1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 10 */ 11 12 #include <stdio.h> 13 #include "../ssl_locl.h" 14 #include "statem_locl.h" 15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" 16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 17 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 18 #include <openssl/rand.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 22 #include <openssl/x509.h> 23 #include <openssl/dh.h> 24 #include <openssl/bn.h> 25 #include <openssl/md5.h> 26 27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 28 29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); 30 31 /* 32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from 34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. 35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 36 * 37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 38 * (transition not allowed) 39 */ 40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 41 { 42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 43 44 /* 45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have 46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by 47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() 48 */ 49 switch (st->hand_state) { 50 default: 51 break; 52 53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 57 return 1; 58 } 59 break; 60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { 61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { 62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 63 return 1; 64 } 65 break; 66 } 67 /* Fall through */ 68 69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 74 return 1; 75 } 76 } else { 77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 79 return 1; 80 } 81 } 82 break; 83 84 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 88 return 1; 89 } 90 } else { 91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 93 return 1; 94 } 95 } 96 break; 97 98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 101 return 1; 102 } 103 break; 104 105 case TLS_ST_OK: 106 /* 107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of 108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) 109 */ 110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) 111 break; 112 113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 116 return 1; 117 } 118 119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { 120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; 121 return 1; 122 } 123 break; 124 } 125 126 /* No valid transition found */ 127 return 0; 128 } 129 130 /* 131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the 133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The 134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 135 * 136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 137 * (transition not allowed) 138 */ 139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 140 { 141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 142 143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) 145 goto err; 146 return 1; 147 } 148 149 switch (st->hand_state) { 150 default: 151 break; 152 153 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 154 case TLS_ST_OK: 155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 158 return 1; 159 } 160 break; 161 162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 163 /* 164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either 165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate 166 * OR 167 * 2) If we did request one then 168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned 169 * AND 170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 171 * list if we requested a certificate) 172 */ 173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 178 /* 179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just 180 * not going to accept it because we require a client 181 * cert. 182 */ 183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, 185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 186 return 0; 187 } 188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 189 return 1; 190 } 191 } else { 192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 193 return 1; 194 } 195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 198 return 1; 199 } 200 } 201 break; 202 203 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 206 return 1; 207 } 208 break; 209 210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 211 /* 212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have 213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| 214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is 215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in 216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be 217 * set. 218 */ 219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { 220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 221 /* 222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 226 */ 227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 228 return 1; 229 } 230 } else { 231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 233 return 1; 234 } 235 } 236 break; 237 238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 241 return 1; 242 } 243 break; 244 245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) { 248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { 249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; 250 return 1; 251 } 252 } else { 253 #endif 254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 256 return 1; 257 } 258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 259 } 260 #endif 261 break; 262 263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 267 return 1; 268 } 269 break; 270 #endif 271 272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 275 return 1; 276 } 277 break; 278 } 279 280 err: 281 /* No valid transition found */ 282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 283 BIO *rbio; 284 285 /* 286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably 287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. 288 */ 289 s->init_num = 0; 290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 294 return 0; 295 } 296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, 298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 299 return 0; 300 } 301 302 /* 303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? 304 * 305 * Valid return values are: 306 * 1: Yes 307 * 0: No 308 */ 309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 310 { 311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 312 313 /* 314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a 315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 319 * key exchange. 320 */ 321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) 322 /* 323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 324 * provided 325 */ 326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ 328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) 329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) 330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */ 331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) 332 #endif 333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 336 #endif 337 ) { 338 return 1; 339 } 340 341 return 0; 342 } 343 344 /* 345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? 346 * 347 * Valid return values are: 348 * 1: Yes 349 * 0: No 350 */ 351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 352 { 353 if ( 354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER 356 /* 357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing 358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: 359 */ 360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) 361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) 362 /* 363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 364 * a second time: 365 */ 366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || 367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) 368 /* 369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 371 * RFC 2246): 372 */ 373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 374 /* 375 * ... except when the application insists on 376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts 377 * this for SSL 3) 378 */ 379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 382 /* 383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 384 * are omitted 385 */ 386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { 387 return 1; 388 } 389 390 return 0; 391 } 392 393 /* 394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the 396 * client. 397 */ 398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) 399 { 400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 401 402 /* 403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated 404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() 405 */ 406 407 switch (st->hand_state) { 408 default: 409 /* Shouldn't happen */ 410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, 412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 414 415 case TLS_ST_OK: 416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; 418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 419 } 420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 423 } 424 /* Try to read from the client instead */ 425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 426 427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 430 431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) 434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 437 else 438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 440 441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 444 else 445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 447 448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 449 if (s->hit) 450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 451 else if (send_certificate_request(s)) 452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 453 else 454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 455 456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 457 458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; 461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 462 } else { 463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 464 } 465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 466 467 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; 469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 470 471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 474 475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 478 479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 481 482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 483 /* 484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're 485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets 486 * immediately. 487 */ 488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; 490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { 491 /* 492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the 493 * handshake at this point. 494 */ 495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 497 } 498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) 499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 500 else 501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 503 504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; 507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 508 } 509 /* Fall through */ 510 511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 514 515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. 517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have 518 * been configured for. 519 */ 520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { 521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */ 522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 523 } 524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 525 } 526 } 527 528 /* 529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move 530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. 531 */ 532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) 533 { 534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 535 536 /* 537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going 538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later 539 */ 540 541 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); 543 544 switch (st->hand_state) { 545 default: 546 /* Shouldn't happen */ 547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, 549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 551 552 case TLS_ST_OK: 553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { 554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ 555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; 556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; 557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 558 } 559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ 560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { 561 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 563 } 564 /* Fall through */ 565 566 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ 568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 569 570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 573 574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified 576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { 577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ 580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 582 } else { 583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 584 } 585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 586 587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 589 590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 591 if (s->hit) { 592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) 593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 594 else 595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 596 } else { 597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 598 /* normal PSK or SRP */ 599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { 601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 606 } else { 607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 608 } 609 } 610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 611 612 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 613 if (s->ext.status_expected) { 614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; 615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 616 } 617 /* Fall through */ 618 619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 623 } 624 /* Fall through */ 625 626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 630 } 631 /* Fall through */ 632 633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 636 637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 639 640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 641 if (s->hit) { 642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 646 } else { 647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 648 } 649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 650 651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 654 655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 658 659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 660 if (s->hit) { 661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 662 } 663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 665 } 666 } 667 668 /* 669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from 670 * the server to the client. 671 */ 672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 673 { 674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 675 676 switch (st->hand_state) { 677 default: 678 /* No pre work to be done */ 679 break; 680 681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 682 s->shutdown = 0; 683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 685 break; 686 687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 688 s->shutdown = 0; 689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ 692 st->use_timer = 0; 693 } 694 break; 695 696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 698 /* 699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and 700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now 701 */ 702 st->use_timer = 1; 703 } 704 break; 705 706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { 709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); 711 } 712 #endif 713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 714 715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) { 717 /* 718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going 719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off 720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. 721 * 722 * Calls SSLfatal as required. 