1 /*- 2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson 5 * All rights reserved. 6 * 7 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. 8 * 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11 * are met: 12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 17 * 18 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 19 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 21 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 22 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 23 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 24 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 25 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 26 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 27 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 28 * SUCH DAMAGE. 29 */ 30 /* 31 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. 32 * 33 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are 34 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e 35 * ACLs. 36 */ 37 38 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 39 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); 40 41 #include <sys/param.h> 42 #include <sys/kernel.h> 43 #include <sys/module.h> 44 #include <sys/systm.h> 45 #include <sys/mount.h> 46 #include <sys/priv.h> 47 #include <sys/vnode.h> 48 #include <sys/errno.h> 49 #include <sys/stat.h> 50 #include <sys/acl.h> 51 52 /* 53 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics; 54 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system 55 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an 56 * errno value. 57 */ 58 int 59 vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid, 60 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused) 61 { 62 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask; 63 accmode_t dac_granted; 64 accmode_t priv_granted; 65 accmode_t acl_mask_granted; 66 int group_matched, i; 67 68 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0, 69 ("invalid bit in accmode")); 70 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE), 71 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE")); 72 73 /* 74 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory 75 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to 76 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which 77 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which 78 * case fall back on first match for the time being. 79 */ 80 if (privused != NULL) 81 *privused = 0; 82 83 /* 84 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC 85 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access. 86 * 87 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before 88 * asking for them. 89 */ 90 priv_granted = 0; 91 92 if (type == VDIR) { 93 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, 94 PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0)) 95 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 96 } else { 97 /* 98 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise, 99 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want 100 * this to happen unless the file really is executable. 101 */ 102 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) & 103 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 && 104 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0)) 105 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 106 } 107 108 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0)) 109 priv_granted |= VREAD; 110 111 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) && 112 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0)) 113 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 114 115 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0)) 116 priv_granted |= VADMIN; 117 118 /* 119 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the 120 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're 121 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and 122 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations. 123 */ 124 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL; 125 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 126 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 127 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 128 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid) 129 break; 130 dac_granted = 0; 131 dac_granted |= VADMIN; 132 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 133 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 134 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 135 dac_granted |= VREAD; 136 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 137 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 138 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 139 return (0); 140 141 /* 142 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 143 */ 144 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == 145 accmode) { 146 if (privused != NULL) 147 *privused = 1; 148 return (0); 149 } 150 goto error; 151 152 case ACL_MASK: 153 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 154 break; 155 156 case ACL_OTHER: 157 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 158 break; 159 160 default: 161 break; 162 } 163 } 164 165 /* 166 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If 167 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means 168 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably 169 * be a panic. 170 */ 171 if (acl_other == NULL) { 172 /* 173 * XXX This should never happen 174 */ 175 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n"); 176 return (EPERM); 177 } 178 179 /* 180 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are 181 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the 182 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user 183 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that 184 * the mask allows all requests to succeed. 185 */ 186 if (acl_mask != NULL) { 187 acl_mask_granted = 0; 188 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 189 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC; 190 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 191 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD; 192 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 193 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 194 } else 195 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND; 196 197 /* 198 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no 199 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the 200 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups. 201 */ 202 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 203 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 204 case ACL_USER: 205 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) 206 break; 207 dac_granted = 0; 208 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 209 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 210 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 211 dac_granted |= VREAD; 212 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 213 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 214 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 215 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 216 return (0); 217 /* 218 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 219 */ 220 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) != 221 accmode) 222 goto error; 223 224 if (privused != NULL) 225 *privused = 1; 226 return (0); 227 } 228 } 229 230 /* 231 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best" 232 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make 233 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we 234 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we 235 * should move on to ACL_OTHER. 236 */ 237 group_matched = 0; 238 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 239 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 240 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 241 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 242 break; 243 dac_granted = 0; 244 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 245 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 246 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 247 dac_granted |= VREAD; 248 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 249 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 250 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 251 252 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 253 return (0); 254 255 group_matched = 1; 256 break; 257 258 case ACL_GROUP: 259 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred)) 260 break; 261 dac_granted = 0; 262 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 263 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 264 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 265 dac_granted |= VREAD; 266 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 267 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 268 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 269 270 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 271 return (0); 272 273 group_matched = 1; 274 break; 275 276 default: 277 break; 278 } 279 } 280 281 if (group_matched == 1) { 282 /* 283 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure 284 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege. 285 */ 286 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 287 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 288 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 289 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 290 break; 291 dac_granted = 0; 292 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 293 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 294 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 295 dac_granted |= VREAD; 296 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 297 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 298 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 299 300 /* 301 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 302 */ 303 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 304 != accmode) 305 break; 306 307 if (privused != NULL) 308 *privused = 1; 309 return (0); 310 311 case ACL_GROUP: 312 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, 313 cred)) 314 break; 315 dac_granted = 0; 316 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 317 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 318 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 319 dac_granted |= VREAD; 320 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 321 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 322 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 323 324 /* 325 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 326 */ 327 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 328 != accmode) 329 break; 330 331 if (privused != NULL) 332 *privused = 1; 333 return (0); 334 335 default: 336 break; 337 } 338 } 339 /* 340 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient. 341 * Return failure. 