1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 10 */ 11 12 #include <stdio.h> 13 #include "../ssl_locl.h" 14 #include "statem_locl.h" 15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" 16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 17 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 18 #include <openssl/rand.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 22 #include <openssl/x509.h> 23 #include <openssl/dh.h> 24 #include <openssl/bn.h> 25 #include <openssl/md5.h> 26 27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 28 29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); 30 31 /* 32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from 34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. 35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 36 * 37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 38 * (transition not allowed) 39 */ 40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 41 { 42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 43 44 /* 45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have 46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by 47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() 48 */ 49 switch (st->hand_state) { 50 default: 51 break; 52 53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 57 return 1; 58 } 59 break; 60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { 61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { 62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 63 return 1; 64 } 65 break; 66 } 67 /* Fall through */ 68 69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 74 return 1; 75 } 76 } else { 77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 79 return 1; 80 } 81 } 82 break; 83 84 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 88 return 1; 89 } 90 } else { 91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 93 return 1; 94 } 95 } 96 break; 97 98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 101 return 1; 102 } 103 break; 104 105 case TLS_ST_OK: 106 /* 107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of 108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) 109 */ 110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) 111 break; 112 113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 116 return 1; 117 } 118 119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { 120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; 121 return 1; 122 } 123 break; 124 } 125 126 /* No valid transition found */ 127 return 0; 128 } 129 130 /* 131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the 133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The 134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 135 * 136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 137 * (transition not allowed) 138 */ 139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 140 { 141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 142 143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) 145 goto err; 146 return 1; 147 } 148 149 switch (st->hand_state) { 150 default: 151 break; 152 153 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 154 case TLS_ST_OK: 155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; 158 return 1; 159 } 160 break; 161 162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 163 /* 164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either 165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate 166 * OR 167 * 2) If we did request one then 168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned 169 * AND 170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 171 * list if we requested a certificate) 172 */ 173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 178 /* 179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just 180 * not going to accept it because we require a client 181 * cert. 182 */ 183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, 185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 186 return 0; 187 } 188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 189 return 1; 190 } 191 } else { 192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 193 return 1; 194 } 195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; 198 return 1; 199 } 200 } 201 break; 202 203 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; 206 return 1; 207 } 208 break; 209 210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 211 /* 212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have 213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| 214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is 215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in 216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be 217 * set. 218 */ 219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { 220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 221 /* 222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 226 */ 227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 228 return 1; 229 } 230 } else { 231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; 233 return 1; 234 } 235 } 236 break; 237 238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 241 return 1; 242 } 243 break; 244 245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) { 248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { 249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; 250 return 1; 251 } 252 } else { 253 #endif 254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 256 return 1; 257 } 258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 259 } 260 #endif 261 break; 262 263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; 267 return 1; 268 } 269 break; 270 #endif 271 272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; 275 return 1; 276 } 277 break; 278 } 279 280 err: 281 /* No valid transition found */ 282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 283 BIO *rbio; 284 285 /* 286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably 287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. 288 */ 289 s->init_num = 0; 290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 294 return 0; 295 } 296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, 298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 299 return 0; 300 } 301 302 /* 303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? 304 * 305 * Valid return values are: 306 * 1: Yes 307 * 0: No 308 */ 309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 310 { 311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 312 313 /* 314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a 315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 319 * key exchange. 320 */ 321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) 322 /* 323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 324 * provided 325 */ 326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ 328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) 329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) 330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */ 331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) 332 #endif 333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 336 #endif 337 ) { 338 return 1; 339 } 340 341 return 0; 342 } 343 344 /* 345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? 346 * 347 * Valid return values are: 348 * 1: Yes 349 * 0: No 350 */ 351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 352 { 353 if ( 354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER 356 /* 357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing 358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: 359 */ 360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) 361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) 362 /* 363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 364 * a second time: 365 */ 366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || 367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) 368 /* 369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 371 * RFC 2246): 372 */ 373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 374 /* 375 * ... except when the application insists on 376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts 377 * this for SSL 3) 378 */ 379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 382 /* 383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 384 * are omitted 385 */ 386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { 387 return 1; 388 } 389 390 return 0; 391 } 392 393 /* 394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the 396 * client. 397 */ 398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) 399 { 400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 401 402 /* 403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated 404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() 405 */ 406 407 switch (st->hand_state) { 408 default: 409 /* Shouldn't happen */ 410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, 412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 414 415 case TLS_ST_OK: 416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; 418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 419 } 420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 423 } 424 /* Try to read from the client instead */ 425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 426 427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 430 431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) 434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 437 else 438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 440 441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 444 else 445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 447 448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 449 if (s->hit) 450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 451 else if (send_certificate_request(s)) 452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 453 else 454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 455 456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 457 458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; 461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 462 } else { 463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 464 } 465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 466 467 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; 469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 470 471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 474 475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 478 479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 481 482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 483 /* 484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're 485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets 486 * immediately. 487 */ 488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; 490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { 491 /* 492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the 493 * handshake at this point. 494 */ 495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 497 } 498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) 499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 500 else 501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 503 504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; 507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 508 } 509 /* Fall through */ 510 511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 514 515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. 517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have 518 * been configured for. 519 */ 520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { 521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */ 522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 523 } 524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 525 } 526 } 527 528 /* 529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move 530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. 531 */ 532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) 533 { 534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 535 536 /* 537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going 538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later 539 */ 540 541 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); 543 544 switch (st->hand_state) { 545 default: 546 /* Shouldn't happen */ 547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, 549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 551 552 case TLS_ST_OK: 553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { 554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ 555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; 556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; 557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 558 } 559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ 560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { 561 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 563 } 564 /* Fall through */ 565 566 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ 568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 569 570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 573 574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified 576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { 577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ 580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 582 } else { 583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; 584 } 585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 586 587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 589 590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 591 if (s->hit) { 592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) 593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 594 else 595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 596 } else { 597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 598 /* normal PSK or SRP */ 599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { 601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; 602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 606 } else { 607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 608 } 609 } 610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 611 612 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 613 if (s->ext.status_expected) { 614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; 615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 616 } 617 /* Fall through */ 618 619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { 621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; 622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 623 } 624 /* Fall through */ 625 626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) { 628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; 629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 630 } 631 /* Fall through */ 632 633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; 635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 636 637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 639 640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 641 if (s->hit) { 642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; 646 } else { 647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 648 } 649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 650 651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; 653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 654 655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; 657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 658 659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 660 if (s->hit) { 661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 662 } 663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 665 } 666 } 667 668 /* 669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from 670 * the server to the client. 671 */ 672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 673 { 674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 675 676 switch (st->hand_state) { 677 default: 678 /* No pre work to be done */ 679 break; 680 681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 682 s->shutdown = 0; 683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 685 break; 686 687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 688 s->shutdown = 0; 689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); 691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ 692 st->use_timer = 0; 693 } 694 break; 695 696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 698 /* 699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and 700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now 701 */ 702 st->use_timer = 1; 703 } 704 break; 705 706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { 709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); 711 } 712 #endif 713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 714 715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) { 717 /* 718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going 719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off 720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. 