1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 10 */ 11 12 #include <stdio.h> 13 #include <time.h> 14 #include <assert.h> 15 #include "../ssl_locl.h" 16 #include "statem_locl.h" 17 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 18 #include <openssl/rand.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/md5.h> 22 #include <openssl/dh.h> 23 #include <openssl/bn.h> 24 #include <openssl/engine.h> 25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h> 26 27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); 28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); 29 30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); 31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); 32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, 33 WPACKET *pkt); 34 35 /* 36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? 37 * 38 * Return values are: 39 * 1: Yes 40 * 0: No 41 */ 42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) 43 { 44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ 45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION 46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) 47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) 48 return 0; 49 50 return 1; 51 } 52 53 /* 54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? 55 * 56 * Return values are: 57 * 1: Yes 58 * 0: No 59 */ 60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) 61 { 62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 63 64 /* 65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral 66 * ciphersuite or for SRP 67 */ 68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK 69 | SSL_kSRP)) { 70 return 1; 71 } 72 73 return 0; 74 } 75 76 /* 77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the 79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The 80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 81 * 82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 83 * (transition not allowed) 84 */ 85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 86 { 87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 88 89 /* 90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't 91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by 92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() 93 */ 94 95 switch (st->hand_state) { 96 default: 97 break; 98 99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 100 /* 101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only 102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. 103 */ 104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { 105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; 106 return 1; 107 } 108 break; 109 110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { 112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; 113 return 1; 114 } 115 break; 116 117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 118 if (s->hit) { 119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; 121 return 1; 122 } 123 } else { 124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { 125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 126 return 1; 127 } 128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; 130 return 1; 131 } 132 } 133 break; 134 135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; 138 return 1; 139 } 140 break; 141 142 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; 145 return 1; 146 } 147 break; 148 149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; 152 return 1; 153 } 154 break; 155 156 case TLS_ST_OK: 157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { 158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; 159 return 1; 160 } 161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { 162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; 163 return 1; 164 } 165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { 166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION 167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message. 168 #endif 169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { 170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; 171 /* 172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the 173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding 174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the 175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? 176 */ 177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 178 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 179 return 0; 180 } 181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 182 return 1; 183 } 184 } 185 break; 186 } 187 188 /* No valid transition found */ 189 return 0; 190 } 191 192 /* 193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed 194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the 195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The 196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. 197 * 198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error 199 * (transition not allowed) 200 */ 201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) 202 { 203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 204 int ske_expected; 205 206 /* 207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version 208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. 209 */ 210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) 212 goto err; 213 return 1; 214 } 215 216 switch (st->hand_state) { 217 default: 218 break; 219 220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { 222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; 223 return 1; 224 } 225 226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { 228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 229 return 1; 230 } 231 } 232 break; 233 234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 235 /* 236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early 237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a 238 * HelloRetryRequest. 239 */ 240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { 241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; 242 return 1; 243 } 244 break; 245 246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 247 if (s->hit) { 248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { 250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; 251 return 1; 252 } 253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 255 return 1; 256 } 257 } else { 258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { 259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; 260 return 1; 261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL 263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL 264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 265 /* 266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session 267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on 268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if 269 * the server is resuming. 270 */ 271 s->hit = 1; 272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 273 return 1; 274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth 275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { 276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; 278 return 1; 279 } 280 } else { 281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); 282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ 283 if (ske_expected 284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) 285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { 286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; 288 return 1; 289 } 290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) { 292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 293 return 1; 294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { 295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; 296 return 1; 297 } 298 } 299 } 300 break; 301 302 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 303 /* 304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if 305 * |ext.status_expected| is set 306 */ 307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { 308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; 309 return 1; 310 } 311 /* Fall through */ 312 313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: 314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); 315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ 316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) 317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { 318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; 320 return 1; 321 } 322 goto err; 323 } 324 /* Fall through */ 325 326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: 327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { 328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { 329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; 330 return 1; 331 } 332 goto err; 333 } 334 /* Fall through */ 335 336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { 338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; 339 return 1; 340 } 341 break; 342 343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { 345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { 346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; 347 return 1; 348 } 349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 351 return 1; 352 } 353 break; 354 355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; 358 return 1; 359 } 360 break; 361 362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: 363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; 365 return 1; 366 } 367 break; 368 369 case TLS_ST_OK: 370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { 371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; 372 return 1; 373 } 374 break; 375 } 376 377 err: 378 /* No valid transition found */ 379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 380 BIO *rbio; 381 382 /* 383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably 384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. 385 */ 386 s->init_num = 0; 387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 391 return 0; 392 } 393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, 395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 396 return 0; 397 } 398 399 /* 400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the 402 * server. 403 */ 404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) 405 { 406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 407 408 /* 409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated 410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by 411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). 412 */ 413 switch (st->hand_state) { 414 default: 415 /* Shouldn't happen */ 416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, 418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 420 421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; 424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 425 } 426 /* 427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after 428 * we already sent close_notify 429 */ 430 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { 431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ 432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 433 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, 434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 436 } 437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 439 440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 441 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY 442 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) 443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; 444 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 445 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 447 else 448 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT 449 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 451 452 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: 453 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { 454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 456 } 457 /* Fall through */ 458 459 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 460 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 461 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT 462 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 464 465 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: 466 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ 467 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY 468 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 470 471 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: 472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 474 475 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: 476 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; 478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 479 } 480 /* Fall through */ 481 482 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: 483 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 484 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 487 488 case TLS_ST_OK: 489 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { 490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; 491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 492 } 493 494 /* Try to read from the server instead */ 495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 496 } 497 } 498 499 /* 500 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to 501 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. 