xref: /freebsd/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c (revision 39beb93c3f8bdbf72a61fda42300b5ebed7390c8)
1 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
2 /*	$OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
3 /*-
4  * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
5  * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
6  * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
7  *
8  * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
9  * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
10  *
11  * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
12  * by Angelos D. Keromytis.
13  *
14  * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
15  * and Niels Provos.
16  *
17  * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
18  *
19  * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
20  * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
21  * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
22  * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
23  *
24  * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
25  * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
26  * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
27  * modification of this software.
28  * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
29  * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
30  * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
31  * all.
32  *
33  * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
34  * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
35  * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
36  * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
37  * PURPOSE.
38  */
39 #include "opt_inet.h"
40 #include "opt_inet6.h"
41 
42 #include <sys/param.h>
43 #include <sys/systm.h>
44 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
45 #include <sys/socket.h>
46 #include <sys/syslog.h>
47 #include <sys/kernel.h>
48 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
49 #include <sys/vimage.h>
50 
51 #include <net/if.h>
52 
53 #include <netinet/in.h>
54 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
55 #include <netinet/ip.h>
56 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
57 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
58 
59 #include <net/route.h>
60 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
61 #include <netipsec/ah.h>
62 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
63 #include <netipsec/xform.h>
64 
65 #ifdef INET6
66 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
67 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
68 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
69 #endif
70 
71 #include <netipsec/key.h>
72 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
73 
74 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
75 
76 /*
77  * Return header size in bytes.  The old protocol did not support
78  * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
79  */
80 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \
81 	(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
82 		sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
83 /*
84  * Return authenticator size in bytes.  The old protocol is known
85  * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator.  The new algorithm use 12-byte
86  * authenticator.
87  */
88 #define	AUTHSIZE(sav) \
89 	((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : AH_HMAC_HASHLEN)
90 
91 #ifdef VIMAGE_GLOBALS
92 int	ah_enable;
93 int	ah_cleartos;
94 struct	ahstat ahstat;
95 #endif
96 
97 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
98 SYSCTL_V_INT(V_NET, vnet_ipsec, _net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
99 	ah_enable,	CTLFLAG_RW,	ah_enable,	0, "");
100 SYSCTL_V_INT(V_NET, vnet_ipsec, _net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
101 	ah_cleartos,	CTLFLAG_RW,	ah_cleartos,	0, "");
102 SYSCTL_V_STRUCT(V_NET, vnet_ipsec, _net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS,
103 	stats,		CTLFLAG_RD,	ahstat,	ahstat, "");
104 
105 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256];	/* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
106 
107 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
108 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
109 
110 /*
111  * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
112  */
113 struct auth_hash *
114 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg)
115 {
116 	if (alg > SADB_AALG_MAX)
117 		return NULL;
118 	switch (alg) {
119 	case SADB_X_AALG_NULL:
120 		return &auth_hash_null;
121 	case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
122 		return &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
123 	case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
124 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
125 	case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC:
126 		return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
127 	case SADB_X_AALG_MD5:
128 		return &auth_hash_key_md5;
129 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA:
130 		return &auth_hash_key_sha1;
131 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
132 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
133 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
134 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
135 	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
136 		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
137 	}
138 	return NULL;
139 }
140 
141 size_t
142 ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
143 {
144 	size_t size;
145 
146 	if (sav != NULL) {
147 		int authsize;
148 		IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform"));
149 		/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
150 		authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
151 		size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
152 	} else {
153 		/* default guess */
154 		size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
155 	}
156 	return size;
157 }
158 
159 /*
160  * NB: public for use by esp_init.
161  */
162 int
163 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
164 {
165 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
166 	struct auth_hash *thash;
167 	int keylen;
168 
169 	thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
170 	if (thash == NULL) {
171 		DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
172 			__func__, sav->alg_auth));
173 		return EINVAL;
174 	}
175 	/*
176 	 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
177 	 * the protocol type.  We check here so we can make assumptions
178 	 * later during protocol processing.