721 * 722 * Calls SSLfatal as required. 723 */ 724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); 725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 726 /* 727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer 729 */ 730 st->use_timer = 0; 731 } 732 break; 733 734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 736 break; 737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 739 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 740 return WORK_ERROR; 741 } 742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 743 /* 744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight 745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have 746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, 747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. 748 */ 749 st->use_timer = 0; 750 } 751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 752 753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING 755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 757 /* Fall through */ 758 759 case TLS_ST_OK: 760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); 762 } 763 764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 765 } 766 767 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) 768 { 769 switch (get_last_sys_error()) { 770 #if defined(EPIPE) 771 case EPIPE: 772 return 1; 773 #endif 774 #if defined(ECONNRESET) 775 case ECONNRESET: 776 return 1; 777 #endif 778 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET) 779 case WSAECONNRESET: 780 return 1; 781 #endif 782 default: 783 return 0; 784 } 785 } 786 787 /* 788 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the 789 * server to the client. 790 */ 791 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 792 { 793 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 794 795 s->init_num = 0; 796 797 switch (st->hand_state) { 798 default: 799 /* No post work to be done */ 800 break; 801 802 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 803 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 804 return WORK_MORE_A; 805 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 806 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 807 return WORK_ERROR; 808 } 809 break; 810 811 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 812 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 813 return WORK_MORE_A; 814 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ 815 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 816 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 817 return WORK_ERROR; 818 } 819 /* 820 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to 821 * treat like it was the first packet 822 */ 823 s->first_packet = 1; 824 break; 825 826 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 827 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 828 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 829 && statem_flush(s) != 1) 830 return WORK_MORE_A; 831 break; 832 } 833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 834 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 835 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 836 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 837 size_t labellen; 838 839 /* 840 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no 841 * SCTP used. 842 */ 843 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 844 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 845 846 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 847 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 848 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 849 labellen += 1; 850 851 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 852 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 853 labellen, NULL, 0, 854 0) <= 0) { 855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 856 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, 857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 858 return WORK_ERROR; 859 } 860 861 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 862 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 863 } 864 #endif 865 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 866 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 867 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) 868 break; 869 /* Fall through */ 870 871 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 872 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 873 if (!statem_flush(s)) 874 return WORK_MORE_A; 875 break; 876 } 877 878 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 879 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) 880 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 881 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 882 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 883 return WORK_ERROR; 884 } 885 886 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 887 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 888 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 889 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 890 return WORK_ERROR; 891 } 892 /* 893 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive 894 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted 895 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. 896 */ 897 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; 898 break; 899 } 900 901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 902 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { 903 /* 904 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 905 * no SCTP used. 906 */ 907 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 908 0, NULL); 909 } 910 #endif 911 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 912 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 913 { 914 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 915 return WORK_ERROR; 916 } 917 918 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 919 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 920 break; 921 922 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 923 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 924 return WORK_MORE_A; 925 break; 926 927 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 928 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 929 return WORK_MORE_A; 930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 931 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 932 /* 933 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 934 * no SCTP used. 935 */ 936 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 937 0, NULL); 938 } 939 #endif 940 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 941 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 942 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, 943 &s->session->master_key_length) 944 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 945 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 946 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 947 return WORK_ERROR; 948 } 949 break; 950 951 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 952 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 953 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 954 return WORK_MORE_A; 955 } 956 break; 957 958 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 959 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 960 return WORK_MORE_A; 961 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { 962 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 963 return WORK_ERROR; 964 } 965 break; 966 967 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 968 clear_sys_error(); 969 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { 970 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 971 && conn_is_closed()) { 972 /* 973 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a 974 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is 975 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client 976 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without 977 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. 978 */ 979 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 980 break; 981 } 982 983 return WORK_MORE_A; 984 } 985 break; 986 } 987 988 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 989 } 990 991 /* 992 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the 993 * server 994 * 995 * Valid return values are: 996 * 1: Success 997 * 0: Error 998 */ 999 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1000 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) 1001 { 1002 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1003 1004 switch (st->hand_state) { 1005 default: 1006 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1008 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, 1009 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 1010 return 0; 1011 1012 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: 1013 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 1014 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1015 else 1016 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 1017 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 1018 break; 1019 1020 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 1021 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; 1022 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 1023 break; 1024 1025 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: 1026 /* No construction function needed */ 1027 *confunc = NULL; 1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 1029 break; 1030 1031 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: 1032 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; 1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1034 break; 1035 1036 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: 1037 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; 1038 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; 1039 break; 1040 1041 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: 1042 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; 1043 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; 1044 break; 1045 1046 1047 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: 1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; 1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1050 break; 1051 1052 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: 1053 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; 1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1055 break; 1056 1057 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: 1058 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; 1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1060 break; 1061 1062 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: 1063 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; 1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 1065 break; 1066 1067 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: 1068 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; 1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 1070 break; 1071 1072 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: 1073 *confunc = tls_construct_finished; 1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; 1075 break; 1076 1077 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 1078 *confunc = NULL; 1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; 1080 break; 1081 1082 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1083 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; 1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 1085 break; 1086 1087 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: 1088 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; 1089 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; 1090 break; 1091 } 1092 1093 return 1; 1094 } 1095 1096 /* 1097 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, 1098 * calculated as follows: 1099 * 1100 * 2 + # client_version 1101 * 32 + # only valid length for random 1102 * 1 + # length of session_id 1103 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id 1104 * 2 + # length of cipher suites 1105 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array 1106 * 1 + # length of compression_methods 1107 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods 1108 * 2 + # length of extensions 1109 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions 1110 */ 1111 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 1112 1113 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 1114 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 1115 1116 /* 1117 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are 1118 * reading. Excludes the message header. 1119 */ 1120 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) 1121 { 1122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1123 1124 switch (st->hand_state) { 1125 default: 1126 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1127 return 0; 1128 1129 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1130 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; 1131 1132 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1133 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; 1134 1135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1136 return s->max_cert_list; 1137 1138 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1139 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; 1140 1141 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1142 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1143 1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1145 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1146 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; 1147 #endif 1148 1149 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1150 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; 1151 1152 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1153 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; 1154 1155 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1156 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; 1157 } 1158 } 1159 1160 /* 1161 * Process a message that the server has received from the client. 1162 */ 1163 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1164 { 1165 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1166 1167 switch (st->hand_state) { 1168 default: 1169 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1171 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1172 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1173 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1174 1175 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1176 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); 1177 1178 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 1179 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); 1180 1181 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: 1182 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); 1183 1184 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1185 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); 1186 1187 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: 1188 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); 1189 1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1191 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: 1192 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); 1193 #endif 1194 1195 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: 1196 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); 1197 1198 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: 1199 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); 1200 1201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: 1202 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); 1203 1204 } 1205 } 1206 1207 /* 1208 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message 1209 * from the client 1210 */ 1211 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1212 { 1213 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1214 1215 switch (st->hand_state) { 1216 default: 1217 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1219 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1220 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1221 return WORK_ERROR; 1222 1223 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: 1224 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); 1225 1226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: 1227 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); 1228 } 1229 } 1230 1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1232 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ 1233 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) 1234 { 1235 int ret; 1236 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1237 1238 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 1239 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 1240 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 1241 /* 1242 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 1243 * login name 1244 */ 1245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 1246 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, 1247 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 1248 return -1; 1249 } else { 1250 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); 1251 if (ret < 0) 1252 return 0; 1253 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { 1254 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, 1255 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1256 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 1257 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1258 return -1; 1259 } 1260 } 1261 } 1262 return 1; 1263 } 1264 #endif 1265 1266 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, 1267 size_t cookie_len) 1268 { 1269 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ 1270 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) 1271 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) 1272 return 0; 1273 1274 return 1; 1275 } 1276 1277 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 1278 { 1279 unsigned int cookie_leni; 1280 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || 1281 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, 1282 &cookie_leni) == 0 || 1283 cookie_leni > 255) { 1284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 1285 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 1286 return 0; 1287 } 1288 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; 1289 1290 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, 1291 s->d1->cookie_len)) { 1292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 1293 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1294 return 0; 1295 } 1296 1297 return 1; 1298 } 1299 1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1301 /*- 1302 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1303 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. 