1 /*- 2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson 5 * All rights reserved. 6 * 7 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. 8 * 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11 * are met: 12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 17 * 18 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 19 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 21 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 22 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 23 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 24 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 25 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 26 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 27 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 28 * SUCH DAMAGE. 29 */ 30 /* 31 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. 32 * 33 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are 34 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e 35 * ACLs. 36 */ 37 38 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 39 #include <sys/param.h> 40 #include <sys/kernel.h> 41 #include <sys/module.h> 42 #include <sys/systm.h> 43 #include <sys/mount.h> 44 #include <sys/priv.h> 45 #include <sys/vnode.h> 46 #include <sys/errno.h> 47 #include <sys/stat.h> 48 #include <sys/acl.h> 49 50 /* 51 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics; 52 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system 53 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an 54 * errno value. 55 */ 56 int 57 vaccess_acl_posix1e(__enum_uint8(vtype) type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid, 58 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred) 59 { 60 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask; 61 accmode_t dac_granted; 62 accmode_t priv_granted; 63 accmode_t acl_mask_granted; 64 int group_matched, i; 65 66 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0, 67 ("invalid bit in accmode")); 68 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE), 69 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE")); 70 71 /* 72 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory 73 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to 74 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which 75 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which 76 * case fall back on first match for the time being. 77 */ 78 79 /* 80 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC 81 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access. 82 * 83 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before 84 * asking for them. 85 */ 86 priv_granted = 0; 87 88 if (type == VDIR) { 89 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP)) 90 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 91 } else { 92 /* 93 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise, 94 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want 95 * this to happen unless the file really is executable. 96 */ 97 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) & 98 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 && 99 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC)) 100 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 101 } 102 103 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ)) 104 priv_granted |= VREAD; 105 106 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) && 107 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE)) 108 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 109 110 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN)) 111 priv_granted |= VADMIN; 112 113 /* 114 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the 115 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're 116 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and 117 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations. 118 */ 119 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL; 120 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 121 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 122 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 123 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid) 124 break; 125 dac_granted = 0; 126 dac_granted |= VADMIN; 127 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 128 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 129 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 130 dac_granted |= VREAD; 131 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 132 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 133 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 134 return (0); 135 136 /* 137 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 138 */ 139 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == 140 accmode) { 141 return (0); 142 } 143 goto error; 144 145 case ACL_MASK: 146 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 147 break; 148 149 case ACL_OTHER: 150 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 151 break; 152 153 default: 154 break; 155 } 156 } 157 158 /* 159 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If 160 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means 161 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably 162 * be a panic. 163 */ 164 if (acl_other == NULL) { 165 /* 166 * XXX This should never happen 167 */ 168 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n"); 169 return (EPERM); 170 } 171 172 /* 173 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are 174 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the 175 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user 176 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that 177 * the mask allows all requests to succeed. 178 */ 179 if (acl_mask != NULL) { 180 acl_mask_granted = 0; 181 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 182 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC; 183 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 184 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD; 185 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 186 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 187 } else 188 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND; 189 190 /* 191 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no 192 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the 193 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups. 194 */ 195 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 196 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 197 case ACL_USER: 198 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) 199 break; 200 dac_granted = 0; 201 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 202 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 203 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 204 dac_granted |= VREAD; 205 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 206 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 207 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 208 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 209 return (0); 210 /* 211 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 212 */ 213 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) != 214 accmode) 215 goto error; 216 217 return (0); 218 } 219 } 220 221 /* 222 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best" 223 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make 224 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we 225 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we 226 * should move on to ACL_OTHER. 227 */ 228 group_matched = 0; 229 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 230 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 231 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 232 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 233 break; 234 dac_granted = 0; 235 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 236 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 237 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 238 dac_granted |= VREAD; 239 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 240 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 241 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 242 243 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 244 return (0); 245 246 group_matched = 1; 247 break; 248 249 case ACL_GROUP: 250 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred)) 251 break; 252 dac_granted = 0; 253 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 254 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 255 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 256 dac_granted |= VREAD; 257 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 258 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 259 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 260 261 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 262 return (0); 263 264 group_matched = 1; 265 break; 266 267 default: 268 break; 269 } 270 } 271 272 if (group_matched == 1) { 273 /* 274 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure 275 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege. 276 */ 277 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 278 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 279 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 280 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 281 break; 282 dac_granted = 0; 283 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 284 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 285 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 286 dac_granted |= VREAD; 287 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 288 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 289 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 290 291 /* 292 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 293 */ 294 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 295 != accmode) 296 break; 297 298 return (0); 299 300 case ACL_GROUP: 301 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, 302 cred)) 303 break; 304 dac_granted = 0; 305 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 306 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 307 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 308 dac_granted |= VREAD; 309 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 310 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 311 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 312 313 /* 314 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 315 */ 316 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 317 != accmode) 318 break; 319 320 return (0); 321 322 default: 323 break; 324 } 325 } 326 /* 327 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient. 328 * Return failure. 