179 	 */
180 	/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
181 	if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
182 		DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, "
183 			"%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__,
184 			(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
185 			sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
186 		return EINVAL;
187 	}
188 	if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
189 		DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n",
190 			__func__, thash->name));
191 		return EINVAL;
192 	}
193 	keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
194 	if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
195 		DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires "
196 			"keysize %d\n", __func__,
197 			 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
198 		return EINVAL;
199 	}
200 
201 	sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
202 	sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
203 
204 	/* Initialize crypto session. */
205 	bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
206 	cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
207 	cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
208 	cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
209 	cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
210 
211 	return 0;
212 }
213 
214 /*
215  * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
216  */
217 static int
218 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
219 {
220 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
221 	struct cryptoini cria;
222 	int error;
223 
224 	error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
225 	return error ? error :
226 		 crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support);
227 }
228 
229 /*
230  * Paranoia.
231  *
232  * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
233  */
234 int
235 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
236 {
237 	int err;
238 
239 	if (sav->key_auth)
240 		bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
241 
242 	err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
243 	sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
244 	sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
245 	sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
246 	return err;
247 }
248 
249 /*
250  * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
251  */
252 static int
253 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
254 {
255 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
256 	struct mbuf *m = *m0;
257 	unsigned char *ptr;
258 	int off, count;
259 
260 #ifdef INET
261 	struct ip *ip;
262 #endif /* INET */
263 
264 #ifdef INET6
265 	struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
266 	struct ip6_hdr ip6;
267 	int alloc, len, ad;
268 #endif /* INET6 */
269 
270 	switch (proto) {
271 #ifdef INET
272 	case AF_INET:
273 		/*
274 		 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
275 		 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in
276 		 * contiguous memory.
277 		 */
278 		*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
279 		if (m == NULL) {
280 			DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__));
281 			return ENOBUFS;
282 		}
283 
284 		/* Fix the IP header */
285 		ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
286 		if (V_ah_cleartos)
287 			ip->ip_tos = 0;
288 		ip->ip_ttl = 0;
289 		ip->ip_sum = 0;
290 
291 		/*
292 		 * On input, fix ip_len which has been byte-swapped
293 		 * at ip_input().
294 		 */
295 		if (!out) {
296 			ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + skip);
297 
298 			if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
299 				ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off & IP_DF);
300 			else
301 				ip->ip_off = 0;
302 		} else {
303 			if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
304 				ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & IP_DF);
305 			else
306 				ip->ip_off = 0;
307 		}
308 
309 		ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
310 
311 		/* IPv4 option processing */
312 		for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
313 			if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
314 			    off + 1 < skip)
315 				;
316 			else {
317 				DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for "
318 					"option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off]));
319 
320 				m_freem(m);
321 				return EINVAL;
322 			}
323 
324 			switch (ptr[off]) {
325 			case IPOPT_EOL:
326 				off = skip;  /* End the loop. */
327 				break;
328 
329 			case IPOPT_NOP:
330 				off++;
331 				break;
332 
333 			case IPOPT_SECURITY:	/* 0x82 */
334 			case 0x85:	/* Extended security. */
335 			case 0x86:	/* Commercial security. */
336 			case 0x94:	/* Router alert */
337 			case 0x95:	/* RFC1770 */
338 				/* Sanity check for option length. */
339 				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
340 					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
341 						"length for option %d\n",
342 						__func__, ptr[off]));
343 
344 					m_freem(m);
345 					return EINVAL;
346 				}
347 
348 				off += ptr[off + 1];
349 				break;
350 
351 			case IPOPT_LSRR:
352 			case IPOPT_SSRR:
353 				/* Sanity check for option length. */
354 				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
355 					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
356 						"length for option %d\n",
357 						__func__, ptr[off]));
358 
359 					m_freem(m);
360 					return EINVAL;
361 				}
362 
363 				/*
364 				 * On output, if we have either of the
365 				 * source routing options, we should
366 				 * swap the destination address of the
367 				 * IP header with the last address
368 				 * specified in the option, as that is
369 				 * what the destination's IP header
370 				 * will look like.
