xref: /freebsd/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c (revision 076ad2f836d5f49dc1375f1677335a48fe0d4b82)
1 /*-
2  * Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2006, 2009 Robert N. M. Watson
3  * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
4  * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
5  * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 SPARTA, Inc.
6  * Copyright (c) 2008-2009 Apple Inc.
7  * All rights reserved.
8  *
9  * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
10  * TrustedBSD Project.
11  *
12  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
13  * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
14  * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
15  * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
16  *
17  * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
18  * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
19  *
20  * This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
21  * Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
22  *
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  *
32  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
33  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
34  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
35  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
36  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
37  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
38  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
39  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
40  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
41  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
42  * SUCH DAMAGE.
43  */
44 
45 /*-
46  * Framework for extensible kernel access control.  This file contains core
47  * kernel infrastructure for the TrustedBSD MAC Framework, including policy
48  * registration, versioning, locking, error composition operator, and system
49  * calls.
50  *
51  * The MAC Framework implements three programming interfaces:
52  *
53  * - The kernel MAC interface, defined in mac_framework.h, and invoked
54  *   throughout the kernel to request security decisions, notify of security
55  *   related events, etc.
56  *
57  * - The MAC policy module interface, defined in mac_policy.h, which is
58  *   implemented by MAC policy modules and invoked by the MAC Framework to
59  *   forward kernel security requests and notifications to policy modules.
60  *
61  * - The user MAC API, defined in mac.h, which allows user programs to query
62  *   and set label state on objects.
63  *
64  * The majority of the MAC Framework implementation may be found in
65  * src/sys/security/mac.  Sample policy modules may be found in
66  * src/sys/security/mac_*.
67  */
68 
69 #include "opt_mac.h"
70 
71 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
72 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
73 
74 #include <sys/param.h>
75 #include <sys/systm.h>
76 #include <sys/condvar.h>
77 #include <sys/kernel.h>
78 #include <sys/lock.h>
79 #include <sys/mac.h>
80 #include <sys/module.h>
81 #include <sys/rmlock.h>
82 #include <sys/sdt.h>
83 #include <sys/sx.h>
84 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
85 
86 #include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
87 #include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
88 #include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
89 
90 /*
91  * DTrace SDT providers for MAC.
92  */
93 SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(mac);
94 SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(mac_framework);
95 
96 SDT_PROBE_DEFINE2(mac, , policy, modevent, "int",
97     "struct mac_policy_conf *");
98 SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(mac, , policy, register,
99     "struct mac_policy_conf *");
100 SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(mac, , policy, unregister,
101     "struct mac_policy_conf *");
102 
103 /*
104  * Root sysctl node for all MAC and MAC policy controls.
105  */
106 SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, mac, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
107     "TrustedBSD MAC policy controls");
108 
109 /*
110  * Declare that the kernel provides MAC support, version 3 (FreeBSD 7.x).
111  * This permits modules to refuse to be loaded if the necessary support isn't
112  * present, even if it's pre-boot.
113  */
114 MODULE_VERSION(kernel_mac_support, MAC_VERSION);
115 
116 static unsigned int	mac_version = MAC_VERSION;
117 SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, version, CTLFLAG_RD, &mac_version, 0,
118     "");
119 
120 /*
121  * Labels consist of a indexed set of "slots", which are allocated policies
122  * as required.  The MAC Framework maintains a bitmask of slots allocated so
123  * far to prevent reuse.  Slots cannot be reused, as the MAC Framework
124  * guarantees that newly allocated slots in labels will be NULL unless
125  * otherwise initialized, and because we do not have a mechanism to garbage
126  * collect slots on policy unload.  As labeled policies tend to be statically
127  * loaded during boot, and not frequently unloaded and reloaded, this is not
128  * generally an issue.
129  */
130 #if MAC_MAX_SLOTS > 32
131 #error "MAC_MAX_SLOTS too large"
132 #endif
133 
134 static unsigned int mac_max_slots = MAC_MAX_SLOTS;
135 static unsigned int mac_slot_offsets_free = (1 << MAC_MAX_SLOTS) - 1;
136 SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, max_slots, CTLFLAG_RD, &mac_max_slots,
137     0, "");
138 
139 /*
140  * Has the kernel started generating labeled objects yet?  All read/write
141  * access to this variable is serialized during the boot process.  Following
142  * the end of serialization, we don't update this flag; no locking.
143  */
144 static int	mac_late = 0;
145 
146 /*
147  * Each policy declares a mask of object types requiring labels to be
148  * allocated for them.  For convenience, we combine and cache the bitwise or
149  * of the per-policy object flags to track whether we will allocate a label
150  * for an object type at run-time.
