xref: /freebsd/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc (revision d262168916de41ea1f9b2d57c67a9842e0b63c45)
19821f1d3SAlan Somers /*-
29821f1d3SAlan Somers  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
39821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
49821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Copyright (c) 2019 The FreeBSD Foundation
59821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
69821f1d3SAlan Somers  * This software was developed by BFF Storage Systems, LLC under sponsorship
79821f1d3SAlan Somers  * from the FreeBSD Foundation.
89821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
99821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
109821f1d3SAlan Somers  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
119821f1d3SAlan Somers  * are met:
129821f1d3SAlan Somers  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
139821f1d3SAlan Somers  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
149821f1d3SAlan Somers  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
159821f1d3SAlan Somers  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
169821f1d3SAlan Somers  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
179821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
189821f1d3SAlan Somers  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
199821f1d3SAlan Somers  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
209821f1d3SAlan Somers  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
219821f1d3SAlan Somers  * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
229821f1d3SAlan Somers  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
239821f1d3SAlan Somers  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
249821f1d3SAlan Somers  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
259821f1d3SAlan Somers  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
269821f1d3SAlan Somers  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
279821f1d3SAlan Somers  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
289821f1d3SAlan Somers  * SUCH DAMAGE.
291fa8ebfbSAlan Somers  *
301fa8ebfbSAlan Somers  * $FreeBSD$
319821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
329821f1d3SAlan Somers 
339821f1d3SAlan Somers extern "C" {
349821f1d3SAlan Somers #include <fcntl.h>
359821f1d3SAlan Somers }
369821f1d3SAlan Somers 
379821f1d3SAlan Somers #include "mockfs.hh"
389821f1d3SAlan Somers #include "utils.hh"
399821f1d3SAlan Somers 
409821f1d3SAlan Somers using namespace testing;
419821f1d3SAlan Somers 
422d445be1SAlan Somers class Create: public FuseTest {
432d445be1SAlan Somers public:
442d445be1SAlan Somers 
45ede571e4SAlan Somers void expect_create(const char *relpath, mode_t mode, ProcessMockerT r)
462d445be1SAlan Somers {
47a4856c96SAlan Somers 	mode_t mask = umask(0);
48a4856c96SAlan Somers 	(void)umask(mask);
49a4856c96SAlan Somers 
502d445be1SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
512d445be1SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
5229edc611SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
53a4856c96SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_create_in);
5429edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_CREATE &&
55a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.mode == mode &&
56a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.umask == mask &&
572d445be1SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(relpath, name)));
582d445be1SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
592d445be1SAlan Somers 		_)
602d445be1SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
612d445be1SAlan Somers }
622d445be1SAlan Somers 
632d445be1SAlan Somers };
649821f1d3SAlan Somers 
6516bd2d47SAlan Somers /* FUSE_CREATE operations for a protocol 7.8 server */
6616bd2d47SAlan Somers class Create_7_8: public Create {
6716bd2d47SAlan Somers public:
6816bd2d47SAlan Somers virtual void SetUp() {
6916bd2d47SAlan Somers 	m_kernel_minor_version = 8;
7016bd2d47SAlan Somers 	Create::SetUp();
7116bd2d47SAlan Somers }
72a4856c96SAlan Somers 
73a4856c96SAlan Somers void expect_create(const char *relpath, mode_t mode, ProcessMockerT r)
74a4856c96SAlan Somers {
75a4856c96SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
76a4856c96SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
77a4856c96SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
78a4856c96SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_open_in);
79a4856c96SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_CREATE &&
80a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.mode == mode &&
81a4856c96SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(relpath, name)));
82a4856c96SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
83a4856c96SAlan Somers 		_)
84a4856c96SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
85a4856c96SAlan Somers }
86a4856c96SAlan Somers 
87a4856c96SAlan Somers };
88a4856c96SAlan Somers 
89a4856c96SAlan Somers /* FUSE_CREATE operations for a server built at protocol <= 7.11 */
90a4856c96SAlan Somers class Create_7_11: public FuseTest {
91a4856c96SAlan Somers public:
92a4856c96SAlan Somers virtual void SetUp() {
93a4856c96SAlan Somers 	m_kernel_minor_version = 11;
94a4856c96SAlan Somers 	FuseTest::SetUp();
95a4856c96SAlan Somers }
96a4856c96SAlan Somers 
97a4856c96SAlan Somers void expect_create(const char *relpath, mode_t mode, ProcessMockerT r)
98a4856c96SAlan Somers {
99a4856c96SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
100a4856c96SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
101a4856c96SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
102a4856c96SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_open_in);
103a4856c96SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_CREATE &&
104a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.mode == mode &&
105a4856c96SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(relpath, name)));
106a4856c96SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
107a4856c96SAlan Somers 		_)
108a4856c96SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
109a4856c96SAlan Somers }
110a4856c96SAlan Somers 
11116bd2d47SAlan Somers };
11216bd2d47SAlan Somers 
11316bd2d47SAlan Somers 
1149821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
115002e54b0SAlan Somers  * If FUSE_CREATE sets attr_valid, then subsequent GETATTRs should use the
1169821f1d3SAlan Somers  * attribute cache
1179821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
118cad67791SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, attr_cache)
1199821f1d3SAlan Somers {
1209821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
1219821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
122ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
1239821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
1249821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
1259821f1d3SAlan Somers 
126a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
127a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
128ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
12929edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
1309821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
13129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
13229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
13329edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
13429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
1352d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
1369821f1d3SAlan Somers 
1379821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
1389821f1d3SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
13929edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR &&
14029edc611SAlan Somers 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
1419821f1d3SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
1429821f1d3SAlan Somers 		_)
1439821f1d3SAlan Somers 	).Times(0);
1449821f1d3SAlan Somers 
1459821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
146*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