371 				 */
372 				if (out)
373 					bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
374 					    sizeof(struct in_addr),
375 					    &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
376 
377 				/* Fall through */
378 			default:
379 				/* Sanity check for option length. */
380 				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
381 					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
382 						"length for option %d\n",
383 						__func__, ptr[off]));
384 					m_freem(m);
385 					return EINVAL;
386 				}
387 
388 				/* Zeroize all other options. */
389 				count = ptr[off + 1];
390 				bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
391 				off += count;
392 				break;
393 			}
394 
395 			/* Sanity check. */
396 			if (off > skip)	{
397 				DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n",
398 					__func__));
399 
400 				m_freem(m);
401 				return EINVAL;
402 			}
403 		}
404 
405 		break;
406 #endif /* INET */
407 
408 #ifdef INET6
409 	case AF_INET6:  /* Ugly... */
410 		/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
411 		m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
412 
413 		/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
414 		if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
415 			DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__));
416 			m_freem(m);
417 			return EMSGSIZE;
418 		}
419 
420 		ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
421 		ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
422 		ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
423 		ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
424 
425 		/* Scoped address handling. */
426 		if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
427 			ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
428 		if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
429 			ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
430 
431 		/* Done with IPv6 header. */
432 		m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
433 
434 		/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
435 		if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
436 			if (m->m_len <= skip) {
437 				ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
438 				    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
439 				    M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
440 				if (ptr == NULL) {
441 					DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory"
442 						"for IPv6 headers\n",__func__));
443 					m_freem(m);
444 					return ENOBUFS;
445 				}
446 
447 				/*
448 				 * Copy all the protocol headers after
449 				 * the IPv6 header.
450 				 */
451 				m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
452 				    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
453 				alloc = 1;
454 			} else {
455 				/* No need to allocate memory. */
456 				ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
457 				    sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
458 				alloc = 0;
459 			}
460 		} else
461 			break;
462 
463 		off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
464 
465 		for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
466 			switch (off) {
467 			case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
468 			case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
469 				ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
470 
471 				/*
472 				 * Process the mutable/immutable
473 				 * options -- borrows heavily from the
474 				 * KAME code.
475 				 */
476 				for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
477 				     count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
478 					if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
479 						count++;
480 						continue; /* Skip padding. */
481 					}
482 
483 					/* Sanity check. */
484 					if (count > len +
485 					    ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
486 						m_freem(m);
487 
488 						/* Free, if we allocated. */
489 						if (alloc)
490 							free(ptr, M_XDATA);
491 						return EINVAL;
492 					}
493 
494 					ad = ptr[count + 1];
495 
496 					/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
497 					if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
498 						bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
499 						    ptr[count + 1]);
500 
501 					count += ad;
502 
503 					/* Sanity check. */
504 					if (count >
505 					    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
506 						m_freem(m);
507 
508 						/* Free, if we allocated. */
509 						if (alloc)
510 							free(ptr, M_XDATA);
511 						return EINVAL;
512 					}
513 				}
514 
515 				/* Advance. */
516 				len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
517 				off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
518 				break;
519 
520 			case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
521 				/*
522 				 * Always include routing headers in
523 				 * computation.
524 				 */
525 				ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
526 				len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
527 				off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
528 				break;
529 
530 			default:
531 				DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d",
532 					__func__, off));
533 				if (alloc)
534 					free(ptr, M_XDATA);
535 				m_freem(m);
536 				return EINVAL;
537 			}
538 
539 		/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
540 		if (alloc) {
541 			m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
542 			    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
543 			free(ptr, M_XDATA);
544 		}
545 
546 		break;
547 #endif /* INET6 */
548 	}
549 
550 	return 0;
551 }
552 
553 /*
554  * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
555  * passes authentication.
556  */
557 static int
558 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
559 {
560 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
561 	struct auth_hash *ahx;
562 	struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
563 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
564 	struct m_tag *mtag;
565 	struct newah *ah;
566 	int hl, rplen, authsize;
567 
568 	struct cryptodesc *crda;
569 	struct cryptop *crp;
570 
571 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
572 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key"));
573 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
574 		("null authentication xform"));
575 
576 	/* Figure out header size. */
577 	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
578 
579 	/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
580 	IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
581 	if (ah == NULL) {
582 		DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
583 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;		/*XXX*/
584 		m_freem(m);
585 		return ENOBUFS;
586 	}
587 
588 	/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
589 	if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) {
590 		V_ahstat.ahs_replay++;
591 		DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__,
592 			  ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
593 		m_freem(m);
594 		return ENOBUFS;
595 	}
596 
597 	/* Verify AH header length. */
598 	hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
599 	ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
600 	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
601 	if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
602 		DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
603 			" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
604 			hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
605 			ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
606 			(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
607 		V_ahstat.ahs_badauthl++;
608 		m_freem(m);
609 		return EACCES;
610 	}
611 	V_ahstat.ahs_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl;
612 
613 	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
614 	crp = crypto_getreq(1);
615 	if (crp == NULL) {
616 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",__func__));
617 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
618 		m_freem(m);
619 		return ENOBUFS;
620 	}
621 
622 	crda = crp->crp_desc;
623 	IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor"));
624 
625 	crda->crd_skip = 0;
626 	crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
627 	crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
628 
629 	/* Authentication operation. */
630 	crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
631 	crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
632 	crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
633 
634 	/* Find out if we've already done crypto. */
635 	for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
636 	     mtag != NULL;
637 	     mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
638 		tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
639 		if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
640 		    tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
641 		    !bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
642 			  sizeof (union sockaddr_union)))
643 			break;
644 	}
645 
646 	/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
647 	if (mtag == NULL) {
648 		tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) +
649 			skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
650 	} else {
651 		/* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */
652 		tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto),
653 						    M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
654 	}
655 	if (tc == NULL) {
656 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
657 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
658 		crypto_freereq(crp);
659 		m_freem(m);
660 		return ENOBUFS;
661 	}
662 
663 	/* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */
664 	if (mtag == NULL) {
665 		int error;
666 
667 		/*
668 		 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
669 		 * and the AH header.
