xref: /freebsd/sys/libkern/arc4random.c (revision 3d69515cfea2781b318ebe1c6e6018d817cde358)
1ee3fd601SDan Moschuk /*-
2150890b0SMark Murray  * Copyright (c) 2017 The FreeBSD Foundation
3ee3fd601SDan Moschuk  *
4150890b0SMark Murray  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5150890b0SMark Murray  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
6150890b0SMark Murray  * are met:
7150890b0SMark Murray  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
8150890b0SMark Murray  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
9150890b0SMark Murray  *    in this position and unchanged.
10150890b0SMark Murray  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11150890b0SMark Murray  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12150890b0SMark Murray  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13ee3fd601SDan Moschuk  *
14150890b0SMark Murray  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15150890b0SMark Murray  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16150890b0SMark Murray  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17150890b0SMark Murray  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18150890b0SMark Murray  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19150890b0SMark Murray  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20150890b0SMark Murray  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21150890b0SMark Murray  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22150890b0SMark Murray  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23150890b0SMark Murray  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24150890b0SMark Murray  *
25ee3fd601SDan Moschuk  */
26ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
27ab0de15bSDavid E. O'Brien #include <sys/cdefs.h>
28ab0de15bSDavid E. O'Brien __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
29ab0de15bSDavid E. O'Brien 
30bf3191e9SMark Murray #include <sys/types.h>
312f823fa3SMike Silbersack #include <sys/param.h>
322f823fa3SMike Silbersack #include <sys/kernel.h>
33ee3fd601SDan Moschuk #include <sys/libkern.h>
34150890b0SMark Murray #include <sys/linker.h>
352f823fa3SMike Silbersack #include <sys/lock.h>
36dcf33028SFabien Thomas #include <sys/malloc.h>
37*3d69515cSMark Johnston #include <sys/msan.h>
38150890b0SMark Murray #include <sys/mutex.h>
39150890b0SMark Murray #include <sys/random.h>
40150890b0SMark Murray #include <sys/smp.h>
41150890b0SMark Murray #include <sys/time.h>
42d65b1670SDan Moschuk 
4310b1a175SConrad Meyer #include <machine/cpu.h>
4410b1a175SConrad Meyer 
45150890b0SMark Murray #include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.h>
463782136fSConrad Meyer #include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
473782136fSConrad Meyer #include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
4810b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
4910b1a175SConrad Meyer #include <dev/random/fenestrasX/fx_pub.h>
5010b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
51150890b0SMark Murray 
52150890b0SMark Murray #define	CHACHA20_RESEED_BYTES	65536
53150890b0SMark Murray #define	CHACHA20_RESEED_SECONDS	300
54150890b0SMark Murray #define	CHACHA20_KEYBYTES	32
55150890b0SMark Murray #define	CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE	64
56150890b0SMark Murray 
57150890b0SMark Murray CTASSERT(CHACHA20_KEYBYTES*8 >= CHACHA_MINKEYLEN);
58ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
5910b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifndef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
602b50ce65SAndrey A. Chernov int arc4rand_iniseed_state = ARC4_ENTR_NONE;
6110b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
622b50ce65SAndrey A. Chernov 
63150890b0SMark Murray MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CHACHA20RANDOM, "chacha20random", "chacha20random structures");
643a7810bcSMike Silbersack 
65150890b0SMark Murray struct chacha20_s {
66cdaf9634SFabien Thomas 	struct mtx mtx;
67150890b0SMark Murray 	int numbytes;
68dcf33028SFabien Thomas 	time_t t_reseed;
69150890b0SMark Murray 	u_int8_t m_buffer[CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE];
70150890b0SMark Murray 	struct chacha_ctx ctx;
7110b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
7210b1a175SConrad Meyer 	uint64_t seed_version;
7310b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
74cdaf9634SFabien Thomas } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
75dcf33028SFabien Thomas 
76150890b0SMark Murray static struct chacha20_s *chacha20inst = NULL;
77dcf33028SFabien Thomas 
78150890b0SMark Murray #define CHACHA20_FOREACH(_chacha20) \
79150890b0SMark Murray 	for (_chacha20 = &chacha20inst[0]; \
80150890b0SMark Murray 	     _chacha20 <= &chacha20inst[mp_maxid]; \
81150890b0SMark Murray 	     _chacha20++)
82ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
83ee3fd601SDan Moschuk /*
84150890b0SMark Murray  * Mix up the current context.