1304 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1305 * SNI, 1306 * elliptic_curves 1307 * ec_point_formats 1308 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) 1309 * 1310 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1311 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1312 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1313 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1314 */ 1315 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) 1316 { 1317 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1318 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1319 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1320 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1321 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1322 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1323 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1324 1325 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1326 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1327 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1328 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1329 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1330 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1331 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1332 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1333 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1334 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1335 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1336 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1337 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1338 }; 1339 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ 1340 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; 1341 unsigned int type; 1342 PACKET sni, tmppkt; 1343 size_t ext_len; 1344 1345 tmppkt = hello->extensions; 1346 1347 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) 1348 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) 1349 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { 1350 return; 1351 } 1352 1353 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1354 return; 1355 1356 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? 1357 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; 1358 1359 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, 1360 ext_len); 1361 } 1362 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1363 1364 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1365 { 1366 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ 1367 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; 1368 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; 1369 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; 1370 1371 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ 1372 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1373 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { 1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1376 goto err; 1377 } 1378 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 1379 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding 1380 && (s->options 1381 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { 1382 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1383 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1384 } 1385 s->renegotiate = 1; 1386 s->new_session = 1; 1387 } 1388 1389 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); 1390 if (clienthello == NULL) { 1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1393 goto err; 1394 } 1395 1396 /* 1397 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. 1398 */ 1399 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); 1400 PACKET_null_init(&cookie); 1401 1402 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1403 unsigned int mt; 1404 1405 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 1406 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1408 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1409 goto err; 1410 } 1411 1412 /*- 1413 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 1414 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS 1415 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes 1416 * the rest right through. Its format is: 1417 * Byte Content 1418 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer 1419 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here 1420 * 3-4 version 1421 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length 1422 * 7-8 session_id_length 1423 * 9-10 challenge_length 1424 * ... ... 1425 */ 1426 1427 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) 1428 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 1429 /* 1430 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record 1431 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record 1432 * in the first place 1433 */ 1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1436 goto err; 1437 } 1438 } 1439 1440 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { 1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1442 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1443 goto err; 1444 } 1445 1446 /* Parse the message and load client random. */ 1447 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1448 /* 1449 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello 1450 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. 1451 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. 1452 */ 1453 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; 1454 PACKET challenge; 1455 1456 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) 1457 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) 1458 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { 1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1460 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1461 goto err; 1462 } 1463 1464 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { 1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1466 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1467 goto err; 1468 } 1469 1470 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1471 ciphersuite_len) 1472 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) 1473 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) 1474 /* No extensions. */ 1475 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1477 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1478 goto err; 1479 } 1480 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; 1481 1482 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1483 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit 1484 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if 1485 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. 1486 */ 1487 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1488 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; 1489 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1490 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, 1491 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 1492 challenge_len, challenge_len) 1493 /* Advertise only null compression. */ 1494 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { 1495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1497 goto err; 1498 } 1499 1500 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1501 } else { 1502 /* Regular ClientHello. */ 1503 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 1504 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) 1505 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, 1506 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, 1507 &clienthello->session_id_len)) { 1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1509 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1510 goto err; 1511 } 1512 1513 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1514 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { 1515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1516 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1517 goto err; 1518 } 1519 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1520 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, 1521 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { 1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1524 goto err; 1525 } 1526 /* 1527 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, 1528 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. 1529 * So check cookie length... 1530 */ 1531 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1532 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { 1533 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1534 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1535 } 1536 } 1537 } 1538 1539 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { 1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1541 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1542 goto err; 1543 } 1544 1545 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { 1546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1547 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1548 goto err; 1549 } 1550 1551 /* Could be empty. */ 1552 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { 1553 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); 1554 } else { 1555 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) 1556 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1558 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 } 1562 } 1563 1564 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, 1565 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, 1566 &clienthello->compressions_len)) { 1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1569 goto err; 1570 } 1571 1572 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ 1573 extensions = clienthello->extensions; 1574 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1575 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, 1576 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { 1577 /* SSLfatal already been called */ 1578 goto err; 1579 } 1580 s->clienthello = clienthello; 1581 1582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 1583 1584 err: 1585 if (clienthello != NULL) 1586 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 1587 OPENSSL_free(clienthello); 1588 1589 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1590 } 1591 1592 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) 1593 { 1594 unsigned int j; 1595 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1596 int protverr; 1597 size_t loop; 1598 unsigned long id; 1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1600 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 1601 #endif 1602 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 1603 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 1604 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; 1605 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; 1606 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; 1607 1608 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ 1609 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ 1610 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { 1611 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ 1612 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { 1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: 1614 break; 1615 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: 1616 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; 1617 return -1; 1618 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: 1619 default: 1620 SSLfatal(s, al, 1621 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1622 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 1623 goto err; 1624 } 1625 } 1626 1627 /* Set up the client_random */ 1628 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1629 1630 /* Choose the version */ 1631 1632 if (clienthello->isv2) { 1633 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION 1634 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) 1635 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { 1636 /* 1637 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't 1638 * support it. 1639 */ 1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1641 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1642 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); 1643 goto err; 1644 } 1645 /* SSLv3/TLS */ 1646 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1647 } 1648 /* 1649 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check 1650 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. 1651 */ 1652 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1653 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1654 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && 1655 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { 1656 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; 1657 } else { 1658 protverr = 0; 1659 } 1660 1661 if (protverr) { 1662 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 1663 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 1664 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; 1665 } 1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1667 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); 1668 goto err; 1669 } 1670 1671 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ 1672 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1674 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1675 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 1676 goto err; 1677 } 1678 1679 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1680 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ 1681 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1682 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1683 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, 1684 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { 1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1687 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1688 goto err; 1689 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1690 } 1691 /* default verification */ 1692 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len 1693 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1694 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1696 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1697 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1698 goto err; 1699 } 1700 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; 1701 } 1702 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1703 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); 1704 if (protverr != 0) { 1705 s->version = s->client_version; 1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 1707 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); 1708 goto err; 1709 } 1710 } 1711 } 1712 1713 s->hit = 0; 1714 1715 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, 1716 clienthello->isv2) || 1717 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, 1718 clienthello->isv2, 1)) { 1719 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1720 goto err; 1721 } 1722 1723 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; 1724 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ 1725 if (scsvs != NULL) { 1726 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { 1727 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); 1728 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { 1729 if (s->renegotiate) { 1730 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ 1731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1732 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1733 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); 1734 goto err; 1735 } 1736 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; 1737 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && 1738 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { 1739 /* 1740 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried 1741 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version 1742 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first 1743 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger 1744 * an insecure downgrade. 