xref: /freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_seeotheruids.4 (revision aa1a8ff2d6dbc51ef058f46f3db5a8bb77967145)
1.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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4.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
5.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
6.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
7.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
8.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
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31.Dd July 25, 2015
32.Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4
33.Os
34.Sh NAME
35.Nm mac_seeotheruids
36.Nd "simple policy controlling whether users see other users"
37.Sh SYNOPSIS
38To compile the
39policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
40configuration file:
41.Bd -ragged -offset indent
42.Cd "options MAC"
43.Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS"
44.Ed
45.Pp
46Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line
47in your kernel configuration file:
48.Bd -ragged -offset indent
49.Cd "options MAC"
50.Ed
51.Pp
52and in
53.Xr loader.conf 5 :
54.Bd -literal -offset indent
55mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"
56.Ed
57.Sh DESCRIPTION
58The
59.Nm
60policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned
61by other users.
62.Pp
63To enable
64.Nm ,
65set the sysctl OID
66.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled
67to 1.
68To permit superuser awareness of other credentials by virtue of privilege,
69set the sysctl OID
70.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged
71to 1.
72.Pp
73To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group,
74set the sysctl OID
75.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
76to 1.
77.Pp
78To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
79set the sysctl OID
80.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled
81to 1, and
82.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid
83to the group ID to be exempted.
84.Ss Label Format
85No labels are defined for
86.Nm .
87.Sh SEE ALSO
88.Xr mac 4 ,
89.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
90.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
91.Xr mac_ddb 4 ,
92.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
93.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
94.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
95.Xr mac_none 4 ,
96.Xr mac_partition 4 ,
97.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
98.Xr mac_test 4 ,
99.Xr mac 9
100.Sh HISTORY
101The
102.Nm
103policy module first appeared in
104.Fx 5.0
105and was developed by the
106.Tn TrustedBSD
107Project.
108.Sh AUTHORS
109This software was contributed to the
110.Fx
111Project by Network Associates Labs,
112the Security Research Division of Network Associates
113Inc.
114under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
115.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
116as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
117.Sh BUGS
118While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
119the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
120point checks.
121As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
122to protect against a malicious privileged user.
123