.nr PI 2n .nr PS 12 .nr LL 15c .nr PO 3c .nr FM 3.5c .po 3c Jails: Confining the omnipotent root. .FS This paper was presented at the 2nd International System Administration and Networking Conference "SANE 2000" May 22-25, 2000 in Maastricht, The Netherlands and is published in the proceedings. .FE .AU Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@FreeBSD.org> .AU Robert N. M. Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> .AI The FreeBSD Project .FS This work was sponsored by http://www.servetheweb.com/ and donated to the FreeBSD Project for inclusion in the FreeBSD OS. FreeBSD 4.0-RELEASE was the first release including this code. Follow-on work was sponsored by Safeport Network Services, http://www.safeport.com/ .FE .AB The traditional UNIX security model is simple but inexpressive. Adding fine-grained access control improves the expressiveness, but often dramatically increases both the cost of system management and implementation complexity. In environments with a more complex management model, with delegation of some management functions to parties under varying degrees of trust, the base UNIX model and most natural extensions are inappropriate at best. Where multiple mutually un-trusting parties are introduced, ``inappropriate'' rapidly transitions to ``nightmarish'', especially with regards to data integrity and privacy protection.
The FreeBSD ``Jail'' facility provides the ability to partition the operating system environment, while maintaining the simplicity of the UNIX ``root'' model. In Jail, users with privilege find that the scope of their requests is limited to the jail, allowing system administrators to delegate management capabilities for each virtual machine environment. Creating virtual machines in this manner has many potential uses; the most popular thus far has been for providing virtual machine services in Internet Service Provider environments. .AE
IntroductionThe UNIX access control mechanism is designed for an environment with two types of users: those with, and without administrative privilege. Within this framework, every attempt is made to provide an open system, allowing easy sharing of files and inter-process communication. As a member of the UNIX family, FreeBSD inherits these security properties. Users of FreeBSD in non-traditional UNIX environments must balance their need for strong application support, high network performance and functionality, and low total cost of ownership with the need for alternative security models that are difficult or impossible to implement with the UNIX security mechanisms.
One such consideration is the desire to delegate some (but not all) administrative functions to untrusted or less trusted parties, and simultaneously impose system-wide mandatory policies on process interaction and sharing. Attempting to create such an environment in the current-day FreeBSD security environment is both difficult and costly: in many cases, the burden of implementing these policies falls on user applications, which means an increase in the size and complexity of the code base, in turn translating to higher development and maintenance cost, as well as less overall flexibility.
This abstract risk becomes more clear when applied to a practical, real-world example: many web service providers turn to the FreeBSD operating system to host customer web sites, as it provides a high-performance, network-centric server environment. However, these providers have a number of concerns on their plate, both in terms of protecting the integrity and confidentiality of their own files and services from their customers, as well as protecting the files and services of one customer from (accidental or intentional) access by any other customer. At the same time, a provider would like to provide substantial autonomy to customers, allowing them to install and maintain their own software, and to manage their own services, such as web servers and other content-related daemon programs.
This problem space points strongly in the direction of a partitioning solution, in which customer processes and storage are isolated from those of other customers, both in terms of accidental disclosure of data or process information, but also in terms of the ability to modify files or processes outside of a compartment. Delegation of management functions within the system must be possible, but not at the cost of system-wide requirements, including integrity and privacy protection between partitions.
However, UNIX-style access control makes it notoriously difficult to compartmentalise functionality. While mechanisms such as chroot(2) provide a modest level compartmentalisation, it is well known that these mechanisms have serious shortcomings, both in terms of the scope of their functionality, and effectiveness at what they provide \s-2[CHROOT]\s+2.
In the case of the chroot(2) call, a process's visibility of the file system name-space is limited to a single subtree. However, the compartmentalisation does not extend to the process or networking spaces and therefore both observation of and interference with processes outside their compartment is possible.
To this end, we describe the new FreeBSD ``Jail'' facility, which provides a strong partitioning solution, leveraging existing mechanisms, such as chroot(2), to what effectively amounts to a virtual machine environment. Processes in a jail are provided full access to the files that they may manipulate, processes they may influence, and network services they can make use of, and neither access nor visibility of files, processes or network services outside their partition.
Unlike other fine-grained security solutions, Jail does not substantially increase the policy management requirements for the system administrator, as each Jail is a virtual FreeBSD environment permitting local policy to be independently managed, with much the same properties as the main system itself, making Jail easy to use for the administrator, and far more compatible with applications.
Traditional UNIX Security, or, ``God, root, what difference?" \s-2[UF]\s+2.The traditional UNIX access model assigns numeric uids to each user of the system. In turn, each process ``owned'' by a user will be tagged with that user's uid in an unforgeable manner. The uids serve two purposes: first, they determine how discretionary access control mechanisms will be applied, and second, they are used to determine whether special privileges are accorded.
