io->ipsec_out_indstpfx;
90 
91 	ASSERT(MUTEX_HELD(&bucket->isaf_lock));
92 
93 	/*
94 	 * Caller must set ipsec_out_t structure such that we know
95 	 * whether this is tunnel mode or transport mode based on
96 	 * io->ipsec_out_tunnel.  If this flag is set, we assume that
97 	 * there are valid inner src and destination addresses to compare.
98 	 */
99 
100 	/*
101 	 * Fast path: do we have a latch structure, is it for this bucket,
102 	 * and does the generation number match?  If so, refhold and return.
103 	 */
104 
105 	if (ipl != NULL) {
106 		ASSERT((protocol == IPPROTO_AH) || (protocol == IPPROTO_ESP));
107 		ipr = &ipl->ipl_ref[protocol - IPPROTO_ESP];
108 
109 		retval = ipr->ipsr_sa;
110 
111 		/*
112 		 * NOTE: The isaf_gen check (incremented upon
113 		 * sadb_unlinkassoc()) protects against retval being a freed
114 		 * SA.  (We're exploiting short-circuit evaluation.)
115 		 */
116 		if ((bucket == ipr->ipsr_bucket) &&
117 		    (bucket->isaf_gen == ipr->ipsr_gen) &&
118 		    (retval->ipsa_state != IPSA_STATE_DEAD) &&
119 		    !(retval->ipsa_flags & IPSA_F_CINVALID)) {
120 			IPSA_REFHOLD(retval);
121 			return (retval);
122 		}
123 	}
124 
125 	ASSERT((pp != NULL) || (actlist != NULL));
126 	if (actlist == NULL)
127 		actlist = pp->ipsp_act;
128 	ASSERT(actlist != NULL);
129 
130 	need_unique = actlist->ipa_want_unique;
131 	unique_id = SA_FORM_UNIQUE_ID(io);
132 
133 	/*
134 	 * Precompute mask for SA flags comparison: If we need a
135 	 * unique SA and an SA has already been used, or if the SA has
136 	 * a unique value which doesn't match, we aren't interested in
137 	 * the SA..
138 	 */
139 
140 	excludeflags = IPSA_F_UNIQUE;
141 	if (need_unique)
142 		excludeflags |= IPSA_F_USED;
143 
144 	/*
145 	 * Walk the hash bucket, matching on:
146 	 *
147 	 * - unique_id
148 	 * - destination
149 	 * - source
150 	 * - algorithms
151 	 * - inner dst
152 	 * - inner src
153 	 * - <MORE TBD>
154 	 *
155 	 * Make sure that wildcard sources are inserted at the end of the hash
156 	 * bucket.
157 	 *
158 	 * DEFINITIONS:	A _shared_ SA is one with unique_id == 0 and USED.
159 	 *		An _unused_ SA is one with unique_id == 0 and not USED.
160 	 *		A _unique_ SA is one with unique_id != 0 and USED.
161 	 *		An SA with unique_id != 0 and not USED never happens.
162 	 */
163 
164 	candidate = NULL;
165 
166 	for (retval = bucket->isaf_ipsa; retval != NULL;
167 	    retval = retval->ipsa_next) {
168 		ASSERT((candidate == NULL) ||
169 		    MUTEX_HELD(&candidate->ipsa_lock));
170 
171 		/*
172 		 * Q: Should I lock this SA?
173 		 * A: For now, yes.  I change and use too many fields in here
174 		 *    (e.g. unique_id) that I may be racing with other threads.
175 		 *    Also, the refcnt needs to be bumped up.
