xref: /freebsd/sys/netsmb/smb_crypt.c (revision 0b3105a37d7adcadcb720112fed4dc4e8040be99)
1 /*-
2  * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins.
6  * All rights reserved.
7  *
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
17  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
18  *    This product includes software developed by Boris Popov.
19  * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
20  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
21  *    without specific prior written permission.
22  *
23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
24  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
25  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
26  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
27  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
28  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
29  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
30  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
31  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
32  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
33  * SUCH DAMAGE.
34  */
35 
36 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
37 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
38 
39 #include <sys/param.h>
40 #include <sys/malloc.h>
41 #include <sys/kernel.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/conf.h>
44 #include <sys/proc.h>
45 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
46 #include <sys/socket.h>
47 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
48 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
49 #include <sys/endian.h>
50 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
51 #include <sys/mchain.h>
52 #include <sys/md4.h>
53 #include <sys/md5.h>
54 #include <sys/iconv.h>
55 
56 #include <netsmb/smb.h>
57 #include <netsmb/smb_conn.h>
58 #include <netsmb/smb_subr.h>
59 #include <netsmb/smb_rq.h>
60 #include <netsmb/smb_dev.h>
61 
62 #include <crypto/des/des.h>
63 
64 #include "opt_netsmb.h"
65 
66 static u_char N8[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
67 
68 
69 static void
70 smb_E(const u_char *key, u_char *data, u_char *dest)
71 {
72 	des_key_schedule *ksp;
73 	u_char kk[8];
74 
75 	kk[0] = key[0] & 0xfe;
76 	kk[1] = key[0] << 7 | (key[1] >> 1 & 0xfe);
77 	kk[2] = key[1] << 6 | (key[2] >> 2 & 0xfe);
78 	kk[3] = key[2] << 5 | (key[3] >> 3 & 0xfe);
79 	kk[4] = key[3] << 4 | (key[4] >> 4 & 0xfe);
80 	kk[5] = key[4] << 3 | (key[5] >> 5 & 0xfe);
81 	kk[6] = key[5] << 2 | (key[6] >> 6 & 0xfe);
82 	kk[7] = key[6] << 1;
83 	ksp = malloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
84 	des_set_key((des_cblock *)kk, *ksp);
85 	des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)data, (des_cblock *)dest, *ksp, 1);
86 	free(ksp, M_SMBTEMP);
87 }
88 
89 
90 int
91 smb_encrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
92 {
93 	u_char *p, *P14, *S21;
94 
95 	p = malloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
96 	bzero(p, 14 + 21);
97 	P14 = p;
98 	S21 = p + 14;
99 	bcopy(apwd, P14, min(14, strlen(apwd)));
100 	/*
101 	 * S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5));
102 	 */
103 	smb_E(P14, N8, S21);
104 	smb_E(P14 + 7, N8, S21 + 8);
105 
106 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
107 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
108 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
109 	free(p, M_SMBTEMP);
110 	return 0;
111 }
112 
113 int
114 smb_ntencrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
115 {
116 	u_char S21[21];
117 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
118 	MD4_CTX *ctxp;
119 	int len;
120 
121 	len = strlen(apwd);
122 	unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
123 	/*
124 	 * S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5));
125 	 */
126 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, apwd);
127 	ctxp = malloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
128 	MD4Init(ctxp);
129 	MD4Update(ctxp, (u_char*)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
130 	free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
131 	bzero(S21, 21);
132 	MD4Final(S21, ctxp);
133 	free(ctxp, M_SMBTEMP);
134 
135 	smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
136 	smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
137 	smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
138 	return 0;
139 }
140 
141 /*
142  * Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit.
143  */
144 int
145 smb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc *vcp)
146 {
147 	const char *pwd;
148 	u_int16_t *unipwd;
149 	int len;
150 	MD4_CTX md4;
151 	u_char S16[16], S21[21];
152 
153 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
154 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
155 
156 	if (vcp->vc_mackey != NULL) {
157 		free(vcp->vc_mackey, M_SMBTEMP);
158 		vcp->vc_mackey = NULL;
159 		vcp->vc_mackeylen = 0;
160 		vcp->vc_seqno = 0;
161 	}
162 
163 	/*
164 	 * The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session
165 	 * key and the 24 byte challenge response.