85d65b1670SDan Moschuk  */
86d65b1670SDan Moschuk static void
87150890b0SMark Murray chacha20_randomstir(struct chacha20_s *chacha20)
88d65b1670SDan Moschuk {
892c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp 	struct timeval tv_now;
9013774e82SConrad Meyer 	u_int8_t key[CHACHA20_KEYBYTES];
9110b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
9210b1a175SConrad Meyer 	uint64_t seed_version;
93d65b1670SDan Moschuk 
9410b1a175SConrad Meyer #else
953782136fSConrad Meyer 	if (__predict_false(random_bypass_before_seeding && !is_random_seeded())) {
963782136fSConrad Meyer 		SHA256_CTX ctx;
973782136fSConrad Meyer 		uint64_t cc;
983782136fSConrad Meyer 		uint32_t fver;
993782136fSConrad Meyer 
1003782136fSConrad Meyer 		if (!arc4random_bypassed_before_seeding) {
1013782136fSConrad Meyer 			arc4random_bypassed_before_seeding = true;
1023782136fSConrad Meyer 			if (!random_bypass_disable_warnings)
1033782136fSConrad Meyer 				printf("arc4random: WARNING: initial seeding "
1043782136fSConrad Meyer 				    "bypassed the cryptographic random device "
1053782136fSConrad Meyer 				    "because it was not yet seeded and the "
1063782136fSConrad Meyer 				    "knob 'bypass_before_seeding' was "
1073782136fSConrad Meyer 				    "enabled.\n");
1083782136fSConrad Meyer 		}
1093782136fSConrad Meyer 
110*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		/*
111*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		 * "key" is intentionally left uninitialized here, so with KMSAN
112*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		 * enabled the arc4random() return value may be marked
113*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		 * uninitialized, leading to spurious reports.  Lie to KMSAN to
114*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		 * avoid this situation.
115*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		 */
116*3d69515cSMark Johnston 		kmsan_mark(key, sizeof(key), KMSAN_STATE_INITED);
117*3d69515cSMark Johnston 
1183782136fSConrad Meyer 		/* Last ditch effort to inject something in a bad condition. */
1193782136fSConrad Meyer 		cc = get_cyclecount();
1203782136fSConrad Meyer 		SHA256_Init(&ctx);
1213782136fSConrad Meyer 		SHA256_Update(&ctx, key, sizeof(key));
1223782136fSConrad Meyer 		SHA256_Update(&ctx, &cc, sizeof(cc));
1233782136fSConrad Meyer 		fver = __FreeBSD_version;
1243782136fSConrad Meyer 		SHA256_Update(&ctx, &fver, sizeof(fver));
1253782136fSConrad Meyer 		_Static_assert(sizeof(key) == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
1263782136fSConrad Meyer 		    "make sure 256 bits is still 256 bits");
1273782136fSConrad Meyer 		SHA256_Final(key, &ctx);
1283782136fSConrad Meyer 	} else {
12910b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
13010b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
13110b1a175SConrad Meyer 		read_random_key(key, CHACHA20_KEYBYTES, &seed_version);
13210b1a175SConrad Meyer #else
13360f8e3afSBruce Evans 		/*
1343782136fSConrad Meyer 		* If the loader(8) did not have an entropy stash from the
1353782136fSConrad Meyer 		* previous shutdown to load, then we will block.  The answer is
1363782136fSConrad Meyer 		* to make sure there is an entropy stash at shutdown time.
