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/etc/inet/ike/config
You can test the syntactic correctness of an /etc/inet/ike/config file by using the -c or -f options of in.iked(8). You must use the -c option to test a config file. You might need to use the -f option if it is not in /etc/inet/ike/config.
There are several types of lexical tokens in the ike.config file: num
A decimal, hex, or octal number representation is as in 'C'.
An IPv4 or IPv6 address with an optional /NNN suffix, (where NNN is a num) that indicates an address (CIDR) prefix (for example, 10.1.2.0/24). An optional /ADDR suffix (where ADDR is a second IP address) indicates an address/mask pair (for example, 10.1.2.0/255.255.255.0). An optional -ADDR suffix (where ADDR is a second IPv4 address) indicates an inclusive range of addresses (for example, 10.1.2.0-10.1.2.255). The / or - can be surrounded by an arbitrary amount of white space.
Either the words XXX, YYY, or ZZZ, for example, {yes,no}.
An IKE phase 1 identity type. IKE phase 1 identity types include:
dn, DN
dns, DNS
fqdn, FQDN
gn, GN
ip, IP
ipv4
ipv4_prefix
ipv4_range
ipv6
ipv6_prefix
ipv6_range
mbox, MBOX
user_fqdn
A quoted string. Examples include:"Label foo", or "C=US, OU=Sun Microsystems\e, Inc., N=olemcd@eng.example.com" A backslash (\e) is an escape character. If the string needs an actual backslash, two must be specified.
A certificate selector, a string which specifies the identities of zero or more certificates. The specifiers can conform to X.509 naming conventions. A cert-sel can also use various shortcuts to match either subject alternative names, the filename or slot of a certificate in /etc/inet/ike/publickeys, or even the ISSUER. For example:
"SLOT=0" "EMAIL=postmaster@example.org" "webmaster@example.org" # Some just work w/o TYPE= "IP=10.0.0.1" "10.21.11.11" # Some just work w/o TYPE= "DNS=www.example.org" "mailhost.example.org" # Some just work w/o TYPE= "ISSUER=C=US, O=Sun Microsystems\\, Inc., CN=Sun CA"Any cert-sel preceded by the character ! indicates a negative match, that is, not matching this specifier. These are the same kind of strings used in ikecert(8).
A quoted, comma-separated list of LDAP servers and ports. For example, "ldap1.example.com", "ldap1.example.com:389", "ldap1.example.com:389,ldap2.example.com". The default port for LDAP is 389.
A list of parameters.
global parameters
IKE phase 1 transform defaults
IKE rule defaults
IKE rules
The global parameter entries are as follows: cert_root cert-sel
The X.509 distinguished name of a certificate that is a trusted root CA certificate. It must be encoded in a file in the /etc/inet/ike/publickeys directory. It must have a CRL in /etc/inet/ike/crls. Multiple cert_root parameters aggregate.
Specifies an X.509 distinguished name of a certificate that is self-signed, or has otherwise been verified as trustworthy for signing IKE exchanges. It must be encoded in a file in /etc/inet/ike/publickeys. Multiple cert_trust parameters aggregate.
The number of seconds to let a not-yet-complete IKE Phase I (Main Mode) negotiation linger before deleting it. Default value: 300 seconds.
If this keyword is present in the file, in.iked(8) ignores Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for root CAs (as given in cert_root)
A list of LDAP servers to query for certificates. The list can be additive.
The string that follows is a name of a shared object (.so) that implements the PKCS#11 standard. The name is passed directly into dlopen(3C) for linking, with all of the semantics of that library call. By default, in.iked(8) runs the same ISA as the running kernel, so a library specified using pkcs11_path and an absolute pathname must match the same ISA as the kernel. One can use the start/exec SMF property (see svccfg(8)) to change in.iked's ISA, but it is not recommended. If this setting is not present, the default value is set to libpkcs11.so. Most cryptographic providers go through the default library, and this parameter should only be used if a specialized provider of IKE-useful cryptographic services cannot interface with the Solaris Cryptographic Framework. See cryptoadm(8). This option is now deprecated, and may be removed in a future release.
