xref: /freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_seeotheruids.4 (revision 4b2eaea43fec8e8792be611dea204071a10b655a)
1.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
2.\" All rights reserved.
3.\"
4.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
5.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
6.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
7.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
8.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
9.\"
10.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12.\" are met:
13.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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17.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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31.\" $FreeBSD$
32.Dd DECEMBER 8, 2002
33.Os
34.Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4
35.Sh NAME
36.Nm mac_seeotheruids
37.Nd simple policy controlling whether users see other users
38.Sh SYNOPSIS
39To compile the mac_seeotheruids
40policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
41configuration file:
42.Cd "options MAC"
43.Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS"
44.Pp
45Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line
46in your kernel configuration file:
47.Cd "options MAC"
48.Pp
49and in
50.Xr loader.conf.5 :
51.Cd mac_seeotheruids_load= Ns \&"YES"
52.Sh DESCRIPTION
53The
54.Nm
55policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned
56by other users.
57.Pp
58To enable
59.Nm ,
60set the sysctl OID
61.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled
62to
63.Li 1 .
64.Pp
65To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group,
66set the sysctl OID
67.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
68to
69.Li 1 .
70.Pp
71To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
72set the sysctl OID
73.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled
74to
75.Li 1 ,
76and
77.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid
78to the gid to be exempted.
79.Ss Label Format
80No labels are defined for
81.Nm .
82.Sh SEE ALSO
83.Xr mac 4 ,
84.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
85.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
86.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
87.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
88.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
89.Xr mac_partition 4 ,
90.Xr mac_none 4 ,
91.Xr mac_test 4 ,
92.Xr mac 9
93.Sh HISTORY
94The
95.Nm
96policy module first appeared in
97.Fx 5.0
98and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
99.Sh AUTHORS
100This software was contributed to the
101.Fx
102Project by Network Associates Labs,
103the Security Research Division of Network Associates
104Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
105as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
106.Sh BUGS
107See
108.Xr mac 9
109concerning appropriateness for production use.
110The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in
111.Fx .
112.Pp
113While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
114the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
115point checks.
116As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
117to protect against a malicious privileged user.
118