1745 */ 1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 1747 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1748 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1749 goto err; 1750 } 1751 } 1752 } 1753 1754 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ 1755 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1756 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = 1757 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1758 1759 if (cipher == NULL) { 1760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1761 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1762 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1763 goto err; 1764 } 1765 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 1766 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL 1767 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { 1768 /* 1769 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we 1770 * just selected. Something must have changed. 1771 */ 1772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1773 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1774 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); 1775 goto err; 1776 } 1777 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 1778 } 1779 1780 /* We need to do this before getting the session */ 1781 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, 1782 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1783 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { 1784 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1785 goto err; 1786 } 1787 1788 /* 1789 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. 1790 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. 1791 * 1792 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1793 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1794 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1795 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1796 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on 1797 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1798 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1799 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1800 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1801 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 1802 * ignored. 1803 */ 1804 if (clienthello->isv2 || 1805 (s->new_session && 1806 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1807 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1808 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1809 goto err; 1810 } 1811 } else { 1812 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); 1813 if (i == 1) { 1814 /* previous session */ 1815 s->hit = 1; 1816 } else if (i == -1) { 1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1818 goto err; 1819 } else { 1820 /* i == 0 */ 1821 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { 1822 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1823 goto err; 1824 } 1825 } 1826 } 1827 1828 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1829 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, 1830 s->clienthello->session_id_len); 1831 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; 1832 } 1833 1834 /* 1835 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check 1836 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. 1837 */ 1838 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { 1839 j = 0; 1840 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1841 1842 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1843 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1844 #endif 1845 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1846 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1847 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1848 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1849 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1850 #endif 1851 if (c->id == id) { 1852 j = 1; 1853 break; 1854 } 1855 } 1856 if (j == 0) { 1857 /* 1858 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1859 * to reuse it 1860 */ 1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1862 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1863 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1864 goto err; 1865 } 1866 } 1867 1868 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { 1869 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) 1870 break; 1871 } 1872 1873 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 1874 /* no compress */ 1875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1876 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1877 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1878 goto err; 1879 } 1880 1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1882 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1883 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); 1884 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1885 1886 /* TLS extensions */ 1887 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1888 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1889 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1890 goto err; 1891 } 1892 1893 /* 1894 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1895 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1896 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1897 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1898 */ 1899 { 1900 unsigned char *pos; 1901 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1902 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { 1903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1904 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1906 goto err; 1907 } 1908 } 1909 1910 if (!s->hit 1911 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 1912 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1913 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) 1914 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { 1915 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1916 /* 1917 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for 1918 * backwards compat reasons 1919 */ 1920 int master_key_length; 1921 1922 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1923 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1924 &master_key_length, ciphers, 1925 &pref_cipher, 1926 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) 1927 && master_key_length > 0) { 1928 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; 1929 s->hit = 1; 1930 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1931 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1932 1933 ciphers = NULL; 1934 1935 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1936 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1937 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1938 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1939 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1941 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1942 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1943 goto err; 1944 } 1945 1946 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1947 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1948 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1949 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1950 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1951 } 1952 } 1953 1954 /* 1955 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1956 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression 1957 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1958 */ 1959 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1960 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1961 /* 1962 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in 1963 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in 1964 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. 1965 */ 1966 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { 1967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1968 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1969 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1970 goto err; 1971 } 1972 } 1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1974 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1975 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1976 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1977 unsigned int k; 1978 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1979 /* Can't disable compression */ 1980 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { 1981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1982 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1983 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1984 goto err; 1985 } 1986 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1987 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1988 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1989 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1990 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1991 break; 1992 } 1993 } 1994 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1996 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 1997 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1998 goto err; 1999 } 2000 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 2001 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { 2002 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) 2003 break; 2004 } 2005 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { 2006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 2007 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2008 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 2009 goto err; 2010 } 2011 } else if (s->hit) { 2012 comp = NULL; 2013 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 2014 /* See if we have a match */ 2015 int m, nn, v, done = 0; 2016 unsigned int o; 2017 2018 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 2019 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 2020 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 2021 v = comp->id; 2022 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { 2023 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { 2024 done = 1; 2025 break; 2026 } 2027 } 2028 if (done) 2029 break; 2030 } 2031 if (done) 2032 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 2033 else 2034 comp = NULL; 2035 } 2036 #else 2037 /* 2038 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 2039 * using compression. 2040 */ 2041 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 2042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2043 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2044 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 2045 goto err; 2046 } 2047 #endif 2048 2049 /* 2050 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 2051 */ 2052 2053 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2054 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 2055 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 2056 if (ciphers == NULL) { 2057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2058 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2060 goto err; 2061 } 2062 ciphers = NULL; 2063 } 2064 2065 if (!s->hit) { 2066 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2067 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 2068 #else 2069 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 2070 #endif 2071 } 2072 2073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2074 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2075 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2076 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2077 s->clienthello = NULL; 2078 return 1; 2079 err: 2080 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 2081 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); 2082 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); 2083 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); 2084 s->clienthello = NULL; 2085 2086 return 0; 2087 } 2088 2089 /* 2090 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2091 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2092 */ 2093 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) 2094 { 2095 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2096 2097 /* 2098 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 2099 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 2100 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 2101 * influence which certificate is sent 2102 */ 2103 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL 2104 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { 2105 int ret; 2106 2107 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { 2109 /* 2110 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 2111 * et al can pick it up. 2112 */ 2113 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; 2114 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); 2115 switch (ret) { 2116 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2118 s->ext.status_expected = 0; 2119 break; 2120 /* status request response should be sent */ 2121 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2122 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) 2123 s->ext.status_expected = 1; 2124 break; 2125 /* something bad happened */ 2126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2127 default: 2128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2129 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, 2130 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2131 return 0; 2132 } 2133 } 2134 } 2135 2136 return 1; 2137 } 2138 2139 /* 2140 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. 2141 * Upon failure, returns 0. 2142 */ 2143 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) 2144 { 2145 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2146 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2147 2148 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2149 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2150 s->s3->alpn_proposed, 2151 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, 2152 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); 2153 2154 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2155 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2156 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); 2157 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2160 return 0; 2161 } 2162 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2164 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2165 s->s3->npn_seen = 0; 2166 #endif 2167 2168 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2169 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL 2170 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len 2171 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, 2172 selected_len) != 0) { 2173 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2174 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2175 2176 if (!s->hit) { 2177 /* 2178 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have 2179 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the 2180 * selected ALPN. 2181 */ 2182 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { 2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2184 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2186 return 0; 2187 } 2188 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, 2189 selected_len); 2190 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 2191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2192 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2194 return 0; 2195 } 2196 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2197 } 2198 } 2199 2200 return 1; 2201 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { 2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, 2203 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); 2204 return 0; 2205 } 2206 /* 2207 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was 2208 * present. 