502 */ 503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) 504 { 505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 506 507 /* 508 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what 509 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until 510 * later 511 */ 512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 513 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); 514 515 switch (st->hand_state) { 516 default: 517 /* Shouldn't happen */ 518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 519 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION, 520 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 521 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 522 523 case TLS_ST_OK: 524 if (!s->renegotiate) { 525 /* 526 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have 527 * received a message from the server. Better read it. 528 */ 529 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 530 } 531 /* Renegotiation */ 532 /* fall thru */ 533 case TLS_ST_BEFORE: 534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 536 537 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 538 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { 539 /* 540 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't 541 * actually selected a version yet. 542 */ 543 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) 544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 545 else 546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 548 } 549 /* 550 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what 551 * we will be sent 552 */ 553 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 554 555 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 556 /* 557 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a 558 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one 559 * because we did early data. 560 */ 561 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 562 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) 563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 564 else 565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 567 568 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 570 571 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 574 575 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: 576 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) 577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; 578 else 579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; 580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 581 582 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: 583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; 584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 585 586 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: 587 /* 588 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is 589 * sent, but no verify packet is sent 590 */ 591 /* 592 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH 593 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We 594 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's 595 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. 596 */ 597 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { 598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; 599 } else { 600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 601 } 602 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { 603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 604 } 605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 606 607 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: 608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 610 611 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 612 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 614 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { 615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; 616 } else { 617 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 619 #else 620 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) 621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; 622 else 623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 624 #endif 625 } 626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 627 628 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 629 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: 630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; 631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 632 #endif 633 634 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 635 if (s->hit) { 636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 638 } else { 639 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; 640 } 641 642 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 643 if (s->hit) { 644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; 645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 646 } else { 647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 649 } 650 651 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: 652 /* 653 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more 654 * convenient time. 655 */ 656 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { 657 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { 658 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 659 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; 660 } 661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; 662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 663 } 664 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; 665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; 666 } 667 } 668 669 /* 670 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from 671 * the client to the server. 672 */ 673 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 674 { 675 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 676 677 switch (st->hand_state) { 678 default: 679 /* No pre work to be done */ 680 break; 681 682 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 683 s->shutdown = 0; 684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 685 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ 686 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 687 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 688 return WORK_ERROR; 689 } 690 } 691 break; 692 693 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 695 if (s->hit) { 696 /* 697 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these 698 * messages unless we need to. 699 */ 700 st->use_timer = 0; 701 } 702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 703 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { 704 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 705 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); 706 } 707 #endif 708 } 709 break; 710 711 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: 712 /* 713 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not 714 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press 715 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. 716 */ 717 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING 718 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) 719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 720 /* Fall through */ 721 722 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: 723 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); 724 725 case TLS_ST_OK: 726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 727 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); 728 } 729 730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 731 } 732 733 /* 734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the 735 * client to the server. 736 */ 737 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 738 { 739 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 740 741 s->init_num = 0; 742 743 switch (st->hand_state) { 744 default: 745 /* No post work to be done */ 746 break; 747 748 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 749 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING 750 && s->max_early_data > 0) { 751 /* 752 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change 753 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead 754 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. 755 */ 756 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { 757 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, 758 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 759 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 760 return WORK_ERROR; 761 } 762 } 763 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ 764 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { 765 return WORK_MORE_A; 766 } 767 768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 769 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ 770 s->first_packet = 1; 771 } 772 break; 773 774 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 775 /* 776 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing 777 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. 778 */ 779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 780 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 781 break; 782 783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: 784 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { 785 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 786 return WORK_ERROR; 787 } 788 break; 789 790 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 791 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) 792 break; 793 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING 794 && s->max_early_data > 0) { 795 /* 796 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change 797 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead 798 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. 799 */ 800 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, 801 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) 802 return WORK_ERROR; 803 break; 804 } 805 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 806 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 807 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 808 #else 809 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 810 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 811 else 812 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 813 #endif 814 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 815 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 816 return WORK_ERROR; 817 } 818 819 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 820 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 821 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 822 return WORK_ERROR; 823 } 824 825 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 827 if (s->hit) { 828 /* 829 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 830 * no SCTP used. 831 */ 832 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 833 0, NULL); 834 } 835 #endif 836 837 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 838 } 839 break; 840 841 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 843 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { 844 /* 845 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 846 * no SCTP used. 847 */ 848 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 849 0, NULL); 850 } 851 #endif 852 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 853 return WORK_MORE_B; 854 855 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 856 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 857 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 858 return WORK_ERROR; 859 } 860 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 861 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 862 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 863 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 864 return WORK_ERROR; 865 } 866 } 867 } 868 break; 869 870 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: 871 if (statem_flush(s) != 1) 872 return WORK_MORE_A; 873 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { 874 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 875 return WORK_ERROR; 876 } 877 break; 878 } 879 880 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 881 } 882 883 /* 884 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the 885 * client 886 * 887 * Valid return values are: 888 * 1: Success 889 * 0: Error 890 */ 891 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 892 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) 893 { 894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 895 896 switch (st->hand_state) { 897 default: 898 /* Shouldn't happen */ 899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 900 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, 901 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); 902 return 0; 903 904 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: 905 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 906 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 907 else 908 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; 909 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 910 break; 911 912 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: 913 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; 914 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; 915 break; 916 917 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: 918 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; 919 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; 920 break; 921 922 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: 923 *confunc = NULL; 924 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; 925 break; 926 927 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: 928 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; 929 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; 930 break; 931 932 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: 933 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; 934 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; 935 break; 936 937 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: 938 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; 939 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; 940 break; 941 942 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 943 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: 944 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; 945 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; 946 break; 947 #endif 948 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: 949 *confunc = tls_construct_finished; 950 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; 951 break; 952 953 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: 954 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; 955 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; 956 break; 957 } 958 959 return 1; 960 } 961 962 /* 963 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are 964 * reading. Excludes the message header. 