xref: /freebsd/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc (revision 7fc0921d7e3c52f66ca8e47c0413ee46f6d73328)
19821f1d3SAlan Somers /*-
29821f1d3SAlan Somers  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
39821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
49821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Copyright (c) 2019 The FreeBSD Foundation
59821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
69821f1d3SAlan Somers  * This software was developed by BFF Storage Systems, LLC under sponsorship
79821f1d3SAlan Somers  * from the FreeBSD Foundation.
89821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
99821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
109821f1d3SAlan Somers  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
119821f1d3SAlan Somers  * are met:
129821f1d3SAlan Somers  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
139821f1d3SAlan Somers  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
149821f1d3SAlan Somers  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
159821f1d3SAlan Somers  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
169821f1d3SAlan Somers  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
179821f1d3SAlan Somers  *
189821f1d3SAlan Somers  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
199821f1d3SAlan Somers  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
209821f1d3SAlan Somers  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
219821f1d3SAlan Somers  * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
229821f1d3SAlan Somers  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
239821f1d3SAlan Somers  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
249821f1d3SAlan Somers  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
259821f1d3SAlan Somers  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
269821f1d3SAlan Somers  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
279821f1d3SAlan Somers  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
289821f1d3SAlan Somers  * SUCH DAMAGE.
299821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
309821f1d3SAlan Somers 
319821f1d3SAlan Somers extern "C" {
329821f1d3SAlan Somers #include <fcntl.h>
339821f1d3SAlan Somers }
349821f1d3SAlan Somers 
359821f1d3SAlan Somers #include "mockfs.hh"
369821f1d3SAlan Somers #include "utils.hh"
379821f1d3SAlan Somers 
389821f1d3SAlan Somers using namespace testing;
399821f1d3SAlan Somers 
402d445be1SAlan Somers class Create: public FuseTest {
412d445be1SAlan Somers public:
422d445be1SAlan Somers 
43ede571e4SAlan Somers void expect_create(const char *relpath, mode_t mode, ProcessMockerT r)
442d445be1SAlan Somers {
45a4856c96SAlan Somers 	mode_t mask = umask(0);
46a4856c96SAlan Somers 	(void)umask(mask);
47a4856c96SAlan Somers 
482d445be1SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
492d445be1SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
5029edc611SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
51a4856c96SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_create_in);
5229edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_CREATE &&
53a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.mode == mode &&
54a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.umask == mask &&
552d445be1SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(relpath, name)));
562d445be1SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
572d445be1SAlan Somers 		_)
582d445be1SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
592d445be1SAlan Somers }
602d445be1SAlan Somers 
612d445be1SAlan Somers };
629821f1d3SAlan Somers 
6316bd2d47SAlan Somers /* FUSE_CREATE operations for a protocol 7.8 server */
6416bd2d47SAlan Somers class Create_7_8: public Create {
6516bd2d47SAlan Somers public:
6616bd2d47SAlan Somers virtual void SetUp() {
6716bd2d47SAlan Somers 	m_kernel_minor_version = 8;
6816bd2d47SAlan Somers 	Create::SetUp();
6916bd2d47SAlan Somers }
70a4856c96SAlan Somers 
71a4856c96SAlan Somers void expect_create(const char *relpath, mode_t mode, ProcessMockerT r)
72a4856c96SAlan Somers {
73a4856c96SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
74a4856c96SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
75a4856c96SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
76a4856c96SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_open_in);
77a4856c96SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_CREATE &&
78a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.mode == mode &&
79a4856c96SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(relpath, name)));
80a4856c96SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
81a4856c96SAlan Somers 		_)
82a4856c96SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
83a4856c96SAlan Somers }
84a4856c96SAlan Somers 
85a4856c96SAlan Somers };
86a4856c96SAlan Somers 
87a4856c96SAlan Somers /* FUSE_CREATE operations for a server built at protocol <= 7.11 */
88a4856c96SAlan Somers class Create_7_11: public FuseTest {
89a4856c96SAlan Somers public:
90a4856c96SAlan Somers virtual void SetUp() {
91a4856c96SAlan Somers 	m_kernel_minor_version = 11;
92a4856c96SAlan Somers 	FuseTest::SetUp();
93a4856c96SAlan Somers }
94a4856c96SAlan Somers 
95a4856c96SAlan Somers void expect_create(const char *relpath, mode_t mode, ProcessMockerT r)
96a4856c96SAlan Somers {
97a4856c96SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
98a4856c96SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
99a4856c96SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
100a4856c96SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_open_in);
101a4856c96SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_CREATE &&
102a4856c96SAlan Somers 				in.body.create.mode == mode &&
103a4856c96SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(relpath, name)));
104a4856c96SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
105a4856c96SAlan Somers 		_)
106a4856c96SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
107a4856c96SAlan Somers }
108a4856c96SAlan Somers 
10916bd2d47SAlan Somers };
11016bd2d47SAlan Somers 
11116bd2d47SAlan Somers 
1129821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
113002e54b0SAlan Somers  * If FUSE_CREATE sets attr_valid, then subsequent GETATTRs should use the
1149821f1d3SAlan Somers  * attribute cache
1159821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
116cad67791SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, attr_cache)
1179821f1d3SAlan Somers {
1189821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
1199821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
120ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
1219821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
1229821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
1239821f1d3SAlan Somers 
124a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
125a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
126ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
12729edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
1289821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
12929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
13029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
13129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
13229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
1332d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
1349821f1d3SAlan Somers 
1359821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
1369821f1d3SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
13729edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR &&
13829edc611SAlan Somers 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
1399821f1d3SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
1409821f1d3SAlan Somers 		_)
1419821f1d3SAlan Somers 	).Times(0);
1429821f1d3SAlan Somers 
1439821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
1449821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
145*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
1469821f1d3SAlan Somers }
1479821f1d3SAlan Somers 
148002e54b0SAlan Somers /* A successful CREATE operation should purge the parent dir's attr cache */
149002e54b0SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, clear_attr_cache)
150002e54b0SAlan Somers {
151002e54b0SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/src";
152002e54b0SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "src";
153002e54b0SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
154002e54b0SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
155002e54b0SAlan Somers 	int fd;
156002e54b0SAlan Somers 	struct stat sb;
157002e54b0SAlan Somers 
158a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
159a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
160002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
161002e54b0SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
16229edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR &&
163a34cdd26SAlan Somers 				in.header.nodeid == FUSE_ROOT_ID);
164002e54b0SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
165002e54b0SAlan Somers 		_)
166002e54b0SAlan Somers 	).Times(2)
16729edc611SAlan Somers 	.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto i __unused, auto& out) {
168002e54b0SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, attr);
169a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		out.body.attr.attr.ino = FUSE_ROOT_ID;
17029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.attr.attr.mode = S_IFDIR | 0755;
17129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.attr.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
172002e54b0SAlan Somers 	})));
173002e54b0SAlan Somers 
174002e54b0SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
17529edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
176002e54b0SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
17729edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
17829edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
17929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
18029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
181002e54b0SAlan Somers 	}));
182002e54b0SAlan Somers 
183002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(0, stat("mountpoint", &sb)) << strerror(errno);
184002e54b0SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
185002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
186002e54b0SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(0, stat("mountpoint", &sb)) << strerror(errno);
187002e54b0SAlan Somers 
188*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
189002e54b0SAlan Somers }
190002e54b0SAlan Somers 
1919821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
1929821f1d3SAlan Somers  * The fuse daemon fails the request with EEXIST.  This usually indicates a
1939821f1d3SAlan Somers  * race condition: some other FUSE client created the file in between when the
1949821f1d3SAlan Somers  * kernel checked for it with lookup and tried to create it with create
1959821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
1969821f1d3SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, eexist)
1979821f1d3SAlan Somers {
1989821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
1999821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
200ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
2019821f1d3SAlan Somers 
202a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
203a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
204ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode, ReturnErrno(EEXIST));
2059821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_NE(0, open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode));
2069821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(EEXIST, errno);
2079821f1d3SAlan Somers }
2089821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2099821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
2109821f1d3SAlan Somers  * If the daemon doesn't implement FUSE_CREATE, then the kernel should fallback
2119821f1d3SAlan Somers  * to FUSE_MKNOD/FUSE_OPEN
2129821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
21319ef317dSAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, Enosys)
2149821f1d3SAlan Somers {
2159821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
2169821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
217ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
2189821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
2199821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
2209821f1d3SAlan Somers 
221a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
222a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
223ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode, ReturnErrno(ENOSYS));
2249821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2259821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
2269821f1d3SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
22729edc611SAlan Somers 			const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
2289821f1d3SAlan Somers 				sizeof(fuse_mknod_in);
22929edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_MKNOD &&
23029edc611SAlan Somers 				in.body.mknod.mode == (S_IFREG | mode) &&