723 */ 724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); 725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 726 /* 727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer 729 */ 730 st->use_timer = 0; 731 } 732 break; 733 734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 736 break; 737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 739 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 740 return WORK_ERROR; 741 } 742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 743 /* 744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have 746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, 747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. 748 */ 749 st->use_timer = 0; 750 } 751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 752 753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING 755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 757 /* Fall through */ 758 759 case TLS_ST_OK: 760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); 762 } 763 764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 765 } 766 767 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) 768 { 769 switch (get_last_sys_error()) { 770 #if defined(EPIPE) 771 case EPIPE: 772 return 1; 773 #endif 774 #if defined(ECONNRESET) 775 case ECONNRESET: 776 return 1; 777 #endif 778 default: 779 return 0; 780 } 781 } 782 783 /* 784 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the 785 * server to the client. 786 */ 787 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 788 { 789 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 790 791 s->init_num = 0; 792 793 switch (st->hand_state) { 794 default: 795 /* No post work to be done */ 796 break; 797 798 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 799 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 800 return WORK_MORE_A; 801 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 802 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 803 return WORK_ERROR; 804 } 805 break; 806 807 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 808 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 809 return WORK_MORE_A; 810 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ 811 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 812 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 813 return WORK_ERROR; 814 } 815 /* 816 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to 817 * treat like it was the first packet 818 */ 819 s->first_packet = 1; 820 break; 821 822 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 824 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 825 && statem_flush(s) != 1) 826 return WORK_MORE_A; 827 break; 828 } 829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 830 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 831 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 832 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 833 834 /* 835 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no 836 * SCTP used. 837 */ 838 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 839 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 840 841 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 842 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 843 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 844 0) <= 0) { 845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 846 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, 847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 848 return WORK_ERROR; 849 } 850 851 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 852 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 853 } 854 #endif 855 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 856 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 857 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) 858 break; 859 /* Fall through */ 860 861 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 862 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 863 if (!statem_flush(s)) 864 return WORK_MORE_A; 865 break; 866 } 867 868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 869 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) 870 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 871 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 872 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 873 return WORK_ERROR; 874 } 875 876 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 877 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 878 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 879 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 880 return WORK_ERROR; 881 } 882 /* 883 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive 884 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted 885 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. 886 */ 887 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; 888 break; 889 } 890 891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 892 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { 893 /* 894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 895 * no SCTP used. 896 */ 897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 898 0, NULL); 899 } 900 #endif 901 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 902 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 903 { 904 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 905 return WORK_ERROR; 906 } 907 908 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 909 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 910 break; 911 912 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 913 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 914 return WORK_MORE_A; 915 break; 916 917 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 918 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 919 return WORK_MORE_A; 920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 921 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 922 /* 923 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 924 * no SCTP used. 925 */ 926 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 927 0, NULL); 928 } 929 #endif 930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 931 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 932 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, 933 &s->session->master_key_length) 934 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 935 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 936 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 937 return WORK_ERROR; 938 } 939 break; 940 941 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 942 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 943 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 944 return WORK_MORE_A; 945 } 946 break; 947 948 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 949 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 950 return WORK_MORE_A; 951 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { 952 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 953 return WORK_ERROR; 954 } 955 break; 956 957 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 958 clear_sys_error(); 959 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { 960 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 961 && conn_is_closed()) { 962 /* 963 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a 964 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is 965 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client 966 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without 967 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. 968 */ 969 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 970 break; 971 } 972 973 return WORK_MORE_A; 974 } 975 break; 976 } 977 978 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 979 } 980 981 /* 982 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the 983 * server 984 * 985 * Valid return values are: 986 * 1: Success 987 * 0: Error 988 */ 989 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 990 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) 991 { 992 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 993 994 switch (st->hand_state) { 995 default: 996 /* Shouldn't happen */ 997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 998 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, 999 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 1000 return 0; 1001 1002 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 1003 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 1004 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1005 else 1006 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1007 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 1008 break; 1009 1010 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 1011 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; 1012 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 1013 break; 1014 1015 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 1016 /* No construction function needed */ 1017 *confunc = NULL; 1018 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 1019 break; 1020 1021 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 1022 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; 1023 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1024 break; 1025 1026 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 1027 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; 1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; 1029 break; 1030 1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 1032 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; 1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; 1034 break; 1035 1036 1037 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 1038 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; 1039 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1040 break; 1041 1042 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 1043 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; 1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1045 break; 1046 1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; 1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1050 break; 1051 1052 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 1053 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; 1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 1055 break; 1056 1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 1058 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; 1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 1060 break; 1061 1062 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 1063 *confunc = tls_construct_finished; 1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; 1065 break; 1066 1067 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 1068 *confunc = NULL; 1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; 1070 break; 1071 1072 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1073 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; 1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 1075 break; 1076 1077 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 1078 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; 1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; 1080 break; 1081 } 1082 1083 return 1; 1084 } 1085 1086 /* 1087 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, 1088 * calculated as follows: 1089 * 1090 * 2 + # client_version 1091 * 32 + # only valid length for random 1092 * 1 + # length of session_id 1093 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id 1094 * 2 + # length of cipher suites 1095 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array 1096 * 1 + # length of compression_methods 1097 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods 1098 * 2 + # length of extensions 1099 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions 1100 */ 1101 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 1102 1103 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 1104 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 1105 1106 /* 1107 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are 1108 * reading. Excludes the message header. 1109 */ 1110 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) 1111 { 1112 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1113 1114 switch (st->hand_state) { 1115 default: 1116 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1117 return 0; 1118 1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1120 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; 1121 1122 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1123 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; 1124 1125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1126 return s->max_cert_list; 1127 1128 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1129 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; 1130 1131 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1132 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1133 1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1135 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1136 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; 1137 #endif 1138 1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1140 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; 1141 1142 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1143 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; 1144 1145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1146 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; 1147 } 1148 } 1149 1150 /* 1151 * Process a message that the server has received from the client. 1152 */ 1153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1154 { 1155 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1156 1157 switch (st->hand_state) { 1158 default: 1159 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1161 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1163 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1164 1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1166 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); 1167 1168 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1169 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); 1170 1171 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1172 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); 1173 1174 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1175 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); 1176 1177 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1178 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); 1179 1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1181 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1182 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); 1183 #endif 1184 1185 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1186 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); 1187 1188 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1189 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); 1190 1191 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1192 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); 1193 1194 } 1195 } 1196 1197 /* 1198 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message 1199 * from the client 1200 */ 1201 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1202 { 1203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1204 1205 switch (st->hand_state) { 1206 default: 1207 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1209 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1211 return WORK_ERROR; 1212 1213 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1214 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); 1215 1216 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1217 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); 1218 } 1219 } 1220 1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1222 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ 1223 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) 1224 { 1225 int ret; 1226 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1227 1228 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 1229 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 1230 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 1231 /* 1232 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 1233 * login name 1234 */ 1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 1236 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, 1237 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 1238 return -1; 1239 } else { 1240 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); 1241 if (ret < 0) 1242 return 0; 1243 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { 1244 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, 1245 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1246 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 1247 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1248 return -1; 1249 } 1250 } 1251 } 1252 return 1; 1253 } 1254 #endif 1255 1256 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, 1257 size_t cookie_len) 1258 { 1259 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ 1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) 1261 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) 1262 return 0; 1263 1264 return 1; 1265 } 1266 1267 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 1268 { 1269 unsigned int cookie_leni; 1270 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || 1271 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, 1272 &cookie_leni) == 0 || 1273 cookie_leni > 255) { 1274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 1275 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 1276 return 0; 1277 } 1278 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; 1279 1280 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, 1281 s->d1->cookie_len)) { 1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1284 return 0; 1285 } 1286 1287 return 1; 1288 } 1289 1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1291 /*- 1292 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1293 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. 