965 */ 966 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) 967 { 968 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 969 970 switch (st->hand_state) { 971 default: 972 /* Shouldn't happen */ 973 return 0; 974 975 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 976 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; 977 978 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 979 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; 980 981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 982 return s->max_cert_list; 983 984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 985 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 986 987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: 988 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 989 990 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: 991 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; 992 993 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 994 /* 995 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In 996 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured 997 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs 998 */ 999 return s->max_cert_list; 1000 1001 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: 1002 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; 1003 1004 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: 1005 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1006 return 3; 1007 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; 1008 1009 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 1010 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1011 1012 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 1013 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; 1014 1015 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1016 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; 1017 1018 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: 1019 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; 1020 } 1021 } 1022 1023 /* 1024 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. 1025 */ 1026 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1027 { 1028 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1029 1030 switch (st->hand_state) { 1031 default: 1032 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1034 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1036 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1037 1038 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: 1039 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); 1040 1041 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: 1042 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); 1043 1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: 1045 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); 1046 1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: 1048 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); 1049 1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: 1051 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); 1052 1053 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: 1054 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); 1055 1056 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 1057 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); 1058 1059 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: 1060 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); 1061 1062 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: 1063 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); 1064 1065 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: 1066 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); 1067 1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: 1069 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); 1070 1071 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: 1072 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); 1073 1074 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: 1075 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); 1076 1077 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: 1078 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); 1079 } 1080 } 1081 1082 /* 1083 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message 1084 * from the server 1085 */ 1086 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 1087 { 1088 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; 1089 1090 switch (st->hand_state) { 1091 default: 1092 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1094 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, 1095 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1096 return WORK_ERROR; 1097 1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: 1099 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); 1100 } 1101 } 1102 1103 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 1104 { 1105 unsigned char *p; 1106 size_t sess_id_len; 1107 int i, protverr; 1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1109 SSL_COMP *comp; 1110 #endif 1111 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; 1112 unsigned char *session_id; 1113 1114 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 1115 /* Should not happen */ 1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1117 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1118 return 0; 1119 } 1120 1121 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ 1122 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); 1123 if (protverr != 0) { 1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1125 protverr); 1126 return 0; 1127 } 1128 1129 if (sess == NULL 1130 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) 1131 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { 1132 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE 1133 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { 1134 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1135 return 0; 1136 } 1137 } 1138 /* else use the pre-loaded session */ 1139 1140 p = s->s3->client_random; 1141 1142 /* 1143 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are 1144 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify 1145 */ 1146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1147 size_t idx; 1148 i = 1; 1149 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { 1150 if (p[idx]) { 1151 i = 0; 1152 break; 1153 } 1154 } 1155 } else { 1156 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); 1157 } 1158 1159 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), 1160 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { 1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1163 return 0; 1164 } 1165 1166 /*- 1167 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from 1168 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version 1169 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also 1170 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can 1171 * choke if we initially report a higher version then 1172 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This 1173 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it 1174 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports 1175 * 1.0. 1176 * 1177 * Possible scenario with previous logic: 1178 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 1179 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 1180 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. 1181 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. 1182 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. 1183 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now 1184 * know that is maximum server supports. 1185 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret 1186 * containing version 1.0. 1187 * 1188 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the 1189 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely 1190 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't 1191 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with 1192 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using 1193 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to 1194 * the negotiated version. 1195 * 1196 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the 1197 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. 1198 */ 1199 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) 1200 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1203 return 0; 1204 } 1205 1206 /* Session ID */ 1207 session_id = s->session->session_id; 1208 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { 1209 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION 1210 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { 1211 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); 1212 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; 1213 session_id = s->tmp_session_id; 1214 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE 1215 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) { 1216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1217 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1219 return 0; 1220 } 1221 } else { 1222 sess_id_len = 0; 1223 } 1224 } else { 1225 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); 1226 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; 1227 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { 1228 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; 1229 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); 1230 } 1231 } 1232 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 1233 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, 1234 sess_id_len)) 1235 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1238 return 0; 1239 } 1240 1241 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ 1242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1243 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) 1244 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, 1245 s->d1->cookie_len)) { 1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1248 return 0; 1249 } 1250 } 1251 1252 /* Ciphers supported */ 1253 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1256 return 0; 1257 } 1258 1259 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { 1260 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1261 return 0; 1262 } 1263 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1266 return 0; 1267 } 1268 1269 /* COMPRESSION */ 1270 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { 1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1273 return 0; 1274 } 1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1276 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) 1277 && s->ctx->comp_methods 1278 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { 1279 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1280 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { 1281 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); 1282 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { 1283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1284 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1286 return 0; 1287 } 1288 } 1289 } 1290 #endif 1291 /* Add the NULL method */ 1292 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, 1294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1295 return 0; 1296 } 1297 1298 /* TLS extensions */ 1299 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { 1300 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1301 return 0; 1302 } 1303 1304 return 1; 1305 } 1306 1307 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1308 { 1309 size_t cookie_len; 1310 PACKET cookiepkt; 1311 1312 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) 1313 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { 1314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, 1315 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1316 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1317 } 1318 1319 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); 1320 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { 1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, 1322 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1323 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1324 } 1325 1326 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { 1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, 1328 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1329 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1330 } 1331 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; 1332 1333 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1334 } 1335 1336 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) 1337 { 1338 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1339 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 1340 int i; 1341 1342 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); 1343 if (c == NULL) { 1344 /* unknown cipher */ 1345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, 1346 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1347 return 0; 1348 } 1349 /* 1350 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, 1351 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. 