xref: /freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_partition.4 (revision e32fecd0c2c3ee37c47ee100f169e7eb0282a873)
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4.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
5.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
6.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
7.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
8.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
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31.\" $FreeBSD$
32.\"
33.Dd July 25, 2015
34.Dt MAC_PARTITION 4
35.Os
36.Sh NAME
37.Nm mac_partition
38.Nd "process partition policy"
39.Sh SYNOPSIS
40To compile the process partition policy into your kernel,
41place the following lines in your kernel
42configuration file:
43.Bd -ragged -offset indent
44.Cd "options MAC"
45.Cd "options MAC_PARTITION"
46.Ed
47.Pp
48Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time,
49place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
50.Bd -ragged -offset indent
51.Cd "options MAC"
52.Ed
53.Pp
54and in
55.Xr loader.conf 5 :
56.Bd -literal -offset indent
57mac_partition_load="YES"
58.Ed
59.Sh DESCRIPTION
60The
61.Nm
62policy module implements a process partition policy,
63which allows administrators to place running processes into
64.Dq partitions ,
65based on their numeric process partition
66(specified in the process's MAC label).
67Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the
68same partition.
69If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes
70in the system
71(subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).
72No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.
73.Ss Label Format
74Partition labels take on the following format:
75.Pp
76.Sm off
77.Dl Li partition / Ar value
78.Sm on
79.Pp
80Where
81.Ar value
82can be any integer value or
83.Dq Li none .
84For example:
85.Bd -literal -offset indent
86partition/1
87partition/20
88partition/none
89.Ed
90.Sh SEE ALSO
91.Xr mac 4 ,
92.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
93.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
94.Xr mac_ddb 4 ,
95.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
96.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
97.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
98.Xr mac_none 4 ,
99.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
100.Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 ,
101.Xr mac_test 4 ,
102.Xr maclabel 7 ,
103.Xr mac 9
104.Sh HISTORY
105The
106.Nm
107policy module first appeared in
108.Fx 5.0
109and was developed by the
110.Tn TrustedBSD
111Project.
112.Sh AUTHORS
113This software was contributed to the
114.Fx
115Project by Network Associates Labs,
116the Security Research Division of Network Associates
117Inc.
118under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
119.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
120as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
121.Sh BUGS
122While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
123the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
124point checks.
125As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
126to protect against a malicious privileged user.
127