1477fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
1489821f1d3SAlan Somers }
1499821f1d3SAlan Somers 
150002e54b0SAlan Somers /* A successful CREATE operation should purge the parent dir's attr cache */
151002e54b0SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, clear_attr_cache)
152002e54b0SAlan Somers {
153002e54b0SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/src";
154002e54b0SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "src";
155002e54b0SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
156002e54b0SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
157002e54b0SAlan Somers 	int fd;
158002e54b0SAlan Somers 	struct stat sb;
159002e54b0SAlan Somers 
160a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
161a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
162002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
163002e54b0SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
16429edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR &&
165a34cdd26SAlan Somers 				in.header.nodeid == FUSE_ROOT_ID);
166002e54b0SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
167002e54b0SAlan Somers 		_)
168002e54b0SAlan Somers 	).Times(2)
16929edc611SAlan Somers 	.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto i __unused, auto& out) {
170002e54b0SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, attr);
171a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		out.body.attr.attr.ino = FUSE_ROOT_ID;
17229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.attr.attr.mode = S_IFDIR | 0755;
17329edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.attr.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
174002e54b0SAlan Somers 	})));
175002e54b0SAlan Somers 
176002e54b0SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
17729edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
178002e54b0SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
17929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
18029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
18129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
18229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
183002e54b0SAlan Somers 	}));
184002e54b0SAlan Somers 
185002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(0, stat("mountpoint", &sb)) << strerror(errno);
186002e54b0SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
187*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
188002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(0, stat("mountpoint", &sb)) << strerror(errno);
189002e54b0SAlan Somers 
1907fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
191002e54b0SAlan Somers }
192002e54b0SAlan Somers 
1939821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
1949821f1d3SAlan Somers  * The fuse daemon fails the request with EEXIST.  This usually indicates a
1959821f1d3SAlan Somers  * race condition: some other FUSE client created the file in between when the
1969821f1d3SAlan Somers  * kernel checked for it with lookup and tried to create it with create
1979821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
1989821f1d3SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, eexist)
1999821f1d3SAlan Somers {
2009821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
2019821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
202ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
2039821f1d3SAlan Somers 
204a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
205a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
206ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode, ReturnErrno(EEXIST));
2074ca1c0b7SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(-1, open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode));
2089821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(EEXIST, errno);
2099821f1d3SAlan Somers }
2109821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2119821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
2129821f1d3SAlan Somers  * If the daemon doesn't implement FUSE_CREATE, then the kernel should fallback
2139821f1d3SAlan Somers  * to FUSE_MKNOD/FUSE_OPEN
2149821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
21519ef317dSAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, Enosys)
2169821f1d3SAlan Somers {
2179821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
2189821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
219ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
2209821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
2219821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
2229821f1d3SAlan Somers 
223a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
224a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
225ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode, ReturnErrno(ENOSYS));
2269821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2279821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
2289821f1d3SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
22929edc611SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
2309821f1d3SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_mknod_in);
23129edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_MKNOD &&
23229edc611SAlan Somers 				in.body.mknod.mode == (S_IFREG | mode) &&
23329edc611SAlan Somers 				in.body.mknod.rdev == 0 &&
2349821f1d3SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(RELPATH, name)));
2359821f1d3SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
2369821f1d3SAlan Somers 		_)
23729edc611SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
23819ef317dSAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry);
23929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.attr.mode = mode;
24029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.nodeid = ino;
24129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
24229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
2439821f1d3SAlan Somers 	})));
2449821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2459821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
2469821f1d3SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
24729edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_OPEN &&
24829edc611SAlan Somers 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
2499821f1d3SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
2509821f1d3SAlan Somers 		_)
25129edc611SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
25229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.header.len = sizeof(out.header);
2539821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, open);
2549821f1d3SAlan Somers 	})));
2559821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2569821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
257*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
2587fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
2599821f1d3SAlan Somers }
2609821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2619821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
2629821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Creating a new file after FUSE_LOOKUP returned a negative cache entry
2639821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
2646248288eSAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, entry_cache_negative)
2659821f1d3SAlan Somers {
2669821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
2679821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
268ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
2699821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
2709821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
2719821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/*
2729821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 * Set entry_valid = 0 because this test isn't concerned with whether
2739821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 * or not we actually cache negative entries, only with whether we
2749821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 * interpret negative cache responses correctly.