1352 */ 1353 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { 1354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, 1355 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1356 return 0; 1357 } 1358 1359 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); 1360 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); 1361 if (i < 0) { 1362 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ 1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, 1364 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1365 return 0; 1366 } 1367 1368 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL 1369 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { 1370 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ 1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, 1372 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 1373 return 0; 1374 } 1375 1376 /* 1377 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher 1378 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is 1379 * set and use it for comparison. 1380 */ 1381 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) 1382 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; 1383 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { 1384 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1385 /* 1386 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different 1387 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. 1388 */ 1389 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) 1390 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { 1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1392 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, 1393 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); 1394 return 0; 1395 } 1396 } else { 1397 /* 1398 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same 1399 * ciphersuite. 1400 */ 1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, 1402 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); 1403 return 0; 1404 } 1405 } 1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1407 1408 return 1; 1409 } 1410 1411 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1412 { 1413 PACKET session_id, extpkt; 1414 size_t session_id_len; 1415 const unsigned char *cipherchars; 1416 int hrr = 0; 1417 unsigned int compression; 1418 unsigned int sversion; 1419 unsigned int context; 1420 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; 1421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1422 SSL_COMP *comp; 1423 #endif 1424 1425 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { 1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1427 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1428 goto err; 1429 } 1430 1431 /* load the server random */ 1432 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION 1433 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION 1434 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1435 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { 1436 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; 1437 hrr = 1; 1438 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1440 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1441 goto err; 1442 } 1443 } else { 1444 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { 1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1446 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1447 goto err; 1448 } 1449 } 1450 1451 /* Get the session-id. */ 1452 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { 1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1454 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1455 goto err; 1456 } 1457 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); 1458 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) 1459 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { 1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1461 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); 1462 goto err; 1463 } 1464 1465 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { 1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1467 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1468 goto err; 1469 } 1470 1471 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { 1472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1473 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1474 goto err; 1475 } 1476 1477 /* TLS extensions */ 1478 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { 1479 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); 1480 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) 1481 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1483 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 1484 goto err; 1485 } 1486 1487 if (!hrr) { 1488 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, 1489 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO 1490 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, 1491 &extensions, NULL, 1)) { 1492 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1493 goto err; 1494 } 1495 1496 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { 1497 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1498 goto err; 1499 } 1500 } 1501 1502 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { 1503 if (compression != 0) { 1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1505 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1506 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1507 goto err; 1508 } 1509 1510 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len 1511 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, 1512 session_id_len) != 0) { 1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1514 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); 1515 goto err; 1516 } 1517 } 1518 1519 if (hrr) { 1520 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { 1521 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1522 goto err; 1523 } 1524 1525 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); 1526 } 1527 1528 /* 1529 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions 1530 * are appropriate for this version. 1531 */ 1532 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO 1533 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; 1534 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { 1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1536 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1537 goto err; 1538 } 1539 1540 s->hit = 0; 1541 1542 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1543 /* 1544 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of 1545 * the message must be on a record boundary. 1546 */ 1547 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 1548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1549 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1550 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 1551 goto err; 1552 } 1553 1554 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ 1555 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, 1556 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, 1557 extensions, NULL, 0)) { 1558 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 } else { 1562 /* 1563 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared 1564 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. 1565 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. 1566 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) 1567 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application 1568 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether 1569 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session 1570 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we 1571 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake 1572 * message to see if the server wants to resume. 1573 */ 1574 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION 1575 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { 1576 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1577 /* 1578 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for 1579 * backwards compat reasons 1580 */ 1581 int master_key_length; 1582 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1583 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1584 &master_key_length, 1585 NULL, &pref_cipher, 1586 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) 1587 && master_key_length > 0) { 1588 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; 1589 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? 1590 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); 1591 } else { 1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1593 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1594 goto err; 1595 } 1596 } 1597 1598 if (session_id_len != 0 1599 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length 1600 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, 1601 session_id_len) == 0) 1602 s->hit = 1; 1603 } 1604 1605 if (s->hit) { 1606 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length 1607 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { 1608 /* actually a client application bug */ 1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1610 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1611 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); 1612 goto err; 1613 } 1614 } else { 1615 /* 1616 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server 1617 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. 1618 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, 1619 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be 1620 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. 1621 */ 1622 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0 1623 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1624 && s->session->ext.tick_identity 1625 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) { 1626 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); 1627 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { 1628 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1629 goto err; 1630 } 1631 } 1632 1633 s->session->ssl_version = s->version; 1634 /* 1635 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can 1636 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an 1637 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be 1638 * used for resumption. 1639 */ 1640 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1641 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; 1642 /* session_id_len could be 0 */ 1643 if (session_id_len > 0) 1644 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), 1645 session_id_len); 1646 } 1647 } 1648 1649 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ 1650 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { 1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1652 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); 1653 goto err; 1654 } 1655 /* 1656 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed 1657 * version. 1658 */ 1659 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; 1660 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; 1661 1662 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { 1663 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1664 goto err; 1665 } 1666 1667 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1668 if (compression != 0) { 1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1670 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1671 goto err; 1672 } 1673 /* 1674 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1675 * using compression. 