1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 10 */ 11 12 #include <stdio.h> 13 #include "../ssl_local.h" 14 #include "statem_local.h" 15 #include "internal/constant_time.h" 16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 17 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 18 #include <openssl/rand.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 22 #include <openssl/x509.h> 23 #include <openssl/dh.h> 24 #include <openssl/bn.h> 25 #include <openssl/md5.h> 26 #include <openssl/asn1t.h> 27 28 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 29 30 typedef struct { 31 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob; 32 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob; 33 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE; 34 35 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) 36 37 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = { 38 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY), 39 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY), 40 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) 41 42 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) 43 44 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); 45 46 /* 47 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 48 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from 49 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. 50 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 51 * 52 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 53 * (transition not allowed) 54 */ 55 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 56 { 57 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 58 59 /* 60 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have 61 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by 62 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() 63 */ 64 switch (st->hand_state) { 65 default: 66 break; 67 68 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 69 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 72 return 1; 73 } 74 break; 75 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { 76 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { 77 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 78 return 1; 79 } 80 break; 81 } 82 /* Fall through */ 83 84 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 85 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 86 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 87 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 88 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 89 return 1; 90 } 91 } else { 92 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 93 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 94 return 1; 95 } 96 } 97 break; 98 99 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 100 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 101 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 102 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 103 return 1; 104 } 105 } else { 106 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 107 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 108 return 1; 109 } 110 } 111 break; 112 113 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 116 return 1; 117 } 118 break; 119 120 case TLS_ST_OK: 121 /* 122 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of 123 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) 124 */ 125 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) 126 break; 127 128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 129 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 130 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 131 return 1; 132 } 133 134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { 135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; 136 return 1; 137 } 138 break; 139 } 140 141 /* No valid transition found */ 142 return 0; 143 } 144 145 /* 146 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 147 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the 148 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The 149 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 150 * 151 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 152 * (transition not allowed) 153 */ 154 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 155 { 156 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 157 158 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 159 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) 160 goto err; 161 return 1; 162 } 163 164 switch (st->hand_state) { 165 default: 166 break; 167 168 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 169 case TLS_ST_OK: 170 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 173 return 1; 174 } 175 break; 176 177 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 178 /* 179 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either 180 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate 181 * OR 182 * 2) If we did request one then 183 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned 184 * AND 185 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 186 * list if we requested a certificate) 187 */ 188 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 189 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 190 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 191 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 192 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 193 /* 194 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just 195 * not going to accept it because we require a client 196 * cert. 197 */ 198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 199 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, 200 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 201 return 0; 202 } 203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 204 return 1; 205 } 206 } else { 207 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 208 return 1; 209 } 210 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 213 return 1; 214 } 215 } 216 break; 217 218 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 221 return 1; 222 } 223 break; 224 225 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 226 /* 227 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have 228 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| 229 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is 230 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in 231 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be 232 * set. 233 */ 234 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { 235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 236 /* 237 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 238 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 239 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 240 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 241 */ 242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 243 return 1; 244 } 245 } else { 246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 248 return 1; 249 } 250 } 251 break; 252 253 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 256 return 1; 257 } 258 break; 259 260 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 262 if (s->s3->npn_seen) { 263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { 264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; 265 return 1; 266 } 267 } else { 268 #endif 269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 271 return 1; 272 } 273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 274 } 275 #endif 276 break; 277 278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 279 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 282 return 1; 283 } 284 break; 285 #endif 286 287 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 288 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 290 return 1; 291 } 292 break; 293 } 294 295 err: 296 /* No valid transition found */ 297 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 298 BIO *rbio; 299 300 /* 301 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably 302 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. 303 */ 304 s->init_num = 0; 305 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 306 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 307 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 308 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 309 return 0; 310 } 311 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 312 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, 313 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 314 return 0; 315 } 316 317 /* 318 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? 319 * 320 * Valid return values are: 321 * 1: Yes 322 * 0: No 323 */ 324 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 325 { 326 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 327 328 /* 329 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a 330 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 331 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 332 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 333 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 334 * key exchange. 335 */ 336 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) 337 /* 338 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 339 * provided 340 */ 341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 342 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ 343 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) 344 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) 345 /* For other PSK always send SKE */ 346 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) 347 #endif 348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 349 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 350 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 351 #endif 352 ) { 353 return 1; 354 } 355 356 return 0; 357 } 358 359 /* 360 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? 361 * 362 * Valid return values are: 363 * 1: Yes 364 * 0: No 365 */ 366 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 367 { 368 if ( 369 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 370 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER 371 /* 372 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing 373 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: 374 */ 375 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) 376 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) 377 /* 378 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 379 * a second time: 380 */ 381 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || 382 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) 383 /* 384 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 385 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 386 * RFC 2246): 387 */ 388 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 389 /* 390 * ... except when the application insists on 391 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts 392 * this for SSL 3) 393 */ 394 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 395 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 397 /* 398 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 399 * are omitted 400 */ 401 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { 402 return 1; 403 } 404 405 return 0; 406 } 407 408 /* 409 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 410 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the 411 * client. 412 */ 413 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) 414 { 415 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 416 417 /* 418 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated 419 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() 420 */ 421 422 switch (st->hand_state) { 423 default: 424 /* Shouldn't happen */ 425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 426 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, 427 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 428 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 429 430 case TLS_ST_OK: 431 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; 433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 434 } 435 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 438 } 439 /* Try to read from the client instead */ 440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 441 442 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 445 446 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 447 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 448 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) 449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 450 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 452 else 453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 455 456 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 457 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 458 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 459 else 460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 462 463 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 464 if (s->hit) 465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 466 else if (send_certificate_request(s)) 467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 468 else 469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 470 471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 472 473 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 474 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 475 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; 476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 477 } else { 478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 479 } 480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 481 482 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; 484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 485 486 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 489 490 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 493 494 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 496 497 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 498 /* 499 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're 500 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets 501 * immediately. 502 */ 503 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 504 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; 505 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { 506 /* 507 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the 508 * handshake at this point. 509 */ 510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 512 } 513 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) 514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 515 else 516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 518 519 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 520 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 523 524 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 525 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. 526 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have 527 * been configured for. 528 */ 529 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { 530 /* We've written enough tickets out. */ 531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 532 } 533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 534 } 535 } 536 537 /* 538 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move 539 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. 540 */ 541 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) 542 { 543 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 544 545 /* 546 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going 547 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later 548 */ 549 550 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 551 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); 552 553 switch (st->hand_state) { 554 default: 555 /* Shouldn't happen */ 556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 557 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, 558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 559 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 560 561 case TLS_ST_OK: 562 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { 563 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ 564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; 565 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; 566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 567 } 568 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ 569 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { 570 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 571 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 572 } 573 /* Fall through */ 574 575 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 576 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ 577 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 578 579 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 582 583 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 584 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified 585 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { 586 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 587 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 588 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ 589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 591 } else { 592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 593 } 594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 595 596 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 597 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 598 599 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 600 if (s->hit) { 601 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) 602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 603 else 604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 605 } else { 606 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 607 /* normal PSK or SRP */ 608 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 609 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { 610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 611 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 613 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 615 } else { 616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 617 } 618 } 619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 620 621 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 622 if (s->ext.status_expected) { 623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; 624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 625 } 626 /* Fall through */ 627 628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 629 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 632 } 633 /* Fall through */ 634 635 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 636 if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 639 } 640 /* Fall through */ 641 642 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 645 646 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 647 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 648 649 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 650 if (s->hit) { 651 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 653 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 655 } else { 656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 657 } 658 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 659 660 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 663 664 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 665 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 667 668 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 669 if (s->hit) { 670 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 671 } 672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 673 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 674 } 675 } 676 677 /* 678 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from 679 * the server to the client. 