xref: /freebsd/share/man/man4/mac_ifoff.4 (revision 8d20be1e22095c27faf8fe8b2f0d089739cc742e)
1.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
2.\" All rights reserved.
3.\"
4.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
5.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
6.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
7.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
8.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
9.\"
10.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12.\" are met:
13.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18.\"
19.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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21.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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30.\"
31.\" $FreeBSD$
32.\"
33.Dd December 10, 2002
34.Dt MAC_IFOFF 4
35.Os
36.Sh NAME
37.Nm mac_ifoff
38.Nd "interface silencing policy"
39.Sh SYNOPSIS
40To compile the interface silencing policy into your kernel,
41place the following lines in your kernel
42configuration file:
43.Bd -ragged -offset indent
44.Cd "options MAC"
45.Cd "options MAC_IFOFF"
46.Ed
47.Pp
48Alternately, to load the interface silencing policy module at boot time,
49place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
50.Bd -ragged -offset indent
51.Cd "options MAC"
52.Ed
53.Pp
54and in
55.Xr loader.conf 5 :
56.Bd -literal -offset indent
57mac_ifoff_load="YES"
58.Ed
59.Sh DESCRIPTION
60The
61.Nm
62interface silencing module allows administrators to enable and disable
63incoming and outgoing data flow on system network interfaces
64via the
65.Xr sysctl 8
66interface.
67.Pp
68To disable network traffic over the loopback
69.Pq Xr lo 4
70interface, set the
71.Xr sysctl 8
72OID
73.Va security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled
74to 0 (default 1).
75.Pp
76To enable network traffic over other interfaces,
77set the
78.Xr sysctl 8
79OID
80.Va security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled
81to 1 (default 0).
82.Pp
83To allow BPF traffic to be received,
84even while other traffic is disabled,
85set the
86.Xr sysctl 8
87OID
88.Va security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled
89to 1 (default 0).
90.Ss Label Format
91No labels are defined.
92.Sh SEE ALSO
93.Xr mac 4 ,
94.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
95.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
96.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
97.Xr mac_none 4 ,
98.Xr mac_partition 4 ,
99.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
100.Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 ,
101.Xr mac_test 4 ,
102.Xr mac 9
103.Sh HISTORY
104The
105.Nm
106policy module first appeared in
107.Fx 5.0
108and was developed by the
109.Tn TrustedBSD
110Project.
111.Sh AUTHORS
112This software was contributed to the
113.Fx
114Project by Network Associates Labs,
115the Security Research Division of Network Associates
116Inc.
117under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
118.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
119as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
120.Sh BUGS
121See
122.Xr mac 9
123concerning appropriateness for production use.
124The
125.Tn TrustedBSD
126MAC Framework is considered experimental in
127.Fx .
128.Pp
129While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
130the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
131point checks.
132As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
133to protect against a malicious privileged user.
134