1676 */ 1677 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1679 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1680 goto err; 1681 } 1682 #else 1683 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { 1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1685 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); 1686 goto err; 1687 } 1688 if (compression == 0) 1689 comp = NULL; 1690 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { 1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1692 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); 1693 goto err; 1694 } else { 1695 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); 1696 } 1697 1698 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { 1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1700 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1701 goto err; 1702 } else { 1703 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1704 } 1705 #endif 1706 1707 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1708 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1709 goto err; 1710 } 1711 1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 1713 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { 1714 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 1715 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 1716 1717 /* 1718 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if 1719 * no SCTP used. 1720 */ 1721 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 1722 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 1723 1724 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 1725 sizeof(sctpauthkey), 1726 labelbuffer, 1727 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { 1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, 1729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1730 goto err; 1731 } 1732 1733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), 1734 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 1735 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 1736 } 1737 #endif 1738 1739 /* 1740 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise 1741 * we're done with this message 1742 */ 1743 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1744 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) 1745 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 1746 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { 1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1748 goto err; 1749 } 1750 1751 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1752 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 1753 err: 1754 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1756 } 1757 1758 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, 1759 PACKET *extpkt) 1760 { 1761 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; 1762 1763 /* 1764 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and 1765 * should not be used. 1766 */ 1767 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 1768 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 1769 1770 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, 1771 &extensions, NULL, 1) 1772 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, 1773 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1775 goto err; 1776 } 1777 1778 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1779 extensions = NULL; 1780 1781 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 1782 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) 1783 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL 1784 #endif 1785 ) { 1786 /* 1787 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next 1788 * ClientHello will not change 1789 */ 1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1791 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, 1792 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); 1793 goto err; 1794 } 1795 1796 /* 1797 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with 1798 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. 1799 */ 1800 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { 1801 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1802 goto err; 1803 } 1804 1805 /* 1806 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done 1807 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the 1808 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now 1809 * for HRR messages. 1810 */ 1811 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 1812 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 1813 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1814 goto err; 1815 } 1816 1817 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 1818 err: 1819 OPENSSL_free(extensions); 1820 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1821 } 1822 1823 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1824 { 1825 int i; 1826 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 1827 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; 1828 X509 *x = NULL; 1829 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; 1830 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 1831 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1832 size_t chainidx, certidx; 1833 unsigned int context = 0; 1834 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; 1835 1836 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1839 goto err; 1840 } 1841 1842 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) 1843 || context != 0 1844 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) 1845 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len 1846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { 1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1848 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1849 goto err; 1850 } 1851 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { 1852 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) 1853 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { 1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1856 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1857 goto err; 1858 } 1859 1860 certstart = certbytes; 1861 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); 1862 if (x == NULL) { 1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, 1864 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 1865 goto err; 1866 } 1867 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { 1868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1869 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1870 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1871 goto err; 1872 } 1873 1874 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1875 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 1876 PACKET extensions; 1877 1878 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { 1879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1880 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1881 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 1882 goto err; 1883 } 1884 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 1885 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, 1886 NULL, chainidx == 0) 1887 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, 1888 rawexts, x, chainidx, 1889 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { 1890 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 1891 /* SSLfatal already called */ 1892 goto err; 1893 } 1894 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 1895 } 1896 1897 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 1898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1899 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1900 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1901 goto err; 1902 } 1903 x = NULL; 1904 } 1905 1906 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 1907 /* 1908 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order 1909 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. 1910 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set 1911 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes 1912 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was 1913 * reverted because at least one application *only* set 1914 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused 1915 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did 1916 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags 1917 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the 1918 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is 1919 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. 1920 */ 1921 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { 1922 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), 1923 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1924 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 1925 goto err; 1926 } 1927 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ 1928 if (i > 1) { 1929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 1930 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); 1931 goto err; 1932 } 1933 1934 s->session->peer_chain = sk; 1935 /* 1936 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, 1937 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c 1938 */ 1939 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); 1940 sk = NULL; 1941 1942 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); 1943 1944 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { 1945 x = NULL; 1946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1947 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); 1948 goto err; 1949 } 1950 1951 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { 1952 x = NULL; 1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1954 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1955 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 1956 goto err; 1957 } 1958 /* 1959 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 1960 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate 1961 * type. 1962 */ 1963 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1964 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { 1965 x = NULL; 1966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1967 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 1968 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 1969 goto err; 1970 } 1971 } 1972 s->session->peer_type = certidx; 1973 1974 X509_free(s->session->peer); 1975 X509_up_ref(x); 1976 s->session->peer = x; 1977 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 1978 x = NULL; 1979 1980 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ 1981 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 1982 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, 1983 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), 1984 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { 1985 /* SSLfatal() already called */; 1986 goto err; 1987 } 1988 1989 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 1990 1991 err: 1992 X509_free(x); 1993 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 1994 return ret; 1995 } 1996 1997 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 1998 { 1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2000 PACKET psk_identity_hint; 2001 2002 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ 2003 2004 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { 2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2006 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2007 return 0; 2008 } 2009 2010 /* 2011 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in 2012 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of 2013 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK 2014 * identity. 