176 		 */
177 
178 		mutex_enter(&retval->ipsa_lock);
179 
180 		/* My apologies for the use of goto instead of continue. */
181 
182 		/* Outer destination address */
183 		if (!IPSA_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(dst, retval->ipsa_dstaddr, af))
184 			goto next_ipsa;	/* Destination mismatch. */
185 
186 		/* Outer source address */
187 		if (!IPSA_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(src, retval->ipsa_srcaddr, af) &&
188 		    !IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(retval->ipsa_srcaddr, af))
189 			goto next_ipsa;	/* Specific source and not matched. */
190 
191 		if (tunnel_mode) {
192 			/* Check tunnel mode */
193 			if (!(retval->ipsa_flags & IPSA_F_TUNNEL))
194 				goto next_ipsa; /* Not tunnel mode SA */
195 
196 			/* Inner destination address */
197 			if (!IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(retval->ipsa_innerdst, inaf)) {
198 				if (!ip_addr_match((uint8_t *)indst,
199 				    min(indstpfx, retval->ipsa_innerdstpfx),
200 				    (in6_addr_t *)retval->ipsa_innerdst))
201 					goto next_ipsa; /* not matched. */
202 			}
203 
204 			/* Inner source address */
205 			if (!IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(retval->ipsa_innersrc, inaf)) {
206 				if (!ip_addr_match((uint8_t *)insrc,
207 				    min(insrcpfx, retval->ipsa_innersrcpfx),
208 				    (in6_addr_t *)retval->ipsa_innersrc))
209 					goto next_ipsa; /* not matched. */
210 			}
211 		} else {
212 			/* Check transport mode */
213 			if (retval->ipsa_flags & IPSA_F_TUNNEL)
214 				goto next_ipsa; /* Not transport mode SA */
215 
216 			/*
217 			 * TODO - If we ever do RFC 3884's dream of transport-
218 			 * mode SAs with inner IP address selectors, we need
219 			 * to put some code here.
220 			 */
221 		}
222 
223 		/*
224 		 * XXX should be able to use cached/latched action
225 		 * to dodge this loop
226 		 */
227 		for (act = actlist; act != NULL; act = act->ipa_next) {
228 			ipsec_act_t *ap = &act->ipa_act;
229 			if (ap->ipa_type != IPSEC_POLICY_APPLY)
230 				continue;
231 
232 			/*
233 			 * XXX ugly.  should be better way to do this test
234 			 */
235 			if (protocol == IPPROTO_AH) {
236 				if (!(ap->ipa_apply.ipp_use_ah))
237 					continue;
238 				if (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_auth_alg !=
239 				    retval->ipsa_auth_alg)
240 					continue;
241 				if (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_ah_minbits >
242 					retval->ipsa_authkeybits)
243 					continue;
244 			} else {
245 				if (!(ap->ipa_apply.ipp_use_esp))
246 					continue;
247 
248 				if ((ap->ipa_apply.ipp_encr_alg !=
249 				    retval->ipsa_encr_alg))
250 					continue;
251 
252 				if (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_espe_minbits >
253 				    retval->ipsa_encrkeybits)
254 					continue;
255 
256 				if (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_esp_auth_alg != 0) {
257 					if (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_esp_auth_alg !=
258 					    retval->ipsa_auth_alg)
259 						continue;
260 					if (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_espa_minbits >
261 					    retval->ipsa_authkeybits)
262 						continue;
263 				}
264 			}
265 
266 			/*
267 			 * Check key mgmt proto, cookie
268 			 */
269 			if ((ap->ipa_apply.ipp_km_proto != 0) &&
270 			    (retval->ipsa_kmp != 0) &&
271 			    (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_km_proto != retval->ipsa_kmp))
272 				continue;
273 
274 			if ((ap->ipa_apply.ipp_km_cookie != 0) &&
275 			    (retval->ipsa_kmc != 0) &&
276 			    (ap->ipa_apply.ipp_km_cookie != retval->ipsa_kmc))
277 				continue;
278 
279 			break;
280 		}
281 		if (act == NULL)
282 			goto next_ipsa;	/* nothing matched */
283 
284 		/*
285 		 * Do identities match?
286 		 */
287 		if (ipl && ipl->ipl_ids_latched &&
288 		    !ipsec_match_outbound_ids(ipl, retval))
289 			goto next_ipsa;
290 
291 		/*
292 		 * At this point, we know that we have at least a match on:
293 		 *
294 		 * - dest
295 		 * - source (if source is specified, i.e. non-zeroes)
296 		 * - inner dest (if specified)
297 		 * - inner source (if specified)
298 		 * - auth alg (if auth alg is specified, i.e. non-zero)
299 		 * - encrypt. alg (if encrypt. alg is specified, i.e. non-zero)
300 		 * and we know that the SA keylengths are appropriate.