1294 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1295 * SNI, 1296 * elliptic_curves 1297 * ec_point_formats 1298 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) 1299 * 1300 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1301 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1302 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1303 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1304 */ 1305 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) 1306 { 1307 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1308 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1309 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1310 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1311 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1312 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1313 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1314 1315 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1316 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1317 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1318 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1319 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1320 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1321 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1322 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1323 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1324 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1325 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1326 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1327 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1328 }; 1329 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ 1330 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; 1331 unsigned int type; 1332 PACKET sni, tmppkt; 1333 size_t ext_len; 1334 1335 tmppkt = hello->extensions; 1336 1337 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) 1338 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) 1339 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { 1340 return; 1341 } 1342 1343 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1344 return; 1345 1346 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? 1347 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; 1348 1349 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, 1350 ext_len); 1351 } 1352 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1353 1354 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1355 { 1356 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ 1357 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; 1358 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; 1359 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; 1360 1361 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ 1362 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1363 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { 1364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1366 goto err; 1367 } 1368 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 1369 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding 1370 && (s->options 1371 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { 1372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1373 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1374 } 1375 s->renegotiate = 1; 1376 s->new_session = 1; 1377 } 1378 1379 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); 1380 if (clienthello == NULL) { 1381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1383 goto err; 1384 } 1385 1386 /* 1387 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. 1388 */ 1389 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); 1390 PACKET_null_init(&cookie); 1391 1392 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1393 unsigned int mt; 1394 1395 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 1396 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1399 goto err; 1400 } 1401 1402 /*- 1403 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 1404 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS 1405 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes 1406 * the rest right through. Its format is: 1407 * Byte Content 1408 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer 1409 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here 1410 * 3-4 version 1411 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length 1412 * 7-8 session_id_length 1413 * 9-10 challenge_length 1414 * ... ... 1415 */ 1416 1417 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) 1418 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 1419 /* 1420 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record 1421 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record 1422 * in the first place 1423 */ 1424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1426 goto err; 1427 } 1428 } 1429 1430 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { 1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1433 goto err; 1434 } 1435 1436 /* Parse the message and load client random. */ 1437 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1438 /* 1439 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello 1440 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. 1441 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. 1442 */ 1443 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; 1444 PACKET challenge; 1445 1446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) 1447 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) 1448 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { 1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1450 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1451 goto err; 1452 } 1453 1454 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { 1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1457 goto err; 1458 } 1459 1460 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1461 ciphersuite_len) 1462 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) 1463 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) 1464 /* No extensions. */ 1465 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1467 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1468 goto err; 1469 } 1470 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; 1471 1472 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1473 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit 1474 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if 1475 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. 1476 */ 1477 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1478 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; 1479 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1480 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, 1481 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 1482 challenge_len, challenge_len) 1483 /* Advertise only null compression. */ 1484 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { 1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1487 goto err; 1488 } 1489 1490 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1491 } else { 1492 /* Regular ClientHello. */ 1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 1494 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) 1495 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, 1496 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, 1497 &clienthello->session_id_len)) { 1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1499 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1500 goto err; 1501 } 1502 1503 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { 1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1506 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1507 goto err; 1508 } 1509 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1510 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, 1511 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { 1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1513 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1514 goto err; 1515 } 1516 /* 1517 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, 1518 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. 1519 * So check cookie length... 1520 */ 1521 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1522 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { 1523 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1524 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1525 } 1526 } 1527 } 1528 1529 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { 1530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1531 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1532 goto err; 1533 } 1534 1535 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { 1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1537 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1538 goto err; 1539 } 1540 1541 /* Could be empty. */ 1542 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { 1543 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1544 } else { 1545 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) 1546 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1548 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1549 goto err; 1550 } 1551 } 1552 } 1553 1554 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, 1555 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, 1556 &clienthello->compressions_len)) { 1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 1562 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ 1563 extensions = clienthello->extensions; 1564 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1565 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, 1566 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { 1567 /* SSLfatal already been called */ 1568 goto err; 1569 } 1570 s->clienthello = clienthello; 1571 1572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 1573 1574 err: 1575 if (clienthello != NULL) 1576 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 1577 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1578 1579 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1580 } 1581 1582 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) 1583 { 1584 unsigned int j; 1585 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1586 int protverr; 1587 size_t loop; 1588 unsigned long id; 1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1590 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 1591 #endif 1592 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 1593 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 1594 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; 1595 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; 1596 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; 1597 1598 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ 1599 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ 1600 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { 1601 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ 1602 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { 1603 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: 1604 break; 1605 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: 1606 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; 1607 return -1; 1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: 1609 default: 1610 SSLfatal(s, al, 1611 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1612 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 1613 goto err; 1614 } 1615 } 1616 1617 /* Set up the client_random */ 1618 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1619 1620 /* Choose the version */ 1621 1622 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1623 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION 1624 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) 1625 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { 1626 /* 1627 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't 1628 * support it. 1629 */ 1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1631 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1632 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); 1633 goto err; 1634 } 1635 /* SSLv3/TLS */ 1636 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1637 } 1638 /* 1639 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check 1640 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. 1641 */ 1642 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1643 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1644 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && 1645 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { 1646 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; 1647 } else { 1648 protverr = 0; 1649 } 1650 1651 if (protverr) { 1652 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1653 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 1654 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1655 } 1656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1657 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); 1658 goto err; 1659 } 1660 1661 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ 1662 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1664 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1665 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 1666 goto err; 1667 } 1668 1669 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1670 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ 1671 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1672 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1673 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1674 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { 1675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1676 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1677 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1678 goto err; 1679 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1680 } 1681 /* default verification */ 1682 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len 1683 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1684 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1687 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1688 goto err; 1689 } 1690 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; 1691 } 1692 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1693 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1694 if (protverr != 0) { 1695 s->version = s->client_version; 1696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1697 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); 1698 goto err; 1699 } 1700 } 1701 } 1702 1703 s->hit = 0; 1704 1705 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1706 clienthello->isv2) || 1707 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, 1708 clienthello->isv2, 1)) { 1709 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1710 goto err; 1711 } 1712 1713 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; 1714 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ 1715 if (scsvs != NULL) { 1716 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { 1717 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); 1718 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { 1719 if (s->renegotiate) { 1720 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ 1721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1722 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1723 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); 1724 goto err; 1725 } 1726 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; 1727 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && 1728 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { 1729 /* 1730 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried 1731 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version 1732 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first 1733 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger 1734 * an insecure downgrade. 