2759821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 */
2769821f1d3SAlan Somers 	struct timespec entry_valid = {.tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0};
2779821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2789821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* create will first do a LOOKUP, adding a negative cache entry */
279a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
280a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(ReturnNegativeCache(&entry_valid));
281ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
28229edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
2839821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
28429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
28529edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
28629edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
28729edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
2882d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
2899821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2909821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
2919821f1d3SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
2927fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
2939821f1d3SAlan Somers }
2949821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2959821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
2969821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Creating a new file should purge any negative namecache entries
2979821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
2986248288eSAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, entry_cache_negative_purge)
2999821f1d3SAlan Somers {
3009821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3019821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
302ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
3039821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
3049821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
3059821f1d3SAlan Somers 	struct timespec entry_valid = {.tv_sec = TIME_T_MAX, .tv_nsec = 0};
3069821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3079821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* create will first do a LOOKUP, adding a negative cache entry */
308a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH).Times(1)
3099821f1d3SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnNegativeCache(&entry_valid)))
3109821f1d3SAlan Somers 	.RetiresOnSaturation();
3119821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3129821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* Then the CREATE should purge the negative cache entry */
313ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
31429edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
3159821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
31629edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
31729edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
31829edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
3192d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
3209821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3219821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
3229821f1d3SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
3239821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3249821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* Finally, a subsequent lookup should query the daemon */
3259821f1d3SAlan Somers 	expect_lookup(RELPATH, ino, S_IFREG | mode, 0, 1);
3269821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3279821f1d3SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_EQ(0, access(FULLPATH, F_OK)) << strerror(errno);
3287fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
3299821f1d3SAlan Somers }
3309821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3319821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
3329821f1d3SAlan Somers  * The daemon is responsible for checking file permissions (unless the
3339821f1d3SAlan Somers  * default_permissions mount option was used)
3349821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
3359821f1d3SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, eperm)
3369821f1d3SAlan Somers {
3379821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3389821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
339ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
3409821f1d3SAlan Somers 
341a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
342a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
343ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode, ReturnErrno(EPERM));
3449821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3454ca1c0b7SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(-1, open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode));
3469821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
3479821f1d3SAlan Somers }
3489821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3499821f1d3SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, ok)
3509821f1d3SAlan Somers {
3519821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3529821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
353ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
3549821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
3559821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
3569821f1d3SAlan Somers 
357a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
358a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
359ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
36029edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
3619821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
36229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
36329edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
36429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
36529edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
3662d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
3679821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3689821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
369*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
3707fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
3719821f1d3SAlan Somers }
3722d445be1SAlan Somers 
3732d445be1SAlan Somers /*
3742d445be1SAlan Somers  * A regression test for a bug that affected old FUSE implementations:
3752d445be1SAlan Somers  * open(..., O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0444) should work despite the seeming
3762d445be1SAlan Somers  * contradiction between O_WRONLY and 0444
3772d445be1SAlan Somers  *
3782d445be1SAlan Somers  * For example:
3792d445be1SAlan Somers  * https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/sshfs-fuse/+bug/44886
3802d445be1SAlan Somers  */
3812d445be1SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, wronly_0444)
3822d445be1SAlan Somers {
3832d445be1SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3842d445be1SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
385ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0444;
3862d445be1SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
3872d445be1SAlan Somers 	int fd;
3882d445be1SAlan Somers 
389a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
390a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
391ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
39229edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
3932d445be1SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
39429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
39529edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
39629edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
39729edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
3982d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
3992d445be1SAlan Somers 
4002d445be1SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, mode);
401*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
4027fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
4032d445be1SAlan Somers }
40416bd2d47SAlan Somers 
40516bd2d47SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create_7_8, ok)
40616bd2d47SAlan Somers {
40716bd2d47SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
40816bd2d47SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
40916bd2d47SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
41016bd2d47SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
41116bd2d47SAlan Somers 	int fd;
41216bd2d47SAlan Somers 
413a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
414a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
41516bd2d47SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
41629edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
41716bd2d47SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create_7_8);
41829edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
41929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
42029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
42129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
42216bd2d47SAlan Somers 	}));
42316bd2d47SAlan Somers 
42416bd2d47SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
425*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
4267fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
42716bd2d47SAlan Somers }
42816bd2d47SAlan Somers 
429a4856c96SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create_7_11, ok)
430a4856c96SAlan Somers {
431a4856c96SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
432a4856c96SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
433a4856c96SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
434a4856c96SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
435a4856c96SAlan Somers 	int fd;
43616bd2d47SAlan Somers 
437a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
438a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
439a4856c96SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
440a4856c96SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
441a4856c96SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
442a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
443a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
444a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
445a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
446a4856c96SAlan Somers 	}));
447a4856c96SAlan Somers 
448a4856c96SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
449*d2621689SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
4507fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
451a4856c96SAlan Somers }
452