166 	 */
167 	vcp->vc_mackeylen = 16 + 24;
168 	vcp->vc_mackey = malloc(vcp->vc_mackeylen, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
169 
170 	/*
171 	 * Calculate session key:
172 	 *	MD4(MD4(U(PN)))
173 	 */
174 	pwd = smb_vc_getpass(vcp);
175 	len = strlen(pwd);
176 	unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
177 	smb_strtouni(unipwd, pwd);
178 	MD4Init(&md4);
179 	MD4Update(&md4, (u_char *)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
180 	MD4Final(S16, &md4);
181 	MD4Init(&md4);
182 	MD4Update(&md4, S16, 16);
183 	MD4Final(vcp->vc_mackey, &md4);
184 	free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
185 
186 	/*
187 	 * Calculate response to challenge:
188 	 *	Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8)
189 	 */
190 	bzero(S21, 21);
191 	bcopy(S16, S21, 16);
192 	smb_E(S21, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 16);
193 	smb_E(S21 + 7, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 24);
194 	smb_E(S21 + 14, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 32);
195 
196 	return (0);
197 }
198 
199 /*
200  * Sign request with MAC.
201  */
202 int
203 smb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq *rqp)
204 {
205 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
206 	struct mbchain *mbp;
207 	struct mbuf *mb;
208 	MD5_CTX md5;
209 	u_char digest[16];
210 
211 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
212 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
213 
214 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
215 		/* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */
216 		return (0);
217 
218 	/*
219 	 * This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION,
220 	 * or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next
221 	 * sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number
222 	 * following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in
223 	 * a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the
224 	 * primary request.
225 	 */
226 	if (rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
227 	    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0) {
228 		rqp->sr_seqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
229 		rqp->sr_rseqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
230 	} else {
231 		/*
232 		 * Sequence numbers are already in the struct because
233 		 * smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the
234 		 * requests in the transaction.
235 		 * (At least we hope so.)
236 		 */
237 		KASSERT(rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
238 		    (rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0 ||
239 		    rqp->sr_t2->t2_rq == rqp,
240 		    ("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq"));
241 	}
242 
243 	/* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */
244 	le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig, rqp->sr_seqno);
245 	le32enc(rqp->sr_rqsig + 4, 0);
246 
247 	/*
248 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
249 	 * Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field.
250 	 */
251 	smb_rq_getrequest(rqp, &mbp);
252 	MD5Init(&md5);
253 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
254 	for (mb = mbp->mb_top; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
255 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
256 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
257 	bcopy(digest, rqp->sr_rqsig, 8);
258 
259 	return (0);
260 }
261 
262 /*
263  * Verify reply signature.
264  */
265 int
266 smb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq *rqp)
267 {
268 	struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
269 	struct mdchain *mdp;
270 	u_char sigbuf[8];
271 	MD5_CTX md5;
272 	u_char digest[16];
273 	struct mbuf *mb;
274 
275 	KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
276 	    ("signatures not enabled"));
277 
278 	if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
279 		/* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */
280 		return (0);
281 
282 	/*
283 	 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
284 	 * We play games to pretend the security signature field
285 	 * contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying
286 	 * the packet itself.
287 	 */
288 	smb_rq_getreply(rqp, &mdp);
289 	mb = mdp->md_top;
290 	KASSERT(mb->m_len >= SMB_HDRLEN, ("forgot to m_pullup"));
291 	MD5Init(&md5);
292 	MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
293 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), 14);
294 	*(u_int32_t *)sigbuf = htole32(rqp->sr_rseqno);
295 	*(u_int32_t *)(sigbuf + 4) = 0;
296 	MD5Update(&md5, sigbuf, 8);
297 	MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, u_char *) + 22, mb->m_len - 22);
298 	for (mb = mb->m_next; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
299 		MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
300 	MD5Final(digest, &md5);
301 
302 	/*
303 	 * Now verify the signature.
304 	 */
305 	if (bcmp(mtod(mdp->md_top, u_char *) + 14, digest, 8) != 0)
306 		return (EAUTH);
307 
308 	return (0);
309 }
310