The number of retransmits before any IKE negotiation is aborted. Default value: 5 times.
The initial interval (in seconds) between retransmits. This interval is doubled until the retry_timer_max value (see below) is reached. Default value: 0.5 seconds.
The maximum interval (in seconds) between retransmits. The doubling retransmit interval stops growing at this limit. Default value: 30 seconds.
Note -
This value is never reached with the default configuration. The longest interval is 8 (0.5 * 2 ^ (5 - 1)) seconds.
The string following this keyword must be a URL for an HTTP proxy, for example, http://proxy:8080.
The string following this keyword must be a URL for a SOCKS proxy, for example, socks://socks-proxy.
If this keyword is present in the file, in.iked(8) uses HTTP to retrieve Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
The following IKE phase 1 transform parameters can be prefigured using file-level defaults. Values specified within any given transform override these defaults.
The IKE phase 1 transform defaults are as follows: p1_lifetime_secs num
The proposed default lifetime, in seconds, of an IKE phase 1 security association (SA).
The length in bytes of the phase 1 (quick mode) nonce data. This cannot be specified on a per-rule basis.
The following IKE rule parameters can be prefigured using file-level defaults. Values specified within any given rule override these defaults, unless a rule cannot. p2_lifetime_secs num
The proposed default lifetime, in seconds, of an IKE phase 2 security association (SA). This value is optional. If omitted, a default value is used.
The soft lifetime of a phase 2 SA, in seconds. If this value is specified, the SA soft expires after the number of seconds specified by p2_softlife_secs. This causes in.iked to renegotiate a new phase 2 SA before the original SA expires. This value is optional, if omitted soft expiry occurs after 90% of the lifetime specified by p2_lifetime_secs. The value specified by p2_softlife_secs is ignored if p2_lifetime_secs is not specified. Setting p2_softlife_secs to the same value as p2_lifetime_secs disables soft expires.
The idle lifetime of a phase 2 SA, in seconds. If the value is specified, the value specifies the lifetime of the SA, if the security association is not used before the SA is revalidated.
The lifetime of an SA can optionally be specified in kilobytes. This parameter specifies the default value. If lifetimes are specified in both seconds and kilobytes, the SA expires when either the seconds or kilobyte thresholds are passed.
This value is the number of kilobytes that can be protected by an SA before a soft expire occurs (see p2_softlife_secs, above). This value is optional. If omitted, soft expiry occurs after 90% of the lifetime specified by p2_lifetime_kb. The value specified by p2_softlife_kb is ignored if p2_lifetime_kb is not specified.
The length in bytes of the phase 2 (quick mode) nonce data. This cannot be specified on a per-rule basis.
The local identity for IKE requires a type. This identity type is reflected in the IKE exchange. The type can be one of the following:
an IP address (for example, 10.1.1.2)
DNS name (for example, test.example.com)
MBOX RFC 822 name (for example, root@example.com)
DNX.509 distinguished name (for example, C=US, O=Sun Microsystems\, Inc., CN=Sun Test cert)
A phase 1 transform specifies a method for protecting an IKE phase 1 exchange. An initiator offers up lists of phase 1 transforms, and a receiver is expected to only accept such an entry if it matches one in a phase 1 rule. There can be several of these, and they are additive. There must be either at least one phase 1 transform in a rule or a global default phase 1 transform list. In a configuration file without a global default phase 1 transform list and a rule without a phase, transform list is an invalid file. Unless specified as optional, elements in the parameter-list must occur exactly once within a given transform's parameter-list: oakley_group number
The Oakley Diffie-Hellman group used for IKE SA key derivation. The group numbers are defined in RFC 2409, Appendix A, RFC 3526, and RFC 5114, section 3.2. Acceptable values are currently:
1 (MODP 768-bit)
2 (MODP 1024-bit)
3 (EC2N 155-bit)
4 (EC2N 185-bit)
5 (MODP 1536-bit)
14 (MODP 2048-bit)
15 (MODP 3072-bit)
16 (MODP 4096-bit)
17 (MODP 6144-bit)
18 (MODP 8192-bit)
19 (ECP 256-bit)
20 (ECP 384-bit)
21 (ECP 521-bit)
22 (MODP 1024-bit, with 160-bit Prime Order Subgroup)
23 (MODP 2048-bit, with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup)
24 (MODP 2048-bit, with 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup)
25 (ECP 192-bit)
26 (ECP 224-bit)
An encryption algorithm, as in ipsecconf(8). However, of the ciphers listed above, only aes and aes-cbc allow optional key-size setting, using the "low value-to-high value" syntax. To specify a single AES key size, the low value must equal the high value. If no range is specified, all three AES key sizes are allowed.
