xref: /freebsd/sys/netsmb/smb_crypt.c (revision 77a1348b3c1cfe8547be49a121b56299a1e18b69)
1 /*-
2  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-4-Clause
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov
5  * All rights reserved.
6  *
7  * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins.
8  * All rights reserved.
9  *
10  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12  * are met:
13  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
19  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
20  *    This product includes software developed by Boris Popov.
21  * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
22  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
23  *    without specific prior written permission.
24  *
25  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
26  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
27  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
28  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
29  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
30  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
31  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
32  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
33  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
34  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35  * SUCH DAMAGE.
36  */
37 
38 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
39 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
40 
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/malloc.h>
43 #include <sys/kernel.h>
44 #include <sys/systm.h>
45 #include <sys/conf.h>
46 #include <sys/proc.h>
47 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
48 #include <sys/socket.h>
49 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
50 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
51 #include <sys/endian.h>
52 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
53 #include <sys/mchain.h>
54 #include <sys/md4.h>
55 #include <sys/md5.h>
56 #include <sys/iconv.h>
57 
58 #include <netsmb/smb.h>
59 #include <netsmb/smb_conn.h>
60 #include <netsmb/smb_subr.h>
61 #include <netsmb/smb_rq.h>
62 #include <netsmb/smb_dev.h>
63 
64 #include <crypto/des/des.h>
65 
66 #include "opt_netsmb.h"
67 
68 static u_char N8[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
69 
70 
71 static void
72 smb_E(const u_char *key, u_char *data, u_char *dest)
73 {
74 	des_key_schedule *ksp;
75 	u_char kk[8];
76 
77 	kk[0] = key[0] & 0xfe;
78 	kk[1] = key[0] << 7 | (key[1] >> 1 & 0xfe);
79 	kk[2] = key[1] << 6 | (key[2] >> 2 & 0xfe);
80 	kk[3] = key[2] << 5 | (key[3] >> 3 & 0xfe);
81 	kk[4] = key[3] << 4 | (key[4] >> 4 & 0xfe);
82 	kk[5] = key[4] << 3 | (key[5] >> 5 & 0xfe);
83 	kk[6] = key[5] << 2 | (key[6] >> 6 & 0xfe);
84 	kk[7] = key[6] << 1;
85 	ksp = malloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
86 	des_set_key(kk, *ksp);
87 	des_ecb_encrypt(data, dest, *ksp, 1);
88 	free(ksp, M_SMBTEMP);
89 }
90 
91 
92 int
93 smb_encrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
94 {
95 	u_char *p, *P14, *S21;
96 
97 	p = malloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
98 	bzero(p, 14 + 21);
99 	P14 = p;
100 	S21 = p + 14;
101 	bcopy(apwd, P14, min(14, strlen(apwd)));
102 	/*
103 	 * S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5));
104 	 */
105 	smb_E(P14, N8, S21);
106 	smb_E(P14 + 7, N8, S21 + 8);
107 
108 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
109 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
110 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
111 	free(p, M_SMBTEMP);
112 	return 0;
113 }
114 
115 int
116 smb_ntencrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
117 {
118 	u_char S21[21];
119 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
120 	MD4_CTX *ctxp;
121 	u_int len;
122 
123 	len = strlen(apwd);
124 	unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
125 	/*
126 	 * S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5));
127 	 */
128 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, apwd);
129 	ctxp = malloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
130 	MD4Init(ctxp);
131 	MD4Update(ctxp, (u_char*)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
132 	free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
133 	bzero(S21, 21);
134 	MD4Final(S21, ctxp);
135 	free(ctxp, M_SMBTEMP);
136 
137 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
138 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
139 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
140 	return 0;
141 }
142 
143 /*
144  * Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit.
145  */
146 int
147 smb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc *vcp)
148 {
149 	const char *pwd;
150 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
151 	u_int len;
152 	MD4_CTX md4;
153 	u_char S16[16], S21[21];
154 
155 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
156 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
157 
158 	if (vcp->vc_mackey != NULL) {
159 		free(vcp->vc_mackey, M_SMBTEMP);
160 		vcp->vc_mackey = NULL;
161 		vcp->vc_mackeylen = 0;
162 		vcp->vc_seqno = 0;
163 	}
164 
165 	/*
166 	 * The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session
167 	 * key and the 24 byte challenge response.