680 */ 681 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 682 { 683 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 684 685 switch (st->hand_state) { 686 default: 687 /* No pre work to be done */ 688 break; 689 690 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 691 s->shutdown = 0; 692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 693 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 694 break; 695 696 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 697 s->shutdown = 0; 698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 699 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 700 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ 701 st->use_timer = 0; 702 } 703 break; 704 705 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 707 /* 708 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and 709 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now 710 */ 711 st->use_timer = 1; 712 } 713 break; 714 715 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { 718 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 719 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); 720 } 721 #endif 722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 723 724 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 725 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) { 726 /* 727 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going 728 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off 729 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. 730 * 731 * Calls SSLfatal as required. 732 */ 733 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); 734 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 735 /* 736 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 737 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer 738 */ 739 st->use_timer = 0; 740 } 741 break; 742 743 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 744 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 745 break; 746 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */ 747 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { 748 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 749 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) { 750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 751 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK, 752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 753 return WORK_ERROR; 754 } 755 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 756 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 757 return WORK_ERROR; 758 } 759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 760 /* 761 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 762 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have 763 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, 764 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. 765 */ 766 st->use_timer = 0; 767 } 768 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 769 770 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 771 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING 772 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 773 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 774 /* Fall through */ 775 776 case TLS_ST_OK: 777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 778 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); 779 } 780 781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 782 } 783 784 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) 785 { 786 switch (get_last_sys_error()) { 787 #if defined(EPIPE) 788 case EPIPE: 789 return 1; 790 #endif 791 #if defined(ECONNRESET) 792 case ECONNRESET: 793 return 1; 794 #endif 795 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET) 796 case WSAECONNRESET: 797 return 1; 798 #endif 799 default: 800 return 0; 801 } 802 } 803 804 /* 805 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the 806 * server to the client. 807 */ 808 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 809 { 810 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 811 812 s->init_num = 0; 813 814 switch (st->hand_state) { 815 default: 816 /* No post work to be done */ 817 break; 818 819 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 820 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 821 return WORK_MORE_A; 822 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 823 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 824 return WORK_ERROR; 825 } 826 break; 827 828 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 829 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 830 return WORK_MORE_A; 831 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ 832 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 833 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 834 return WORK_ERROR; 835 } 836 /* 837 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to 838 * treat like it was the first packet 839 */ 840 s->first_packet = 1; 841 break; 842 843 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 845 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 846 && statem_flush(s) != 1) 847 return WORK_MORE_A; 848 break; 849 } 850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 851 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 852 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 853 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 854 size_t labellen; 855 856 /* 857 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no 858 * SCTP used. 859 */ 860 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 861 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 862 863 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 864 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 865 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 866 labellen += 1; 867 868 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 869 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 870 labellen, NULL, 0, 871 0) <= 0) { 872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 873 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, 874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 875 return WORK_ERROR; 876 } 877 878 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 879 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 880 } 881 #endif 882 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 883 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 884 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) 885 break; 886 /* Fall through */ 887 888 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 889 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 890 if (!statem_flush(s)) 891 return WORK_MORE_A; 892 break; 893 } 894 895 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 896 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) 897 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 898 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 899 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 900 return WORK_ERROR; 901 } 902 903 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 904 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 905 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 906 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 907 return WORK_ERROR; 908 } 909 /* 910 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive 911 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted 912 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. 913 */ 914 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; 915 break; 916 } 917 918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 919 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { 920 /* 921 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 922 * no SCTP used. 923 */ 924 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 925 0, NULL); 926 } 927 #endif 928 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 929 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 930 { 931 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 932 return WORK_ERROR; 933 } 934 935 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 936 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 937 break; 938 939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 940 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 941 return WORK_MORE_A; 942 break; 943 944 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 945 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 946 return WORK_MORE_A; 947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 948 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 949 /* 950 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 951 * no SCTP used. 952 */ 953 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 954 0, NULL); 955 } 956 #endif 957 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 958 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ 959 size_t dummy; 960 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 961 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, 962 &dummy) 963 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 964 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 965 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 966 return WORK_ERROR; 967 } 968 break; 969 970 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 971 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 972 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 973 return WORK_MORE_A; 974 } 975 break; 976 977 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 978 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 979 return WORK_MORE_A; 980 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { 981 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 982 return WORK_ERROR; 983 } 984 break; 985 986 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 987 clear_sys_error(); 988 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { 989 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 990 && conn_is_closed()) { 991 /* 992 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a 993 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is 994 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client 995 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without 996 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. 997 */ 998 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 999 break; 1000 } 1001 1002 return WORK_MORE_A; 1003 } 1004 break; 1005 } 1006 1007 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 1008 } 1009 1010 /* 1011 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the 1012 * server 1013 * 1014 * Valid return values are: 1015 * 1: Success 1016 * 0: Error 1017 */ 1018 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1019 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) 1020 { 1021 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1022 1023 switch (st->hand_state) { 1024 default: 1025 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1027 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, 1028 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 1029 return 0; 1030 1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 1032 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 1033 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1034 else 1035 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1036 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 1037 break; 1038 1039 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 1040 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; 1041 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 1042 break; 1043 1044 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 1045 /* No construction function needed */ 1046 *confunc = NULL; 1047 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 1048 break; 1049 1050 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 1051 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; 1052 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1053 break; 1054 1055 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 1056 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; 1057 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; 1058 break; 1059 1060 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 1061 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; 1062 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; 1063 break; 1064 1065 1066 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 1067 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; 1068 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1069 break; 1070 1071 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 1072 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; 1073 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1074 break; 1075 1076 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 1077 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; 1078 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1079 break; 1080 1081 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 1082 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; 1083 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 1084 break; 1085 1086 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 1087 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; 1088 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 1089 break; 1090 1091 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 1092 *confunc = tls_construct_finished; 1093 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; 1094 break; 1095 1096 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 1097 *confunc = NULL; 1098 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; 1099 break; 1100 1101 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1102 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; 1103 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 1104 break; 1105 1106 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 1107 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; 1108 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; 1109 break; 1110 } 1111 1112 return 1; 1113 } 1114 1115 /* 1116 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, 1117 * calculated as follows: 1118 * 1119 * 2 + # client_version 1120 * 32 + # only valid length for random 1121 * 1 + # length of session_id 1122 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id 1123 * 2 + # length of cipher suites 1124 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array 1125 * 1 + # length of compression_methods 1126 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods 1127 * 2 + # length of extensions 1128 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions 1129 */ 1130 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 1131 1132 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 1133 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 1134 1135 /* 1136 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are 1137 * reading. Excludes the message header. 