An authentication algorithm. Use ipsecalgs(8) with the -l option to list the IPsec protocols and algorithms currently defined on a system. The cryptoadm list command displays a list of installed providers and their mechanisms. See cryptoadm(8).
The authentication method used for IKE phase 1.
Optional. The lifetime for a phase 1 SA.
If configuring the kernel defaults is not sufficient for different tasks, this parameter can be used on a per-rule basis to set the IPsec SA lifetimes in seconds.
Use perfect forward secrecy for phase 2 (quick mode). If selected, the oakley group specified is used for phase 2 PFS. Acceptable values are:
0 (do not use Perfect Forward Secrecy for IPsec SAs)
1 (768-bit)
2 (1024-bit)
5 (1536-bit)
14 (2048-bit)
15 (3072-bit)
16 (4096-bit)
An IKE rule starts with a right-curly-brace ({), ends with a left-curly-brace (}), and has the following parameters in between: label string
Required parameter. The administrative interface to in.iked looks up phase 1 policy rules with the label as the search string. The administrative interface also converts the label into an index, suitable for an extended ACQUIRE message from PF_KEY - effectively tying IPsec policy to IKE policy in the case of a node initiating traffic. Only one label parameter is allowed per rule.
Required parameter. The local address, address prefix, or address range for this phase 1 rule. Multiple local_addr parameters accumulate within a given rule.
Required parameter. The remote address, address prefix, or address range for this phase 1 rule. Multiple remote_addr parameters accumulate within a given rule.
Which phase 1 identity type I uses. This is needed because a single certificate can contain multiple values for use in IKE phase 1. Within a given rule, all phase 1 transforms must either use preshared or non-preshared authentication (they cannot be mixed). For rules with preshared authentication, the local_id_type parameter is optional, and defaults to IP. For rules which use non-preshared authentication, the 'local_id_type' parameter is required. Multiple 'local_id_type' parameters within a rule are not allowed.
Disallowed for preshared authentication method; required parameter for non-preshared authentication method. The local identity string or certificate selector. Only one local identity per rule is used, the first one stated.
Disallowed for preshared authentication method; required parameter for non-preshared authentication method. Selector for which remote phase 1 identities are allowed by this rule. Multiple remote_id parameters accumulate within a given rule. If a single empty string ("") is given, then this accepts any remote ID for phase 1. It is recommended that certificate trust chains or address enforcement be configured strictly to prevent a breakdown in security if this value for remote_id is used.
If configuring the kernel defaults is not sufficient for different tasks, this parameter can be used on a per-rule basis to set the IPsec SA lifetimes in seconds.
Use perfect forward secrecy for phase 2 (quick mode). If selected, the oakley group specified is used for phase 2 PFS. Acceptable values are:
0 (do not use Perfect Forward Secrecy for IPsec SAs)
1 (768-bit)
2 (1024-bit)
5 (1536-bit)
14 (2048-bit)
15 (3072-bit)
16 (4096-bit)
A phase 1 transform specifies a method for protecting an IKE phase 1 exchange. An initiator offers up lists of phase 1 transforms, and a receiver is expected to only accept such an entry if it matches one in a phase 1 rule. There can be several of these, and they are additive. There must be either at least one phase 1 transform in a rule or a global default phase 1 transform list. A ike.config file without a global default phase 1 transform list and a rule without a phase 1 transform list is an invalid file. Elements within the parameter-list; unless specified as optional, must occur exactly once within a given transform's parameter-list: oakley_group number
The Oakley Diffie-Hellman group used for IKE SA key derivation. Acceptable values are currently:
1 (768-bit)
2 (1024-bit)
5 (1536-bit)
14 (2048-bit)
15 (3072-bit)
16 (4096-bit)
An encryption algorithm, as in ipsecconf(8). However, of the ciphers listed above, only aes and aes-cbc allow optional key-size setting, using the "low value-to-high value" syntax. To specify a single AES key size, the low value must equal the high value. If no range is specified, all three AES key sizes are allowed.