1735 */ 1736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 1737 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1738 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1739 goto err; 1740 } 1741 } 1742 } 1743 1744 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ 1745 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1746 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = 1747 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1748 1749 if (cipher == NULL) { 1750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1751 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1752 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1753 goto err; 1754 } 1755 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 1756 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL 1757 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { 1758 /* 1759 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we 1760 * just selected. Something must have changed. 1761 */ 1762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1763 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1764 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); 1765 goto err; 1766 } 1767 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 1768 } 1769 1770 /* We need to do this before getting the session */ 1771 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, 1772 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1773 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { 1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1775 goto err; 1776 } 1777 1778 /* 1779 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. 1780 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. 1781 * 1782 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1783 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1784 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1785 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1786 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on 1787 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1788 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1789 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1790 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1791 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 1792 * ignored. 1793 */ 1794 if (clienthello->isv2 || 1795 (s->new_session && 1796 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1797 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1798 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1799 goto err; 1800 } 1801 } else { 1802 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); 1803 if (i == 1) { 1804 /* previous session */ 1805 s->hit = 1; 1806 } else if (i == -1) { 1807 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1808 goto err; 1809 } else { 1810 /* i == 0 */ 1811 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1813 goto err; 1814 } 1815 } 1816 } 1817 1818 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1819 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, 1820 s->clienthello->session_id_len); 1821 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; 1822 } 1823 1824 /* 1825 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check 1826 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. 1827 */ 1828 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { 1829 j = 0; 1830 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1831 1832 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1833 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1834 #endif 1835 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1836 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1837 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1838 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1839 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1840 #endif 1841 if (c->id == id) { 1842 j = 1; 1843 break; 1844 } 1845 } 1846 if (j == 0) { 1847 /* 1848 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1849 * to reuse it 1850 */ 1851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1852 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1853 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1854 goto err; 1855 } 1856 } 1857 1858 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { 1859 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) 1860 break; 1861 } 1862 1863 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 1864 /* no compress */ 1865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1866 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1867 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1868 goto err; 1869 } 1870 1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1872 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1873 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); 1874 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1875 1876 /* TLS extensions */ 1877 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1878 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1879 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1880 goto err; 1881 } 1882 1883 /* 1884 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1885 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1886 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1887 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1888 */ 1889 { 1890 unsigned char *pos; 1891 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1892 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { 1893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1894 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1896 goto err; 1897 } 1898 } 1899 1900 if (!s->hit 1901 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 1902 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1903 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) 1904 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { 1905 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1906 /* 1907 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for 1908 * backwards compat reasons 1909 */ 1910 int master_key_length; 1911 1912 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1913 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1914 &master_key_length, ciphers, 1915 &pref_cipher, 1916 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) 1917 && master_key_length > 0) { 1918 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; 1919 s->hit = 1; 1920 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1921 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1922 1923 ciphers = NULL; 1924 1925 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1926 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1927 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1928 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1929 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1931 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1932 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1933 goto err; 1934 } 1935 1936 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1937 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1938 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1939 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1940 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1941 } 1942 } 1943 1944 /* 1945 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1946 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression 1947 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1948 */ 1949 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1950 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1951 /* 1952 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in 1953 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in 1954 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. 1955 */ 1956 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { 1957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1958 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1959 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1960 goto err; 1961 } 1962 } 1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1964 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1965 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1966 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1967 unsigned int k; 1968 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1969 /* Can't disable compression */ 1970 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { 1971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1972 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1973 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1974 goto err; 1975 } 1976 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1977 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1978 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1979 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1980 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1981 break; 1982 } 1983 } 1984 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1986 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1987 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1988 goto err; 1989 } 1990 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1991 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { 1992 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) 1993 break; 1994 } 1995 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 1996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1997 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1998 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1999 goto err; 2000 } 2001 } else if (s->hit) { 2002 comp = NULL; 2003 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 2004 /* See if we have a match */ 2005 int m, nn, v, done = 0; 2006 unsigned int o; 2007 2008 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 2009 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 2010 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 2011 v = comp->id; 2012 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { 2013 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { 2014 done = 1; 2015 break; 2016 } 2017 } 2018 if (done) 2019 break; 2020 } 2021 if (done) 2022 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 2023 else 2024 comp = NULL; 2025 } 2026 #else 2027 /* 2028 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 2029 * using compression. 2030 */ 2031 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 2032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2033 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2034 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 2035 goto err; 2036 } 2037 #endif 2038 2039 /* 2040 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 2041 */ 2042 2043 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2044 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 2045 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 2046 if (ciphers == NULL) { 2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2048 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2050 goto err; 2051 } 2052 ciphers = NULL; 2053 } 2054 2055 if (!s->hit) { 2056 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2057 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 2058 #else 2059 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 2060 #endif 2061 } 2062 2063 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2064 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2065 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2066 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2067 s->clienthello = NULL; 2068 return 1; 2069 err: 2070 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2071 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2072 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2073 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2074 s->clienthello = NULL; 2075 2076 return 0; 2077 } 2078 2079 /* 2080 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2081 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2082 */ 2083 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) 2084 { 2085 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2086 2087 /* 2088 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 2089 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 2090 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 2091 * influence which certificate is sent 2092 */ 2093 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL 2094 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { 2095 int ret; 2096 2097 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2098 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { 2099 /* 2100 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 2101 * et al can pick it up. 2102 */ 2103 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; 2104 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); 2105 switch (ret) { 2106 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2107 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2108 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2109 break; 2110 /* status request response should be sent */ 2111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2112 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) 2113 s->ext.status_expected = 1; 2114 break; 2115 /* something bad happened */ 2116 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2117 default: 2118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2119 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, 2120 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2121 return 0; 2122 } 2123 } 2124 } 2125 2126 return 1; 2127 } 2128 2129 /* 2130 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2131 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2132 */ 2133 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) 2134 { 2135 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2136 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2137 2138 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2139 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2140 s->s3->alpn_proposed, 2141 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, 2142 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); 2143 2144 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2145 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2146 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); 2147 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2150 return 0; 2151 } 2152 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2154 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2155 s->s3->npn_seen = 0; 2156 #endif 2157 2158 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2159 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL 2160 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len 2161 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, 2162 selected_len) != 0) { 2163 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2164 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2165 2166 if (!s->hit) { 2167 /* 2168 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have 2169 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the 2170 * selected ALPN. 2171 */ 2172 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { 2173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2174 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2176 return 0; 2177 } 2178 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, 2179 selected_len); 2180 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 2181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2182 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2184 return 0; 2185 } 2186 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2187 } 2188 } 2189 2190 return 1; 2191 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { 2192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2193 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); 2194 return 0; 2195 } 2196 /* 2197 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was 2198 * present. 