342 */ 343 goto error; 344 } 345 346 /* 347 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER. 348 */ 349 dac_granted = 0; 350 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 351 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 352 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 353 dac_granted |= VREAD; 354 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 355 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 356 357 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 358 return (0); 359 /* 360 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 361 */ 362 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) { 363 if (privused != NULL) 364 *privused = 1; 365 return (0); 366 } 367 368 error: 369 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES); 370 } 371 372 /* 373 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode 374 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an 375 * acl_perm_t. 376 */ 377 acl_perm_t 378 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode) 379 { 380 acl_perm_t perm = 0; 381 382 switch(tag) { 383 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 384 if (mode & S_IXUSR) 385 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 386 if (mode & S_IRUSR) 387 perm |= ACL_READ; 388 if (mode & S_IWUSR) 389 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 390 return (perm); 391 392 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 393 if (mode & S_IXGRP) 394 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 395 if (mode & S_IRGRP) 396 perm |= ACL_READ; 397 if (mode & S_IWGRP) 398 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 399 return (perm); 400 401 case ACL_OTHER: 402 if (mode & S_IXOTH) 403 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 404 if (mode & S_IROTH) 405 perm |= ACL_READ; 406 if (mode & S_IWOTH) 407 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 408 return (perm); 409 410 default: 411 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 412 return (0); 413 } 414 } 415 416 /* 417 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the 418 * appropriate type. 419 */ 420 struct acl_entry 421 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) 422 { 423 struct acl_entry acl_entry; 424 425 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag; 426 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode); 427 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0; 428 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0; 429 switch(tag) { 430 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 431 acl_entry.ae_id = uid; 432 break; 433 434 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 435 acl_entry.ae_id = gid; 436 break; 437 438 case ACL_OTHER: 439 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 440 break; 441 442 default: 443 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 444 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 445 } 446 447 return (acl_entry); 448 } 449 450 /* 451 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries. 452 */ 453 mode_t 454 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry, 455 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry) 456 { 457 mode_t mode; 458 459 mode = 0; 460 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 461 mode |= S_IXUSR; 462 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 463 mode |= S_IRUSR; 464 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 465 mode |= S_IWUSR; 466 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 467 mode |= S_IXGRP; 468 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 469 mode |= S_IRGRP; 470 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 471 mode |= S_IWGRP; 472 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 473 mode |= S_IXOTH; 474 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 475 mode |= S_IROTH; 476 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 477 mode |= S_IWOTH; 478 479 return (mode); 480 } 481 482 /* 483 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access 484 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a 485 * panic. 486 */ 487 mode_t 488 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl) 489 { 490 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other; 491 int i; 492 493 /* 494 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode. 495 */ 496 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL; 497 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 498 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 499 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 500 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 501 break; 502 503 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 504 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 505 break; 506 507 case ACL_OTHER: 508 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 509 break; 510 511 case ACL_MASK: 512 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 513 break; 514 515 case ACL_USER: 516 case ACL_GROUP: 517 break; 518 519 default: 520 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag"); 521 } 522 } 523 524 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL) 525 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags"); 526 527 /* 528 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace 529 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we 530 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions. 531 */ 532 if (acl_mask != NULL) 533 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask, 534 acl_other)); 535 else 536 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj, 537 acl_other)); 538 } 539 540 /* 541 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing 542 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e 543 * ACL properties. 544 */ 545 int 546 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl) 547 { 548 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group; 549 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i; 550 551 /* 552 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum 553 * defined for acl_t. 554 * 555 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are 556 * present: 557 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ 558 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ 559 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER 560 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one 561 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear. 562 * 563 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS. 564 * 565 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation. 566 * 567 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field. 568 */ 569 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group = 570 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0; 571 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES) 572 return (EINVAL); 573 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 574 /* 575 * Check for a valid tag. 576 */ 577 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 578 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 579 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 580 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 581 return (EINVAL); 582 num_acl_user_obj++; 583 break; 584 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 585 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 586 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 587 return (EINVAL); 588 num_acl_group_obj++; 589 break; 590 case ACL_USER: 591 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 592 return (EINVAL); 593 num_acl_user++; 594 break; 595 case ACL_GROUP: 596 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 597 return (EINVAL); 598 num_acl_group++; 599 break; 600 case ACL_OTHER: 601 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 602 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 603 return (EINVAL); 604 num_acl_other++; 605 break; 606 case ACL_MASK: 607 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 608 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 609 return (EINVAL); 610 num_acl_mask++; 611 break; 612 default: 613 return (EINVAL); 614 } 615 /* 616 * Check for valid perm entries. 617 */ 618 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) != 619 ACL_PERM_BITS) 620 return (EINVAL); 621 } 622 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) || 623 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1)) 624 return (EINVAL); 625 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) && 626 (num_acl_mask != 1)) 627 return (EINVAL); 628 return (0); 629 } 630 631 /* 632 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the 633 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't 634 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also 635 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into 636 * per-filesystem-code. 637 */ 638 mode_t 639 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl) 640 { 641 mode_t mode; 642 643 mode = cmode; 644 /* 645 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be 646 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to 647 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly 648 * effected bits, then reconstruct. 649 */ 650 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK; 651 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl)); 652 653 return (mode); 654 } 655 656 657 static int 658 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg) 659 { 660 int ret; 661 662 ret = 0; 663 664 switch (what) { 665 case MOD_LOAD: 666 case MOD_SHUTDOWN: 667 break; 668 669 case MOD_QUIESCE: 670 /* XXX TODO */ 671 ret = 0; 672 break; 673 674 case MOD_UNLOAD: 675 /* XXX TODO */ 676 ret = 0; 677 break; 678 default: 679 ret = EINVAL; 680 break; 681 } 682 683 return (ret); 684 } 685 686 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = { 687 "acl_posix1e", 688 acl_posix1e_modload, 689 NULL 690 }; 691 692 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST); 693 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1); 694