1 /*- 2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson 5 * All rights reserved. 6 * 7 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. 8 * 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11 * are met: 12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 17 * 18 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 19 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 21 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 22 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 23 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 24 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 25 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 26 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 27 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 28 * SUCH DAMAGE. 29 */ 30 /* 31 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. 32 * 33 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are 34 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e 35 * ACLs. 36 */ 37 38 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 39 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); 40 41 #include <sys/param.h> 42 #include <sys/kernel.h> 43 #include <sys/module.h> 44 #include <sys/systm.h> 45 #include <sys/mount.h> 46 #include <sys/priv.h> 47 #include <sys/vnode.h> 48 #include <sys/errno.h> 49 #include <sys/stat.h> 50 #include <sys/acl.h> 51 52 /* 53 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics; 54 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system 55 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an 56 * errno value. 57 */ 58 int 59 vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid, 60 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred) 61 { 62 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask; 63 accmode_t dac_granted; 64 accmode_t priv_granted; 65 accmode_t acl_mask_granted; 66 int group_matched, i; 67 68 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0, 69 ("invalid bit in accmode")); 70 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE), 71 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE")); 72 73 /* 74 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory 75 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to 76 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which 77 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which 78 * case fall back on first match for the time being. 79 */ 80 81 /* 82 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC 83 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access. 84 * 85 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before 86 * asking for them. 87 */ 88 priv_granted = 0; 89 90 if (type == VDIR) { 91 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP)) 92 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 93 } else { 94 /* 95 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise, 96 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want 97 * this to happen unless the file really is executable. 98 */ 99 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) & 100 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 && 101 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC)) 102 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 103 } 104 105 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ)) 106 priv_granted |= VREAD; 107 108 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) && 109 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE)) 110 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 111 112 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN)) 113 priv_granted |= VADMIN; 114 115 /* 116 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the 117 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're 118 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and 119 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations. 120 */ 121 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL; 122 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 123 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 124 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 125 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid) 126 break; 127 dac_granted = 0; 128 dac_granted |= VADMIN; 129 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 130 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 131 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 132 dac_granted |= VREAD; 133 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 134 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 135 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 136 return (0); 137 138 /* 139 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 140 */ 141 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == 142 accmode) { 143 return (0); 144 } 145 goto error; 146 147 case ACL_MASK: 148 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 149 break; 150 151 case ACL_OTHER: 152 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 153 break; 154 155 default: 156 break; 157 } 158 } 159 160 /* 161 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If 162 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means 163 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably 164 * be a panic. 165 */ 166 if (acl_other == NULL) { 167 /* 168 * XXX This should never happen 169 */ 170 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n"); 171 return (EPERM); 172 } 173 174 /* 175 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are 176 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the 177 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user 178 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that 179 * the mask allows all requests to succeed. 180 */ 181 if (acl_mask != NULL) { 182 acl_mask_granted = 0; 183 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 184 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC; 185 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 186 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD; 187 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 188 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 189 } else 190 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND; 191 192 /* 193 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no 194 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the 195 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups. 196 */ 197 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 198 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 199 case ACL_USER: 200 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) 201 break; 202 dac_granted = 0; 203 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 204 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 205 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 206 dac_granted |= VREAD; 207 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 208 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 209 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 210 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 211 return (0); 212 /* 213 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 214 */ 215 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) != 216 accmode) 217 goto error; 218 219 return (0); 220 } 221 } 222 223 /* 224 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best" 225 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make 226 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we 227 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we 228 * should move on to ACL_OTHER. 229 */ 230 group_matched = 0; 231 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 232 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 233 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 234 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 235 break; 236 dac_granted = 0; 237 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 238 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 239 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 240 dac_granted |= VREAD; 241 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 242 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 243 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 244 245 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 246 return (0); 247 248 group_matched = 1; 249 break; 250 251 case ACL_GROUP: 252 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred)) 253 break; 254 dac_granted = 0; 255 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 256 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 257 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 258 dac_granted |= VREAD; 259 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 260 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 261 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 262 263 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 264 return (0); 265 266 group_matched = 1; 267 break; 268 269 default: 270 break; 271 } 272 } 273 274 if (group_matched == 1) { 275 /* 276 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure 277 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege. 278 */ 279 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 280 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 281 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 282 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 283 break; 284 dac_granted = 0; 285 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 286 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 287 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 288 dac_granted |= VREAD; 289 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 290 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 291 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 292 293 /* 294 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 295 */ 296 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 297 != accmode) 298 break; 299 300 return (0); 301 302 case ACL_GROUP: 303 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, 304 cred)) 305 break; 306 dac_granted = 0; 307 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 308 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 309 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 310 dac_granted |= VREAD; 311 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 312 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 313 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 314 315 /* 316 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 317 */ 318 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 319 != accmode) 320 break; 321 322 return (0); 323 324 default: 325 break; 326 } 327 } 328 /* 329 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient. 330 * Return failure. 