1138 */ 1139 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) 1140 { 1141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1142 1143 switch (st->hand_state) { 1144 default: 1145 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1146 return 0; 1147 1148 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1149 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; 1150 1151 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1152 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; 1153 1154 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1155 return s->max_cert_list; 1156 1157 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1158 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; 1159 1160 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1161 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1162 1163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1164 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1165 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; 1166 #endif 1167 1168 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1169 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; 1170 1171 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1172 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; 1173 1174 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1175 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; 1176 } 1177 } 1178 1179 /* 1180 * Process a message that the server has received from the client. 1181 */ 1182 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1183 { 1184 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1185 1186 switch (st->hand_state) { 1187 default: 1188 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1190 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1192 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1193 1194 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1195 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); 1196 1197 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1198 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); 1199 1200 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1201 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); 1202 1203 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1204 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); 1205 1206 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1207 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); 1208 1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1210 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1211 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); 1212 #endif 1213 1214 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1215 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); 1216 1217 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1218 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); 1219 1220 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1221 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); 1222 1223 } 1224 } 1225 1226 /* 1227 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message 1228 * from the client 1229 */ 1230 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1231 { 1232 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1233 1234 switch (st->hand_state) { 1235 default: 1236 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1238 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1240 return WORK_ERROR; 1241 1242 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1243 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); 1244 1245 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1246 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); 1247 } 1248 } 1249 1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1251 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ 1252 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) 1253 { 1254 int ret; 1255 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1256 1257 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 1258 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 1259 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 1260 /* 1261 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 1262 * login name 1263 */ 1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 1265 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, 1266 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 1267 return -1; 1268 } else { 1269 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); 1270 if (ret < 0) 1271 return 0; 1272 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { 1273 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, 1274 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1275 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 1276 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1277 return -1; 1278 } 1279 } 1280 } 1281 return 1; 1282 } 1283 #endif 1284 1285 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, 1286 size_t cookie_len) 1287 { 1288 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ 1289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) 1290 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) 1291 return 0; 1292 1293 return 1; 1294 } 1295 1296 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 1297 { 1298 unsigned int cookie_leni; 1299 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || 1300 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, 1301 &cookie_leni) == 0 || 1302 cookie_leni > 255) { 1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 1304 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 1305 return 0; 1306 } 1307 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; 1308 1309 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, 1310 s->d1->cookie_len)) { 1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 1312 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1313 return 0; 1314 } 1315 1316 return 1; 1317 } 1318 1319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1320 /*- 1321 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1322 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. 1323 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1324 * SNI, 1325 * elliptic_curves 1326 * ec_point_formats 1327 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) 1328 * 1329 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1330 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1331 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1332 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1333 */ 1334 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) 1335 { 1336 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1337 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1338 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1339 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1340 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1341 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1342 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1343 1344 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1345 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1346 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1347 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1348 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1349 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1350 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1351 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1352 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1353 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1354 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1355 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1356 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1357 }; 1358 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ 1359 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; 1360 unsigned int type; 1361 PACKET sni, tmppkt; 1362 size_t ext_len; 1363 1364 tmppkt = hello->extensions; 1365 1366 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) 1367 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) 1368 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { 1369 return; 1370 } 1371 1372 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1373 return; 1374 1375 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? 1376 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; 1377 1378 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, 1379 ext_len); 1380 } 1381 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1382 1383 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1384 { 1385 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ 1386 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; 1387 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; 1388 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; 1389 1390 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ 1391 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1392 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { 1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1394 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1395 goto err; 1396 } 1397 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 1398 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding 1399 && (s->options 1400 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { 1401 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1402 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1403 } 1404 s->renegotiate = 1; 1405 s->new_session = 1; 1406 } 1407 1408 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); 1409 if (clienthello == NULL) { 1410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1411 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1412 goto err; 1413 } 1414 1415 /* 1416 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. 1417 */ 1418 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); 1419 PACKET_null_init(&cookie); 1420 1421 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1422 unsigned int mt; 1423 1424 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 1425 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1427 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1428 goto err; 1429 } 1430 1431 /*- 1432 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 1433 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS 1434 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes 1435 * the rest right through. Its format is: 1436 * Byte Content 1437 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer 1438 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here 1439 * 3-4 version 1440 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length 1441 * 7-8 session_id_length 1442 * 9-10 challenge_length 1443 * ... ... 1444 */ 1445 1446 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) 1447 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 1448 /* 1449 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record 1450 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record 1451 * in the first place 1452 */ 1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1455 goto err; 1456 } 1457 } 1458 1459 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { 1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1461 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1462 goto err; 1463 } 1464 1465 /* Parse the message and load client random. */ 1466 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1467 /* 1468 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello 1469 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. 1470 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. 1471 */ 1472 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; 1473 PACKET challenge; 1474 1475 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) 1476 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) 1477 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { 1478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1479 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1480 goto err; 1481 } 1482 1483 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { 1484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1485 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1486 goto err; 1487 } 1488 1489 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1490 ciphersuite_len) 1491 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) 1492 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) 1493 /* No extensions. */ 1494 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1496 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1497 goto err; 1498 } 1499 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; 1500 1501 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1502 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit 1503 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if 1504 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. 1505 */ 1506 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1507 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; 1508 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1509 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, 1510 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 1511 challenge_len, challenge_len) 1512 /* Advertise only null compression. */ 1513 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { 1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1516 goto err; 1517 } 1518 1519 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1520 } else { 1521 /* Regular ClientHello. */ 1522 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 1523 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) 1524 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, 1525 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, 1526 &clienthello->session_id_len)) { 1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1528 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1529 goto err; 1530 } 1531 1532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1533 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { 1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1536 goto err; 1537 } 1538 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1539 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, 1540 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { 1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1542 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1543 goto err; 1544 } 1545 /* 1546 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, 1547 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. 1548 * So check cookie length... 1549 */ 1550 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1551 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { 1552 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1553 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1554 } 1555 } 1556 } 1557 1558 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { 1559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1560 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1561 goto err; 1562 } 1563 1564 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { 1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1566 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1567 goto err; 1568 } 1569 1570 /* Could be empty. */ 1571 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { 1572 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1573 } else { 1574 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) 1575 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1577 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1578 goto err; 1579 } 1580 } 1581 } 1582 1583 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, 1584 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, 1585 &clienthello->compressions_len)) { 1586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1587 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1588 goto err; 1589 } 1590 1591 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ 1592 extensions = clienthello->extensions; 1593 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1594 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, 1595 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { 1596 /* SSLfatal already been called */ 1597 goto err; 1598 } 1599 s->clienthello = clienthello; 1600 1601 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 1602 1603 err: 1604 if (clienthello != NULL) 1605 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 1606 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1607 1608 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1609 } 1610 1611 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) 1612 { 1613 unsigned int j; 1614 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1615 int protverr; 1616 size_t loop; 1617 unsigned long id; 1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1619 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 1620 #endif 1621 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 1622 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 1623 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; 1624 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; 1625 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; 1626 1627 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ 1628 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ 1629 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { 1630 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ 1631 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { 1632 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: 1633 break; 1634 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: 1635 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; 1636 return -1; 1637 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: 1638 default: 1639 SSLfatal(s, al, 1640 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1641 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 1642 goto err; 1643 } 1644 } 1645 1646 /* Set up the client_random */ 1647 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1648 1649 /* Choose the version */ 1650 1651 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1652 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION 1653 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) 1654 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { 1655 /* 1656 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't 1657 * support it. 1658 */ 1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1660 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1661 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); 1662 goto err; 1663 } 1664 /* SSLv3/TLS */ 1665 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1666 } 1667 /* 1668 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check 1669 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. 