670 		 */
671 		m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1));
672 
673 		/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
674 		m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
675 
676 		/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
677 		error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
678 		    skip, ahx->type, 0);
679 		if (error != 0) {
680 			/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
681 			V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
682 			free(tc, M_XDATA);
683 			crypto_freereq(crp);
684 			return error;
685 		}
686 	}
687 
688 	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
689 	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
690 	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
691 	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
692 	crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
693 	crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
694 	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
695 
696 	/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
697 	tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
698 	tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
699 	tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
700 	tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
701 	tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
702 	tc->tc_skip = skip;
703 	tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */
704 
705 	if (mtag == NULL)
706 		return crypto_dispatch(crp);
707 	else
708 		return ah_input_cb(crp);
709 }
710 
711 #ifdef INET6
712 #define	IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do {		     \
713 	if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {			     \
714 		error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \
715 	} else {							     \
716 		error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \
717 	}								     \
718 } while (0)
719 #else
720 #define	IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)		     \
721 	(error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag))
722 #endif
723 
724 /*
725  * AH input callback from the crypto driver.
726  */
727 static int
728 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
729 {
730 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
731 	int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
732 	unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
733 	struct mbuf *m;
734 	struct cryptodesc *crd;
735 	struct auth_hash *ahx;
736 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
737 	struct m_tag *mtag;
738 	struct secasvar *sav;
739 	struct secasindex *saidx;
740 	u_int8_t nxt;
741 	caddr_t ptr;
742 	int authsize;
743 
744 	crd = crp->crp_desc;
745 
746 	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
747 	IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
748 	skip = tc->tc_skip;
749 	nxt = tc->tc_nxt;
750 	protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
751 	mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
752 	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
753 
754 	sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
755 	if (sav == NULL) {
756 		V_ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
757 		DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
758 		error = ENOBUFS;		/*XXX*/
759 		goto bad;
760 	}
761 
762 	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
763 	IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
764 		saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
765 		("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
766 
767 	ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform;
768 
769 	/* Check for crypto errors. */
770 	if (crp->crp_etype) {
771 		if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
772 			sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
773 
774 		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
775 			error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
776 			return error;
777 		}
778 
779 		V_ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
780 		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
781 		error = crp->crp_etype;
782 		goto bad;
783 	} else {
784 		V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
785 		crypto_freereq(crp);		/* No longer needed. */
786 		crp = NULL;
787 	}
788 
789 	/* Shouldn't happen... */
790 	if (m == NULL) {
791 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
792 		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
793 		error = EINVAL;
794 		goto bad;
795 	}
796 
797 	/* Figure out header size. */
798 	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
799 	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
800 
801 	/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
802 	m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
803 
804 	/*
805 	 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator --
806 	 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC.
807 	 */
808 	if (mtag == NULL) {
809 		ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
810 
811 		/* Verify authenticator. */
812 		if (bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
813 			DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet "
814 			    "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
815 			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
816 			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
817 			V_ahstat.ahs_badauth++;
818 			error = EACCES;
819 			goto bad;
820 		}
821 
822 		/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
823 		((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
824 
825 		/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
826 		m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
827 	} else {
828 		/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
829 		m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt);
830 	}
831 
832 	free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;			/* No longer needed */
833 
834 	/*
835 	 * Header is now authenticated.