168 	 */
169 	vcp->vc_mackeylen = 16 + 24;
170 	vcp->vc_mackey = malloc(vcp->vc_mackeylen, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
171 
172 	/*
173 	 * Calculate session key:
174 	 *	MD4(MD4(U(PN)))
175 	 */
176 	pwd = smb_vc_getpass(vcp);
177 	len = strlen(pwd);
178 	unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
179 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, pwd);
180 	MD4Init(&md4);
181 	MD4Update(&md4, (u_char *)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
182 	MD4Final(S16, &md4);
183 	MD4Init(&md4);
184 	MD4Update(&md4, S16, 16);
185 	MD4Final(vcp->vc_mackey, &md4);
186 	free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
187 
188 	/*
189 	 * Calculate response to challenge:
190 	 *	Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8)
191 	 */
192 	bzero(S21, 21);
193 	bcopy(S16, S21, 16);
194 	smb_E(S21, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 16);
195 	smb_E(S21 + 7, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 24);
196 	smb_E(S21 + 14, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 32);
197 
198 	return (0);
199 }
200 
201 /*
202  * Sign request with MAC.
203  */
204 int
205 smb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq *rqp)
206 {
207 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
208 	struct mbchain *mbp;
209 	struct mbuf *mb;
210 	MD5_CTX md5;
211 	u_char digest[16];
212 
213 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
214 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
215 
216 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
217 		/* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */
218 		return (0);
219 
220 	/*
221 	 * This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION,
222 	 * or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next
223 	 * sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number
224 	 * following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in
225 	 * a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the
226 	 * primary request.
227 	 */
228 	if (rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
229 	    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0) {
230 		rqp->sr_seqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
231 		rqp->sr_rseqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
232 	} else {
233 		/*
234 		 * Sequence numbers are already in the struct because
235 		 * smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the
236 		 * requests in the transaction.
237 		 * (At least we hope so.)
238 		 */
239 		KASSERT(rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
240 		    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0 ||
241 		    rqp->sr_t2->t2_rq == rqp,
242 		    ("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq"));
243 	}
244 
245 	/* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */
246 	le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig, rqp->sr_seqno);
247 	le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig + 4, 0);
248 
249 	/*
250 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
251 	 * Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field.
252 	 */
253 	smb_rq_getrequest(rqp, &mbp);
254 	MD5Init(&md5);
255 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
256 	for (mb = mbp->mb_top; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
257 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
258 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
259 	bcopy(digest, rqp->sr_rqsig, 8);
260 
261 	return (0);
262 }
263 
264 /*
265  * Verify reply signature.
266  */
267 int
268 smb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq *rqp)
269 {
270 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
271 	struct mdchain *mdp;
272 	u_char sigbuf[8];
273 	MD5_CTX md5;
274 	u_char digest[16];
275 	struct mbuf *mb;
276 
277 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
278 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
279 
280 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
281 		/* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */
282 		return (0);
283 
284 	/*
285 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
286 	 * We play games to pretend the security signature field
287 	 * contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying
288 	 * the packet itself.
289 	 */
290 	smb_rq_getreply(rqp, &mdp);
291 	mb = mdp->md_top;
292 	KASSERT(mb->m_len >= SMB_HDRLEN, ("forgot to m_pullup"));
293 	MD5Init(&md5);
294 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
295 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), 14);
296 	*(u_int32_t *)sigbuf = htole32(rqp->sr_rseqno);
297 	*(u_int32_t *)(sigbuf + 4) = 0;
298 	MD5Update(&md5, sigbuf, 8);
299 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, u_char *) + 22, mb->m_len - 22);
300 	for (mb = mb->m_next; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
301 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
302 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
303 
304 	/*
305 	 * Now verify the signature.
306 	 */
307 	if (bcmp(mtod(mdp->md_top, u_char *) + 14, digest, 8) != 0)
308 		return (EAUTH);
309 
310 	return (0);
311 }
312