2015 */ 2016 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2018 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2019 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2020 return 0; 2021 } 2022 2023 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { 2024 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2025 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; 2026 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, 2027 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { 2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2030 return 0; 2031 } 2032 2033 return 1; 2034 #else 2035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2037 return 0; 2038 #endif 2039 } 2040 2041 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 2042 { 2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2044 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; 2045 2046 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) 2047 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) 2048 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) 2049 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { 2050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, 2051 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2052 return 0; 2053 } 2054 2055 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ 2056 if ((s->srp_ctx.N = 2057 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), 2058 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL 2059 || (s->srp_ctx.g = 2060 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), 2061 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL 2062 || (s->srp_ctx.s = 2063 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), 2064 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL 2065 || (s->srp_ctx.B = 2066 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), 2067 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { 2068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, 2069 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2070 return 0; 2071 } 2072 2073 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { 2074 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2075 return 0; 2076 } 2077 2078 /* We must check if there is a certificate */ 2079 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) 2080 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2081 2082 return 1; 2083 #else 2084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, 2085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2086 return 0; 2087 #endif 2088 } 2089 2090 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 2091 { 2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2093 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; 2094 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; 2095 2096 DH *dh = NULL; 2097 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; 2098 2099 int check_bits = 0; 2100 2101 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) 2102 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) 2103 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { 2104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2105 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2106 return 0; 2107 } 2108 2109 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); 2110 dh = DH_new(); 2111 2112 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { 2113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2114 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2115 goto err; 2116 } 2117 2118 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ 2119 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); 2120 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), 2121 NULL); 2122 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), 2123 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); 2124 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { 2125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2126 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2127 goto err; 2128 } 2129 2130 /* test non-zero pubkey */ 2131 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { 2132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2133 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); 2134 goto err; 2135 } 2136 2137 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { 2138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2139 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2140 goto err; 2141 } 2142 p = g = NULL; 2143 2144 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { 2145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2146 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); 2147 goto err; 2148 } 2149 2150 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { 2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2152 ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2153 goto err; 2154 } 2155 bnpub_key = NULL; 2156 2157 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { 2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2159 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 2160 goto err; 2161 } 2162 2163 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { 2164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2165 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2166 goto err; 2167 } 2168 2169 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; 2170 2171 /* 2172 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with 2173 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this 2174 */ 2175 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) 2176 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2177 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ 2178 2179 return 1; 2180 2181 err: 2182 BN_free(p); 2183 BN_free(g); 2184 BN_free(bnpub_key); 2185 DH_free(dh); 2186 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); 2187 2188 return 0; 2189 #else 2190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, 2191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2192 return 0; 2193 #endif 2194 } 2195 2196 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 2197 { 2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2199 PACKET encoded_pt; 2200 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; 2201 2202 /* 2203 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH 2204 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and 2205 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. 2206 */ 2207 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { 2208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, 2209 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 2210 return 0; 2211 } 2212 /* 2213 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not 2214 * server has sent an invalid curve. 2215 */ 2216 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 2217 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { 2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, 2219 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 2220 return 0; 2221 } 2222 2223 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) { 2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, 2225 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); 2226 return 0; 2227 } 2228 2229 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { 2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, 2231 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2232 return 0; 2233 } 2234 2235 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, 2236 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), 2237 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { 2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, 2239 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); 2240 return 0; 2241 } 2242 2243 /* 2244 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign 2245 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA 2246 * and ECDSA. 2247 */ 2248 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) 2249 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2250 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) 2251 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2252 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ 2253 2254 return 1; 2255 #else 2256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, 2257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2258 return 0; 2259 #endif 2260 } 2261 2262 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2263 { 2264 long alg_k; 2265 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2266 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; 2267 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2268 PACKET save_param_start, signature; 2269 2270 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2271 2272 save_param_start = *pkt; 2273 2274 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) 2275 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); 2276 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; 2277 #endif 2278 2279 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { 2280 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { 2281 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2282 goto err; 2283 } 2284 } 2285 2286 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ 2287 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 2288 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2289 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { 2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2291 goto err; 2292 } 2293 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 2294 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { 2295 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2296 goto err; 2297 } 2298 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 2299 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { 2300 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2301 goto err; 2302 } 2303 } else if (alg_k) { 2304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2305 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2306 goto err; 2307 } 2308 2309 /* if it was signed, check the signature */ 2310 if (pkey != NULL) { 2311 PACKET params; 2312 int maxsig; 2313 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2314 unsigned char *tbs; 2315 size_t tbslen; 2316 int rv; 2317 2318 /* 2319 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference 2320 * equals the length of the parameters. 2321 */ 2322 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, 2323 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - 2324 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { 2325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2327 goto err; 2328 } 2329 2330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2331 unsigned int sigalg; 2332 2333 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { 2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2335 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 2336 goto err; 2337 } 2338 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { 2339 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2340 goto err; 2341 } 2342 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { 2343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2344 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2345 goto err; 2346 } 2347 2348 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { 2349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2351 goto err; 2352 } 2353 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2354 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2355 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2356 #endif 2357 2358 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) 2359 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2361 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2362 goto err; 2363 } 2364 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2365 if (maxsig < 0) { 2366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2368 goto err; 2369 } 2370 2371 /* 2372 * Check signature length 2373 */ 2374 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { 2375 /* wrong packet length */ 2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2377 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); 2378 goto err; 2379 } 2380 2381 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2382 if (md_ctx == NULL) { 2383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2384 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2385 goto err; 2386 } 2387 2388 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { 2389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2390 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2391 goto err; 2392 } 2393 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { 2394 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 2395 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, 2396 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { 2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2399 goto err; 2400 } 2401 } 2402 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), 2403 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); 2404 if (tbslen == 0) { 2405 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2406 goto err; 2407 } 2408 2409 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), 2410 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); 2411 OPENSSL_free(tbs); 2412 if (rv <= 0) { 2413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2414 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2415 goto err; 2416 } 2417 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2418 md_ctx = NULL; 2419 } else { 2420 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ 2421 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 2422 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { 2423 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ 2424 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { 2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2426 SSL_R_BAD_DATA); 2427 } 2428 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ 2429 goto err; 2430 } 2431 /* still data left over */ 2432 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2434 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 2435 goto err; 2436 } 2437 } 2438 2439 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2440 err: 2441 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); 2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2443 } 2444 2445 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2446 { 2447 size_t i; 2448 2449 /* Clear certificate validity flags */ 2450 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) 2451 