329 */ 330 goto error; 331 } 332 333 /* 334 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER. 335 */ 336 dac_granted = 0; 337 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 338 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 339 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 340 dac_granted |= VREAD; 341 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 342 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 343 344 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 345 return (0); 346 /* 347 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 348 */ 349 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) { 350 return (0); 351 } 352 353 error: 354 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES); 355 } 356 357 /* 358 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode 359 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an 360 * acl_perm_t. 361 */ 362 acl_perm_t 363 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode) 364 { 365 acl_perm_t perm = 0; 366 367 switch(tag) { 368 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 369 if (mode & S_IXUSR) 370 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 371 if (mode & S_IRUSR) 372 perm |= ACL_READ; 373 if (mode & S_IWUSR) 374 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 375 return (perm); 376 377 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 378 if (mode & S_IXGRP) 379 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 380 if (mode & S_IRGRP) 381 perm |= ACL_READ; 382 if (mode & S_IWGRP) 383 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 384 return (perm); 385 386 case ACL_OTHER: 387 if (mode & S_IXOTH) 388 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 389 if (mode & S_IROTH) 390 perm |= ACL_READ; 391 if (mode & S_IWOTH) 392 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 393 return (perm); 394 395 default: 396 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 397 return (0); 398 } 399 } 400 401 /* 402 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the 403 * appropriate type. 404 */ 405 struct acl_entry 406 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) 407 { 408 struct acl_entry acl_entry; 409 410 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag; 411 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode); 412 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0; 413 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0; 414 switch(tag) { 415 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 416 acl_entry.ae_id = uid; 417 break; 418 419 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 420 acl_entry.ae_id = gid; 421 break; 422 423 case ACL_OTHER: 424 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 425 break; 426 427 default: 428 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 429 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 430 } 431 432 return (acl_entry); 433 } 434 435 /* 436 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries. 437 */ 438 mode_t 439 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry, 440 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry) 441 { 442 mode_t mode; 443 444 mode = 0; 445 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 446 mode |= S_IXUSR; 447 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 448 mode |= S_IRUSR; 449 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 450 mode |= S_IWUSR; 451 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 452 mode |= S_IXGRP; 453 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 454 mode |= S_IRGRP; 455 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 456 mode |= S_IWGRP; 457 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 458 mode |= S_IXOTH; 459 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 460 mode |= S_IROTH; 461 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 462 mode |= S_IWOTH; 463 464 return (mode); 465 } 466 467 /* 468 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access 469 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a 470 * panic. 471 */ 472 mode_t 473 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl) 474 { 475 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other; 476 int i; 477 478 /* 479 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode. 480 */ 481 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL; 482 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 483 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 484 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 485 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 486 break; 487 488 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 489 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 490 break; 491 492 case ACL_OTHER: 493 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 494 break; 495 496 case ACL_MASK: 497 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 498 break; 499 500 case ACL_USER: 501 case ACL_GROUP: 502 break; 503 504 default: 505 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag"); 506 } 507 } 508 509 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL) 510 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags"); 511 512 /* 513 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace 514 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we 515 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions. 516 */ 517 if (acl_mask != NULL) 518 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask, 519 acl_other)); 520 else 521 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj, 522 acl_other)); 523 } 524 525 /* 526 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing 527 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e 528 * ACL properties. 529 */ 530 int 531 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl) 532 { 533 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group; 534 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i; 535 536 /* 537 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum 538 * defined for acl_t. 539 * 540 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are 541 * present: 542 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ 543 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ 544 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER 545 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one 546 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear. 547 * 548 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS. 549 * 550 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation. 551 * 552 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field. 553 */ 554 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group = 555 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0; 556 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES) 557 return (EINVAL); 558 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 559 /* 560 * Check for a valid tag. 561 */ 562 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 563 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 564 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 565 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 566 return (EINVAL); 567 num_acl_user_obj++; 568 break; 569 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 570 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 571 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 572 return (EINVAL); 573 num_acl_group_obj++; 574 break; 575 case ACL_USER: 576 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 577 return (EINVAL); 578 num_acl_user++; 579 break; 580 case ACL_GROUP: 581 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 582 return (EINVAL); 583 num_acl_group++; 584 break; 585 case ACL_OTHER: 586 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 587 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 588 return (EINVAL); 589 num_acl_other++; 590 break; 591 case ACL_MASK: 592 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 593 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 594 return (EINVAL); 595 num_acl_mask++; 596 break; 597 default: 598 return (EINVAL); 599 } 600 /* 601 * Check for valid perm entries. 602 */ 603 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) != 604 ACL_PERM_BITS) 605 return (EINVAL); 606 } 607 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) || 608 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1)) 609 return (EINVAL); 610 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) && 611 (num_acl_mask != 1)) 612 return (EINVAL); 613 return (0); 614 } 615 616 /* 617 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the 618 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't 619 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also 620 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into 621 * per-filesystem-code. 622 */ 623 mode_t 624 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl) 625 { 626 mode_t mode; 627 628 mode = cmode; 629 /* 630 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be 631 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to 632 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly 633 * effected bits, then reconstruct. 634 */ 635 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK; 636 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl)); 637 638 return (mode); 639 } 640 641 static int 642 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg) 643 { 644 int ret; 645 646 ret = 0; 647 648 switch (what) { 649 case MOD_LOAD: 650 case MOD_SHUTDOWN: 651 break; 652 653 case MOD_QUIESCE: 654 /* XXX TODO */ 655 ret = 0; 656 break; 657 658 case MOD_UNLOAD: 659 /* XXX TODO */ 660 ret = 0; 661 break; 662 default: 663 ret = EINVAL; 664 break; 665 } 666 667 return (ret); 668 } 669 670 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = { 671 "acl_posix1e", 672 acl_posix1e_modload, 673 NULL 674 }; 675 676 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST); 677 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1); 678