In the case of discretionary access controls, the primary object protected is a file. The uid (and related gids indicating group membership) are mapped to a set of rights for each object, courtesy the UNIX file mode, in effect acting as a limited form of access control list. Jail is, in general, not concerned with modifying the semantics of discretionary access control mechanisms, although there are important implications from a management perspective.
For the purposes of determining whether special privileges are accorded to a process, the check is simple: ``is the numeric uid equal to 0 ?''. If so, the process is acting with ``super-user privileges'', and all access checks are granted, in effect allowing the process the ability to do whatever it wants to \**. .FS ... no matter how patently stupid it may be. .FE
For the purposes of human convenience, uid 0 is canonically allocated to the ``root'' user \s-2[ROOT]\s+2. For the purposes of jail, this behaviour is extremely relevant: many of these privileged operations can be used to manage system hardware and configuration, file system name-space, and special network operations.
Many limitations to this model are immediately clear: the root user is a single, concentrated source of privilege that is exposed to many pieces of software, and as such an immediate target for attacks. In the event of a compromise of the root capability set, the attacker has complete control over the system. Even without an attacker, the risks of a single administrative account are serious: delegating a narrow scope of capability to an inexperienced administrator is difficult, as the granularity of delegation is that of all system management abilities. These features make the omnipotent root account a sharp, efficient and extremely dangerous tool.
The BSD family of operating systems have implemented the ``securelevel'' mechanism which allows the administrator to block certain configuration and management functions from being performed by root, until the system is restarted and brought up into single-user mode. While this does provide some amount of protection in the case of a root compromise of the machine, it does nothing to address the need for delegation of certain root abilities.
Other Solutions to the Root ProblemMany operating systems attempt to address these limitations by providing fine-grained access controls for system resources \s-2[BIBA]\s+2. These efforts vary in degrees of success, but almost all suffer from at least three serious limitations:
First, increasing the granularity of security controls increases the complexity of the administration process, in turn increasing both the opportunity for incorrect configuration, as well as the demand on administrator time and resources. In many cases, the increased complexity results in significant frustration for the administrator, which may result in two disastrous types of policy: ``all doors open as it's too much trouble'', and ``trust that the system is secure, when in fact it isn't''.
The extent of the trouble is best illustrated by the fact that an entire niche industry has emerged providing tools to manage fine grained security controls \s-2[UAS]\s+2.
Second, usefully segregating capabilities and assigning them to running code and users is very difficult. Many privileged operations in UNIX seem independent, but are in fact closely related, and the handing out of one privilege may, in effect, be transitive to the many others. For example, in some trusted operating systems, a system capability may be assigned to a running process to allow it to read any file, for the purposes of backup. However, this capability is, in effect, equivalent to the ability to switch to any other account, as the ability to access any file provides access to system keying material, which in turn provides the ability to authenticate as any user. Similarly, many operating systems attempt to segregate management capabilities from auditing capabilities. In a number of these operating systems, however, ``management capabilities'' permit the administrator to assign ``auditing capabilities'' to itself, or another account, circumventing the segregation of capability.
Finally, introducing new security features often involves introducing new security management APIs. When fine-grained capabilities are introduced to replace the setuid mechanism in UNIX-like operating systems, applications that previously did an ``appropriateness check'' to see if they were running as root before executing must now be changed to know that they need not run as root. In the case of applications running with privilege and executing other programs, there is now a new set of privileges that must be voluntarily given up before executing another program. These change can introduce significant incompatibility for existing applications, and make life more difficult for application developers who may not be aware of differing security semantics on different systems \s-2[POSIX1e]\s+2.
The Jail Partitioning SolutionJail neatly side-steps the majority of these problems through partitioning. Rather than introduce additional fine-grained access control mechanism, we partition a FreeBSD environment (processes, file system, network resources) into a management environment, and optionally subset Jail environments. In doing so, we simultaneously maintain the existing UNIX security model, allowing multiple users and a privileged root user in each jail, while limiting the scope of root's activities to his jail. Consequently the administrator of a FreeBSD machine can partition the machine into separate jails, and provide access to the super-user account in each of these without losing control of the over-all environment.
A process in a partition is referred to as ``in jail''. When a FreeBSD system is booted up after a fresh install, no processes will be in jail. When a process is placed in a jail, it, and any descendents of the process created after the jail creation, will be in that jail. A process may be in only one jail, and after creation, it can not leave the jail. Jails are created when a privileged process calls the jail(2) syscall, with a description of the jail as an argument to the call. Each call to jail(2) creates a new jail; the only way for a new process to enter the jail is by inheriting access to the jail from another process already in that jail. Processes may never leave the jail they created, or were created in. .KF
1 Fig. 1 \(em Schematic diagram of machine with two configured jails .KE
Membership in a jail involves a number of restrictions: access to the file name-space is restricted in the style of chroot(2), the ability to bind network resources is limited to a specific IP address, the ability to manipulate system resources and perform privileged operations is sharply curtailed, and the ability to interact with other processes is limited to only processes inside the same jail.