151  */
152 uint64_t	mac_labeled;
153 SYSCTL_UQUAD(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, labeled, CTLFLAG_RD, &mac_labeled, 0,
154     "Mask of object types being labeled");
155 
156 MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACTEMP, "mactemp", "MAC temporary label storage");
157 
158 /*
159  * MAC policy modules are placed in one of two lists: mac_static_policy_list,
160  * for policies that are loaded early and cannot be unloaded, and
161  * mac_policy_list, which holds policies either loaded later in the boot
162  * cycle or that may be unloaded.  The static policy list does not require
163  * locks to iterate over, but the dynamic list requires synchronization.
164  * Support for dynamic policy loading can be compiled out using the
165  * MAC_STATIC kernel option.
166  *
167  * The dynamic policy list is protected by two locks: modifying the list
168  * requires both locks to be held exclusively.  One of the locks,
169  * mac_policy_rm, is acquired over policy entry points that will never sleep;
170  * the other, mac_policy_sx, is acquire over policy entry points that may
171  * sleep.  The former category will be used when kernel locks may be held
172  * over calls to the MAC Framework, during network processing in ithreads,
173  * etc.  The latter will tend to involve potentially blocking memory
174  * allocations, extended attribute I/O, etc.
175  */
176 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
177 static struct rmlock mac_policy_rm;	/* Non-sleeping entry points. */
178 static struct sx mac_policy_sx;		/* Sleeping entry points. */
179 #endif
180 
181 struct mac_policy_list_head mac_policy_list;
182 struct mac_policy_list_head mac_static_policy_list;
183 u_int mac_policy_count;			/* Registered policy count. */
184 
185 static void	mac_policy_xlock(void);
186 static void	mac_policy_xlock_assert(void);
187 static void	mac_policy_xunlock(void);
188 
189 void
190 mac_policy_slock_nosleep(struct rm_priotracker *tracker)
191 {
192 
193 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
194 	if (!mac_late)
195 		return;
196 
197 	rm_rlock(&mac_policy_rm, tracker);
198 #endif
199 }
200 
201 void
202 mac_policy_slock_sleep(void)
203 {
204 
205 	WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
206  	    "mac_policy_slock_sleep");
207 
208 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
209 	if (!mac_late)
210 		return;
211 
212 	sx_slock(&mac_policy_sx);
213 #endif
214 }
215 
216 void
217 mac_policy_sunlock_nosleep(struct rm_priotracker *tracker)
218 {
219 
220 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
221 	if (!mac_late)
222 		return;
223 
224 	rm_runlock(&mac_policy_rm, tracker);
225 #endif
226 }
227 
228 void
229 mac_policy_sunlock_sleep(void)
230 {
231 
232 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
233 	if (!mac_late)
234 		return;
235 
236 	sx_sunlock(&mac_policy_sx);
237 #endif
238 }
239 
240 static void
241 mac_policy_xlock(void)
242 {
243 
244 	WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
245  	    "mac_policy_xlock()");
246 
247 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
248 	if (!mac_late)
249 		return;
250 
251 	sx_xlock(&mac_policy_sx);
252 	rm_wlock(&mac_policy_rm);
253 #endif
254 }
255 
256 static void
257 mac_policy_xunlock(void)
258 {
259 
260 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
261 	if (!mac_late)
262 		return;
263 
264 	rm_wunlock(&mac_policy_rm);
265 	sx_xunlock(&mac_policy_sx);
266 #endif
267 }
268 
269 static void
270 mac_policy_xlock_assert(void)
271 {
272 
273 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
274 	if (!mac_late)
275 		return;
276 
277 	/* XXXRW: rm_assert(&mac_policy_rm, RA_WLOCKED); */
278 	sx_assert(&mac_policy_sx, SA_XLOCKED);
279 #endif
280 }
281 
282 /*
283  * Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks.
284  */
285 static void
286 mac_init(void)
287 {
288 
289 	LIST_INIT(&mac_static_policy_list);
290 	LIST_INIT(&mac_policy_list);
291 	mac_labelzone_init();
292 
293 #ifndef MAC_STATIC
294 	rm_init_flags(&mac_policy_rm, "mac_policy_rm", RM_NOWITNESS |
295 	    RM_RECURSE);
296 	sx_init_flags(&mac_policy_sx, "mac_policy_sx", SX_NOWITNESS);
297 #endif
298 }
299 
300 /*
301  * For the purposes of modules that want to know if they were loaded "early",
302  * set the mac_late flag once we've processed modules either linked into the
303  * kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup.