836 	 */
837 	m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
838 
839 	/*
840 	 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
841 	 */
842 	if (sav->replay) {
843 		u_int32_t seq;
844 
845 		m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
846 			   sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
847 		if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
848 			V_ahstat.ahs_replay++;
849 			error = ENOBUFS;			/*XXX as above*/
850 			goto bad;
851 		}
852 	}
853 
854 	/*
855 	 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
856 	 */
857 	error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
858 	if (error) {
859 		DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
860 		    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
861 
862 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
863 		goto bad;
864 	}
865 
866 	IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
867 
868 	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
869 	return error;
870 bad:
871 	if (sav)
872 		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
873 	if (m != NULL)
874 		m_freem(m);
875 	if (tc != NULL)
876 		free(tc, M_XDATA);
877 	if (crp != NULL)
878 		crypto_freereq(crp);
879 	return error;
880 }
881 
882 /*
883  * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
884  */
885 static int
886 ah_output(
887 	struct mbuf *m,
888 	struct ipsecrequest *isr,
889 	struct mbuf **mp,
890 	int skip,
891 	int protoff)
892 {
893 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
894 	struct secasvar *sav;
895 	struct auth_hash *ahx;
896 	struct cryptodesc *crda;
897 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
898 	struct mbuf *mi;
899 	struct cryptop *crp;
900 	u_int16_t iplen;
901 	int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
902 	u_int8_t prot;
903 	struct newah *ah;
904 
905 	sav = isr->sav;
906 	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
907 	ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
908 	IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform"));
909 
910 	V_ahstat.ahs_output++;
911 
912 	/* Figure out header size. */
913 	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
914 
915 	/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
916 	switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
917 #ifdef INET
918 	case AF_INET:
919 		maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
920 		break;
921 #endif /* INET */
922 #ifdef INET6
923 	case AF_INET6:
924 		maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
925 		break;
926 #endif /* INET6 */
927 	default:
928 		DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, "
929 		    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
930 		    sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
931 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
932 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
933 		V_ahstat.ahs_nopf++;
934 		error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
935 		goto bad;
936 	}
937 	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
938 	if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
939 		DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
940 		    "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
941 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
942 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
943 		    rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
944 		V_ahstat.ahs_toobig++;
945 		error = EMSGSIZE;
946 		goto bad;
947 	}
948 
949 	/* Update the counters. */
950 	V_ahstat.ahs_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
951 
952 	m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
953 	if (m == NULL) {
954 		DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
955 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
956 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
957 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
958 		error = ENOBUFS;
959 		goto bad;
960 	}
961 
962 	/* Inject AH header. */
963 	mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
964 	if (mi == NULL) {
965 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
966 		    "%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
967 		    rplen + authsize,
968 		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
969 		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
970 		V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;		/*XXX differs from openbsd */
971 		error = ENOBUFS;
972 		goto bad;
973 	}
974 
975 	/*
976 	 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
977 	 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
978 	 */
979 	ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
980 
981 	/* Initialize the AH header. */
982 	m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
983 	ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
984 	ah->ah_reserve = 0;
985 	ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
986 
987 	/* Zeroize authenticator. */
988 	m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
989 
990 	/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested.  */
991 	if (sav->replay) {
992 		if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
993 		    (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
994 			DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n",
995 				__func__,
996 				ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
997 				(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
998 			V_ahstat.ahs_wrap++;
999 			error = EINVAL;
1000 			goto bad;
1001 		}
1002 #ifdef REGRESSION
1003 		/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
1004 		if (!V_ipsec_replay)
1005 #endif
1006 			sav->replay->count++;
1007 		ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
1008 	}
1009 
1010 	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
1011 	crp = crypto_getreq(1);
1012 	if (crp == NULL) {
1013 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
1014 			__func__));
1015 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
1016 		error = ENOBUFS;
1017 		goto bad;
1018 	}
1019 
1020 	crda = crp->crp_desc;
1021 
1022 	crda->crd_skip = 0;
1023 	crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
1024 	crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
1025 
1026 	/* Authentication operation. */
1027 	crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
1028 	crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
1029 	crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
1030 
1031 	/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
1032 	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(
1033 		sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
1034 	if (tc == NULL) {
1035 		crypto_freereq(crp);
1036 		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