301 		 *
302 		 * (Keep in mind known-src SAs are hit before zero-src SAs,
303 		 * thanks to sadb_insertassoc().)
304 		 * If we need a unique asssociation, optimally we have
305 		 * ipsa_unique_id == unique_id, otherwise NOT USED
306 		 * is held in reserve (stored in candidate).
307 		 *
308 		 * For those stored in candidate, take best-match (i.e. given
309 		 * a choice, candidate should have non-zero ipsa_src).
310 		 */
311 
312 		/*
313 		 * If SA has a unique value which matches, we're all set...
314 		 * "key management knows best"
315 		 */
316 		if ((retval->ipsa_flags & IPSA_F_UNIQUE) &&
317 		    ((unique_id & retval->ipsa_unique_mask) ==
318 			retval->ipsa_unique_id))
319 			break;
320 
321 		/*
322 		 * If we need a unique SA and this SA has already been used,
323 		 * or if the SA has a unique value which doesn't match,
324 		 * this isn't for us.
325 		 */
326 
327 		if (retval->ipsa_flags & excludeflags)
328 			goto next_ipsa;
329 
330 
331 		/*
332 		 * I found a candidate..
333 		 */
334 		if (candidate == NULL) {
335 			/*
336 			 * and didn't already have one..
337 			 */
338 			candidate = retval;
339 			candact = act;
340 			continue;
341 		} else {
342 			/*
343 			 * If candidate's source address is zero and
344 			 * the current match (i.e. retval) address is
345 			 * not zero, we have a better candidate..
346 			 */
347 			if (IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(candidate->ipsa_srcaddr, af) &&
348 			    !IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(retval->ipsa_srcaddr, af)) {
349 				mutex_exit(&candidate->ipsa_lock);
350 				candidate = retval;
351 				candact = act;
352 				continue;
353 			}
354 		}
355 next_ipsa:
356 		mutex_exit(&retval->ipsa_lock);
357 	}
358 	ASSERT((retval == NULL) || MUTEX_HELD(&retval->ipsa_lock));
359 	ASSERT((candidate == NULL) || MUTEX_HELD(&candidate->ipsa_lock));
360 	ASSERT((retval == NULL) || (act != NULL));
361 	ASSERT((candidate == NULL) || (candact != NULL));
362 
363 	/* Let caller react to a lookup failure when it gets NULL. */
364 	if (retval == NULL && candidate == NULL)
365 		return (NULL);
366 
367 	if (retval == NULL) {
368 		ASSERT(MUTEX_HELD(&candidate->ipsa_lock));
369 		retval = candidate;
370 		act = candact;
371 	} else if (candidate != NULL) {
372 		mutex_exit(&candidate->ipsa_lock);
373 	}
374 	ASSERT(MUTEX_HELD(&retval->ipsa_lock));
375 	ASSERT(act != NULL);
376 
377 	/*
378 	 * Even though I hold the mutex, since the reference counter is an
379 	 * atomic operation, I really have to use the IPSA_REFHOLD macro.
380 	 */
381 	IPSA_REFHOLD(retval);
382 
383 	/*
384 	 * This association is no longer unused.
385 	 */
386 	old_flags = retval->ipsa_flags;
387 	retval->ipsa_flags |= IPSA_F_USED;
388 
389 	/*
390 	 * Cache a reference to this SA for the fast path.
391 	 */
392 	if (ipr != NULL) {
393 		ipr->ipsr_bucket = bucket;
394 		ipr->ipsr_gen = bucket->isaf_gen;
395 		ipr->ipsr_sa = retval;
396 		/* I'm now caching, so the cache-invalid flag goes away! */
397 		retval->ipsa_flags &= ~IPSA_F_CINVALID;
398 	}
399 	/*
400 	 * Latch various things while we're here..