304  */
305 static void
306 mac_late_init(void)
307 {
308 
309 	mac_late = 1;
310 }
311 
312 /*
313  * Given a policy, derive from its set of non-NULL label init methods what
314  * object types the policy is interested in.
315  */
316 static uint64_t
317 mac_policy_getlabeled(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
318 {
319 	uint64_t labeled;
320 
321 #define	MPC_FLAG(method, flag)					\
322 	if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## method != NULL)			\
323 		labeled |= (flag);					\
324 
325 	labeled = 0;
326 	MPC_FLAG(cred_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_CRED);
327 	MPC_FLAG(proc_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_PROC);
328 	MPC_FLAG(vnode_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_VNODE);
329 	MPC_FLAG(inpcb_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB);
330 	MPC_FLAG(socket_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SOCKET);
331 	MPC_FLAG(devfs_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_DEVFS);
332 	MPC_FLAG(mbuf_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_MBUF);
333 	MPC_FLAG(ipq_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_IPQ);
334 	MPC_FLAG(ifnet_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_IFNET);
335 	MPC_FLAG(bpfdesc_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_BPFDESC);
336 	MPC_FLAG(pipe_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_PIPE);
337 	MPC_FLAG(mount_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_MOUNT);
338 	MPC_FLAG(posixsem_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_POSIXSEM);
339 	MPC_FLAG(posixshm_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_POSIXSHM);
340 	MPC_FLAG(sysvmsg_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVMSG);
341 	MPC_FLAG(sysvmsq_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVMSQ);
342 	MPC_FLAG(sysvsem_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVSEM);
343 	MPC_FLAG(sysvshm_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVSHM);
344 	MPC_FLAG(syncache_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYNCACHE);
345 	MPC_FLAG(ip6q_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_IP6Q);
346 
347 #undef MPC_FLAG
348 	return (labeled);
349 }
350 
351 /*
352  * When policies are loaded or unloaded, walk the list of registered policies
353  * and built mac_labeled, a bitmask representing the union of all objects
354  * requiring labels across all policies.
355  */
356 static void
357 mac_policy_update(void)
358 {
359 	struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
360 
361 	mac_policy_xlock_assert();
362 
363 	mac_labeled = 0;
364 	mac_policy_count = 0;
365 	LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
366 		mac_labeled |= mac_policy_getlabeled(mpc);
367 		mac_policy_count++;
368 	}
369 	LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
370 		mac_labeled |= mac_policy_getlabeled(mpc);
371 		mac_policy_count++;
372 	}
373 }
374 
375 static int
376 mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
377 {
378 	struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
379 	int error, slot, static_entry;
380 
381 	error = 0;
382 
383 	/*
384 	 * We don't technically need exclusive access while !mac_late, but
385 	 * hold it for assertion consistency.
386 	 */
387 	mac_policy_xlock();
388 
389 	/*
390 	 * If the module can potentially be unloaded, or we're loading late,
391 	 * we have to stick it in the non-static list and pay an extra
392 	 * performance overhead.  Otherwise, we can pay a light locking cost
393 	 * and stick it in the static list.
394 	 */
395 	static_entry = (!mac_late &&
396 	    !(mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK));
397 
398 	if (static_entry) {
399 		LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
400 			if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
401 				error = EEXIST;
402 				goto out;
403 			}
404 		}
405 	} else {
406 		LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
407 			if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
408 				error = EEXIST;
409 				goto out;
410 			}
411 		}
412 	}
413 	if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
414 		slot = ffs(mac_slot_offsets_free);
415 		if (slot == 0) {
416 			error = ENOMEM;
417 			goto out;
418 		}
419 		slot--;
420 		mac_slot_offsets_free &= ~(1 << slot);
421 		*mpc->mpc_field_off = slot;
422 	}
423 	mpc->mpc_runtime_flags |= MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
424 
425 	/*
426 	 * If we're loading a MAC module after the framework has initialized,
427 	 * it has to go into the dynamic list.  If we're loading it before
428 	 * we've finished initializing, it can go into the static list with
429 	 * weaker locker requirements.
430 	 */
431 	if (static_entry)
432 		LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_static_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
433 	else
434 		LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
435 
436 	/*
437 	 * Per-policy initialization.  Currently, this takes place under the
438 	 * exclusive lock, so policies must not sleep in their init method.
439 	 * In the future, we may want to separate "init" from "start", with
440 	 * "init" occurring without the lock held.  Likewise, on tear-down,
441 	 * breaking out "stop" from "destroy".