1670 */ 1671 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1672 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1673 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && 1674 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { 1675 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; 1676 } else { 1677 protverr = 0; 1678 } 1679 1680 if (protverr) { 1681 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1682 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 1683 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1684 } 1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); 1687 goto err; 1688 } 1689 1690 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ 1691 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 1692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1693 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1694 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 1695 goto err; 1696 } 1697 1698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1699 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ 1700 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1701 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1702 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1703 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { 1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1705 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1706 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1707 goto err; 1708 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1709 } 1710 /* default verification */ 1711 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len 1712 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1713 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1715 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1716 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1717 goto err; 1718 } 1719 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; 1720 } 1721 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1722 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1723 if (protverr != 0) { 1724 s->version = s->client_version; 1725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1726 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); 1727 goto err; 1728 } 1729 } 1730 } 1731 1732 s->hit = 0; 1733 1734 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1735 clienthello->isv2) || 1736 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, 1737 clienthello->isv2, 1)) { 1738 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1739 goto err; 1740 } 1741 1742 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; 1743 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ 1744 if (scsvs != NULL) { 1745 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { 1746 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); 1747 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { 1748 if (s->renegotiate) { 1749 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ 1750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1751 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1752 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); 1753 goto err; 1754 } 1755 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; 1756 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && 1757 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { 1758 /* 1759 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried 1760 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version 1761 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first 1762 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger 1763 * an insecure downgrade. 1764 */ 1765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 1766 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1767 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1768 goto err; 1769 } 1770 } 1771 } 1772 1773 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ 1774 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1775 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = 1776 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1777 1778 if (cipher == NULL) { 1779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1780 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1781 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1782 goto err; 1783 } 1784 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 1785 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL 1786 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { 1787 /* 1788 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we 1789 * just selected. Something must have changed. 1790 */ 1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1792 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1793 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); 1794 goto err; 1795 } 1796 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 1797 } 1798 1799 /* We need to do this before getting the session */ 1800 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, 1801 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1802 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { 1803 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1804 goto err; 1805 } 1806 1807 /* 1808 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. 1809 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. 1810 * 1811 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1812 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1813 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1814 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1815 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on 1816 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1817 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1818 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1819 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1820 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 1821 * ignored. 1822 */ 1823 if (clienthello->isv2 || 1824 (s->new_session && 1825 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1826 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1827 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1828 goto err; 1829 } 1830 } else { 1831 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); 1832 if (i == 1) { 1833 /* previous session */ 1834 s->hit = 1; 1835 } else if (i == -1) { 1836 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1837 goto err; 1838 } else { 1839 /* i == 0 */ 1840 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1841 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1842 goto err; 1843 } 1844 } 1845 } 1846 1847 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1848 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, 1849 s->clienthello->session_id_len); 1850 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; 1851 } 1852 1853 /* 1854 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check 1855 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. 1856 */ 1857 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { 1858 j = 0; 1859 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1860 1861 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1862 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1863 #endif 1864 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1865 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1866 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1867 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1868 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1869 #endif 1870 if (c->id == id) { 1871 j = 1; 1872 break; 1873 } 1874 } 1875 if (j == 0) { 1876 /* 1877 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1878 * to reuse it 1879 */ 1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1881 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1882 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1883 goto err; 1884 } 1885 } 1886 1887 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { 1888 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) 1889 break; 1890 } 1891 1892 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 1893 /* no compress */ 1894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1895 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1896 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1897 goto err; 1898 } 1899 1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1901 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1902 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); 1903 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1904 1905 /* TLS extensions */ 1906 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1907 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1908 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1909 goto err; 1910 } 1911 1912 /* 1913 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1914 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1915 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1916 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1917 */ 1918 { 1919 unsigned char *pos; 1920 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1921 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { 1922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1923 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1925 goto err; 1926 } 1927 } 1928 1929 if (!s->hit 1930 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 1931 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1932 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) 1933 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { 1934 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1935 /* 1936 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for 1937 * backwards compat reasons 1938 */ 1939 int master_key_length; 1940 1941 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1942 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1943 &master_key_length, ciphers, 1944 &pref_cipher, 1945 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) 1946 && master_key_length > 0) { 1947 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; 1948 s->hit = 1; 1949 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; 1950 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1951 1952 ciphers = NULL; 1953 1954 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1955 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1956 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, 1957 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1958 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1960 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1961 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1962 goto err; 1963 } 1964 1965 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1966 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1967 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); 1968 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1969 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); 1970 } 1971 } 1972 1973 /* 1974 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1975 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression 1976 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1977 */ 1978 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1979 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1980 /* 1981 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in 1982 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in 1983 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. 1984 */ 1985 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { 1986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1987 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1988 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1989 goto err; 1990 } 1991 } 1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1993 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1994 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1995 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1996 unsigned int k; 1997 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1998 /* Can't disable compression */ 1999 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { 2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2001 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2002 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 2003 goto err; 2004 } 2005 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 2006 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 2007 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 2008 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 2009 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 2010 break; 2011 } 2012 } 2013 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 2014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2015 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2016 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 2017 goto err; 2018 } 2019 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 2020 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { 2021 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) 2022 break; 2023 } 2024 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 2026 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2027 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 2028 goto err; 2029 } 2030 } else if (s->hit) { 2031 comp = NULL; 2032 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 2033 /* See if we have a match */ 2034 int m, nn, v, done = 0; 2035 unsigned int o; 2036 2037 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 2038 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 2039 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 2040 v = comp->id; 2041 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { 2042 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { 2043 done = 1; 2044 break; 2045 } 2046 } 2047 if (done) 2048 break; 2049 } 2050 if (done) 2051 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 2052 else 2053 comp = NULL; 2054 } 2055 #else 2056 /* 2057 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 2058 * using compression. 2059 */ 2060 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 2061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2062 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2063 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 2064 goto err; 2065 } 2066 #endif 2067 2068 /* 2069 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 2070 */ 2071 2072 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); 2074 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; 2075 if (ciphers == NULL) { 2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2077 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2079 goto err; 2080 } 2081 ciphers = NULL; 2082 } 2083 2084 if (!s->hit) { 2085 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2086 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 2087 #else 2088 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 2089 #endif 2090 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 2091 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2092 goto err; 2093 } 2094 } 2095 2096 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2097 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2098 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2099 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2100 s->clienthello = NULL; 2101 return 1; 2102 err: 2103 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2104 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2105 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2106 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2107 s->clienthello = NULL; 2108 2109 return 0; 2110 } 2111 2112 /* 2113 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2114 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2115 */ 2116 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) 2117 { 2118 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2119 2120 /* 2121 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 2122 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 2123 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 2124 * influence which certificate is sent 2125 */ 2126 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL 2127 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { 2128 int ret; 2129 2130 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2131 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { 2132 /* 2133 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 2134 * et al can pick it up. 2135 */ 2136 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; 2137 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); 2138 switch (ret) { 2139 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2140 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2141 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2142 break; 2143 /* status request response should be sent */ 2144 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2145 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) 2146 s->ext.status_expected = 1; 2147 break; 2148 /* something bad happened */ 2149 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2150 default: 2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2152 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, 2153 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2154 return 0; 2155 } 2156 } 2157 } 2158 2159 return 1; 2160 } 2161 2162 /* 2163 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2164 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2165 */ 2166 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) 2167 { 2168 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2169 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2170 2171 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2172 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2173 s->s3->alpn_proposed, 2174 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, 2175 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); 2176 2177 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2178 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2179 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); 2180 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2183 return 0; 2184 } 2185 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2187 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2188 s->s3->npn_seen = 0; 2189 #endif 2190 2191 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2192 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL 2193 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len 2194 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, 2195 selected_len) != 0) { 2196 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2197 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2198 2199 if (!s->hit) { 2200 /* 2201 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have 2202 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the 2203 * selected ALPN. 2204 */ 2205 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { 2206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2207 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2209 return 0; 2210 } 2211 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, 2212 selected_len); 2213 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 2214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2215 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2217 return 0; 2218 } 2219 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2220 } 2221 } 2222 2223 return 1; 2224 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { 2225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2226 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); 2227 return 0; 2228 } 2229 /* 2230 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was 2231 * present. 