xref: /freebsd/sys/kern/kern_priv.c (revision 1e413cf93298b5b97441a21d9a50fdcd0ee9945e)
1 /*-
2  * Copyright (c) 2006 nCircle Network Security, Inc.
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This software was developed by Robert N. M. Watson for the TrustedBSD
6  * Project under contract to nCircle Network Security, Inc.
7  *
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16  *
17  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
18  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR, NCIRCLE NETWORK SECURITY,
21  * INC., OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
22  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
23  * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
24  * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
25  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
26  * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
27  * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
28  *
29  * $FreeBSD$
30  */
31 
32 #include "opt_mac.h"
33 
34 #include <sys/param.h>
35 #include <sys/jail.h>
36 #include <sys/kernel.h>
37 #include <sys/priv.h>
38 #include <sys/proc.h>
39 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
40 #include <sys/systm.h>
41 
42 #include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
43 
44 /*
45  * `suser_enabled' (which can be set by the security.bsd.suser_enabled
46  * sysctl) determines whether the system 'super-user' policy is in effect.  If
47  * it is nonzero, an effective uid of 0 connotes special privilege,
48  * overriding many mandatory and discretionary protections.  If it is zero,
49  * uid 0 is offered no special privilege in the kernel security policy.
50  * Setting it to zero may seriously impact the functionality of many existing
51  * userland programs, and should not be done without careful consideration of
52  * the consequences.
53  */
54 static int	suser_enabled = 1;
55 SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, suser_enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
56     &suser_enabled, 0, "processes with uid 0 have privilege");
57 TUNABLE_INT("security.bsd.suser_enabled", &suser_enabled);
58 
59 /*
60  * Check a credential for privilege.  Lots of good reasons to deny privilege;
61  * only a few to grant it.
62  */
63 int
64 priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int flags)
65 {
66 	int error;
67 
68 	KASSERT(PRIV_VALID(priv), ("priv_check_cred: invalid privilege %d",
69 	    priv));
70 
71 	/*
72 	 * We first evaluate policies that may deny the granting of
73 	 * privilege unilaterally.
74 	 */
75 #ifdef MAC
76 	error = mac_priv_check(cred, priv);
77 	if (error)
78 		return (error);
79 #endif
80 
81 	/*
82 	 * Jail policy will restrict certain privileges that may otherwise be
83 	 * be granted.
84 	 */
85 	error = prison_priv_check(cred, priv);
86 	if (error)
87 		return (error);
88 
89 	/*
90 	 * Having determined if privilege is restricted by various policies,
91 	 * now determine if privilege is granted.  At this point, any policy
92 	 * may grant privilege.  For now, we allow short-circuit boolean
93 	 * evaluation, so may not call all policies.  Perhaps we should.
94 	 *
95 	 * Superuser policy grants privilege based on the effective (or in
96 	 * the case of specific privileges, real) uid being 0.  We allow the
97 	 * superuser policy to be globally disabled, although this is
98 	 * currenty of limited utility.
99 	 */
100 	if (suser_enabled) {
101 		switch (priv) {
102 		case PRIV_MAXFILES:
103 		case PRIV_MAXPROC:
104 		case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
105 			if (cred->cr_ruid == 0)
106 				return (0);
107 			break;
108 
109 		default:
110 			if (cred->cr_uid == 0)
111 				return (0);
112 			break;
113 		}
114 	}
115 
116 	/*
117 	 * Now check with MAC, if enabled, to see if a policy module grants
118 	 * privilege.
119 	 */
120 #ifdef MAC
121 	if (mac_priv_grant(cred, priv) == 0)
122 		return (0);
123 #endif
124 	return (EPERM);
125 }
126 
127 int
128 priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv)
129 {
130 
131 	KASSERT(td == curthread, ("priv_check: td != curthread"));
132 
133 	return (priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, priv, 0));
134 }
135 
136 /*
137  * Historical suser() wrapper functions, which now simply request PRIV_ROOT.
138  * These will be removed in the near future, and exist solely because
139  * the kernel and modules are not yet fully adapted to the new model.
140  */
141 int
142 suser_cred(struct ucred *cred, int flags)
143 {
144 
145 	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ROOT, flags));
146 }
147 
148 int
149 suser(struct thread *td)
150 {
151 
152 	KASSERT(td == curthread, ("suser: td != curthread"));
153 
154 	return (suser_cred(td->td_ucred, 0));
155 }
156