331 */ 332 goto error; 333 } 334 335 /* 336 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER. 337 */ 338 dac_granted = 0; 339 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 340 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 341 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 342 dac_granted |= VREAD; 343 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 344 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 345 346 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 347 return (0); 348 /* 349 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 350 */ 351 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) { 352 return (0); 353 } 354 355 error: 356 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES); 357 } 358 359 /* 360 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode 361 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an 362 * acl_perm_t. 363 */ 364 acl_perm_t 365 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode) 366 { 367 acl_perm_t perm = 0; 368 369 switch(tag) { 370 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 371 if (mode & S_IXUSR) 372 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 373 if (mode & S_IRUSR) 374 perm |= ACL_READ; 375 if (mode & S_IWUSR) 376 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 377 return (perm); 378 379 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 380 if (mode & S_IXGRP) 381 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 382 if (mode & S_IRGRP) 383 perm |= ACL_READ; 384 if (mode & S_IWGRP) 385 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 386 return (perm); 387 388 case ACL_OTHER: 389 if (mode & S_IXOTH) 390 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 391 if (mode & S_IROTH) 392 perm |= ACL_READ; 393 if (mode & S_IWOTH) 394 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 395 return (perm); 396 397 default: 398 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 399 return (0); 400 } 401 } 402 403 /* 404 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the 405 * appropriate type. 406 */ 407 struct acl_entry 408 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) 409 { 410 struct acl_entry acl_entry; 411 412 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag; 413 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode); 414 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0; 415 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0; 416 switch(tag) { 417 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 418 acl_entry.ae_id = uid; 419 break; 420 421 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 422 acl_entry.ae_id = gid; 423 break; 424 425 case ACL_OTHER: 426 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 427 break; 428 429 default: 430 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 431 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 432 } 433 434 return (acl_entry); 435 } 436 437 /* 438 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries. 439 */ 440 mode_t 441 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry, 442 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry) 443 { 444 mode_t mode; 445 446 mode = 0; 447 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 448 mode |= S_IXUSR; 449 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 450 mode |= S_IRUSR; 451 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 452 mode |= S_IWUSR; 453 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 454 mode |= S_IXGRP; 455 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 456 mode |= S_IRGRP; 457 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 458 mode |= S_IWGRP; 459 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 460 mode |= S_IXOTH; 461 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 462 mode |= S_IROTH; 463 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 464 mode |= S_IWOTH; 465 466 return (mode); 467 } 468 469 /* 470 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access 471 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a 472 * panic. 473 */ 474 mode_t 475 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl) 476 { 477 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other; 478 int i; 479 480 /* 481 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode. 482 */ 483 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL; 484 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 485 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 486 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 487 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 488 break; 489 490 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 491 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 492 break; 493 494 case ACL_OTHER: 495 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 496 break; 497 498 case ACL_MASK: 499 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 500 break; 501 502 case ACL_USER: 503 case ACL_GROUP: 504 break; 505 506 default: 507 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag"); 508 } 509 } 510 511 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL) 512 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags"); 513 514 /* 515 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace 516 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we 517 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions. 518 */ 519 if (acl_mask != NULL) 520 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask, 521 acl_other)); 522 else 523 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj, 524 acl_other)); 525 } 526 527 /* 528 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing 529 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e 530 * ACL properties. 531 */ 532 int 533 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl) 534 { 535 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group; 536 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i; 537 538 /* 539 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum 540 * defined for acl_t. 541 * 542 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are 543 * present: 544 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ 545 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ 546 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER 547 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one 548 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear. 549 * 550 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS. 551 * 552 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation. 553 * 554 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field. 555 */ 556 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group = 557 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0; 558 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES) 559 return (EINVAL); 560 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 561 /* 562 * Check for a valid tag. 563 */ 564 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 565 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 566 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 567 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 568 return (EINVAL); 569 num_acl_user_obj++; 570 break; 571 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 572 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 573 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 574 return (EINVAL); 575 num_acl_group_obj++; 576 break; 577 case ACL_USER: 578 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 579 return (EINVAL); 580 num_acl_user++; 581 break; 582 case ACL_GROUP: 583 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 584 return (EINVAL); 585 num_acl_group++; 586 break; 587 case ACL_OTHER: 588 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 589 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 590 return (EINVAL); 591 num_acl_other++; 592 break; 593 case ACL_MASK: 594 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 595 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 596 return (EINVAL); 597 num_acl_mask++; 598 break; 599 default: 600 return (EINVAL); 601 } 602 /* 603 * Check for valid perm entries. 604 */ 605 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) != 606 ACL_PERM_BITS) 607 return (EINVAL); 608 } 609 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) || 610 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1)) 611 return (EINVAL); 612 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) && 613 (num_acl_mask != 1)) 614 return (EINVAL); 615 return (0); 616 } 617 618 /* 619 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the 620 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't 621 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also 622 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into 623 * per-filesystem-code. 624 */ 625 mode_t 626 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl) 627 { 628 mode_t mode; 629 630 mode = cmode; 631 /* 632 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be 633 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to 634 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly 635 * effected bits, then reconstruct. 636 */ 637 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK; 638 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl)); 639 640 return (mode); 641 } 642 643 static int 644 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg) 645 { 646 int ret; 647 648 ret = 0; 649 650 switch (what) { 651 case MOD_LOAD: 652 case MOD_SHUTDOWN: 653 break; 654 655 case MOD_QUIESCE: 656 /* XXX TODO */ 657 ret = 0; 658 break; 659 660 case MOD_UNLOAD: 661 /* XXX TODO */ 662 ret = 0; 663 break; 664 default: 665 ret = EINVAL; 666 break; 667 } 668 669 return (ret); 670 } 671 672 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = { 673 "acl_posix1e", 674 acl_posix1e_modload, 675 NULL 676 }; 677 678 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST); 679 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1); 680