2209 */ 2210 } 2211 2212 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ 2213 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { 2214 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ 2215 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 2216 } 2217 2218 return 1; 2219 } 2220 2221 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 2222 { 2223 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; 2224 2225 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 2226 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); 2227 if (rv == 0) { 2228 /* SSLfatal() was already called */ 2229 goto err; 2230 } 2231 if (rv < 0) 2232 return WORK_MORE_A; 2233 wst = WORK_MORE_B; 2234 } 2235 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { 2236 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2237 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 2238 if (!s->hit) { 2239 if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { 2240 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 2241 if (rv == 0) { 2242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2243 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2244 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 2245 goto err; 2246 } 2247 if (rv < 0) { 2248 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2249 return WORK_MORE_B; 2250 } 2251 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 2252 } 2253 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 2254 /* SSLfatal already called */ 2255 goto err; 2256 } 2257 } 2258 2259 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ 2260 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2261 cipher = 2262 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 2263 2264 if (cipher == NULL) { 2265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2266 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 2267 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 2268 goto err; 2269 } 2270 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; 2271 } 2272 if (!s->hit) { 2273 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { 2274 /* SSLfatal already called */ 2275 goto err; 2276 } 2277 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ 2278 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) 2279 s->session->not_resumable = 2280 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, 2281 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey 2282 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); 2283 if (s->session->not_resumable) 2284 /* do not send a session ticket */ 2285 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 2286 } 2287 } else { 2288 /* Session-id reuse */ 2289 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 2290 } 2291 2292 /*- 2293 * we now have the following setup. 2294 * client_random 2295 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers 2296 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers 2297 * compression - basically ignored right now 2298 * ssl version is set - sslv3 2299 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 2300 * s->hit - session reuse flag 2301 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. 2302 */ 2303 2304 /* 2305 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the 2306 * certificate callbacks etc above. 2307 */ 2308 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { 2309 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2310 goto err; 2311 } 2312 /* 2313 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and 2314 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 2315 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and 2316 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. 2317 */ 2318 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { 2319 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2320 goto err; 2321 } 2322 2323 wst = WORK_MORE_C; 2324 } 2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2326 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { 2327 int ret; 2328 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { 2329 /* 2330 * callback indicates further work to be done 2331 */ 2332 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 2333 return WORK_MORE_C; 2334 } 2335 if (ret < 0) { 2336 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2337 goto err; 2338 } 2339 } 2340 #endif 2341 2342 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 2343 err: 2344 return WORK_ERROR; 2345 } 2346 2347 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2348 { 2349 int compm; 2350 size_t sl, len; 2351 int version; 2352 unsigned char *session_id; 2353 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; 2354 2355 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; 2356 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) 2357 /* 2358 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in 2359 * tls_process_client_hello() 2360 */ 2361 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, 2362 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2363 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random, 2364 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2367 return 0; 2368 } 2369 2370 /*- 2371 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 2372 * back in the server hello: 2373 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 2374 * we send back the old session ID. 2375 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 2376 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 2377 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 2378 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 2379 * session ID. 2380 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 2381 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 2382 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client 2383 * regardless 2384 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 2385 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 2386 * to send back. 2387 */ 2388 if (s->session->not_resumable || 2389 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 2390 && !s->hit)) 2391 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 2392 2393 if (usetls13) { 2394 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; 2395 session_id = s->tmp_session_id; 2396 } else { 2397 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 2398 session_id = s->session->session_id; 2399 } 2400 2401 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 2402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2404 return 0; 2405 } 2406 2407 /* set up the compression method */ 2408 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 2409 compm = 0; 2410 #else 2411 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 2412 compm = 0; 2413 else 2414 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 2415 #endif 2416 2417 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) 2418 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) 2419 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { 2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, 2421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2422 return 0; 2423 } 2424 2425 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2426 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING 2427 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST 2428 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 2429 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO 2430 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), 2431 NULL, 0)) { 2432 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2433 return 0; 2434 } 2435 2436 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 2437 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ 2438 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 2439 s->session = NULL; 2440 s->hit = 0; 2441 2442 /* 2443 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with 2444 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. 2445 */ 2446 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { 2447 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2448 return 0; 2449 } 2450 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) 2451 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2452 /* SSLfatal() already called */; 2453 return 0; 2454 } 2455 2456 return 1; 2457 } 2458 2459 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2460 { 2461 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 2462 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 2463 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2464 return 0; 2465 } 2466 } 2467 return 1; 2468 } 2469 2470 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2471 { 2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2473 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; 2474 #endif 2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2476 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 2477 size_t encodedlen = 0; 2478 int curve_id = 0; 2479 #endif 2480 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; 2481 int i; 2482 unsigned long type; 2483 const BIGNUM *r[4]; 2484 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2485 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2486 size_t paramlen, paramoffset; 2487 2488 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { 2489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2490 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2491 goto err; 2492 } 2493 2494 if (md_ctx == NULL) { 2495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2496 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2497 goto err; 2498 } 2499 2500 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2501 2502 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2504 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ 2505 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 2506 } else 2507 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2509 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 2510 CERT *cert = s->cert; 2511 2512 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; 2513 DH *dh; 2514 2515 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { 2516 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); 2517 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); 2518 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { 2519 DH_free(dhp); 2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2521 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2523 goto err; 2524 } 2525 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); 2526 pkdhp = pkdh; 2527 } else { 2528 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; 2529 } 2530 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 2531 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); 2532 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); 2533 if (pkdh == NULL) { 2534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2535 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2537 goto err; 2538 } 2539 pkdhp = pkdh; 2540 } 2541 if (pkdhp == NULL) { 2542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2543 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2544 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2545 goto err; 2546 } 2547 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, 2548 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { 2549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2550 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2551 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 2552 goto err; 2553 } 2554 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2558 goto err; 2559 } 2560 2561 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); 2562 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2563 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2564 goto err; 2565 } 2566 2567 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 2568 if (dh == NULL) { 2569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2570 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2571 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2572 goto err; 2573 } 2574 2575 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2576 pkdh = NULL; 2577 2578 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); 2579 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); 2580 } else 2581 #endif 2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2583 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2584 2585 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { 2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2587 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2589 goto err; 2590 } 2591 2592 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 2593 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); 2594 if (curve_id == 0) { 2595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2596 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2597 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 2598 goto err; 2599 } 2600 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); 2601 /* Generate a new key for this curve */ 2602 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { 2603 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2604 goto err; 2605 } 2606 2607 /* Encode the public key. */ 2608 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, 2609 &encodedPoint); 2610 if (encodedlen == 0) { 2611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2612 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2613 goto err; 2614 } 2615 2616 /* 2617 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 2618 * can set these to NULLs 2619 */ 2620 r[0] = NULL; 2621 r[1] = NULL; 2622 r[2] = NULL; 2623 r[3] = NULL; 2624 } else 2625 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2627 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 2628 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 2629 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 2630 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2632 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2633 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 2634 goto err; 2635 } 2636 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 2637 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 2638 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 2639 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 2640 } else 2641 #endif 2642 { 2643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2644 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2645 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 2646 goto err; 2647 } 2648 2649 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) 2650 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { 2651 lu = NULL; 2652 } else if (lu == NULL) { 2653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2654 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2655 goto err; 2656 } 2657 2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2659 if (type & SSL_PSK) { 2660 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2661 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); 2662 2663 /* 2664 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already 2665 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case 2666 */ 2667 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 2668 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, 2669 len)) { 2670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2671 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2672 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2673 goto err; 2674 } 2675 } 2676 #endif 2677 2678 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 2679 unsigned char *binval; 2680 int res; 2681 2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2683 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 2684 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); 2685 } else 2686 #endif 2687 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); 2688 2689 if (!res) { 2690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2691 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2692 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2693 goto err; 2694 } 2695 2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2697 /*- 2698 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS 2699 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length 2700 * as the prime 2701 */ 2702 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { 2703 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); 2704 2705 if (len > 0) { 2706 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { 2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2708 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2709 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2710 goto err; 2711 } 2712 memset(binval, 0, len); 2713 } 2714 } 2715 #endif 2716 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) 2717 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2719 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2721 goto err; 2722 } 2723 2724 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); 2725 } 2726 2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2728 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2729 /* 2730 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the 2731 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 2732 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded 2733 * point itself 2734 */ 2735 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 2736 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) 2737 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) 2738 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { 2739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2740 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2741 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2742 goto err; 2743 } 2744 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2745 encodedPoint = NULL; 2746 } 2747 #endif 2748 2749 /* not anonymous */ 2750 if (lu != NULL) { 2751 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; 2752 const EVP_MD *md; 2753 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; 2754 size_t siglen, tbslen; 2755 int rv; 2756 2757 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { 2758 /* Should never happen */ 2759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2760 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2762 goto err; 2763 } 2764 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ 2765 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { 2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2767 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2768 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2769 goto err; 2770 } 2771 /* send signature algorithm */ 2772 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { 2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2774 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2775 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2776 goto err; 2777 } 2778 /* 2779 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig 2780 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it 2781 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET 2782 * afterwards. 