xref: /freebsd/sys/netsmb/smb_crypt.c (revision 1719886f6d08408b834d270c59ffcfd821c8f63a)
1 /*-
2  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-4-Clause
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov
5  * All rights reserved.
6  *
7  * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins.
8  * All rights reserved.
9  *
10  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12  * are met:
13  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
19  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
20  *    This product includes software developed by Boris Popov.
21  * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
22  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
23  *    without specific prior written permission.
24  *
25  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
26  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
27  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
28  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
29  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
30  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
31  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
32  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
33  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
34  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35  * SUCH DAMAGE.
36  */
37 
38 #include <sys/param.h>
39 #include <sys/malloc.h>
40 #include <sys/kernel.h>
41 #include <sys/systm.h>
42 #include <sys/conf.h>
43 #include <sys/proc.h>
44 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
45 #include <sys/socket.h>
46 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
47 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
48 #include <sys/endian.h>
49 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
50 #include <sys/mchain.h>
51 #include <sys/md4.h>
52 #include <sys/md5.h>
53 #include <sys/iconv.h>
54 
55 #include <netsmb/smb.h>
56 #include <netsmb/smb_conn.h>
57 #include <netsmb/smb_subr.h>
58 #include <netsmb/smb_rq.h>
59 #include <netsmb/smb_dev.h>
60 
61 #include <crypto/des/des.h>
62 
63 #include "opt_netsmb.h"
64 
65 static u_char N8[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
66 
67 static void
68 smb_E(const u_char *key, u_char *data, u_char *dest)
69 {
70 	des_key_schedule *ksp;
71 	u_char kk[8];
72 
73 	kk[0] = key[0] & 0xfe;
74 	kk[1] = key[0] << 7 | (key[1] >> 1 & 0xfe);
75 	kk[2] = key[1] << 6 | (key[2] >> 2 & 0xfe);
76 	kk[3] = key[2] << 5 | (key[3] >> 3 & 0xfe);
77 	kk[4] = key[3] << 4 | (key[4] >> 4 & 0xfe);
78 	kk[5] = key[4] << 3 | (key[5] >> 5 & 0xfe);
79 	kk[6] = key[5] << 2 | (key[6] >> 6 & 0xfe);
80 	kk[7] = key[6] << 1;
81 	ksp = malloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
82 	des_set_key(kk, *ksp);
83 	des_ecb_encrypt(data, dest, *ksp, 1);
84 	free(ksp, M_SMBTEMP);
85 }
86 
87 int
88 smb_encrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
89 {
90 	u_char *p, *P14, *S21;
91 
92 	p = malloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
93 	bzero(p, 14 + 21);
94 	P14 = p;
95 	S21 = p + 14;
96 	bcopy(apwd, P14, min(14, strlen(apwd)));
97 	/*
98 	 * S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5));
99 	 */
100 	smb_E(P14, N8, S21);
101 	smb_E(P14 + 7, N8, S21 + 8);
102 
103 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
104 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
105 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
106 	free(p, M_SMBTEMP);
107 	return 0;
108 }
109 
110 int
111 smb_ntencrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
112 {
113 	u_char S21[21];
114 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
115 	MD4_CTX *ctxp;
116 	u_int len;
117 
118 	len = strlen(apwd);
119 	unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
120 	/*
121 	 * S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5));
122 	 */
123 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, apwd);
124 	ctxp = malloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
125 	MD4Init(ctxp);
126 	MD4Update(ctxp, (u_char*)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
127 	free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
128 	bzero(S21, 21);
129 	MD4Final(S21, ctxp);
130 	free(ctxp, M_SMBTEMP);
131 
132 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
133 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
134 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
135 	return 0;
136 }
137 
138 /*
139  * Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit.
140  */
141 int
142 smb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc *vcp)
143 {
144 	const char *pwd;
145 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
146 	u_int len;
147 	MD4_CTX md4;
148 	u_char S16[16], S21[21];
149 
150 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
151 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
152 
153 	if (vcp->vc_mackey != NULL) {
154 		free(vcp->vc_mackey, M_SMBTEMP);
155 		vcp->vc_mackey = NULL;
156 		vcp->vc_mackeylen = 0;
157 		vcp->vc_seqno = 0;
158 	}
159 
160 	/*
161 	 * The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session
162 	 * key and the 24 byte challenge response.