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; 2452 2453 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2454 PACKET reqctx, extensions; 2455 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 2456 2457 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 2458 /* 2459 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 2460 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so 2461 * we just ignore it 2462 */ 2463 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 2464 } 2465 2466 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ 2467 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); 2468 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; 2469 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; 2470 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); 2471 s->pha_context = NULL; 2472 2473 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || 2474 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { 2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2476 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2477 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2478 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2479 } 2480 2481 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { 2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2483 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2484 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2486 } 2487 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 2488 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2489 &rawexts, NULL, 1) 2490 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2491 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 2492 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2493 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 2494 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2495 } 2496 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 2497 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 2498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2499 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2500 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 2501 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2502 } 2503 } else { 2504 PACKET ctypes; 2505 2506 /* get the certificate types */ 2507 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { 2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2511 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2512 } 2513 2514 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { 2515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2516 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2517 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2518 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2519 } 2520 2521 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2522 PACKET sigalgs; 2523 2524 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { 2525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2526 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2527 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2528 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2529 } 2530 2531 /* 2532 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility 2533 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. 2534 */ 2535 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { 2536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2537 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2538 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); 2539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2540 } 2541 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 2542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2544 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2545 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2546 } 2547 } 2548 2549 /* get the CA RDNs */ 2550 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { 2551 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2552 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2553 } 2554 } 2555 2556 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2558 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2559 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2560 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2561 } 2562 2563 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ 2564 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; 2565 2566 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 2567 } 2568 2569 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2570 { 2571 unsigned int ticklen; 2572 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; 2573 unsigned int sess_len; 2574 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; 2575 PACKET nonce; 2576 2577 PACKET_null_init(&nonce); 2578 2579 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) 2580 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 2581 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) 2582 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) 2583 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) 2584 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) 2585 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { 2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2587 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2588 goto err; 2589 } 2590 2591 /* 2592 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty 2593 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never 2594 * be 0 here in that instance 2595 */ 2596 if (ticklen == 0) 2597 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2598 2599 /* 2600 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise 2601 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, 2602 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every 2603 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive 2604 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session 2605 * cache. 2606 */ 2607 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { 2608 SSL_SESSION *new_sess; 2609 2610 /* 2611 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new 2612 * one 2613 */ 2614 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { 2615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2616 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2617 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2618 goto err; 2619 } 2620 2621 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 2622 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2623 /* 2624 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that 2625 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the 2626 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails 2627 */ 2628 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 2629 } 2630 2631 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 2632 s->session = new_sess; 2633 } 2634 2635 /* 2636 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - 2637 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. 2638 */ 2639 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); 2640 2641 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); 2642 s->session->ext.tick = NULL; 2643 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; 2644 2645 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 2646 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { 2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2648 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2649 goto err; 2650 } 2651 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { 2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2653 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2654 goto err; 2655 } 2656 2657 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; 2658 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; 2659 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; 2660 2661 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2662 PACKET extpkt; 2663 2664 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) 2665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 2666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 2667 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2668 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2669 goto err; 2670 } 2671 2672 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, 2673 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, 2674 NULL, 1) 2675 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, 2676 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2677 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 2678 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2679 goto err; 2680 } 2681 } 2682 2683 /* 2684 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set 2685 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in 2686 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work 2687 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The 2688 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is 2689 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. 2690 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions 2691 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is 2692 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. 2693 */ 2694 /* 2695 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int 2696 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t 2697 */ 2698 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, 2699 s->session->session_id, &sess_len, 2700 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { 2701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2702 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2703 goto err; 2704 } 2705 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; 2706 s->session->not_resumable = 0; 2707 2708 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ 2709 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2710 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); 2711 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); 2712 size_t hashlen; 2713 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; 2714 2715 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ 2716 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { 2717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2718 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 2719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2720 goto err; 2721 } 2722 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; 2723 2724 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, 2725 nonce_label, 2726 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, 2727 PACKET_data(&nonce), 2728 PACKET_remaining(&nonce), 2729 s->session->master_key, 2730 hashlen)) { 2731 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2732 goto err; 2733 } 2734 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; 2735 2736 OPENSSL_free(exts); 2737 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); 2738 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 2739 } 2740 2741 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2742 err: 2743 OPENSSL_free(exts); 2744 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2745 } 2746 2747 /* 2748 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to 2749 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure 2750 */ 2751 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2752 { 2753 size_t resplen; 2754 unsigned int type; 2755 2756 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) 2757 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 2759 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); 2760 return 0; 2761 } 2762 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) 2763 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { 2764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 2765 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2766 return 0; 2767 } 2768 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); 2769 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { 2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 2771 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2772 return 0; 2773 } 2774 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { 2775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, 2776 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2777 return 0; 2778 } 2779 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; 2780 2781 return 1; 2782 } 2783 2784 2785 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2786 { 2787 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 2788 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2789 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2790 } 2791 2792 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 2793 } 2794 2795 /* 2796 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the 2797 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. 2798 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 2799 * on failure. 