2783 */ 2784 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2785 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) 2786 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { 2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2790 goto err; 2791 } 2792 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { 2793 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 2794 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { 2795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2796 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2797 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2798 goto err; 2799 } 2800 } 2801 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, 2802 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, 2803 paramlen); 2804 if (tbslen == 0) { 2805 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2806 goto err; 2807 } 2808 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); 2809 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2810 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) 2811 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { 2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2813 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2815 goto err; 2816 } 2817 } 2818 2819 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2820 return 1; 2821 err: 2822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2823 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); 2824 #endif 2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2826 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2827 #endif 2828 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2829 return 0; 2830 } 2831 2832 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2833 { 2834 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2835 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ 2836 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { 2837 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); 2838 s->pha_context_len = 32; 2839 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL 2840 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0 2841 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { 2842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2843 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2845 return 0; 2846 } 2847 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ 2848 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 2849 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2850 return 0; 2851 } 2852 } else { 2853 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 2854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2855 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2856 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2857 return 0; 2858 } 2859 } 2860 2861 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 2862 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, 2863 0)) { 2864 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2865 return 0; 2866 } 2867 goto done; 2868 } 2869 2870 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2871 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 2872 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2874 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2875 return 0; 2876 } 2877 2878 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2879 const uint16_t *psigs; 2880 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); 2881 2882 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 2883 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) 2884 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) 2885 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2887 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2888 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2889 return 0; 2890 } 2891 } 2892 2893 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { 2894 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2895 return 0; 2896 } 2897 2898 done: 2899 s->certreqs_sent++; 2900 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 2901 return 1; 2902 } 2903 2904 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2905 { 2906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2907 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2908 size_t psklen; 2909 PACKET psk_identity; 2910 2911 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { 2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2913 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2914 return 0; 2915 } 2916 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2918 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2919 return 0; 2920 } 2921 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2923 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2924 return 0; 2925 } 2926 2927 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { 2928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2929 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2930 return 0; 2931 } 2932 2933 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, 2934 psk, sizeof(psk)); 2935 2936 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2938 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2939 return 0; 2940 } else if (psklen == 0) { 2941 /* 2942 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2943 */ 2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 2945 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2946 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2947 return 0; 2948 } 2949 2950 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); 2951 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); 2952 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); 2953 2954 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { 2955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2956 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2957 return 0; 2958 } 2959 2960 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; 2961 2962 return 1; 2963 #else 2964 /* Should never happen */ 2965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2967 return 0; 2968 #endif 2969 } 2970 2971 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2972 { 2973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2974 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2975 int decrypt_len; 2976 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2977 size_t j, padding_len; 2978 PACKET enc_premaster; 2979 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2980 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; 2981 int ret = 0; 2982 2983 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); 2984 if (rsa == NULL) { 2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 2986 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2987 return 0; 2988 } 2989 2990 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ 2991 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2992 enc_premaster = *pkt; 2993 } else { 2994 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) 2995 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 2997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2998 return 0; 2999 } 3000 } 3001 3002 /* 3003 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to 3004 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret 3005 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because 3006 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. 3007 */ 3008 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3010 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); 3011 return 0; 3012 } 3013 3014 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); 3015 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { 3016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3017 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3018 return 0; 3019 } 3020 3021 /* 3022 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 3023 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 3024 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 3025 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 3026 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 3027 */ 3028 3029 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 3030 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { 3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3033 goto err; 3034 } 3035 3036 /* 3037 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of 3038 * the timing-sensitive code below. 3039 */ 3040 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 3041 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), 3042 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), 3043 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); 3044 if (decrypt_len < 0) { 3045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3047 goto err; 3048 } 3049 3050 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ 3051 3052 /* 3053 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys 3054 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures 3055 * PS is at least 8 bytes. 3056 */ 3057 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3059 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3060 goto err; 3061 } 3062 3063 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 3064 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & 3065 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); 3066 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { 3067 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); 3068 } 3069 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); 3070 3071 /* 3072 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 3073 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 3074 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 3075 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 3076 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 3077 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 3078 */ 3079 version_good = 3080 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], 3081 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 3082 version_good &= 3083 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], 3084 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 3085 3086 /* 3087 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 3088 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 3089 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 3090 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 3091 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 3092 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 3093 * clients. 3094 */ 3095 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 3096 unsigned char workaround_good; 3097 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], 3098 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 3099 workaround_good &= 3100 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], 3101 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 3102 version_good |= workaround_good; 3103 } 3104 3105 /* 3106 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 3107 * remain non-zero (0xff). 3108 */ 3109 decrypt_good &= version_good; 3110 3111 /* 3112 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 3113 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 3114 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 3115 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 3116 */ 3117 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 3118 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = 3119 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, 3120 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], 3121 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 3122 } 3123 3124 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, 3125 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { 3126 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3127 goto err; 3128 } 3129 3130 ret = 1; 3131 err: 3132 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); 3133 return ret; 3134 #else 3135 /* Should never happen */ 3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, 3137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3138 return 0; 3139 #endif 3140 } 3141 3142 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3143 { 3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3145 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 3146 DH *cdh; 3147 unsigned int i; 3148 BIGNUM *pub_key; 3149 const unsigned char *data; 3150 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3151 int ret = 0; 3152 3153 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { 3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3155 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 3156 goto err; 3157 } 3158 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; 3159 if (skey == NULL) { 3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3161 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 3162 goto err; 3163 } 3164 3165 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3167 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 3168 goto err; 3169 } 3170 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3171 /* We already checked we have enough data */ 3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3174 goto err; 3175 } 3176 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3177 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { 3178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3179 SSL_R_BN_LIB); 3180 goto err; 3181 } 3182 3183 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); 3184 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); 3185 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { 3186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3188 BN_free(pub_key); 3189 goto err; 3190 } 3191 3192 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3193 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3194 goto err; 3195 } 3196 3197 ret = 1; 3198 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 3199 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; 3200 err: 3201 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3202 return ret; 3203 #else 3204 /* Should never happen */ 3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, 3206 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3207 return 0; 3208 #endif 3209 } 3210 3211 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3212 { 3213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3214 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; 3215 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; 3216 int ret = 0; 3217 3218 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { 3219 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ 3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3221 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3222 goto err; 3223 } else { 3224 unsigned int i; 3225 const unsigned char *data; 3226 3227 /* 3228 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 3229 * ClientKeyExchange message. 