401 	 */
402 	if (ipl != NULL) {
403 		if (!ipl->ipl_ids_latched) {
404 			ipsec_latch_ids(ipl,
405 			    retval->ipsa_src_cid, retval->ipsa_dst_cid);
406 		}
407 		if (!ipl->ipl_out_action_latched) {
408 			IPACT_REFHOLD(act);
409 			ipl->ipl_out_action = act;
410 			ipl->ipl_out_action_latched = B_TRUE;
411 		}
412 	}
413 
414 	/*
415 	 * Set the uniqueness only first time.
416 	 */
417 	if (need_unique && !(old_flags & IPSA_F_USED)) {
418 		if (retval->ipsa_unique_id == 0) {
419 			ASSERT((retval->ipsa_flags & IPSA_F_UNIQUE) == 0);
420 			/*
421 			 * From now on, only this src, dst[ports, addr],
422 			 * proto, should use it.
423 			 */
424 			retval->ipsa_flags |= IPSA_F_UNIQUE;
425 			retval->ipsa_unique_id = unique_id;
426 			retval->ipsa_unique_mask = SA_UNIQUE_MASK(
427 			    io->ipsec_out_src_port, io->ipsec_out_dst_port,
428 			    protocol, 0);
429 		}
430 
431 		/*
432 		 * Set the source address and adjust the hash
433 		 * buckets only if src_addr is zero.
434 		 */
435 		if (IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(retval->ipsa_srcaddr, af)) {
436 			/*
437 			 * sadb_unlinkassoc() will decrement the refcnt.  Bump
438 			 * up when we have the lock so that we don't have to
439 			 * acquire locks when we come back from
440 			 * sadb_insertassoc().
441 			 *
442 			 * We don't need to bump the bucket's gen since
443 			 * we aren't moving to a new bucket.
444 			 */
445 			IPSA_REFHOLD(retval);
446 			IPSA_COPY_ADDR(retval->ipsa_srcaddr, src, af);
447 			mutex_exit(&retval->ipsa_lock);
448 			sadb_unlinkassoc(retval);
449 			/*
450 			 * Since the bucket lock is held, we know
451 			 * sadb_insertassoc() will succeed.
452 			 */
453 #ifdef DEBUG
454 			if (sadb_insertassoc(retval, bucket) != 0) {
455 				cmn_err(CE_PANIC,
456 				    "sadb_insertassoc() failed in "
457 				    "ipsec_getassocbyconn().\n");
458 			}
459 #else	/* non-DEBUG */
460 			(void) sadb_insertassoc(retval, bucket);
461 #endif	/* DEBUG */
462 			return (retval);
463 		}
464 	}
465 	mutex_exit(&retval->ipsa_lock);
466 
467 	return (retval);
468 }
469 
470 /*
471  * Look up a security association based on the security parameters index (SPI)
472  * and address(es).  This is used for inbound packets and general SA lookups
473  * (even in outbound SA tables).  The source address may be ignored.  Return
474  * NULL if no association is available.	 If an SA is found, return it, with
475  * its refcnt incremented.  The caller must REFRELE after using the SA.
476  * The hash bucket must be locked down before calling.
477  */
478 ipsa_t *
479 ipsec_getassocbyspi(isaf_t *bucket, uint32_t spi, uint32_t *src, uint32_t *dst,
480     sa_family_t af)
481 {
482 	ipsa_t *retval;
483 
484 	ASSERT(MUTEX_HELD(&bucket->isaf_lock));
485 
486 	/*
487 	 * Walk the hash bucket, matching exactly on SPI, then destination,
488 	 * then source.
489 	 *
490 	 * Per-SA locking doesn't need to happen, because I'm only matching
491 	 * on addresses.  Addresses are only changed during insertion/deletion
492 	 * from the hash bucket.  Since the hash bucket lock is held, we don't
493 	 * need to worry about addresses changing.
494 	 */
495 
496 	for (retval = bucket->isaf_ipsa; retval != NULL;
497 	    retval = retval->ipsa_next) {
498 		if (retval->ipsa_spi != spi)
499 			continue;
500 		if (!IPSA_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(dst, retval->ipsa_dstaddr, af))
501 			continue;
502 
503 		/*
504 		 * Assume that wildcard source addresses are inserted at the
505 		 * end of the hash bucket.  (See sadb_insertassoc().)