An authentication algorithm, as specified in ipseckey(8).
The authentication method used for IKE phase 1.
Optional. The lifetime for a phase 1 SA.
The following is an example of an ike.config file:
### BEGINNING OF FILE
### First some global parameters...
### certificate parameters...
# Root certificates. I SHOULD use a full Distinguished Name.
# I must have this certificate in my local filesystem, see ikecert(8).
cert_root "C=US, O=Sun Microsystems\\, Inc., CN=Sun CA"
# Explicitly trusted certs that need no signatures, or perhaps
# self-signed ones. Like root certificates, use full DNs for them
# for now.
cert_trust "EMAIL=root@example.org"
# Where do I send LDAP requests?
ldap_server "ldap1.example.org,ldap2.example.org:389"
## phase 1 transform defaults...
p1_lifetime_secs 14400
p1_nonce_len 20
## Parameters that might also show up in rules.
p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha
encr_alg 3des }
p2_pfs 2
### Now some rules...
{
label "simple inheritor"
local_id_type ip
local_addr 10.1.1.1
remote_addr 10.1.1.2
}
{
label "simple inheritor IPv6"
local_id_type ipv6
local_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6
remote_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fefb:3780
}
{
# an index-only rule. If I'm a receiver, and all I
# have are index-only rules, what do I do about inbound IKE requests?
# Answer: Take them all!
label "default rule"
# Use whatever "host" (e.g. IP address) identity is appropriate
local_id_type ipv4
local_addr 0.0.0.0/0
remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0
p2_pfs 5
# Now I'm going to have the p1_xforms
p1_xform
{auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
blowfish } p1_xform
{auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des }
# After said list, another keyword (or a '}') stops xform
# parsing.
}
{
# Let's try something a little more conventional.
label "host to .80 subnet"
local_id_type ip
local_id "10.1.86.51"
remote_id "" # Take any, use remote_addr for access control.
local_addr 10.1.86.51
remote_addr 10.1.80.0/24
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des }
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
blowfish }
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha1 encr_alg 3des }
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha1 encr_alg \e
blowfish }
}
{
# Let's try something a little more conventional, but with ipv6.
label "host to fe80::/10 subnet"
local_id_type ip
local_id "fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6"
remote_id "" # Take any, use remote_addr for access control.
local_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6
remote_addr fe80::/10
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des }
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
blowfish }
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha1 encr_alg \e
3des }
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha1 encr_alg \e
blowfish }
}
{
# How 'bout something with a different cert type and name?
label "punchin-point"
local_id_type mbox
local_id "ipsec-wizard@example.org"
remote_id "10.5.5.128"
local_addr 0.0.0.0/0
remote_addr 10.5.5.128
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
blowfish }
}
{
label "receiver side"
remote_id "ipsec-wizard@example.org"
local_id_type ip
local_id "10.5.5.128"
local_addr 10.5.5.128
remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0
p1_xform
{ auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg blowfish }
# NOTE: Specifying preshared null-and-voids the remote_id/local_id
# fields.
p1_xform
{ auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg \e
blowfish}
}
| ATTRIBUTE TYPE ATTRIBUTE VALUE |
| Interface Stability Committed |
Harkins, Dan and Carrel, Dave. RFC 2409, Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Cisco Systems, November 1998.
Maughan, Douglas et. al. RFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD. November 1998.
Piper, Derrell. RFC 2407, The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP. Network Alchemy. Santa Cruz, California. November 1998.
Kivinen, T. RFC 3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman Groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). The Internet Society, Network Working Group. May 2003.
Lepinksi, M. and Kent, S. RFC 5114, Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. BBN Technologies, January 2008.
Fu, D. and Solinas, J. RFC 5903, Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2. NSA, June 2010.