1373782136fSConrad Meyer 		*
1383782136fSConrad Meyer 		* On the other hand, if the random_bypass_before_seeding knob
1393782136fSConrad Meyer 		* was set and we landed in this branch, we know this won't
1403782136fSConrad Meyer 		* block because we know the random device is seeded.
1414cb1e539SMark Murray 		*/
14213774e82SConrad Meyer 		read_random(key, CHACHA20_KEYBYTES);
1433782136fSConrad Meyer 	}
14410b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
1452f823fa3SMike Silbersack 	getmicrouptime(&tv_now);
146150890b0SMark Murray 	mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx);
147150890b0SMark Murray 	chacha_keysetup(&chacha20->ctx, key, CHACHA20_KEYBYTES*8);
148150890b0SMark Murray 	chacha_ivsetup(&chacha20->ctx, (u_char *)&tv_now.tv_sec, (u_char *)&tv_now.tv_usec);
1493a7810bcSMike Silbersack 	/* Reset for next reseed cycle. */
150150890b0SMark Murray 	chacha20->t_reseed = tv_now.tv_sec + CHACHA20_RESEED_SECONDS;
151150890b0SMark Murray 	chacha20->numbytes = 0;
15210b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
15310b1a175SConrad Meyer 	chacha20->seed_version = seed_version;
15410b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
155150890b0SMark Murray 	mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx);
156d65b1670SDan Moschuk }
157d65b1670SDan Moschuk 
158d65b1670SDan Moschuk /*
159150890b0SMark Murray  * Initialize the contexts.
160ee3fd601SDan Moschuk  */
161ee3fd601SDan Moschuk static void
162150890b0SMark Murray chacha20_init(void)
163ee3fd601SDan Moschuk {
164150890b0SMark Murray 	struct chacha20_s *chacha20;
165ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
166150890b0SMark Murray 	chacha20inst = malloc((mp_maxid + 1) * sizeof(struct chacha20_s),
167150890b0SMark Murray 			M_CHACHA20RANDOM, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
168150890b0SMark Murray 	KASSERT(chacha20inst != NULL, ("chacha20_init: memory allocation error"));
169d65b1670SDan Moschuk 
170150890b0SMark Murray 	CHACHA20_FOREACH(chacha20) {
171150890b0SMark Murray 		mtx_init(&chacha20->mtx, "chacha20_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
172150890b0SMark Murray 		chacha20->t_reseed = -1;
173150890b0SMark Murray 		chacha20->numbytes = 0;
174150890b0SMark Murray 		explicit_bzero(chacha20->m_buffer, CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE);
175150890b0SMark Murray 		explicit_bzero(&chacha20->ctx, sizeof(chacha20->ctx));
176dcf33028SFabien Thomas 	}
177dcf33028SFabien Thomas }
178150890b0SMark Murray SYSINIT(chacha20, SI_SUB_LOCK, SI_ORDER_ANY, chacha20_init, NULL);
179dcf33028SFabien Thomas 
180dcf33028SFabien Thomas 
181dcf33028SFabien Thomas static void
182150890b0SMark Murray chacha20_uninit(void)
183dcf33028SFabien Thomas {
184150890b0SMark Murray 	struct chacha20_s *chacha20;
185dcf33028SFabien Thomas 
186150890b0SMark Murray 	CHACHA20_FOREACH(chacha20)
187150890b0SMark Murray 		mtx_destroy(&chacha20->mtx);
188150890b0SMark Murray 	free(chacha20inst, M_CHACHA20RANDOM);
189ee3fd601SDan Moschuk }
190150890b0SMark Murray SYSUNINIT(chacha20, SI_SUB_LOCK, SI_ORDER_ANY, chacha20_uninit, NULL);
191ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
192ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
1932f823fa3SMike Silbersack /*
1942f823fa3SMike Silbersack  * MPSAFE
1952f823fa3SMike Silbersack  */
1962c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp void
1972c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp arc4rand(void *ptr, u_int len, int reseed)
198ee3fd601SDan Moschuk {
199150890b0SMark Murray 	struct chacha20_s *chacha20;
