xref: /freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_seeotheruids.4 (revision 1b10e191f341111fad7be32ead11484dfd09b800)
1.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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4.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
5.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
6.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
7.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
8.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
9.\"
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31.\" $FreeBSD$
32.\"
33.Dd July 25, 2015
34.Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4
35.Os
36.Sh NAME
37.Nm mac_seeotheruids
38.Nd "simple policy controlling whether users see other users"
39.Sh SYNOPSIS
40To compile the
41policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
42configuration file:
43.Bd -ragged -offset indent
44.Cd "options MAC"
45.Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS"
46.Ed
47.Pp
48Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line
49in your kernel configuration file:
50.Bd -ragged -offset indent
51.Cd "options MAC"
52.Ed
53.Pp
54and in
55.Xr loader.conf 5 :
56.Bd -literal -offset indent
57mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"
58.Ed
59.Sh DESCRIPTION
60The
61.Nm
62policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned
63by other users.
64.Pp
65To enable
66.Nm ,
67set the sysctl OID
68.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled
69to 1.
70To permit superuser awareness of other credentials by virtue of privilege,
71set the sysctl OID
72.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged
73to 1.
74.Pp
75To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group,
76set the sysctl OID
77.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
78to 1.
79.Pp
80To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
81set the sysctl OID
82.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled
83to 1, and
84.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid
85to the group ID to be exempted.
86.Ss Label Format
87No labels are defined for
88.Nm .
89.Sh SEE ALSO
90.Xr mac 4 ,
91.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
92.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
93.Xr mac_ddb 4 ,
94.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
95.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
96.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
97.Xr mac_none 4 ,
98.Xr mac_partition 4 ,
99.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
100.Xr mac_test 4 ,
101.Xr mac 9
102.Sh HISTORY
103The
104.Nm
105policy module first appeared in
106.Fx 5.0
107and was developed by the
108.Tn TrustedBSD
109Project.
110.Sh AUTHORS
111This software was contributed to the
112.Fx
113Project by Network Associates Labs,
114the Security Research Division of Network Associates
115Inc.
116under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
117.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
118as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
119.Sh BUGS
120While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
121the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
122point checks.
123As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
124to protect against a malicious privileged user.
125