2199 */ 2200 } 2201 2202 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2203 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { 2204 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2205 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2206 } 2207 2208 return 1; 2209 } 2210 2211 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 2212 { 2213 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; 2214 2215 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 2216 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); 2217 if (rv == 0) { 2218 /* SSLfatal() was already called */ 2219 goto err; 2220 } 2221 if (rv < 0) 2222 return WORK_MORE_A; 2223 wst = WORK_MORE_B; 2224 } 2225 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { 2226 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2227 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 2228 if (!s->hit) { 2229 if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { 2230 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 2231 if (rv == 0) { 2232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2233 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2234 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 2235 goto err; 2236 } 2237 if (rv < 0) { 2238 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2239 return WORK_MORE_B; 2240 } 2241 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 2242 } 2243 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 2244 /* SSLfatal already called */ 2245 goto err; 2246 } 2247 } 2248 2249 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ 2250 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2251 cipher = 2252 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 2253 2254 if (cipher == NULL) { 2255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2256 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2257 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 2258 goto err; 2259 } 2260 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 2261 } 2262 if (!s->hit) { 2263 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { 2264 /* SSLfatal already called */ 2265 goto err; 2266 } 2267 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ 2268 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) 2269 s->session->not_resumable = 2270 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, 2271 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey 2272 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); 2273 if (s->session->not_resumable) 2274 /* do not send a session ticket */ 2275 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 2276 } 2277 } else { 2278 /* Session-id reuse */ 2279 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 2280 } 2281 2282 /*- 2283 * we now have the following setup. 2284 * client_random 2285 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers 2286 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers 2287 * compression - basically ignored right now 2288 * ssl version is set - sslv3 2289 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 2290 * s->hit - session reuse flag 2291 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. 2292 */ 2293 2294 /* 2295 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the 2296 * certificate callbacks etc above. 2297 */ 2298 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { 2299 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2300 goto err; 2301 } 2302 /* 2303 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and 2304 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 2305 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and 2306 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. 2307 */ 2308 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { 2309 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2310 goto err; 2311 } 2312 2313 wst = WORK_MORE_C; 2314 } 2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2316 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { 2317 int ret; 2318 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { 2319 /* 2320 * callback indicates further work to be done 2321 */ 2322 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2323 return WORK_MORE_C; 2324 } 2325 if (ret < 0) { 2326 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2327 goto err; 2328 } 2329 } 2330 #endif 2331 2332 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 2333 err: 2334 return WORK_ERROR; 2335 } 2336 2337 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2338 { 2339 int compm; 2340 size_t sl, len; 2341 int version; 2342 unsigned char *session_id; 2343 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; 2344 2345 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; 2346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) 2347 /* 2348 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in 2349 * tls_process_client_hello() 2350 */ 2351 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, 2352 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2353 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random, 2354 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 2355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2357 return 0; 2358 } 2359 2360 /*- 2361 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 2362 * back in the server hello: 2363 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 2364 * we send back the old session ID. 2365 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 2366 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 2367 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 2368 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 2369 * session ID. 2370 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 2371 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 2372 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client 2373 * regardless 2374 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 2375 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 2376 * to send back. 2377 */ 2378 if (s->session->not_resumable || 2379 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 2380 && !s->hit)) 2381 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 2382 2383 if (usetls13) { 2384 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; 2385 session_id = s->tmp_session_id; 2386 } else { 2387 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 2388 session_id = s->session->session_id; 2389 } 2390 2391 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 2392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2394 return 0; 2395 } 2396 2397 /* set up the compression method */ 2398 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2399 compm = 0; 2400 #else 2401 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 2402 compm = 0; 2403 else 2404 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 2405 #endif 2406 2407 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) 2408 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) 2409 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { 2410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2411 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2412 return 0; 2413 } 2414 2415 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2416 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2417 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST 2418 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 2419 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO 2420 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), 2421 NULL, 0)) { 2422 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2423 return 0; 2424 } 2425 2426 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 2427 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ 2428 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 2429 s->session = NULL; 2430 s->hit = 0; 2431 2432 /* 2433 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with 2434 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. 2435 */ 2436 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { 2437 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2438 return 0; 2439 } 2440 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 2441 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2442 /* SSLfatal() already called */; 2443 return 0; 2444 } 2445 2446 return 1; 2447 } 2448 2449 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2450 { 2451 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 2452 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2453 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2454 return 0; 2455 } 2456 } 2457 return 1; 2458 } 2459 2460 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2461 { 2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2463 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; 2464 #endif 2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2466 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 2467 size_t encodedlen = 0; 2468 int curve_id = 0; 2469 #endif 2470 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; 2471 int i; 2472 unsigned long type; 2473 const BIGNUM *r[4]; 2474 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2475 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2476 size_t paramlen, paramoffset; 2477 2478 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { 2479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2480 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2481 goto err; 2482 } 2483 2484 if (md_ctx == NULL) { 2485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2486 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2487 goto err; 2488 } 2489 2490 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2491 2492 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 2493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2494 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ 2495 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 2496 } else 2497 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2499 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 2500 CERT *cert = s->cert; 2501 2502 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; 2503 DH *dh; 2504 2505 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { 2506 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); 2507 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); 2508 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { 2509 DH_free(dhp); 2510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2511 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2513 goto err; 2514 } 2515 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); 2516 pkdhp = pkdh; 2517 } else { 2518 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; 2519 } 2520 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 2521 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); 2522 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); 2523 if (pkdh == NULL) { 2524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2525 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2526 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2527 goto err; 2528 } 2529 pkdhp = pkdh; 2530 } 2531 if (pkdhp == NULL) { 2532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2534 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2535 goto err; 2536 } 2537 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, 2538 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { 2539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2540 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2541 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 2542 goto err; 2543 } 2544 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2548 goto err; 2549 } 2550 2551 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); 2552 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2553 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2554 goto err; 2555 } 2556 2557 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 2558 if (dh == NULL) { 2559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2560 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2561 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2562 goto err; 2563 } 2564 2565 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2566 pkdh = NULL; 2567 2568 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); 2569 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); 2570 } else 2571 #endif 2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2573 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2574 2575 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2577 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2578 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2579 goto err; 2580 } 2581 2582 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 2583 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); 2584 if (curve_id == 0) { 2585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2586 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2587 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 2588 goto err; 2589 } 2590 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); 2591 /* Generate a new key for this curve */ 2592 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2593 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2594 goto err; 2595 } 2596 2597 /* Encode the public key. */ 2598 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, 2599 &encodedPoint); 2600 if (encodedlen == 0) { 2601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2602 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2603 goto err; 2604 } 2605 2606 /* 2607 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 2608 * can set these to NULLs 2609 */ 2610 r[0] = NULL; 2611 r[1] = NULL; 2612 r[2] = NULL; 2613 r[3] = NULL; 2614 } else 2615 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2617 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 2618 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 2619 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 2620 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2623 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 2624 goto err; 2625 } 2626 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 2627 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 2628 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 2629 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 2630 } else 2631 #endif 2632 { 2633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2634 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2635 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 2636 goto err; 2637 } 2638 2639 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) 2640 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { 2641 lu = NULL; 2642 } else if (lu == NULL) { 2643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2644 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2645 goto err; 2646 } 2647 2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2649 if (type & SSL_PSK) { 2650 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2651 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); 2652 2653 /* 2654 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already 2655 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case 2656 */ 2657 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 2658 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, 2659 len)) { 2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2663 goto err; 2664 } 2665 } 2666 #endif 2667 2668 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 2669 unsigned char *binval; 2670 int res; 2671 2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2673 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 2674 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); 2675 } else 2676 #endif 2677 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); 2678 2679 if (!res) { 2680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2681 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2683 goto err; 2684 } 2685 2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2687 /*- 2688 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 2689 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 2690 * as the prime 2691 */ 2692 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { 2693 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); 2694 2695 if (len > 0) { 2696 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { 2697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2698 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2700 goto err; 2701 } 2702 memset(binval, 0, len); 2703 } 2704 } 2705 #endif 2706 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) 2707 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2709 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2710 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2711 goto err; 2712 } 2713 2714 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); 2715 } 2716 2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2718 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2719 /* 2720 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the 2721 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 2722 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded 2723 * point itself 2724 */ 2725 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 2726 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) 2727 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) 2728 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { 2729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2730 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2731 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2732 goto err; 2733 } 2734 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2735 encodedPoint = NULL; 2736 } 2737 #endif 2738 2739 /* not anonymous */ 2740 if (lu != NULL) { 2741 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; 2742 const EVP_MD *md; 2743 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; 2744 size_t siglen, tbslen; 2745 int rv; 2746 2747 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { 2748 /* Should never happen */ 2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2750 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2752 goto err; 2753 } 2754 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ 2755 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { 2756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2757 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2759 goto err; 2760 } 2761 /* send signature algorithm */ 2762 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { 2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2764 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2766 goto err; 2767 } 2768 /* 2769 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig 2770 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it 2771 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET 2772 * afterwards. 