2232 */ 2233 } 2234 2235 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2236 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { 2237 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2238 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2239 } 2240 2241 return 1; 2242 } 2243 2244 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 2245 { 2246 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; 2247 2248 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 2249 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); 2250 if (rv == 0) { 2251 /* SSLfatal() was already called */ 2252 goto err; 2253 } 2254 if (rv < 0) 2255 return WORK_MORE_A; 2256 wst = WORK_MORE_B; 2257 } 2258 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { 2259 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2260 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 2261 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { 2262 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 2263 if (rv == 0) { 2264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2265 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2266 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 2267 goto err; 2268 } 2269 if (rv < 0) { 2270 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2271 return WORK_MORE_B; 2272 } 2273 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 2274 } 2275 2276 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ 2277 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2278 cipher = 2279 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 2280 2281 if (cipher == NULL) { 2282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2283 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2284 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 2285 goto err; 2286 } 2287 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 2288 } 2289 if (!s->hit) { 2290 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { 2291 /* SSLfatal already called */ 2292 goto err; 2293 } 2294 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ 2295 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) 2296 s->session->not_resumable = 2297 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, 2298 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey 2299 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); 2300 if (s->session->not_resumable) 2301 /* do not send a session ticket */ 2302 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 2303 } 2304 } else { 2305 /* Session-id reuse */ 2306 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 2307 } 2308 2309 /*- 2310 * we now have the following setup. 2311 * client_random 2312 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers 2313 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers 2314 * compression - basically ignored right now 2315 * ssl version is set - sslv3 2316 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 2317 * s->hit - session reuse flag 2318 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. 2319 */ 2320 2321 /* 2322 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the 2323 * certificate callbacks etc above. 2324 */ 2325 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { 2326 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2327 goto err; 2328 } 2329 /* 2330 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and 2331 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 2332 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and 2333 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. 2334 */ 2335 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { 2336 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2337 goto err; 2338 } 2339 2340 wst = WORK_MORE_C; 2341 } 2342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2343 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { 2344 int ret; 2345 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { 2346 /* 2347 * callback indicates further work to be done 2348 */ 2349 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2350 return WORK_MORE_C; 2351 } 2352 if (ret < 0) { 2353 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2354 goto err; 2355 } 2356 } 2357 #endif 2358 2359 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 2360 err: 2361 return WORK_ERROR; 2362 } 2363 2364 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2365 { 2366 int compm; 2367 size_t sl, len; 2368 int version; 2369 unsigned char *session_id; 2370 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; 2371 2372 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; 2373 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) 2374 /* 2375 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in 2376 * tls_process_client_hello() 2377 */ 2378 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, 2379 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2380 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random, 2381 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 2382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2384 return 0; 2385 } 2386 2387 /*- 2388 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 2389 * back in the server hello: 2390 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 2391 * we send back the old session ID. 2392 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 2393 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 2394 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 2395 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 2396 * session ID. 2397 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 2398 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 2399 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client 2400 * regardless 2401 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 2402 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 2403 * to send back. 2404 */ 2405 if (s->session->not_resumable || 2406 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 2407 && !s->hit)) 2408 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 2409 2410 if (usetls13) { 2411 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; 2412 session_id = s->tmp_session_id; 2413 } else { 2414 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 2415 session_id = s->session->session_id; 2416 } 2417 2418 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2421 return 0; 2422 } 2423 2424 /* set up the compression method */ 2425 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2426 compm = 0; 2427 #else 2428 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 2429 compm = 0; 2430 else 2431 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 2432 #endif 2433 2434 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) 2435 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) 2436 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { 2437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2439 return 0; 2440 } 2441 2442 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2443 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2444 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST 2445 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 2446 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO 2447 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), 2448 NULL, 0)) { 2449 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2450 return 0; 2451 } 2452 2453 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 2454 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ 2455 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 2456 s->session = NULL; 2457 s->hit = 0; 2458 2459 /* 2460 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with 2461 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. 2462 */ 2463 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { 2464 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2465 return 0; 2466 } 2467 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 2468 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2469 /* SSLfatal() already called */; 2470 return 0; 2471 } 2472 2473 return 1; 2474 } 2475 2476 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2477 { 2478 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 2479 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2480 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2481 return 0; 2482 } 2483 } 2484 return 1; 2485 } 2486 2487 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2488 { 2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2490 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; 2491 #endif 2492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2493 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 2494 size_t encodedlen = 0; 2495 int curve_id = 0; 2496 #endif 2497 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; 2498 int i; 2499 unsigned long type; 2500 const BIGNUM *r[4]; 2501 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2502 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2503 size_t paramlen, paramoffset; 2504 2505 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { 2506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2507 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2508 goto err; 2509 } 2510 2511 if (md_ctx == NULL) { 2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2514 goto err; 2515 } 2516 2517 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2518 2519 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2521 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ 2522 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 2523 } else 2524 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2526 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 2527 CERT *cert = s->cert; 2528 2529 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; 2530 DH *dh; 2531 2532 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { 2533 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); 2534 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); 2535 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { 2536 DH_free(dhp); 2537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2539 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2540 goto err; 2541 } 2542 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); 2543 pkdhp = pkdh; 2544 } else { 2545 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; 2546 } 2547 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 2548 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); 2549 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); 2550 if (pkdh == NULL) { 2551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2552 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2553 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2554 goto err; 2555 } 2556 pkdhp = pkdh; 2557 } 2558 if (pkdhp == NULL) { 2559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2560 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2561 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2562 goto err; 2563 } 2564 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, 2565 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { 2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2567 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2568 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 2569 goto err; 2570 } 2571 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2573 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2575 goto err; 2576 } 2577 2578 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); 2579 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2581 goto err; 2582 } 2583 2584 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 2585 if (dh == NULL) { 2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2587 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2589 goto err; 2590 } 2591 2592 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2593 pkdh = NULL; 2594 2595 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); 2596 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); 2597 } else 2598 #endif 2599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2600 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2601 2602 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2604 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2605 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2606 goto err; 2607 } 2608 2609 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 2610 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); 2611 if (curve_id == 0) { 2612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2613 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2614 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 2615 goto err; 2616 } 2617 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); 2618 /* Generate a new key for this curve */ 2619 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2620 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2621 goto err; 2622 } 2623 2624 /* Encode the public key. */ 2625 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, 2626 &encodedPoint); 2627 if (encodedlen == 0) { 2628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2629 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2630 goto err; 2631 } 2632 2633 /* 2634 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 2635 * can set these to NULLs 2636 */ 2637 r[0] = NULL; 2638 r[1] = NULL; 2639 r[2] = NULL; 2640 r[3] = NULL; 2641 } else 2642 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2644 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 2645 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 2646 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 2647 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 2648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2649 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2650 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 2651 goto err; 2652 } 2653 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 2654 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 2655 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 2656 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 2657 } else 2658 #endif 2659 { 2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2662 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 2663 goto err; 2664 } 2665 2666 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) 2667 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { 2668 lu = NULL; 2669 } else if (lu == NULL) { 2670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2671 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2672 goto err; 2673 } 2674 2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2676 if (type & SSL_PSK) { 2677 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2678 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); 2679 2680 /* 2681 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already 2682 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case 2683 */ 2684 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 2685 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, 2686 len)) { 2687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2688 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2690 goto err; 2691 } 2692 } 2693 #endif 2694 2695 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 2696 unsigned char *binval; 2697 int res; 2698 2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2700 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 2701 