1037 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
1038 		error = ENOBUFS;
1039 		goto bad;
1040 	}
1041 
1042 	/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
1043 	m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
1044 
1045 	/*
1046 	 * Fix IP header length on the header used for
1047 	 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original
1048 	 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
1049 	 */
1050 	switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
1051 #ifdef INET
1052 	case AF_INET:
1053 		bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
1054 		    offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
1055 		    (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
1056 		iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
1057 		m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
1058 		    sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
1059 		break;
1060 #endif /* INET */
1061 
1062 #ifdef INET6
1063 	case AF_INET6:
1064 		bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
1065 		    offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
1066 		    (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
1067 		iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
1068 		m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
1069 		    sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
1070 		break;
1071 #endif /* INET6 */
1072 	}
1073 
1074 	/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
1075 	((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
1076 
1077 	/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
1078 	prot = IPPROTO_AH;
1079 	m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
1080 
1081 	/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
1082 	error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
1083 			skip, ahx->type, 1);
1084 	if (error != 0) {
1085 		m = NULL;	/* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
1086 		free(tc, M_XDATA);
1087 		crypto_freereq(crp);
1088 		goto bad;
1089 	}
1090 
1091 	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
1092 	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
1093 	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
1094 	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
1095 	crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
1096 	crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
1097 	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
1098 
1099 	/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
1100 	tc->tc_isr = isr;
1101 	tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
1102 	tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
1103 	tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
1104 	tc->tc_skip = skip;
1105 	tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
1106 
1107 	return crypto_dispatch(crp);
1108 bad:
1109 	if (m)
1110 		m_freem(m);
1111 	return (error);
1112 }
1113 
1114 /*
1115  * AH output callback from the crypto driver.
1116  */
1117 static int
1118 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
1119 {
1120 	INIT_VNET_IPSEC(curvnet);
1121 	int skip, protoff, error;
1122 	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
1123 	struct ipsecrequest *isr;
1124 	struct secasvar *sav;
1125 	struct mbuf *m;
1126 	caddr_t ptr;
1127 	int err;
1128 
1129 	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
1130 	IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque data area!"));
1131 	skip = tc->tc_skip;
1132 	protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
1133 	ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
1134 	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
1135 
1136 	isr = tc->tc_isr;
1137 	IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr);
1138 	sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
1139 	if (sav == NULL) {
1140 		V_ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
1141 		DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
1142 		error = ENOBUFS;		/*XXX*/
1143 		goto bad;
1144 	}
1145 	IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("SA changed\n"));
1146 
1147 	/* Check for crypto errors. */
1148 	if (crp->crp_etype) {
1149 		if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
1150 			sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
1151 
1152 		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
1153 			KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1154 			IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1155 			error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
1156 			return error;
1157 		}
1158 
1159 		V_ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
1160 		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
1161 		error = crp->crp_etype;
1162 		goto bad;
1163 	}
1164 
1165 	/* Shouldn't happen... */
1166 	if (m == NULL) {
1167 		V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
1168 		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
1169 		error = EINVAL;
1170 		goto bad;
1171 	}
1172 	V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
1173 
1174 	/*
1175 	 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
1176 	 * in place.
1177 	 */
1178 	m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
1179 
1180 	/* No longer needed. */
1181 	free(tc, M_XDATA);
1182 	crypto_freereq(crp);
1183 
1184 #ifdef REGRESSION
1185 	/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
1186 	if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
1187 		int alen;
1188 
1189 		/*
1190 		 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
1191 		 * the other side.
1192 		 */
1193 		alen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
1194 		m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes);
1195 	}
1196 #endif
1197 
1198 	/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
1199 	err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
1200 	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1201 	IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1202 	return err;
1203 bad:
1204 	if (sav)
1205 		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1206 	IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1207 	if (m)
1208 		m_freem(m);
1209 	free(tc, M_XDATA);
1210 	crypto_freereq(crp);
1211 	return error;
1212 }
1213 
1214 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
1215 	XF_AH,		XFT_AUTH,	"IPsec AH",
1216 	ah_init,	ah_zeroize,	ah_input,	ah_output,
1217 };
1218 
1219 static void
1220 ah_attach(void)
1221 {
1222 
1223 	V_ah_enable = 1;	/* control flow of packets with AH */
1224 	V_ah_cleartos = 1;	/* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
1225 
1226 	xform_register(&ah_xformsw);
1227 }
1228 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL);
1229