3230 */ 3231 3232 /* Get encoded point length */ 3233 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) 3234 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3236 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3237 goto err; 3238 } 3239 if (skey == NULL) { 3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3241 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 3242 goto err; 3243 } 3244 3245 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 3246 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { 3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3248 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3249 goto err; 3250 } 3251 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { 3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3253 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 3254 goto err; 3255 } 3256 } 3257 3258 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 3259 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3260 goto err; 3261 } 3262 3263 ret = 1; 3264 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); 3265 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; 3266 err: 3267 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3268 3269 return ret; 3270 #else 3271 /* Should never happen */ 3272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, 3273 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3274 return 0; 3275 #endif 3276 } 3277 3278 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3279 { 3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3281 unsigned int i; 3282 const unsigned char *data; 3283 3284 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) 3285 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { 3286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3287 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 3288 return 0; 3289 } 3290 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { 3291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3292 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 3293 return 0; 3294 } 3295 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3297 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 3298 return 0; 3299 } 3300 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 3301 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 3302 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3304 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3305 return 0; 3306 } 3307 3308 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { 3309 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3310 return 0; 3311 } 3312 3313 return 1; 3314 #else 3315 /* Should never happen */ 3316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, 3317 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3318 return 0; 3319 #endif 3320 } 3321 3322 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3323 { 3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3325 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 3326 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 3327 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 3328 const unsigned char *start; 3329 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 3330 unsigned long alg_a; 3331 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len; 3332 int ret = 0; 3333 PACKET encdata; 3334 3335 /* Get our certificate private key */ 3336 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3337 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { 3338 /* 3339 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too 3340 */ 3341 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; 3342 if (pk == NULL) { 3343 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; 3344 } 3345 if (pk == NULL) { 3346 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3347 } 3348 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { 3349 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 3350 } 3351 3352 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 3353 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3355 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3356 return 0; 3357 } 3358 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 3359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3361 return 0; 3362 } 3363 /* 3364 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 3365 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 3366 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 3367 * client certificate for authorization only. 3368 */ 3369 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 3370 if (client_pub_pkey) { 3371 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 3372 ERR_clear_error(); 3373 } 3374 /* Decrypt session key */ 3375 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id) 3376 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) 3377 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) { 3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3379 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3380 goto err; 3381 } 3382 if (asn1len == 0x81) { 3383 /* 3384 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else 3385 * isn't supported. 3386 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail 3387 */ 3388 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) { 3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3390 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3391 goto err; 3392 } 3393 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) { 3394 /* 3395 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't 3396 * support it 3397 */ 3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3399 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3400 goto err; 3401 } /* else short form length */ 3402 3403 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) { 3404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3405 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3406 goto err; 3407 } 3408 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata); 3409 start = PACKET_data(&encdata); 3410 3411 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, 3412 inlen) <= 0) { 3413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3414 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 3415 goto err; 3416 } 3417 /* Generate master secret */ 3418 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, 3419 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { 3420 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3421 goto err; 3422 } 3423 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 3424 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, 3425 NULL) > 0) 3426 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; 3427 3428 ret = 1; 3429 err: 3430 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3431 return ret; 3432 #else 3433 /* Should never happen */ 3434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, 3435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3436 return 0; 3437 #endif 3438 } 3439 3440 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3441 { 3442 unsigned long alg_k; 3443 3444 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3445 3446 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ 3447 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { 3448 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3449 goto err; 3450 } 3451 3452 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 3453 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ 3454 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3457 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3458 goto err; 3459 } 3460 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ 3461 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { 3462 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3463 goto err; 3464 } 3465 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 3466 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { 3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3468 goto err; 3469 } 3470 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 3471 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { 3472 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3473 goto err; 3474 } 3475 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 3476 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { 3477 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3478 goto err; 3479 } 3480 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 3481 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { 3482 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3483 goto err; 3484 } 3485 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 3486 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { 3487 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3488 goto err; 3489 } 3490 } else { 3491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3493 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 3494 goto err; 3495 } 3496 3497 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 3498 err: 3499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 3500 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); 3501 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; 3502 #endif 3503 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3504 } 3505 3506 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 3507 { 3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 3509 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 3510 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3511 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 3512 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 3513 size_t labellen; 3514 /* 3515 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP 3516 * used. 3517 */ 3518 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 3519 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 3520 3521 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ 3522 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; 3523 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) 3524 labellen += 1; 3525 3526 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 3527 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 3528 labellen, NULL, 0, 3529 0) <= 0) { 3530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3531 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3533 return WORK_ERROR; 3534 } 3535 3536 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 3537 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 3538 } 3539 } 3540 #endif 3541 3542 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { 3543 /* 3544 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need 3545 * the handshake_buffer 3546 */ 3547 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3548 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3549 return WORK_ERROR; 3550 } 3551 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3552 } else { 3553 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3555 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 3556 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3557 return WORK_ERROR; 3558 } 3559 /* 3560 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support 3561 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op 3562 */ 3563 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3564 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3565 return WORK_ERROR; 3566 } 3567 } 3568 3569 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3570 } 3571 3572 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3573 { 3574 int i; 3575 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3576 X509 *x = NULL; 3577 unsigned long l; 3578 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; 3579 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3580 PACKET spkt, context; 3581 size_t chainidx; 3582 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; 3583 3584 /* 3585 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no 3586 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than 3587 * TLSv1.3 3588 */ 3589 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; 3590 3591 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3593 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3594 goto err; 3595 } 3596 3597 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) 3598 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) 3599 || (s->pha_context != NULL && 3600 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { 3601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3602 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 3603 goto err; 3604 } 3605 3606 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) 3607 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3609 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3610 goto err; 3611 } 3612 3613 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { 3614 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) 3615 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { 3616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3617 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3618 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3619 goto err; 3620 } 3621 3622 certstart = certbytes; 3623 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); 3624 if (x == NULL) { 3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3626 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3627 goto err; 3628 } 3629 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { 3630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3631 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3632 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3633 goto err; 3634 } 3635 3636 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3637 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 3638 PACKET extensions; 3639 3640 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { 3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 3642 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3643 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 3644 goto err; 3645 } 3646 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 3647 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, 3648 NULL, chainidx == 0) 3649 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, 3650 rawexts, x, chainidx, 3651 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { 3652 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3653 goto err; 3654 } 3655 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3656 } 3657 3658 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3660 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3661 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3662 goto err; 3663 } 3664 x = NULL; 3665 } 3666 3667 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3668 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3669 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3671 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3672 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3673 goto err; 3674 } 3675 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3676 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3677 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, 3679 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3680 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3681 goto err; 3682 } 3683 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3684 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3685 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3686 goto err; 3687 } 3688 } else { 3689 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 3690 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3691 if (i <= 0) { 3692 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), 3693 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3694 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3695 goto err; 3696 } 3697 if (i > 1) { 3698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3699 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); 3700 goto err; 3701 } 3702 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); 3703 if (pkey == NULL) { 3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3705 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3706 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 3707 goto err; 3708 } 3709 } 3710 3711 /* 3712 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise 3713 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, 3714 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time 3715 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the 3716 * session may have already gone into the session cache. 3717 */ 3718 3719 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 3720 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { 3721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3722 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3723 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3724 goto err; 3725 } 3726 3727 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 3728 s->session = new_sess; 3729 } 3730 3731 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3732 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3733 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3734 3735 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); 3736 s->session->peer_chain = sk; 3737 3738 /* 3739 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE 3740 * message 3741 */ 3742 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { 3743 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3744 goto err; 3745 } 3746 3747 /* 3748 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3749 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c 3750 */ 3751 sk = NULL; 3752 3753 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ 3754 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3755 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, 3756 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), 3757 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { 3758 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3759 goto err; 3760 } 3761 3762 /* Resend session tickets */ 3763 s->sent_tickets = 0; 3764 } 3765 3766 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 3767 3768 err: 3769 X509_free(x); 3770 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3771 return ret; 3772 } 3773 3774 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3775 { 3776 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; 3777 3778 if (cpk == NULL) { 3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3780 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3781 return 0; 3782 } 3783 3784 /* 3785 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context 3786 * for the server Certificate message 3787 */ 3788 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 3789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3790 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3791 return 0; 3792 } 3793 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { 3794 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3795 return 0; 3796 } 3797 3798 return 1; 3799 } 3800 3801 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3802 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3803 { 3804 /* 3805 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this 3806 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). 