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); 2702 } else 2703 #endif 2704 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); 2705 2706 if (!res) { 2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2708 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2709 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2710 goto err; 2711 } 2712 2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2714 /*- 2715 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 2716 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 2717 * as the prime 2718 */ 2719 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { 2720 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); 2721 2722 if (len > 0) { 2723 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { 2724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2725 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2727 goto err; 2728 } 2729 memset(binval, 0, len); 2730 } 2731 } 2732 #endif 2733 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) 2734 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2736 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2737 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2738 goto err; 2739 } 2740 2741 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); 2742 } 2743 2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2745 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2746 /* 2747 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the 2748 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 2749 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded 2750 * point itself 2751 */ 2752 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 2753 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) 2754 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) 2755 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { 2756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2757 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2759 goto err; 2760 } 2761 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2762 encodedPoint = NULL; 2763 } 2764 #endif 2765 2766 /* not anonymous */ 2767 if (lu != NULL) { 2768 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; 2769 const EVP_MD *md; 2770 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; 2771 size_t siglen, tbslen; 2772 int rv; 2773 2774 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { 2775 /* Should never happen */ 2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2777 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2779 goto err; 2780 } 2781 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ 2782 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { 2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2784 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2786 goto err; 2787 } 2788 /* send signature algorithm */ 2789 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { 2790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2791 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2793 goto err; 2794 } 2795 /* 2796 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig 2797 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it 2798 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET 2799 * afterwards. 2800 */ 2801 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2802 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) 2803 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { 2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2805 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2807 goto err; 2808 } 2809 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { 2810 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 2811 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { 2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2813 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2814 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2815 goto err; 2816 } 2817 } 2818 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, 2819 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, 2820 paramlen); 2821 if (tbslen == 0) { 2822 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2823 goto err; 2824 } 2825 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); 2826 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2827 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) 2828 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { 2829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2830 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2832 goto err; 2833 } 2834 } 2835 2836 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2837 return 1; 2838 err: 2839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2840 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2841 #endif 2842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2843 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2844 #endif 2845 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2846 return 0; 2847 } 2848 2849 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2850 { 2851 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2852 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ 2853 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 2854 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); 2855 s->pha_context_len = 32; 2856 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL 2857 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0 2858 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { 2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2860 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2862 return 0; 2863 } 2864 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ 2865 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 2866 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2867 return 0; 2868 } 2869 } else { 2870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2872 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2873 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2874 return 0; 2875 } 2876 } 2877 2878 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2879 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, 2880 0)) { 2881 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2882 return 0; 2883 } 2884 goto done; 2885 } 2886 2887 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2888 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 2889 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2891 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2892 return 0; 2893 } 2894 2895 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2896 const uint16_t *psigs; 2897 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); 2898 2899 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 2900 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) 2901 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) 2902 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2904 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2906 return 0; 2907 } 2908 } 2909 2910 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { 2911 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2912 return 0; 2913 } 2914 2915 done: 2916 s->certreqs_sent++; 2917 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 2918 return 1; 2919 } 2920 2921 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2922 { 2923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2924 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2925 size_t psklen; 2926 PACKET psk_identity; 2927 2928 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { 2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2930 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2931 return 0; 2932 } 2933 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2935 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2936 return 0; 2937 } 2938 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2940 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2941 return 0; 2942 } 2943 2944 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { 2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2946 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2947 return 0; 2948 } 2949 2950 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, 2951 psk, sizeof(psk)); 2952 2953 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2956 return 0; 2957 } else if (psklen == 0) { 2958 /* 2959 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2960 */ 2961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 2962 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2963 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2964 return 0; 2965 } 2966 2967 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); 2968 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); 2969 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); 2970 2971 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { 2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2973 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2974 return 0; 2975 } 2976 2977 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; 2978 2979 return 1; 2980 #else 2981 /* Should never happen */ 2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2984 return 0; 2985 #endif 2986 } 2987 2988 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2989 { 2990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2991 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2992 int decrypt_len; 2993 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2994 size_t j, padding_len; 2995 PACKET enc_premaster; 2996 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2997 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; 2998 int ret = 0; 2999 3000 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); 3001 if (rsa == NULL) { 3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3003 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 3004 return 0; 3005 } 3006 3007 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ 3008 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 3009 enc_premaster = *pkt; 3010 } else { 3011 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) 3012 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3014 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3015 return 0; 3016 } 3017 } 3018 3019 /* 3020 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to 3021 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret 3022 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because 3023 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. 3024 */ 3025 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3027 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); 3028 return 0; 3029 } 3030 3031 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); 3032 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { 3033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3034 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3035 return 0; 3036 } 3037 3038 /* 3039 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 3040 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 3041 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 3042 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 3043 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 3044 */ 3045 3046 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 3047 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { 3048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3050 goto err; 3051 } 3052 3053 /* 3054 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of 3055 * the timing-sensitive code below. 3056 */ 3057 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 3058 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), 3059 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), 3060 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); 3061 if (decrypt_len < 0) { 3062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3063 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3064 goto err; 3065 } 3066 3067 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ 3068 3069 /* 3070 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys 3071 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures 3072 * PS is at least 8 bytes. 3073 */ 3074 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 3075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3076 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3077 goto err; 3078 } 3079 3080 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 3081 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & 3082 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); 3083 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { 3084 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); 3085 } 3086 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); 3087 3088 /* 3089 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 3090 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 3091 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 3092 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 3093 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 3094 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 3095 */ 3096 version_good = 3097 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], 3098 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 3099 version_good &= 3100 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], 3101 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 3102 3103 /* 3104 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 3105 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 3106 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 3107 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 3108 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 3109 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 3110 * clients. 3111 */ 3112 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 3113 unsigned char workaround_good; 3114 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], 3115 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 3116 workaround_good &= 3117 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], 3118 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 3119 version_good |= workaround_good; 3120 } 3121 3122 /* 3123 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 3124 * remain non-zero (0xff). 3125 */ 3126 decrypt_good &= version_good; 3127 3128 /* 3129 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 3130 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 3131 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 3132 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 3133 */ 3134 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 3135 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = 3136 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, 3137 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], 3138 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 3139 } 3140 3141 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, 3142 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { 3143 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3144 goto err; 3145 } 3146 3147 ret = 1; 3148 err: 3149 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); 3150 return ret; 3151 #else 3152 /* Should never happen */ 3153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3155 return 0; 3156 #endif 3157 } 3158 3159 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3160 { 3161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3162 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 3163 DH *cdh; 3164 unsigned int i; 3165 BIGNUM *pub_key; 3166 const unsigned char *data; 3167 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3168 int ret = 0; 3169 3170 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { 3171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3172 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 3173 goto err; 3174 } 3175 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; 3176 if (skey == NULL) { 3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3178 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 3179 goto err; 3180 } 3181 3182 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3184 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 3185 goto err; 3186 } 3187 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3188 /* We already checked we have enough data */ 3189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3191 goto err; 3192 } 3193 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3194 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { 3195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3196 SSL_R_BN_LIB); 3197 goto err; 3198 } 3199 3200 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); 3201 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); 3202 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { 3203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3205 BN_free(pub_key); 3206 goto err; 3207 } 3208 3209 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3210 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3211 goto err; 3212 } 3213 3214 ret = 1; 3215 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 3216 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; 3217 err: 3218 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3219 return ret; 3220 #else 3221 /* Should never happen */ 3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3223 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3224 return 0; 3225 #endif 3226 } 3227 3228 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3229 { 3230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3231 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; 3232 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3233 int ret = 0; 3234 3235 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3236 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ 3237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3238 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3239 goto err; 3240 } else { 3241 unsigned int i; 3242 const unsigned char *data; 3243 3244 /* 3245 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 3246 * ClientKeyExchange message. 