442 	 */
443 	if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init != NULL)
444 		(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init))(mpc);
445 	mac_policy_update();
446 
447 	SDT_PROBE1(mac, , policy, register, mpc);
448 	printf("Security policy loaded: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
449 	    mpc->mpc_name);
450 
451 out:
452 	mac_policy_xunlock();
453 	return (error);
454 }
455 
456 static int
457 mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
458 {
459 
460 	/*
461 	 * If we fail the load, we may get a request to unload.  Check to see
462 	 * if we did the run-time registration, and if not, silently succeed.
463 	 */
464 	mac_policy_xlock();
465 	if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) == 0) {
466 		mac_policy_xunlock();
467 		return (0);
468 	}
469 #if 0
470 	/*
471 	 * Don't allow unloading modules with private data.
472 	 */
473 	if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
474 		mac_policy_xunlock();
475 		return (EBUSY);
476 	}
477 #endif
478 	/*
479 	 * Only allow the unload to proceed if the module is unloadable by
480 	 * its own definition.
481 	 */
482 	if ((mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK) == 0) {
483 		mac_policy_xunlock();
484 		return (EBUSY);
485 	}
486 	if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy != NULL)
487 		(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy))(mpc);
488 
489 	LIST_REMOVE(mpc, mpc_list);
490 	mpc->mpc_runtime_flags &= ~MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
491 	mac_policy_update();
492 	mac_policy_xunlock();
493 
494 	SDT_PROBE1(mac, , policy, unregister, mpc);
495 	printf("Security policy unload: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
496 	    mpc->mpc_name);
497 
498 	return (0);
499 }
500 
501 /*
502  * Allow MAC policy modules to register during boot, etc.
503  */
504 int
505 mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data)
506 {
507 	struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
508 	int error;
509 
510 	error = 0;
511 	mpc = (struct mac_policy_conf *) data;
512 
513 #ifdef MAC_STATIC
514 	if (mac_late) {
515 		printf("mac_policy_modevent: MAC_STATIC and late\n");
516 		return (EBUSY);
517 	}
518 #endif
519 
520 	SDT_PROBE2(mac, , policy, modevent, type, mpc);
521 	switch (type) {
522 	case MOD_LOAD:
523 		if (mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE &&
524 		    mac_late) {
525 			printf("mac_policy_modevent: can't load %s policy "
526 			    "after booting\n", mpc->mpc_name);
527 			error = EBUSY;
528 			break;
529 		}
530 		error = mac_policy_register(mpc);
531 		break;
532 	case MOD_UNLOAD:
533 		/* Don't unregister the module if it was never registered. */
534 		if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED)
535 		    != 0)
536 			error = mac_policy_unregister(mpc);
537 		else
538 			error = 0;
539 		break;
540 	default:
541 		error = EOPNOTSUPP;
542 		break;
543 	}
544 
545 	return (error);
546 }
547 
548 /*
549  * Define an error value precedence, and given two arguments, selects the
550  * value with the higher precedence.
551  */
552 int
553 mac_error_select(int error1, int error2)
554 {
555 
556 	/* Certain decision-making errors take top priority. */
557 	if (error1 == EDEADLK || error2 == EDEADLK)
558 		return (EDEADLK);
559 
560 	/* Invalid arguments should be reported where possible. */
561 	if (error1 == EINVAL || error2 == EINVAL)
562 		return (EINVAL);
563 
564 	/* Precedence goes to "visibility", with both process and file. */
565 	if (error1 == ESRCH || error2 == ESRCH)
566 		return (ESRCH);
567 
568 	if (error1 == ENOENT || error2 == ENOENT)
569 		return (ENOENT);
570 
571 	/* Precedence goes to DAC/MAC protections. */
572 	if (error1 == EACCES || error2 == EACCES)
573 		return (EACCES);
574 
575 	/* Precedence goes to privilege. */
576 	if (error1 == EPERM || error2 == EPERM)
577 		return (EPERM);
578 
579 	/* Precedence goes to error over success; otherwise, arbitrary. */
580 	if (error1 != 0)
581 		return (error1);
582 	return (error2);
583 }
584 
585 int
586 mac_check_structmac_consistent(struct mac *mac)
587 {
588 
589 	if (mac->m_buflen > MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN)
590 		return (EINVAL);
591 
592 	return (0);
593 }
594 
595 SYSINIT(mac, SI_SUB_MAC, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_init, NULL);
596 SYSINIT(mac_late, SI_SUB_MAC_LATE, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_late_init, NULL);
597