506 		 * The following check for source addresses is a weak form
507 		 * of access control/source identity verification.  If an
508 		 * SA has a source address, I only match an all-zeroes
509 		 * source address, or that particular one.  If the SA has
510 		 * an all-zeroes source, then I match regardless.
511 		 *
512 		 * There is a weakness here in that a packet with all-zeroes
513 		 * for an address will match regardless of the source address
514 		 * stored in the packet.
515 		 *
516 		 * Note that port-level packet selectors, if present,
517 		 * are checked in ipsec_check_ipsecin_unique().
518 		 */
519 		if (IPSA_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(src, retval->ipsa_srcaddr, af) ||
520 		    IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(retval->ipsa_srcaddr, af) ||
521 		    IPSA_IS_ADDR_UNSPEC(src, af))
522 			break;
523 	}
524 
525 	if (retval != NULL) {
526 		/*
527 		 * Just refhold the return value.  The caller will then
528 		 * make the appropriate calls to set the USED flag.
529 		 */
530 		IPSA_REFHOLD(retval);
531 	}
532 
533 	return (retval);
534 }
535 
536 boolean_t
537 ipsec_outbound_sa(mblk_t *mp, uint_t proto)
538 {
539 	mblk_t *data_mp;
540 	ipsec_out_t *io;
541 	ipaddr_t dst;
542 	uint32_t *dst_ptr, *src_ptr;
543 	isaf_t *bucket;
544 	ipsa_t *assoc;
545 	ip6_pkt_t ipp;
546 	in6_addr_t dst6;
547 	ipsa_t **sa;
548 	sadbp_t *sadbp;
549 	sadb_t *sp;
550 	sa_family_t af;
551 	netstack_t	*ns;
552 
553 	data_mp = mp->b_cont;
554 	io = (ipsec_out_t *)mp->b_rptr;
555 	ns = io->ipsec_out_ns;
556 
557 	if (proto == IPPROTO_ESP) {
558 		ipsecesp_stack_t	*espstack;
559 
560 		espstack = ns->netstack_ipsecesp;
561 		sa = &io->ipsec_out_esp_sa;
562 		sadbp = &espstack->esp_sadb;
563 	} else {
564 		ipsecah_stack_t	*ahstack;
565 
566 		ASSERT(proto == IPPROTO_AH);
567 		ahstack = ns->netstack_ipsecah;
568 		sa = &io->ipsec_out_ah_sa;
569 		sadbp = &ahstack->ah_sadb;
570 	}
571 
572 	ASSERT(*sa == NULL);
573 
574 	if (io->ipsec_out_v4) {
575 		ipha_t *ipha = (ipha_t *)data_mp->b_rptr;
576 
577 		ASSERT(IPH_HDR_VERSION(ipha) == IPV4_VERSION);
578 		dst = ip_get_dst(ipha);
579 		sp = &sadbp->s_v4;
580 		af = AF_INET;
581 
582 		/*
583 		 * NOTE:Getting the outbound association is considerably
584 		 *	painful.  ipsec_getassocbyconn() will require more
585 		 *	parameters as policy implementations mature.
586 		 */
587 		bucket = OUTBOUND_BUCKET_V4(sp, dst);
588 		src_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ipha->ipha_src;
589 		dst_ptr = (uint32_t *)&dst;
590 	} else {
591 		ip6_t *ip6h = (ip6_t *)data_mp->b_rptr;
592 
593 		ASSERT(IPH_HDR_VERSION(ip6h) == IPV6_VERSION);
594 		dst6 = ip_get_dst_v6(ip6h, NULL);
595 		af = AF_INET6;
596 
597 		bzero(&ipp, sizeof (ipp));
598 		sp = &sadbp->s_v6;
599 
600 		/* Same NOTE: applies here! */
601 		bucket = OUTBOUND_BUCKET_V6(sp, dst6);
602 		src_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ip6h->ip6_src;
603 		dst_ptr = (uint32_t *)&dst6;
604 	}
605 
606 	mutex_enter(&bucket->isaf_lock);
607 	assoc = ipsec_getassocbyconn(bucket, io, src_ptr, dst_ptr, af, proto);
608 	mutex_exit(&bucket->isaf_lock);
609 
610 	if (assoc == NULL)
611 		return (B_FALSE);
612 
613 	if (assoc->ipsa_state == IPSA_STATE_DEAD) {
614 		IPSA_REFRELE(assoc);
615 		return (B_FALSE);
616 	}
617 
618 	ASSERT(assoc->ipsa_state != IPSA_STATE_LARVAL);
619 
620 	*sa = assoc;
621 	return (B_TRUE);
622 }
623 
624 /*
625  * Inbound IPsec SA selection.