2773 */ 2774 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2775 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) 2776 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { 2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2778 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2780 goto err; 2781 } 2782 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { 2783 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 2784 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { 2785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2786 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2787 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2788 goto err; 2789 } 2790 } 2791 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, 2792 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, 2793 paramlen); 2794 if (tbslen == 0) { 2795 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2796 goto err; 2797 } 2798 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); 2799 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2800 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) 2801 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { 2802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2803 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2805 goto err; 2806 } 2807 } 2808 2809 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2810 return 1; 2811 err: 2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2813 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2814 #endif 2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2816 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2817 #endif 2818 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2819 return 0; 2820 } 2821 2822 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2823 { 2824 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2825 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ 2826 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 2827 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); 2828 s->pha_context_len = 32; 2829 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL 2830 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0 2831 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { 2832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2833 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2835 return 0; 2836 } 2837 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ 2838 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 2839 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2840 return 0; 2841 } 2842 } else { 2843 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2845 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2847 return 0; 2848 } 2849 } 2850 2851 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2852 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, 2853 0)) { 2854 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2855 return 0; 2856 } 2857 goto done; 2858 } 2859 2860 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2861 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 2862 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2864 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2865 return 0; 2866 } 2867 2868 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2869 const uint16_t *psigs; 2870 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); 2871 2872 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 2873 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) 2874 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) 2875 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2877 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2879 return 0; 2880 } 2881 } 2882 2883 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { 2884 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2885 return 0; 2886 } 2887 2888 done: 2889 s->certreqs_sent++; 2890 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 2891 return 1; 2892 } 2893 2894 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2895 { 2896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2897 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2898 size_t psklen; 2899 PACKET psk_identity; 2900 2901 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { 2902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2903 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2904 return 0; 2905 } 2906 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2908 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2909 return 0; 2910 } 2911 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2913 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2914 return 0; 2915 } 2916 2917 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { 2918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2920 return 0; 2921 } 2922 2923 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, 2924 psk, sizeof(psk)); 2925 2926 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2929 return 0; 2930 } else if (psklen == 0) { 2931 /* 2932 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2933 */ 2934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 2935 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2936 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2937 return 0; 2938 } 2939 2940 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); 2941 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); 2942 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); 2943 2944 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { 2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2947 return 0; 2948 } 2949 2950 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; 2951 2952 return 1; 2953 #else 2954 /* Should never happen */ 2955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2957 return 0; 2958 #endif 2959 } 2960 2961 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2962 { 2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2964 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2965 int decrypt_len; 2966 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2967 size_t j, padding_len; 2968 PACKET enc_premaster; 2969 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2970 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; 2971 int ret = 0; 2972 2973 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); 2974 if (rsa == NULL) { 2975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 2976 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2977 return 0; 2978 } 2979 2980 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ 2981 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2982 enc_premaster = *pkt; 2983 } else { 2984 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) 2985 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 2987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2988 return 0; 2989 } 2990 } 2991 2992 /* 2993 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to 2994 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret 2995 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because 2996 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. 2997 */ 2998 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3000 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); 3001 return 0; 3002 } 3003 3004 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); 3005 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { 3006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3007 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3008 return 0; 3009 } 3010 3011 /* 3012 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 3013 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 3014 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 3015 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 3016 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 3017 */ 3018 3019 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 3020 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { 3021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3023 goto err; 3024 } 3025 3026 /* 3027 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of 3028 * the timing-sensitive code below. 3029 */ 3030 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 3031 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), 3032 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), 3033 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); 3034 if (decrypt_len < 0) { 3035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3037 goto err; 3038 } 3039 3040 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ 3041 3042 /* 3043 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys 3044 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures 3045 * PS is at least 8 bytes. 3046 */ 3047 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 3048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3049 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3050 goto err; 3051 } 3052 3053 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 3054 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & 3055 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); 3056 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { 3057 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); 3058 } 3059 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); 3060 3061 /* 3062 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 3063 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 3064 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 3065 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 3066 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 3067 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 3068 */ 3069 version_good = 3070 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], 3071 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 3072 version_good &= 3073 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], 3074 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 3075 3076 /* 3077 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 3078 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 3079 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 3080 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 3081 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 3082 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 3083 * clients. 3084 */ 3085 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 3086 unsigned char workaround_good; 3087 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], 3088 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 3089 workaround_good &= 3090 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], 3091 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 3092 version_good |= workaround_good; 3093 } 3094 3095 /* 3096 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 3097 * remain non-zero (0xff). 3098 */ 3099 decrypt_good &= version_good; 3100 3101 /* 3102 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 3103 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 3104 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 3105 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 3106 */ 3107 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 3108 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = 3109 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, 3110 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], 3111 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 3112 } 3113 3114 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, 3115 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { 3116 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3117 goto err; 3118 } 3119 3120 ret = 1; 3121 err: 3122 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); 3123 return ret; 3124 #else 3125 /* Should never happen */ 3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3127 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3128 return 0; 3129 #endif 3130 } 3131 3132 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3133 { 3134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3135 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 3136 DH *cdh; 3137 unsigned int i; 3138 BIGNUM *pub_key; 3139 const unsigned char *data; 3140 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3141 int ret = 0; 3142 3143 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { 3144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3145 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 3146 goto err; 3147 } 3148 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; 3149 if (skey == NULL) { 3150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3151 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 3152 goto err; 3153 } 3154 3155 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3157 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 3158 goto err; 3159 } 3160 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3161 /* We already checked we have enough data */ 3162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3164 goto err; 3165 } 3166 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3167 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { 3168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3169 SSL_R_BN_LIB); 3170 goto err; 3171 } 3172 3173 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); 3174 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); 3175 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { 3176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3178 BN_free(pub_key); 3179 goto err; 3180 } 3181 3182 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3183 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3184 goto err; 3185 } 3186 3187 ret = 1; 3188 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 3189 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; 3190 err: 3191 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3192 return ret; 3193 #else 3194 /* Should never happen */ 3195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3197 return 0; 3198 #endif 3199 } 3200 3201 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3202 { 3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3204 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; 3205 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3206 int ret = 0; 3207 3208 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3209 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ 3210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3211 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3212 goto err; 3213 } else { 3214 unsigned int i; 3215 const unsigned char *data; 3216 3217 /* 3218 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 3219 * ClientKeyExchange message. 