2002c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp 	struct timeval tv;
201150890b0SMark Murray 	u_int length;
202150890b0SMark Murray 	u_int8_t *p;
203ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
20410b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
20510b1a175SConrad Meyer 	if (__predict_false(reseed))
20610b1a175SConrad Meyer #else
2075e57adc8SMateusz Guzik 	if (__predict_false(reseed ||
2085e57adc8SMateusz Guzik 	    (arc4rand_iniseed_state == ARC4_ENTR_HAVE &&
2095e57adc8SMateusz Guzik 	    atomic_cmpset_int(&arc4rand_iniseed_state, ARC4_ENTR_HAVE, ARC4_ENTR_SEED))))
21010b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
211150890b0SMark Murray 		CHACHA20_FOREACH(chacha20)
212150890b0SMark Murray 			chacha20_randomstir(chacha20);
213dcf33028SFabien Thomas 
2142c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp 	getmicrouptime(&tv);
2155e57adc8SMateusz Guzik 	chacha20 = &chacha20inst[curcpu];
216150890b0SMark Murray 	/* We may get unlucky and be migrated off this CPU, but that is expected to be infrequent */
217150890b0SMark Murray 	if ((chacha20->numbytes > CHACHA20_RESEED_BYTES) || (tv.tv_sec > chacha20->t_reseed))
218150890b0SMark Murray 		chacha20_randomstir(chacha20);
2192c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp 
2205e57adc8SMateusz Guzik 	mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx);
22110b1a175SConrad Meyer #ifdef RANDOM_FENESTRASX
22210b1a175SConrad Meyer 	if (__predict_false(
22310b1a175SConrad Meyer 	    atomic_load_acq_64(&fxrng_root_generation) != chacha20->seed_version
22410b1a175SConrad Meyer 	    )) {
22510b1a175SConrad Meyer 		mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx);
22610b1a175SConrad Meyer 		chacha20_randomstir(chacha20);
22710b1a175SConrad Meyer 		mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx);
22810b1a175SConrad Meyer 	}
22910b1a175SConrad Meyer #endif
23010b1a175SConrad Meyer 
23110b1a175SConrad Meyer 	p = ptr;
232150890b0SMark Murray 	while (len) {
233150890b0SMark Murray 		length = MIN(CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE, len);
234150890b0SMark Murray 		chacha_encrypt_bytes(&chacha20->ctx, chacha20->m_buffer, p, length);
235150890b0SMark Murray 		p += length;
236150890b0SMark Murray 		len -= length;
237150890b0SMark Murray 		chacha20->numbytes += length;
238150890b0SMark Murray 		if (chacha20->numbytes > CHACHA20_RESEED_BYTES) {
239150890b0SMark Murray 			mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx);
240150890b0SMark Murray 			chacha20_randomstir(chacha20);
241150890b0SMark Murray 			mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx);
242150890b0SMark Murray 		}
243150890b0SMark Murray 	}
244150890b0SMark Murray 	mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx);
245d65b1670SDan Moschuk }
246ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
2472c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp uint32_t
2482c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp arc4random(void)
2492c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp {
2502c38619bSPoul-Henning Kamp 	uint32_t ret;
251ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 
252150890b0SMark Murray 	arc4rand(&ret, sizeof(ret), 0);
253ee3fd601SDan Moschuk 	return ret;
254ee3fd601SDan Moschuk }
255150890b0SMark Murray 
256150890b0SMark Murray void
257150890b0SMark Murray arc4random_buf(void *ptr, size_t len)
258150890b0SMark Murray {
259150890b0SMark Murray 
260150890b0SMark Murray 	arc4rand(ptr, len, 0);
261150890b0SMark Murray }
262