626  */
627 
628 ah_t *
629 ipsec_inbound_ah_sa(mblk_t *mp, netstack_t *ns)
630 {
631 	mblk_t *ipsec_in;
632 	ipha_t *ipha;
633 	ipsa_t 	*assoc;
634 	ah_t *ah;
635 	isaf_t *hptr;
636 	ipsec_in_t *ii;
637 	boolean_t isv6;
638 	ip6_t *ip6h;
639 	int ah_offset;
640 	uint32_t *src_ptr, *dst_ptr;
641 	int pullup_len;
642 	sadb_t *sp;
643 	sa_family_t af;
644 	ipsec_stack_t	*ipss = ns->netstack_ipsec;
645 	ipsecah_stack_t	*ahstack = ns->netstack_ipsecah;
646 
647 	IP_AH_BUMP_STAT(ipss, in_requests);
648 
649 	ASSERT(mp->b_datap->db_type == M_CTL);
650 
651 	ipsec_in = mp;
652 	ii = (ipsec_in_t *)ipsec_in->b_rptr;
653 	mp = mp->b_cont;
654 
655 	ASSERT(mp->b_datap->db_type == M_DATA);
656 
657 	isv6 = !ii->ipsec_in_v4;
658 	if (isv6) {
659 		ip6h = (ip6_t *)mp->b_rptr;
660 		ah_offset = ipsec_ah_get_hdr_size_v6(mp, B_TRUE);
661 	} else {
662 		ipha = (ipha_t *)mp->b_rptr;
663 		ASSERT(ipha->ipha_protocol == IPPROTO_AH);
664 		ah_offset = ipha->ipha_version_and_hdr_length -
665 		    (uint8_t)((IP_VERSION << 4));
666 		ah_offset <<= 2;
667 	}
668 
669 	/*
670 	 * We assume that the IP header is pulled up until
671 	 * the options. We need to see whether we have the
672 	 * AH header in the same mblk or not.
673 	 */
674 	pullup_len = ah_offset + sizeof (ah_t);
675 	if (mp->b_rptr + pullup_len > mp->b_wptr) {
676 		if (!pullupmsg(mp, pullup_len)) {
677 			ipsec_rl_strlog(ns, ip_mod_info.mi_idnum, 0, 0,
678 			    SL_WARN | SL_ERROR,
679 			    "ipsec_inbound_ah_sa: Small AH header\n");
680 			IP_AH_BUMP_STAT(ipss, in_discards);
681 			ip_drop_packet(ipsec_in, B_TRUE, NULL, NULL,
682 			    DROPPER(ipss, ipds_ah_bad_length),
683 			    &ipss->ipsec_dropper);
684 			return (NULL);
685 		}
686 		if (isv6)
687 			ip6h = (ip6_t *)mp->b_rptr;
688 		else
689 			ipha = (ipha_t *)mp->b_rptr;
690 	}
691 
692 	ah = (ah_t *)(mp->b_rptr + ah_offset);
693 
694 	if (isv6) {
695 		src_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ip6h->ip6_src;
696 		dst_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ip6h->ip6_dst;
697 		sp = &ahstack->ah_sadb.s_v6;
698 		af = AF_INET6;
699 	} else {
700 		src_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ipha->ipha_src;
701 		dst_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ipha->ipha_dst;
702 		sp = &ahstack->ah_sadb.s_v4;
703 		af = AF_INET;
704 	}
705 
706 	hptr = INBOUND_BUCKET(sp, ah->ah_spi);
707 	mutex_enter(&hptr->isaf_lock);
708 	assoc = ipsec_getassocbyspi(hptr, ah->ah_spi, src_ptr, dst_ptr, af);