23129edc611SAlan Somers 				in.body.mknod.rdev == 0 &&
2329821f1d3SAlan Somers 				(0 == strcmp(RELPATH, name)));
2339821f1d3SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
2349821f1d3SAlan Somers 		_)
23529edc611SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
23619ef317dSAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry);
23729edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.attr.mode = mode;
23829edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.nodeid = ino;
23929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
24029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
2419821f1d3SAlan Somers 	})));
2429821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2439821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
2449821f1d3SAlan Somers 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
24529edc611SAlan Somers 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_OPEN &&
24629edc611SAlan Somers 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
2479821f1d3SAlan Somers 		}, Eq(true)),
2489821f1d3SAlan Somers 		_)
24929edc611SAlan Somers 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
25029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.header.len = sizeof(out.header);
2519821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, open);
2529821f1d3SAlan Somers 	})));
2539821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2549821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
2559821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
256*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
2579821f1d3SAlan Somers }
2589821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2599821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
2609821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Creating a new file after FUSE_LOOKUP returned a negative cache entry
2619821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
2626248288eSAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, entry_cache_negative)
2639821f1d3SAlan Somers {
2649821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
2659821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
266ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
2679821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
2689821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
2699821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/*
2709821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 * Set entry_valid = 0 because this test isn't concerned with whether
2719821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 * or not we actually cache negative entries, only with whether we
2729821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 * interpret negative cache responses correctly.
2739821f1d3SAlan Somers 	 */
2749821f1d3SAlan Somers 	struct timespec entry_valid = {.tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0};
2759821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2769821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* create will first do a LOOKUP, adding a negative cache entry */
277a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
278a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(ReturnNegativeCache(&entry_valid));
279ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
28029edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
2819821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
28229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
28329edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
28429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
28529edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
2862d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
2879821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2889821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
2899821f1d3SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
290*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
2919821f1d3SAlan Somers }
2929821f1d3SAlan Somers 
2939821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
2949821f1d3SAlan Somers  * Creating a new file should purge any negative namecache entries
2959821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
2966248288eSAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, entry_cache_negative_purge)
2979821f1d3SAlan Somers {
2989821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
2999821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
300ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
3019821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
3029821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
3039821f1d3SAlan Somers 	struct timespec entry_valid = {.tv_sec = TIME_T_MAX, .tv_nsec = 0};
3049821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3059821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* create will first do a LOOKUP, adding a negative cache entry */
306a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH).Times(1)
3079821f1d3SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnNegativeCache(&entry_valid)))
3089821f1d3SAlan Somers 	.RetiresOnSaturation();
3099821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3109821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* Then the CREATE should purge the negative cache entry */
311ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
31229edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
3139821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
31429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
31529edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
31629edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
3172d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
3189821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3199821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
3209821f1d3SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
3219821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3229821f1d3SAlan Somers 	/* Finally, a subsequent lookup should query the daemon */
3239821f1d3SAlan Somers 	expect_lookup(RELPATH, ino, S_IFREG | mode, 0, 1);
3249821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3259821f1d3SAlan Somers 	ASSERT_EQ(0, access(FULLPATH, F_OK)) << strerror(errno);
326*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
3279821f1d3SAlan Somers }
3289821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3299821f1d3SAlan Somers /*
3309821f1d3SAlan Somers  * The daemon is responsible for checking file permissions (unless the
3319821f1d3SAlan Somers  * default_permissions mount option was used)