3220 */ 3221 3222 /* Get encoded point length */ 3223 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) 3224 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3226 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3227 goto err; 3228 } 3229 if (skey == NULL) { 3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3231 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3232 goto err; 3233 } 3234 3235 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3236 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { 3237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3238 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3239 goto err; 3240 } 3241 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { 3242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3243 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 3244 goto err; 3245 } 3246 } 3247 3248 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3249 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3250 goto err; 3251 } 3252 3253 ret = 1; 3254 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 3255 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; 3256 err: 3257 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3258 3259 return ret; 3260 #else 3261 /* Should never happen */ 3262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3263 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3264 return 0; 3265 #endif 3266 } 3267 3268 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3269 { 3270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3271 unsigned int i; 3272 const unsigned char *data; 3273 3274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) 3275 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3277 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 3278 return 0; 3279 } 3280 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { 3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3282 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 3283 return 0; 3284 } 3285 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 3286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3287 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 3288 return 0; 3289 } 3290 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 3291 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 3292 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 3293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3294 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3295 return 0; 3296 } 3297 3298 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { 3299 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3300 return 0; 3301 } 3302 3303 return 1; 3304 #else 3305 /* Should never happen */ 3306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3308 return 0; 3309 #endif 3310 } 3311 3312 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3313 { 3314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3315 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 3316 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 3317 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 3318 const unsigned char *start; 3319 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 3320 unsigned long alg_a; 3321 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len; 3322 int ret = 0; 3323 PACKET encdata; 3324 3325 /* Get our certificate private key */ 3326 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3327 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { 3328 /* 3329 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too 3330 */ 3331 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; 3332 if (pk == NULL) { 3333 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; 3334 } 3335 if (pk == NULL) { 3336 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3337 } 3338 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { 3339 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3340 } 3341 3342 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 3343 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3345 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3346 return 0; 3347 } 3348 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 3349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3351 return 0; 3352 } 3353 /* 3354 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 3355 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 3356 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 3357 * client certificate for authorization only. 3358 */ 3359 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 3360 if (client_pub_pkey) { 3361 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 3362 ERR_clear_error(); 3363 } 3364 /* Decrypt session key */ 3365 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id) 3366 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) 3367 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) { 3368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3369 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3370 goto err; 3371 } 3372 if (asn1len == 0x81) { 3373 /* 3374 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else 3375 * isn't supported. 3376 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail 3377 */ 3378 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) { 3379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3380 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3381 goto err; 3382 } 3383 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) { 3384 /* 3385 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't 3386 * support it 3387 */ 3388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3389 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3390 goto err; 3391 } /* else short form length */ 3392 3393 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) { 3394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3395 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3396 goto err; 3397 } 3398 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata); 3399 start = PACKET_data(&encdata); 3400 3401 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, 3402 inlen) <= 0) { 3403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3404 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3405 goto err; 3406 } 3407 /* Generate master secret */ 3408 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, 3409 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { 3410 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3411 goto err; 3412 } 3413 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 3414 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, 3415 NULL) > 0) 3416 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; 3417 3418 ret = 1; 3419 err: 3420 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3421 return ret; 3422 #else 3423 /* Should never happen */ 3424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3426 return 0; 3427 #endif 3428 } 3429 3430 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3431 { 3432 unsigned long alg_k; 3433 3434 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3435 3436 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ 3437 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { 3438 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3439 goto err; 3440 } 3441 3442 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 3443 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ 3444 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3446 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3448 goto err; 3449 } 3450 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ 3451 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { 3452 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3453 goto err; 3454 } 3455 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 3456 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { 3457 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3458 goto err; 3459 } 3460 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 3461 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { 3462 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3463 goto err; 3464 } 3465 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 3466 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { 3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3468 goto err; 3469 } 3470 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 3471 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { 3472 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3473 goto err; 3474 } 3475 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 3476 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { 3477 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3478 goto err; 3479 } 3480 } else { 3481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3483 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 3484 goto err; 3485 } 3486 3487 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 3488 err: 3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 3490 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); 3491 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; 3492 #endif 3493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3494 } 3495 3496 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 3497 { 3498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 3499 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 3500 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3501 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 3502 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 3503 /* 3504 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP 3505 * used. 3506 */ 3507 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 3508 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 3509 3510 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 3511 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 3512 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 3513 0) <= 0) { 3514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3515 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3516 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3517 return WORK_ERROR; 3518 } 3519 3520 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 3521 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 3522 } 3523 } 3524 #endif 3525 3526 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { 3527 /* 3528 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need 3529 * the handshake_buffer 3530 */ 3531 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3532 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3533 return WORK_ERROR; 3534 } 3535 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3536 } else { 3537 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3539 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3541 return WORK_ERROR; 3542 } 3543 /* 3544 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support 3545 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op 3546 */ 3547 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3548 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3549 return WORK_ERROR; 3550 } 3551 } 3552 3553 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3554 } 3555 3556 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3557 { 3558 int i; 3559 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3560 X509 *x = NULL; 3561 unsigned long l; 3562 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; 3563 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3564 PACKET spkt, context; 3565 size_t chainidx; 3566 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; 3567 3568 /* 3569 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no 3570 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than 3571 * TLSv1.3 3572 */ 3573 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; 3574 3575 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3577 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3578 goto err; 3579 } 3580 3581 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) 3582 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) 3583 || (s->pha_context != NULL && 3584 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { 3585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3586 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 3587 goto err; 3588 } 3589 3590 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) 3591 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3593 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3594 goto err; 3595 } 3596 3597 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { 3598 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) 3599 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { 3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3601 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3602 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3603 goto err; 3604 } 3605 3606 certstart = certbytes; 3607 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); 3608 if (x == NULL) { 3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3610 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3611 goto err; 3612 } 3613 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { 3614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3615 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3616 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3617 goto err; 3618 } 3619 3620 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3621 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 3622 PACKET extensions; 3623 3624 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { 3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3626 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3627 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 3628 goto err; 3629 } 3630 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 3631 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, 3632 NULL, chainidx == 0) 3633 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, 3634 rawexts, x, chainidx, 3635 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { 3636 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3637 goto err; 3638 } 3639 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3640 } 3641 3642 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3644 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3645 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3646 goto err; 3647 } 3648 x = NULL; 3649 } 3650 3651 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3652 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3653 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3655 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3656 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3657 goto err; 3658 } 3659 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3660 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3661 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, 3663 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3664 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3665 goto err; 3666 } 3667 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3668 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3669 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3670 goto err; 3671 } 3672 } else { 3673 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 3674 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3675 if (i <= 0) { 3676 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), 3677 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3678 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3679 goto err; 3680 } 3681 if (i > 1) { 3682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3683 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); 3684 goto err; 3685 } 3686 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); 3687 if (pkey == NULL) { 3688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3689 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3690 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 3691 goto err; 3692 } 3693 } 3694 3695 /* 3696 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise 3697 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, 3698 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time 3699 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the 3700 * session may have already gone into the session cache. 3701 */ 3702 3703 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 3704 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { 3705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3706 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3707 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3708 goto err; 3709 } 3710 3711 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 3712 s->session = new_sess; 3713 } 3714 3715 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3716 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3717 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3718 3719 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); 3720 s->session->peer_chain = sk; 3721 3722 /* 3723 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE 3724 * message 3725 */ 3726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3727 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3728 goto err; 3729 } 3730 3731 /* 3732 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3733 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c 3734 */ 3735 sk = NULL; 3736 3737 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ 3738 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3739 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, 3740 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), 3741 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { 3742 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3743 goto err; 3744 } 3745 3746 /* Resend session tickets */ 3747 s->sent_tickets = 0; 3748 } 3749 3750 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 3751 3752 err: 3753 X509_free(x); 3754 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3755 return ret; 3756 } 3757 3758 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3759 { 3760 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; 3761 3762 if (cpk == NULL) { 3763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3764 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3765 return 0; 3766 } 3767 3768 /* 3769 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context 3770 * for the server Certificate message 3771 */ 3772 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 3773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3774 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3775 return 0; 3776 } 3777 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { 3778 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3779 return 0; 3780 } 3781 3782 return 1; 3783 } 3784 3785 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3786 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3787 { 3788 /* 3789 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this 3790 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). 