Jail takes advantage of the existing chroot(2) behaviour to limit access to the file system name-space for jailed processes. When a jail is created, it is bound to a particular file system root. Processes are unable to manipulate files that they cannot address, and as such the integrity and confidentiality of files outside of the jail file system root are protected. Traditional mechanisms for breaking out of chroot(2) have been blocked. In the expected and documented configuration, each jail is provided with its exclusive file system root, and standard FreeBSD directory layout, but this is not mandated by the implementation.
Each jail is bound to a single IP address: processes within the jail may not make use of any other IP address for outgoing or incoming connections; this includes the ability to restrict what network services a particular jail may offer. As FreeBSD distinguishes attempts to bind all IP addresses from attempts to bind a particular address, bind requests for all IP addresses are redirected to the individual Jail address. Some network functionality associated with privileged calls are wholesale disabled due to the nature of the functionality offered, in particular facilities which would allow ``spoofing'' of IP numbers or disruptive traffic to be generated have been disabled.
Processes running without root privileges will notice few, if any differences between a jailed environment or un-jailed environment. Processes running with root privileges will find that many restrictions apply to the privileged calls they may make. Some calls will now return an access error \(em for example, an attempt to create a device node will now fail. Others will have a more limited scope than normal \(em attempts to bind a reserved port number on all available addresses will result in binding only the address associated with the jail. Other calls will succeed as normal: root may read a file owned by any uid, as long as it is accessible through the jail file system name-space.
Processes within the jail will find that they are unable to interact or even verify the existence of processes outside the jail \(em processes within the jail are prevented from delivering signals to processes outside the jail, as well as connecting to those processes with debuggers, or even see them in the sysctl or process file system monitoring mechanisms. Jail does not prevent, nor is it intended to prevent, the use of covert channels or communications mechanisms via accepted interfaces \(em for example, two processes may communicate via sockets over the IP network interface. Nor does it attempt to provide scheduling services based on the partition; however, it does prevent calls that interfere with normal process operation.
As a result of these attempts to retain the standard FreeBSD API and framework, almost all applications will run unaffected. Standard system services such as Telnet, FTP, and SSH all behave normally, as do most third party applications, including the popular Apache web server.
Jail ImplementationProcesses running with root privileges in the jail find that there are serious restrictions on what it is capable of doing \(em in particular, activities that would extend outside of the jail:
Other privileged activities are permitted as long as they are limited to the scope of the jail:
These restrictions on root access limit the scope of root processes, enabling most applications to run un-hindered, but preventing calls that might allow an application to reach beyond the jail and influence other processes or system-wide configuration.
.so implementation.ms .so mgt.ms .so future.ms
ConclusionThe jail facility provides FreeBSD with a conceptually simple security partitioning mechanism, allowing the delegation of administrative rights within virtual machine partitions.
The implementation relies on restricting access within the jail environment to a well-defined subset of the overall host environment. This includes limiting interaction between processes, and to files, network resources, and privileged operations. Administrative overhead is reduced through avoiding fine-grained access control mechanisms, and maintaining a consistent administrative interface across partitions and the host environment.
The jail facility has already seen widespread deployment in particular as a vehicle for delivering "virtual private server" services.
The jail code is included in the base system as part of FreeBSD 4.0-RELEASE, and fully documented in the jail(2) and jail(8) man-pages. .bp
Notes & References\s-2http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dpetrou/papers/freebsd_lottery_writeup98.ps\s+2 \s-2http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dpetrou/code/freebsd_lottery_code.tar.gz\s+2\s-2[LOTTERY2]\s+2 .5iCarl A. Waldspurger and William E. Weihl. Lottery Scheduling: Flexible Proportional-Share Resource Management, Proceedings of the First Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI '94), pages 1-11, Monterey, California, November 1994.\s-2http://www.research.digital.com/SRC/personal/caw/papers.html\s+2\s-2[POSIX1e]\s+2 .5iDraft Standard for Information Technology \(em Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) \(em Part 1: System Application Program Interface (API) \(em Amendment: Protection, Audit and Control Interfaces [C Language] IEEE Std 1003.1e Draft 17 Editor Casey Schaufler\s-2[ROOT]\s+2 .5iHistorically other names have been used at times, Zilog for instance called the super-user account ``zeus''.\s-2[UAS]\s+2 .5iOne such niche product is the ``UAS'' system to maintain and audit RACF configurations on MVS systems.\s-2http://www.entactinfo.com/products/uas/\s+2\s-2[UF]\s+2 .5iQuote from the User-Friendly cartoon by Illiad.\s-2http://www.userfriendly.org/cartoons/archives/98nov/19981111.html\s+2