3329821f1d3SAlan Somers  */
3339821f1d3SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, eperm)
3349821f1d3SAlan Somers {
3359821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3369821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
337ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
3389821f1d3SAlan Somers 
339a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
340a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
341ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode, ReturnErrno(EPERM));
3429821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3439821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_NE(0, open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode));
3449821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
3459821f1d3SAlan Somers }
3469821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3479821f1d3SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, ok)
3489821f1d3SAlan Somers {
3499821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3509821f1d3SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
351ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
3529821f1d3SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
3539821f1d3SAlan Somers 	int fd;
3549821f1d3SAlan Somers 
355a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
356a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
357ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
35829edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
3599821f1d3SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
36029edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
36129edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
36229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
36329edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
3642d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
3659821f1d3SAlan Somers 
3669821f1d3SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
3679821f1d3SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
368*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
3699821f1d3SAlan Somers }
3702d445be1SAlan Somers 
3712d445be1SAlan Somers /*
3722d445be1SAlan Somers  * A regression test for a bug that affected old FUSE implementations:
3732d445be1SAlan Somers  * open(..., O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0444) should work despite the seeming
3742d445be1SAlan Somers  * contradiction between O_WRONLY and 0444
3752d445be1SAlan Somers  *
3762d445be1SAlan Somers  * For example:
3772d445be1SAlan Somers  * https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/sshfs-fuse/+bug/44886
3782d445be1SAlan Somers  */
3792d445be1SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create, wronly_0444)
3802d445be1SAlan Somers {
3812d445be1SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
3822d445be1SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
383ede571e4SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0444;
3842d445be1SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
3852d445be1SAlan Somers 	int fd;
3862d445be1SAlan Somers 
387a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
388a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
389ede571e4SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
39029edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
3912d445be1SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
39229edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
39329edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
39429edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
39529edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
3962d445be1SAlan Somers 	}));
3972d445be1SAlan Somers 
3982d445be1SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, mode);
3992d445be1SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
400*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
4012d445be1SAlan Somers }
40216bd2d47SAlan Somers 
40316bd2d47SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create_7_8, ok)
40416bd2d47SAlan Somers {
40516bd2d47SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
40616bd2d47SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
40716bd2d47SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
40816bd2d47SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
40916bd2d47SAlan Somers 	int fd;
41016bd2d47SAlan Somers 
411a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
412a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
41316bd2d47SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
41429edc611SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
41516bd2d47SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create_7_8);
41629edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
41729edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
41829edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
41929edc611SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
42016bd2d47SAlan Somers 	}));
42116bd2d47SAlan Somers 
42216bd2d47SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
42316bd2d47SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
424*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
42516bd2d47SAlan Somers }
42616bd2d47SAlan Somers 
427a4856c96SAlan Somers TEST_F(Create_7_11, ok)
428a4856c96SAlan Somers {
429a4856c96SAlan Somers 	const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
430a4856c96SAlan Somers 	const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
431a4856c96SAlan Somers 	mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0755;
432a4856c96SAlan Somers 	uint64_t ino = 42;
433a4856c96SAlan Somers 	int fd;
43416bd2d47SAlan Somers 
435a34cdd26SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH)
436a34cdd26SAlan Somers 		.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
437a4856c96SAlan Somers 	expect_create(RELPATH, mode,
438a4856c96SAlan Somers 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
439a4856c96SAlan Somers 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create);
440a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = mode;
441a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino;
442a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
443a4856c96SAlan Somers 		out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
444a4856c96SAlan Somers 	}));
445a4856c96SAlan Somers 
446a4856c96SAlan Somers 	fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
447a4856c96SAlan Somers 	EXPECT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno);
448*7fc0921dSAlan Somers 	leak(fd);
449a4856c96SAlan Somers }
450