3807 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the 3808 * timeout. 3809 */ 3810 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 3811 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 3812 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { 3813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3815 return 0; 3816 } 3817 3818 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) 3820 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { 3821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3823 return 0; 3824 } 3825 } 3826 3827 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ 3828 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 3829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, 3830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3831 return 0; 3832 } 3833 3834 return 1; 3835 } 3836 3837 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 3838 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 3839 { 3840 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3841 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; 3842 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; 3843 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; 3844 const unsigned char *const_p; 3845 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; 3846 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3847 unsigned int hlen; 3848 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 3849 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3850 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; 3851 int iv_len, ok = 0; 3852 size_t macoffset, macendoffset; 3853 3854 /* get session encoding length */ 3855 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3856 /* 3857 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3858 * long 3859 */ 3860 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3863 goto err; 3864 } 3865 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3866 if (senc == NULL) { 3867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3868 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3869 goto err; 3870 } 3871 3872 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); 3873 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); 3874 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { 3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3876 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3877 goto err; 3878 } 3879 3880 p = senc; 3881 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { 3882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3884 goto err; 3885 } 3886 3887 /* 3888 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3889 */ 3890 const_p = senc; 3891 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3892 if (sess == NULL) { 3893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3895 goto err; 3896 } 3897 3898 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3899 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { 3900 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3903 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3904 goto err; 3905 } 3906 p = senc; 3907 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3910 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3911 goto err; 3912 } 3913 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3914 3915 /* 3916 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3917 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3918 */ 3919 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { 3920 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ 3921 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, 3922 hctx, 1); 3923 3924 if (ret == 0) { 3925 3926 /* Put timeout and length */ 3927 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) 3928 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 3929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3930 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3932 goto err; 3933 } 3934 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3935 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 3936 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); 3937 return 1; 3938 } 3939 if (ret < 0) { 3940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3941 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 3942 goto err; 3943 } 3944 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); 3945 } else { 3946 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); 3947 3948 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 3949 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0 3950 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, 3951 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) 3952 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, 3953 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), 3954 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { 3955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 3956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3957 goto err; 3958 } 3959 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, 3960 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); 3961 } 3962 3963 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 3964 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3965 goto err; 3966 } 3967 3968 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) 3969 /* Output key name */ 3970 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) 3971 /* output IV */ 3972 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) 3973 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, 3974 &encdata1) 3975 /* Encrypt session data */ 3976 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) 3977 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) 3978 || encdata1 != encdata2 3979 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) 3980 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) 3981 || encdata1 + len != encdata2 3982 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 3983 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) 3984 || !HMAC_Update(hctx, 3985 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, 3986 macendoffset - macoffset) 3987 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) 3988 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) 3989 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 3990 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) 3991 || macdata1 != macdata2) { 3992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3993 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3994 goto err; 3995 } 3996 3997 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ 3998 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 3999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, 4000 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4001 goto err; 4002 } 4003 4004 ok = 1; 4005 err: 4006 OPENSSL_free(senc); 4007 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 4008 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); 4009 return ok; 4010 } 4011 4012 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, 4013 unsigned char *tick_nonce) 4014 { 4015 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { 4016 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4017 return 0; 4018 } 4019 4020 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, 4021 s->session->session_id_length) 4022 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 4023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET, 4024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4025 return 0; 4026 } 4027 4028 return 1; 4029 } 4030 4031 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4032 { 4033 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; 4034 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; 4035 union { 4036 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; 4037 uint32_t age_add; 4038 } age_add_u; 4039 4040 age_add_u.age_add = 0; 4041 4042 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4043 size_t i, hashlen; 4044 uint64_t nonce; 4045 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; 4046 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); 4047 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); 4048 4049 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ 4050 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { 4051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4052 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4053 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4054 goto err; 4055 } 4056 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; 4057 4058 /* 4059 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then 4060 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. 4061 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. 4062 */ 4063 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { 4064 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); 4065 4066 if (new_sess == NULL) { 4067 /* SSLfatal already called */ 4068 goto err; 4069 } 4070 4071 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 4072 s->session = new_sess; 4073 } 4074 4075 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { 4076 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4077 goto err; 4078 } 4079 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { 4080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4081 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4083 goto err; 4084 } 4085 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; 4086 4087 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; 4088 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { 4089 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); 4090 nonce >>= 8; 4091 } 4092 4093 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, 4094 nonce_label, 4095 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, 4096 tick_nonce, 4097 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, 4098 s->session->master_key, 4099 hashlen, 1)) { 4100 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4101 goto err; 4102 } 4103 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; 4104 4105 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); 4106 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { 4107 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); 4108 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = 4109 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); 4110 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { 4111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 4112 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4113 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4114 goto err; 4115 } 4116 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 4117 } 4118 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; 4119 } 4120 4121 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && 4122 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) 4123 goto err; 4124 4125 /* 4126 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if 4127 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there 4128 * is no point in using full stateless tickets. 4129 */ 4130 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 4131 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 4132 || (s->max_early_data > 0 4133 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { 4134 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { 4135 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4136 goto err; 4137 } 4138 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, 4139 tick_nonce)) { 4140 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4141 goto err; 4142 } 4143 4144 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 4145 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, 4146 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4147 NULL, 0)) { 4148 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4149 goto err; 4150 } 4151 /* 4152 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| 4153 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake 4154 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. 4155 */ 4156 s->sent_tickets++; 4157 s->next_ticket_nonce++; 4158 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 4159 } 4160 4161 return 1; 4162 err: 4163 return 0; 4164 } 4165 4166 /* 4167 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to 4168 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 4169 */ 4170 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4171 { 4172 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) 4173 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, 4174 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { 4175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 4176 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4177 return 0; 4178 } 4179 4180 return 1; 4181 } 4182 4183 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4184 { 4185 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 4186 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4187 return 0; 4188 } 4189 4190 return 1; 4191 } 4192 4193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 4194 /* 4195 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 4196 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 4197 */ 4198 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4199 { 4200 PACKET next_proto, padding; 4201 size_t next_proto_len; 4202 4203 /*- 4204 * The payload looks like: 4205 * uint8 proto_len; 4206 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 4207 * uint8 padding_len; 4208 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 4209 */ 4210 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) 4211 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) 4212 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 4213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, 4214 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4215 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4216 } 4217 4218 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { 4219 s->ext.npn_len = 0; 4220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, 4221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4222 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4223 } 4224 4225 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; 4226 4227 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4228 } 4229 #endif 4230 4231 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 4232 { 4233 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 4234 NULL, 0)) { 4235 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4236 return 0; 4237 } 4238 4239 return 1; 4240 } 4241 4242 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 4243 { 4244 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 4245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4246 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 4247 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4248 } 4249 4250 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING 4251 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { 4252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4254 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4255 } 4256 4257 /* 4258 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on 4259 * a record boundary. 4260 */ 4261 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 4262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 4263 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 4264 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 4265 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4266 } 4267 4268 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; 4269 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 4270 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 4271 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 4272 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 4273 } 4274 4275 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 4276 } 4277