709 	mutex_exit(&hptr->isaf_lock);
710 
711 	if (assoc == NULL || assoc->ipsa_state == IPSA_STATE_DEAD) {
712 		IP_AH_BUMP_STAT(ipss, lookup_failure);
713 		IP_AH_BUMP_STAT(ipss, in_discards);
714 		ipsecah_in_assocfailure(ipsec_in, 0,
715 		    SL_ERROR | SL_CONSOLE | SL_WARN,
716 		    "ipsec_inbound_ah_sa: No association found for "
717 		    "spi 0x%x, dst addr %s\n",
718 		    ah->ah_spi, dst_ptr, af, ahstack);
719 		if (assoc != NULL) {
720 			IPSA_REFRELE(assoc);
721 		}
722 		return (NULL);
723 	}
724 
725 	if (assoc->ipsa_state == IPSA_STATE_LARVAL) {
726 		/* Not fully baked; swap the packet under a rock until then */
727 		sadb_set_lpkt(assoc, ipsec_in, ns);
728 		IPSA_REFRELE(assoc);
729 		return (NULL);
730 	}
731 
732 	/*
733 	 * Save a reference to the association so that it can
734 	 * be retrieved after execution. We free any AH SA reference
735 	 * already there (innermost SA "wins". The reference to
736 	 * the SA will also be used later when doing the policy checks.
737 	 */
738 	if (ii->ipsec_in_ah_sa != NULL) {
739 		IPSA_REFRELE(ii->ipsec_in_ah_sa);
740 	}
741 	ii->ipsec_in_ah_sa = assoc;
742 
743 	return (ah);
744 }
745 
746 esph_t *
747 ipsec_inbound_esp_sa(mblk_t *ipsec_in_mp, netstack_t *ns)
748 {
749 	mblk_t *data_mp, *placeholder;
750 	uint32_t *src_ptr, *dst_ptr;
751 	ipsec_in_t *ii;
752 	ipha_t *ipha;
753 	ip6_t *ip6h;
754 	esph_t *esph;
755 	ipsa_t *ipsa;
756 	isaf_t *bucket;
757 	uint_t preamble;
758 	sa_family_t af;
759 	boolean_t isv6;
760 	sadb_t *sp;
761 	ipsec_stack_t	*ipss = ns->netstack_ipsec;
762 	ipsecesp_stack_t *espstack = ns->netstack_ipsecesp;
763 
764 	IP_ESP_BUMP_STAT(ipss, in_requests);
765 	ASSERT(ipsec_in_mp->b_datap->db_type == M_CTL);
766 
767 	/* We have IPSEC_IN already! */
768 	ii = (ipsec_in_t *)ipsec_in_mp->b_rptr;
769 	data_mp = ipsec_in_mp->b_cont;
770 
771 	ASSERT(ii->ipsec_in_type == IPSEC_IN);
772 
773 	isv6 = !ii->ipsec_in_v4;
774 	if (isv6) {
775 		ip6h = (ip6_t *)data_mp->b_rptr;
776 	} else {
777 		ipha = (ipha_t *)data_mp->b_rptr;
778 	}
779 
780 	/*
781 	 * Put all data into one mblk if it's not there already.
782 	 * XXX This is probably bad long-term.  Figure out better ways of doing
783 	 * this.  Much of the inbound path depends on all of the data being
784 	 * in one mblk.
785 	 *
786 	 * XXX Jumbogram issues will have to be dealt with here.
787 	 * If the plen is 0, we'll have to scan for a HBH header with the
788 	 * actual packet length.
