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Title "SSL_KEY_UPDATE 3"
SSL_KEY_UPDATE 3 "2023-05-30" "1.1.1u" "OpenSSL"
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"NAME"
SSL_key_update, SSL_get_key_update_type, SSL_renegotiate, SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated, SSL_renegotiate_pending \- initiate and obtain information about updating connection keys
"SYNOPSIS"
Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 1 #include <openssl/ssl.h> \& int SSL_key_update(SSL *s, int updatetype); int SSL_get_key_update_type(const SSL *s); \& int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_pending(const SSL *s); .Ve
"DESCRIPTION"
Header "DESCRIPTION" \fBSSL_key_update() schedules an update of the keys for the current \s-1TLS\s0 connection. If the updatetype parameter is set to \s-1SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED\s0 then the sending keys for this connection will be updated and the peer will be informed of the change. If the updatetype parameter is set to \fB\s-1SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED\s0 then the sending keys for this connection will be updated and the peer will be informed of the change along with a request for the peer to additionally update its sending keys. It is an error if updatetype is set to \s-1SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE\s0.

\fBSSL_key_update() must only be called after the initial handshake has been completed and TLSv1.3 has been negotiated. The key update will not take place until the next time an \s-1IO\s0 operation such as SSL_read_ex() or SSL_write_ex() takes place on the connection. Alternatively SSL_do_handshake() can be called to force the update to take place immediately.

\fBSSL_get_key_update_type() can be used to determine whether a key update operation has been scheduled but not yet performed. The type of the pending key update operation will be returned if there is one, or \s-1SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE\s0 otherwise.

\fBSSL_renegotiate() and SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() should only be called for connections that have negotiated TLSv1.2 or less. Calling them on any other connection will result in an error.

When called from the client side, SSL_renegotiate() schedules a completely new handshake over an existing \s-1SSL/TLS\s0 connection. The next time an \s-1IO\s0 operation such as SSL_read_ex() or SSL_write_ex() takes place on the connection a check will be performed to confirm that it is a suitable time to start a renegotiation. If so, then it will be initiated immediately. OpenSSL will not attempt to resume any session associated with the connection in the new handshake.

When called from the client side, SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() works in the same was as SSL_renegotiate() except that OpenSSL will attempt to resume the session associated with the current connection in the new handshake.

When called from the server side, SSL_renegotiate() and \fBSSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() behave identically. They both schedule a request for a new handshake to be sent to the client. The next time an \s-1IO\s0 operation is performed then the same checks as on the client side are performed and then, if appropriate, the request is sent. The client may or may not respond with a new handshake and it may or may not attempt to resume an existing session. If a new handshake is started then this will be handled transparently by calling any OpenSSL \s-1IO\s0 function.

If an OpenSSL client receives a renegotiation request from a server then again this will be handled transparently through calling any OpenSSL \s-1IO\s0 function. For a \s-1TLS\s0 connection the client will attempt to resume the current session in the new handshake. For historical reasons, \s-1DTLS\s0 clients will not attempt to resume the session in the new handshake.

The SSL_renegotiate_pending() function returns 1 if a renegotiation or renegotiation request has been scheduled but not yet acted on, or 0 otherwise.

"RETURN VALUES"
Header "RETURN VALUES" \fBSSL_key_update(), SSL_renegotiate() and SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() return 1 on success or 0 on error.

\fBSSL_get_key_update_type() returns the update type of the pending key update operation or \s-1SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE\s0 if there is none.

\fBSSL_renegotiate_pending() returns 1 if a renegotiation or renegotiation request has been scheduled but not yet acted on, or 0 otherwise.

"SEE ALSO"
Header "SEE ALSO" \fBssl\|(7), SSL_read_ex\|(3), \fBSSL_write_ex\|(3), \fBSSL_do_handshake\|(3)
"HISTORY"
Header "HISTORY" The SSL_key_update() and SSL_get_key_update_type() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
"COPYRIGHT"
Header "COPYRIGHT" Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.