3247 */ 3248 3249 /* Get encoded point length */ 3250 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) 3251 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3253 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3254 goto err; 3255 } 3256 if (skey == NULL) { 3257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3258 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3259 goto err; 3260 } 3261 3262 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3263 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { 3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3265 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3266 goto err; 3267 } 3268 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { 3269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3270 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 3271 goto err; 3272 } 3273 } 3274 3275 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3276 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3277 goto err; 3278 } 3279 3280 ret = 1; 3281 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 3282 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; 3283 err: 3284 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3285 3286 return ret; 3287 #else 3288 /* Should never happen */ 3289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3290 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3291 return 0; 3292 #endif 3293 } 3294 3295 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3296 { 3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3298 unsigned int i; 3299 const unsigned char *data; 3300 3301 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) 3302 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3304 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 3305 return 0; 3306 } 3307 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { 3308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3309 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 3310 return 0; 3311 } 3312 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 3313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3314 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 3315 return 0; 3316 } 3317 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 3318 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 3319 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 3320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3321 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3322 return 0; 3323 } 3324 3325 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { 3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3327 return 0; 3328 } 3329 3330 return 1; 3331 #else 3332 /* Should never happen */ 3333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3334 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3335 return 0; 3336 #endif 3337 } 3338 3339 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3340 { 3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3342 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 3343 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 3344 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 3345 const unsigned char *start; 3346 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 3347 unsigned long alg_a; 3348 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL; 3349 const unsigned char *ptr; 3350 int ret = 0; 3351 3352 /* Get our certificate private key */ 3353 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3354 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { 3355 /* 3356 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too 3357 */ 3358 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; 3359 if (pk == NULL) { 3360 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; 3361 } 3362 if (pk == NULL) { 3363 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3364 } 3365 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { 3366 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3367 } 3368 3369 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 3370 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3372 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3373 return 0; 3374 } 3375 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 3376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3377 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3378 return 0; 3379 } 3380 /* 3381 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 3382 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 3383 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 3384 * client certificate for authorization only. 3385 */ 3386 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 3387 if (client_pub_pkey) { 3388 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 3389 ERR_clear_error(); 3390 } 3391 3392 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt); 3393 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob 3394 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */ 3395 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt)); 3396 if (pKX == NULL 3397 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL 3398 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { 3399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3400 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3401 goto err; 3402 } 3403 3404 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) { 3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3406 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3407 goto err; 3408 } 3409 3410 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3412 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3413 goto err; 3414 } 3415 3416 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length; 3417 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data; 3418 3419 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, 3420 inlen) <= 0) { 3421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3422 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3423 goto err; 3424 } 3425 /* Generate master secret */ 3426 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, 3427 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { 3428 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3429 goto err; 3430 } 3431 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 3432 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, 3433 NULL) > 0) 3434 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; 3435 3436 ret = 1; 3437 err: 3438 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3439 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX); 3440 return ret; 3441 #else 3442 /* Should never happen */ 3443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3444 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3445 return 0; 3446 #endif 3447 } 3448 3449 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3450 { 3451 unsigned long alg_k; 3452 3453 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3454 3455 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ 3456 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { 3457 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3458 goto err; 3459 } 3460 3461 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 3462 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ 3463 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3465 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3466 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3467 goto err; 3468 } 3469 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ 3470 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { 3471 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3472 goto err; 3473 } 3474 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 3475 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { 3476 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3477 goto err; 3478 } 3479 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 3480 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { 3481 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3482 goto err; 3483 } 3484 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 3485 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { 3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3487 goto err; 3488 } 3489 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 3490 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { 3491 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3492 goto err; 3493 } 3494 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 3495 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { 3496 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3497 goto err; 3498 } 3499 } else { 3500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3501 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3502 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 3503 goto err; 3504 } 3505 3506 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 3507 err: 3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 3509 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); 3510 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; 3511 #endif 3512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3513 } 3514 3515 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 3516 { 3517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 3518 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 3519 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3520 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 3521 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 3522 size_t labellen; 3523 /* 3524 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP 3525 * used. 3526 */ 3527 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 3528 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 3529 3530 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 3531 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 3532 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 3533 labellen += 1; 3534 3535 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 3536 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 3537 labellen, NULL, 0, 3538 0) <= 0) { 3539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3540 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3541 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3542 return WORK_ERROR; 3543 } 3544 3545 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 3546 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 3547 } 3548 } 3549 #endif 3550 3551 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { 3552 /* 3553 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need 3554 * the handshake_buffer 3555 */ 3556 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3557 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3558 return WORK_ERROR; 3559 } 3560 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3561 } else { 3562 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3564 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3566 return WORK_ERROR; 3567 } 3568 /* 3569 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support 3570 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op 3571 */ 3572 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3573 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3574 return WORK_ERROR; 3575 } 3576 } 3577 3578 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3579 } 3580 3581 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3582 { 3583 int i; 3584 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3585 X509 *x = NULL; 3586 unsigned long l; 3587 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; 3588 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3589 PACKET spkt, context; 3590 size_t chainidx; 3591 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; 3592 3593 /* 3594 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no 3595 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than 3596 * TLSv1.3 3597 */ 3598 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; 3599 3600 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3602 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3603 goto err; 3604 } 3605 3606 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) 3607 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) 3608 || (s->pha_context != NULL && 3609 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { 3610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3611 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 3612 goto err; 3613 } 3614 3615 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) 3616 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3618 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3619 goto err; 3620 } 3621 3622 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { 3623 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) 3624 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { 3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3626 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3627 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3628 goto err; 3629 } 3630 3631 certstart = certbytes; 3632 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); 3633 if (x == NULL) { 3634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3635 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3636 goto err; 3637 } 3638 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { 3639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3640 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3641 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3642 goto err; 3643 } 3644 3645 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3646 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 3647 PACKET extensions; 3648 3649 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { 3650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3651 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3652 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 3653 goto err; 3654 } 3655 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 3656 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, 3657 NULL, chainidx == 0) 3658 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, 3659 rawexts, x, chainidx, 3660 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { 3661 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3662 goto err; 3663 } 3664 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3665 } 3666 3667 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3669 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3670 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3671 goto err; 3672 } 3673 x = NULL; 3674 } 3675 3676 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3677 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3678 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3680 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3681 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3682 goto err; 3683 } 3684 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3685 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3686 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, 3688 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3689 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3690 goto err; 3691 } 3692 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3693 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3694 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3695 goto err; 3696 } 3697 } else { 3698 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 3699 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3700 if (i <= 0) { 3701 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), 3702 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3703 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3704 goto err; 3705 } 3706 if (i > 1) { 3707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3708 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); 3709 goto err; 3710 } 3711 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); 3712 if (pkey == NULL) { 3713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3714 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3715 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 3716 goto err; 3717 } 3718 } 3719 3720 /* 3721 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise 3722 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, 3723 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time 3724 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the 3725 * session may have already gone into the session cache. 