789 	 */
790 	if (data_mp->b_datap->db_ref > 1 ||
791 	    (data_mp->b_wptr - data_mp->b_rptr) <
792 	    (isv6 ? (ntohs(ip6h->ip6_plen) + sizeof (ip6_t))
793 		: ntohs(ipha->ipha_length))) {
794 		placeholder = msgpullup(data_mp, -1);
795 		if (placeholder == NULL) {
796 			IP_ESP_BUMP_STAT(ipss, in_discards);
797 			/*
798 			 * TODO: Extract inbound interface from the IPSEC_IN
799 			 * message's ii->ipsec_in_rill_index.
800 			 */
801 			ip_drop_packet(ipsec_in_mp, B_TRUE, NULL, NULL,
802 			    DROPPER(ipss, ipds_esp_nomem),
803 			    &ipss->ipsec_dropper);
804 			return (NULL);
805 		} else {
806 			/* Reset packet with new pulled up mblk. */
807 			freemsg(data_mp);
808 			data_mp = placeholder;
809 			ipsec_in_mp->b_cont = data_mp;
810 		}
811 	}
812 
813 	/*
814 	 * Find the ESP header, point the address pointers at the appropriate
815 	 * IPv4/IPv6 places.
816 	 */
817 	if (isv6) {
818 		ip6h = (ip6_t *)data_mp->b_rptr;
819 		src_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ip6h->ip6_src;
820 		dst_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ip6h->ip6_dst;
821 		if (ip6h->ip6_nxt != IPPROTO_ESP) {
822 			/* There are options that need to be processed. */
823 			preamble = ip_hdr_length_v6(data_mp, ip6h);
824 		} else {
825 			preamble = sizeof (ip6_t);
826 		}
827 
828 		sp = &espstack->esp_sadb.s_v6;
829 		af = AF_INET6;
830 	} else {
831 		ipha = (ipha_t *)data_mp->b_rptr;
832 		src_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ipha->ipha_src;
833 		dst_ptr = (uint32_t *)&ipha->ipha_dst;
834 		preamble = IPH_HDR_LENGTH(ipha);
835 
836 		sp = &espstack->esp_sadb.s_v4;
837 		af = AF_INET;
838 	}
839 
840 	esph = (esph_t *)(data_mp->b_rptr + preamble);
841 
842 	/* Since hash is common on inbound (SPI value), hash here. */
843 	bucket = INBOUND_BUCKET(sp, esph->esph_spi);
844 	mutex_enter(&bucket->isaf_lock);
845 	ipsa = ipsec_getassocbyspi(bucket, esph->esph_spi, src_ptr, dst_ptr,
846 	    af);
847 	mutex_exit(&bucket->isaf_lock);
848 
849 	if (ipsa == NULL || ipsa->ipsa_state == IPSA_STATE_DEAD) {
850 		/*  This is a loggable error!  AUDIT ME! */
851 		IP_ESP_BUMP_STAT(ipss, lookup_failure);
852 		IP_ESP_BUMP_STAT(ipss, in_discards);
853 		ipsecesp_in_assocfailure(ipsec_in_mp, 0,
854 		    SL_ERROR | SL_CONSOLE | SL_WARN,
855 		    "ipsec_inbound_esp_sa: No association found for "
856 		    "spi 0x%x, dst addr %s\n",
857 		    esph->esph_spi, dst_ptr, af, espstack);
858 		if (ipsa != NULL) {
859 			IPSA_REFRELE(ipsa);
860 		}
861 		return (NULL);
862 	}
863 
864 	if (ipsa->ipsa_state == IPSA_STATE_LARVAL) {
865 		/* Not fully baked; swap the packet under a rock until then */
866 		sadb_set_lpkt(ipsa, ipsec_in_mp, ns);
867 		IPSA_REFRELE(ipsa);
868 		return (NULL);
869 	}
870 
871 	/*
872 	 * Save a reference to the association so that it can
873 	 * be retrieved after execution. We free any AH SA reference
874 	 * already there (innermost SA "wins". The reference to
875 	 * the SA will also be used later when doing the policy checks.
876 	 */
877 	if (ii->ipsec_in_esp_sa != NULL) {
878 		IPSA_REFRELE(ii->ipsec_in_esp_sa);
879 	}
880 	ii->ipsec_in_esp_sa = ipsa;
881 
882 	return (esph);
883 }
884