3791 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the 3792 * timeout. 3793 */ 3794 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 3795 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 3796 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { 3797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3799 return 0; 3800 } 3801 3802 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3803 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) 3804 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { 3805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3807 return 0; 3808 } 3809 } 3810 3811 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ 3812 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 3813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3815 return 0; 3816 } 3817 3818 return 1; 3819 } 3820 3821 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3822 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3823 { 3824 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3825 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; 3826 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; 3827 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; 3828 const unsigned char *const_p; 3829 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; 3830 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3831 unsigned int hlen; 3832 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 3833 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3834 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; 3835 int iv_len, ok = 0; 3836 size_t macoffset, macendoffset; 3837 3838 /* get session encoding length */ 3839 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3840 /* 3841 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3842 * long 3843 */ 3844 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3847 goto err; 3848 } 3849 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3850 if (senc == NULL) { 3851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3852 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3853 goto err; 3854 } 3855 3856 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); 3857 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); 3858 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { 3859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3860 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3861 goto err; 3862 } 3863 3864 p = senc; 3865 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { 3866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3868 goto err; 3869 } 3870 3871 /* 3872 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3873 */ 3874 const_p = senc; 3875 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3876 if (sess == NULL) { 3877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3879 goto err; 3880 } 3881 3882 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3883 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { 3884 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3887 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3888 goto err; 3889 } 3890 p = senc; 3891 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3894 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3895 goto err; 3896 } 3897 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3898 3899 /* 3900 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3901 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3902 */ 3903 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { 3904 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ 3905 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, 3906 hctx, 1); 3907 3908 if (ret == 0) { 3909 3910 /* Put timeout and length */ 3911 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) 3912 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 3913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3914 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3916 goto err; 3917 } 3918 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3919 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 3920 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); 3921 return 1; 3922 } 3923 if (ret < 0) { 3924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3925 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 3926 goto err; 3927 } 3928 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); 3929 } else { 3930 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); 3931 3932 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 3933 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0 3934 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, 3935 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) 3936 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, 3937 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), 3938 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { 3939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3941 goto err; 3942 } 3943 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, 3944 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); 3945 } 3946 3947 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 3948 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3949 goto err; 3950 } 3951 3952 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) 3953 /* Output key name */ 3954 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) 3955 /* output IV */ 3956 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) 3957 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, 3958 &encdata1) 3959 /* Encrypt session data */ 3960 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) 3961 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) 3962 || encdata1 != encdata2 3963 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) 3964 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) 3965 || encdata1 + len != encdata2 3966 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 3967 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) 3968 || !HMAC_Update(hctx, 3969 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, 3970 macendoffset - macoffset) 3971 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) 3972 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) 3973 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 3974 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) 3975 || macdata1 != macdata2) { 3976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3977 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3978 goto err; 3979 } 3980 3981 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ 3982 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 3983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3984 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3985 goto err; 3986 } 3987 3988 ok = 1; 3989 err: 3990 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3991 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 3992 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); 3993 return ok; 3994 } 3995 3996 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3997 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3998 { 3999 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 4000 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4001 return 0; 4002 } 4003 4004 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, 4005 s->session->session_id_length) 4006 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 4007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET, 4008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4009 return 0; 4010 } 4011 4012 return 1; 4013 } 4014 4015 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4016 { 4017 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 4018 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; 4019 union { 4020 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; 4021 uint32_t age_add; 4022 } age_add_u; 4023 4024 age_add_u.age_add = 0; 4025 4026 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4027 size_t i, hashlen; 4028 uint64_t nonce; 4029 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; 4030 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); 4031 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 4032 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); 4033 4034 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ 4035 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { 4036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4037 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4039 goto err; 4040 } 4041 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; 4042 4043 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 4044 cb = s->info_callback; 4045 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 4046 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 4047 4048 if (cb != NULL) { 4049 /* 4050 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when 4051 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info 4052 * callback. 4053 */ 4054 if (s->sent_tickets != 0) { 4055 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); 4056 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 4057 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 4058 } 4059 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 4060 } 4061 /* 4062 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then 4063 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. 4064 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. 4065 */ 4066 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { 4067 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); 4068 4069 if (new_sess == NULL) { 4070 /* SSLfatal already called */ 4071 goto err; 4072 } 4073 4074 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 4075 s->session = new_sess; 4076 } 4077 4078 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { 4079 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4080 goto err; 4081 } 4082 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { 4083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4084 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4086 goto err; 4087 } 4088 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; 4089 4090 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; 4091 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { 4092 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); 4093 nonce >>= 8; 4094 } 4095 4096 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, 4097 nonce_label, 4098 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, 4099 tick_nonce, 4100 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, 4101 s->session->master_key, 4102 hashlen)) { 4103 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4104 goto err; 4105 } 4106 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; 4107 4108 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); 4109 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { 4110 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); 4111 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = 4112 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); 4113 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 4114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4115 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4116 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4117 goto err; 4118 } 4119 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 4120 } 4121 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; 4122 } 4123 4124 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && 4125 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) 4126 goto err; 4127 4128 /* 4129 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if 4130 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there 4131 * is no point in using full stateless tickets. 4132 */ 4133 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 4134 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 4135 || (s->max_early_data > 0 4136 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { 4137 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { 4138 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4139 goto err; 4140 } 4141 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, 4142 tick_nonce)) { 4143 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4144 goto err; 4145 } 4146 4147 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4148 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 4149 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4150 NULL, 0)) { 4151 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4152 goto err; 4153 } 4154 /* 4155 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| 4156 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake 4157 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. 4158 */ 4159 s->sent_tickets++; 4160 s->next_ticket_nonce++; 4161 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 4162 } 4163 4164 return 1; 4165 err: 4166 return 0; 4167 } 4168 4169 /* 4170 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to 4171 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 4172 */ 4173 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4174 { 4175 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) 4176 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, 4177 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { 4178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 4179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4180 return 0; 4181 } 4182 4183 return 1; 4184 } 4185 4186 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4187 { 4188 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 4189 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4190 return 0; 4191 } 4192 4193 return 1; 4194 } 4195 4196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 4197 /* 4198 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 4199 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 4200 */ 4201 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4202 { 4203 PACKET next_proto, padding; 4204 size_t next_proto_len; 4205 4206 /*- 4207 * The payload looks like: 4208 * uint8 proto_len; 4209 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 4210 * uint8 padding_len; 4211 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 4212 */ 4213 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) 4214 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) 4215 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 4216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, 4217 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4218 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4219 } 4220 4221 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { 4222 s->ext.npn_len = 0; 4223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, 4224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4225 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4226 } 4227 4228 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; 4229 4230 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4231 } 4232 #endif 4233 4234 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4235 { 4236 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 4237 NULL, 0)) { 4238 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4239 return 0; 4240 } 4241 4242 return 1; 4243 } 4244 4245 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4246 { 4247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 4248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4249 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4250 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4251 } 4252 4253 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING 4254 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { 4255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4257 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4258 } 4259 4260 /* 4261 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on 4262 * a record boundary. 4263 */ 4264 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 4265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 4266 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4267 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 4268 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4269 } 4270 4271 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; 4272 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 4273 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 4274 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4275 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4276 } 4277 4278 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4279 } 4280