3726 */ 3727 3728 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 3729 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { 3730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3731 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3732 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3733 goto err; 3734 } 3735 3736 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 3737 s->session = new_sess; 3738 } 3739 3740 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3741 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3742 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3743 3744 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); 3745 s->session->peer_chain = sk; 3746 3747 /* 3748 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE 3749 * message 3750 */ 3751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3752 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3753 goto err; 3754 } 3755 3756 /* 3757 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3758 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c 3759 */ 3760 sk = NULL; 3761 3762 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ 3763 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3764 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, 3765 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), 3766 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { 3767 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3768 goto err; 3769 } 3770 3771 /* Resend session tickets */ 3772 s->sent_tickets = 0; 3773 } 3774 3775 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 3776 3777 err: 3778 X509_free(x); 3779 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3780 return ret; 3781 } 3782 3783 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3784 { 3785 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; 3786 3787 if (cpk == NULL) { 3788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3789 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3790 return 0; 3791 } 3792 3793 /* 3794 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context 3795 * for the server Certificate message 3796 */ 3797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 3798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3799 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3800 return 0; 3801 } 3802 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { 3803 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3804 return 0; 3805 } 3806 3807 return 1; 3808 } 3809 3810 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3811 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3812 { 3813 /* 3814 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this 3815 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). 3816 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the 3817 * timeout. 3818 */ 3819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 3820 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 3821 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { 3822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3824 return 0; 3825 } 3826 3827 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3828 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) 3829 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { 3830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3832 return 0; 3833 } 3834 } 3835 3836 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ 3837 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 3838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3840 return 0; 3841 } 3842 3843 return 1; 3844 } 3845 3846 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3847 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3848 { 3849 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3850 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; 3851 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; 3852 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; 3853 const unsigned char *const_p; 3854 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; 3855 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3856 unsigned int hlen; 3857 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 3858 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3859 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; 3860 int iv_len, ok = 0; 3861 size_t macoffset, macendoffset; 3862 3863 /* get session encoding length */ 3864 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3865 /* 3866 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3867 * long 3868 */ 3869 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3872 goto err; 3873 } 3874 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3875 if (senc == NULL) { 3876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3877 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3878 goto err; 3879 } 3880 3881 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); 3882 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); 3883 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { 3884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3885 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3886 goto err; 3887 } 3888 3889 p = senc; 3890 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { 3891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3893 goto err; 3894 } 3895 3896 /* 3897 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3898 */ 3899 const_p = senc; 3900 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3901 if (sess == NULL) { 3902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3903 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3904 goto err; 3905 } 3906 3907 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3908 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { 3909 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3912 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3913 goto err; 3914 } 3915 p = senc; 3916 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3918 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3919 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3920 goto err; 3921 } 3922 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3923 3924 /* 3925 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3926 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3927 */ 3928 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { 3929 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ 3930 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, 3931 hctx, 1); 3932 3933 if (ret == 0) { 3934 3935 /* Put timeout and length */ 3936 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) 3937 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 3938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3939 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3941 goto err; 3942 } 3943 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3944 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 3945 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); 3946 return 1; 3947 } 3948 if (ret < 0) { 3949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3950 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 3951 goto err; 3952 } 3953 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); 3954 } else { 3955 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); 3956 3957 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 3958 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0 3959 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, 3960 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) 3961 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, 3962 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), 3963 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { 3964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3966 goto err; 3967 } 3968 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, 3969 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); 3970 } 3971 3972 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 3973 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3974 goto err; 3975 } 3976 3977 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) 3978 /* Output key name */ 3979 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) 3980 /* output IV */ 3981 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) 3982 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, 3983 &encdata1) 3984 /* Encrypt session data */ 3985 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) 3986 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) 3987 || encdata1 != encdata2 3988 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) 3989 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) 3990 || encdata1 + len != encdata2 3991 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 3992 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) 3993 || !HMAC_Update(hctx, 3994 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, 3995 macendoffset - macoffset) 3996 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) 3997 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) 3998 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 3999 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) 4000 || macdata1 != macdata2) { 4001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4002 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4003 goto err; 4004 } 4005 4006 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ 4007 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 4008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 4009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4010 goto err; 4011 } 4012 4013 ok = 1; 4014 err: 4015 OPENSSL_free(senc); 4016 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 4017 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); 4018 return ok; 4019 } 4020 4021 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 4022 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 4023 { 4024 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 4025 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4026 return 0; 4027 } 4028 4029 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, 4030 s->session->session_id_length) 4031 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 4032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET, 4033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4034 return 0; 4035 } 4036 4037 return 1; 4038 } 4039 4040 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4041 { 4042 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 4043 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; 4044 union { 4045 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; 4046 uint32_t age_add; 4047 } age_add_u; 4048 4049 age_add_u.age_add = 0; 4050 4051 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4052 size_t i, hashlen; 4053 uint64_t nonce; 4054 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; 4055 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); 4056 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); 4057 4058 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ 4059 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { 4060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4061 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4062 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4063 goto err; 4064 } 4065 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; 4066 4067 /* 4068 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then 4069 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. 4070 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. 4071 */ 4072 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { 4073 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); 4074 4075 if (new_sess == NULL) { 4076 /* SSLfatal already called */ 4077 goto err; 4078 } 4079 4080 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 4081 s->session = new_sess; 4082 } 4083 4084 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { 4085 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4086 goto err; 4087 } 4088 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { 4089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4090 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4091 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4092 goto err; 4093 } 4094 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; 4095 4096 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; 4097 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { 4098 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); 4099 nonce >>= 8; 4100 } 4101 4102 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, 4103 nonce_label, 4104 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, 4105 tick_nonce, 4106 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, 4107 s->session->master_key, 4108 hashlen, 1)) { 4109 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4110 goto err; 4111 } 4112 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; 4113 4114 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); 4115 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { 4116 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); 4117 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = 4118 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); 4119 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 4120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4121 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4122 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4123 goto err; 4124 } 4125 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 4126 } 4127 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; 4128 } 4129 4130 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && 4131 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) 4132 goto err; 4133 4134 /* 4135 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if 4136 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there 4137 * is no point in using full stateless tickets. 4138 */ 4139 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 4140 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 4141 || (s->max_early_data > 0 4142 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { 4143 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { 4144 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4145 goto err; 4146 } 4147 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, 4148 tick_nonce)) { 4149 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4150 goto err; 4151 } 4152 4153 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4154 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 4155 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4156 NULL, 0)) { 4157 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4158 goto err; 4159 } 4160 /* 4161 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| 4162 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake 4163 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. 4164 */ 4165 s->sent_tickets++; 4166 s->next_ticket_nonce++; 4167 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 4168 } 4169 4170 return 1; 4171 err: 4172 return 0; 4173 } 4174 4175 /* 4176 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to 4177 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 4178 */ 4179 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4180 { 4181 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) 4182 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, 4183 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { 4184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 4185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4186 return 0; 4187 } 4188 4189 return 1; 4190 } 4191 4192 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4193 { 4194 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 4195 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4196 return 0; 4197 } 4198 4199 return 1; 4200 } 4201 4202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 4203 /* 4204 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 4205 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 4206 */ 4207 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4208 { 4209 PACKET next_proto, padding; 4210 size_t next_proto_len; 4211 4212 /*- 4213 * The payload looks like: 4214 * uint8 proto_len; 4215 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 4216 * uint8 padding_len; 4217 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 4218 */ 4219 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) 4220 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) 4221 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 4222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, 4223 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4224 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4225 } 4226 4227 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { 4228 s->ext.npn_len = 0; 4229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, 4230 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4231 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4232 } 4233 4234 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; 4235 4236 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4237 } 4238 #endif 4239 4240 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4241 { 4242 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 4243 NULL, 0)) { 4244 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4245 return 0; 4246 } 4247 4248 return 1; 4249 } 4250 4251 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4252 { 4253 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 4254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4256 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4257 } 4258 4259 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING 4260 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { 4261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4263 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4264 } 4265 4266 /* 4267 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on 4268 * a record boundary. 4269 */ 4270 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 4271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 4272 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4273 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 4274 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4275 } 4276 4277 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; 4278 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 4279 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 4280 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4281 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4282 } 4283 4284 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4285 } 4286