163 	 */
164 	vcp->vc_mackeylen = 16 + 24;
165 	vcp->vc_mackey = malloc(vcp->vc_mackeylen, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
166 
167 	/*
168 	 * Calculate session key:
169 	 *	MD4(MD4(U(PN)))
170 	 */
171 	pwd = smb_vc_getpass(vcp);
172 	len = strlen(pwd);
173 	unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
174 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, pwd);
175 	MD4Init(&md4);
176 	MD4Update(&md4, (u_char *)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
177 	MD4Final(S16, &md4);
178 	MD4Init(&md4);
179 	MD4Update(&md4, S16, 16);
180 	MD4Final(vcp->vc_mackey, &md4);
181 	free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
182 
183 	/*
184 	 * Calculate response to challenge:
185 	 *	Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8)
186 	 */
187 	bzero(S21, 21);
188 	bcopy(S16, S21, 16);
189 	smb_E(S21, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 16);
190 	smb_E(S21 + 7, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 24);
191 	smb_E(S21 + 14, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 32);
192 
193 	return (0);
194 }
195 
196 /*
197  * Sign request with MAC.
198  */
199 int
200 smb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq *rqp)
201 {
202 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
203 	struct mbchain *mbp;
204 	struct mbuf *mb;
205 	MD5_CTX md5;
206 	u_char digest[16];
207 
208 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
209 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
210 
211 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
212 		/* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */
213 		return (0);
214 
215 	/*
216 	 * This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION,
217 	 * or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next
218 	 * sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number
219 	 * following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in
220 	 * a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the
221 	 * primary request.
222 	 */
223 	if (rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
224 	    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0) {
225 		rqp->sr_seqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
226 		rqp->sr_rseqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
227 	} else {
228 		/*
229 		 * Sequence numbers are already in the struct because
230 		 * smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the
231 		 * requests in the transaction.
232 		 * (At least we hope so.)
233 		 */
234 		KASSERT(rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
235 		    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0 ||
236 		    rqp->sr_t2->t2_rq == rqp,
237 		    ("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq"));
238 	}
239 
240 	/* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */
241 	le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig, rqp->sr_seqno);
242 	le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig + 4, 0);
243 
244 	/*
245 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
246 	 * Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field.
247 	 */
248 	smb_rq_getrequest(rqp, &mbp);
249 	MD5Init(&md5);
250 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
251 	for (mb = mbp->mb_top; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
252 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
253 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
254 	bcopy(digest, rqp->sr_rqsig, 8);
255 
256 	return (0);
257 }
258 
259 /*
260  * Verify reply signature.
261  */
262 int
263 smb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq *rqp)
264 {
265 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
266 	struct mdchain *mdp;
267 	u_char sigbuf[8];
268 	MD5_CTX md5;
269 	u_char digest[16];
270 	struct mbuf *mb;
271 
272 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
273 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
274 
275 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
276 		/* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */
277 		return (0);
278 
279 	/*
280 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
281 	 * We play games to pretend the security signature field
282 	 * contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying
283 	 * the packet itself.
284 	 */
285 	smb_rq_getreply(rqp, &mdp);
286 	mb = mdp->md_top;
287 	KASSERT(mb->m_len >= SMB_HDRLEN, ("forgot to m_pullup"));
288 	MD5Init(&md5);
289 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
290 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), 14);
291 	*(u_int32_t *)sigbuf = htole32(rqp->sr_rseqno);
292 	*(u_int32_t *)(sigbuf + 4) = 0;
293 	MD5Update(&md5, sigbuf, 8);
294 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, u_char *) + 22, mb->m_len - 22);
295 	for (mb = mb->m_next; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
296 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
297 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
298 
299 	/*
300 	 * Now verify the signature.
301 	 */
302 	if (bcmp(mtod(mdp->md_top, u_char *) + 14, digest, 8) != 0)
303 		return (EAUTH);
304 
305 	return (0);
306 }
307