2800 */ 2801 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) 2802 { 2803 /* 2804 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from 2805 * the server 2806 */ 2807 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { 2808 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2809 return 0; 2810 } 2811 2812 /* 2813 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and 2814 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status 2815 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise 2816 */ 2817 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing 2818 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { 2819 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); 2820 2821 if (ret == 0) { 2822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, 2823 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, 2824 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); 2825 return 0; 2826 } 2827 if (ret < 0) { 2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 2829 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, 2830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2831 return 0; 2832 } 2833 } 2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT 2835 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { 2836 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ 2837 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 2838 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2839 return 0; 2840 } 2841 } 2842 #endif 2843 2844 return 1; 2845 } 2846 2847 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 2848 { 2849 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 2850 /* should contain no data */ 2851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, 2852 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2853 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2854 } 2855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2856 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { 2857 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { 2858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, 2859 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); 2860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2861 } 2862 } 2863 #endif 2864 2865 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { 2866 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2867 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2868 } 2869 2870 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 2871 } 2872 2873 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2874 { 2875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2876 int ret = 0; 2877 /* 2878 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a 2879 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating 2880 * strnlen. 2881 */ 2882 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2883 size_t identitylen = 0; 2884 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2885 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; 2886 char *tmpidentity = NULL; 2887 size_t psklen = 0; 2888 2889 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { 2890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2891 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); 2892 goto err; 2893 } 2894 2895 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); 2896 2897 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, 2898 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, 2899 psk, sizeof(psk)); 2900 2901 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2903 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2904 goto err; 2905 } else if (psklen == 0) { 2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 2907 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2908 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2909 goto err; 2910 } 2911 2912 identitylen = strlen(identity); 2913 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2916 goto err; 2917 } 2918 2919 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); 2920 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); 2921 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { 2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2923 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2924 goto err; 2925 } 2926 2927 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); 2928 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; 2929 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; 2930 tmppsk = NULL; 2931 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2932 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; 2933 tmpidentity = NULL; 2934 2935 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { 2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2938 goto err; 2939 } 2940 2941 ret = 1; 2942 2943 err: 2944 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); 2945 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); 2946 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); 2947 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); 2948 2949 return ret; 2950 #else 2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, 2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2953 return 0; 2954 #endif 2955 } 2956 2957 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 2958 { 2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2960 unsigned char *encdata = NULL; 2961 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2962 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 2963 size_t enclen; 2964 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 2965 size_t pmslen = 0; 2966 2967 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2968 /* 2969 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. 2970 */ 2971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 2972 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2973 return 0; 2974 } 2975 2976 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2977 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { 2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 2979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2980 return 0; 2981 } 2982 2983 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2984 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); 2985 if (pms == NULL) { 2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 2987 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2988 return 0; 2989 } 2990 2991 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 2992 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 2993 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 2994 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { 2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 2996 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2997 goto err; 2998 } 2999 3000 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ 3001 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 3003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3004 goto err; 3005 } 3006 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3007 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 3008 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 3010 ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3011 goto err; 3012 } 3013 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) 3014 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 3015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 3016 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); 3017 goto err; 3018 } 3019 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3020 pctx = NULL; 3021 3022 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ 3023 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 3024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 3025 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3026 goto err; 3027 } 3028 3029 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ 3030 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { 3031 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3032 goto err; 3033 } 3034 3035 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; 3036 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; 3037 3038 return 1; 3039 err: 3040 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 3041 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3042 3043 return 0; 3044 #else 3045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, 3046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3047 return 0; 3048 #endif 3049 } 3050 3051 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3052 { 3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3054 DH *dh_clnt = NULL; 3055 const BIGNUM *pub_key; 3056 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; 3057 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; 3058 3059 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; 3060 if (skey == NULL) { 3061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, 3062 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3063 goto err; 3064 } 3065 3066 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); 3067 if (ckey == NULL) { 3068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, 3069 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3070 goto err; 3071 } 3072 3073 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); 3074 3075 if (dh_clnt == NULL) { 3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, 3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3078 goto err; 3079 } 3080 3081 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { 3082 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3083 goto err; 3084 } 3085 3086 /* send off the data */ 3087 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); 3088 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), 3089 &keybytes)) { 3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, 3091 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3092 goto err; 3093 } 3094 3095 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); 3096 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3097 3098 return 1; 3099 err: 3100 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3101 return 0; 3102 #else 3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, 3104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3105 return 0; 3106 #endif 3107 } 3108 3109 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3110 { 3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3112 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 3113 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; 3114 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; 3115 int ret = 0; 3116 3117 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; 3118 if (skey == NULL) { 3119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, 3120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3121 return 0; 3122 } 3123 3124 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); 3125 if (ckey == NULL) { 3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, 3127 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3128 goto err; 3129 } 3130 3131 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { 3132 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3133 goto err; 3134 } 3135 3136 /* Generate encoding of client key */ 3137 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); 3138 3139 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { 3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, 3141 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 3142 goto err; 3143 } 3144 3145 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { 3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, 3147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3148 goto err; 3149 } 3150 3151 ret = 1; 3152 err: 3153 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 3154 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); 3155 return ret; 3156 #else 3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, 3158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3159 return 0; 3160 #endif 3161 } 3162 3163 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3164 { 3165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 3166 /* GOST key exchange message creation */ 3167 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; 3168 X509 *peer_cert; 3169 size_t msglen; 3170 unsigned int md_len; 3171 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; 3172 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; 3173 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; 3174 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 3175 size_t pmslen = 0; 3176 3177 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) 3178 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; 3179 3180 /* 3181 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it 3182 */ 3183 peer_cert = s->session->peer; 3184 if (!peer_cert) { 3185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3186 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); 3187 return 0; 3188 } 3189 3190 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); 3191 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3193 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3194 return 0; 3195 } 3196 /* 3197 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key 3198 * parameters match those of server certificate, use 3199 * certificate key for key exchange 3200 */ 3201 3202 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ 3203 pmslen = 32; 3204 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); 3205 if (pms == NULL) { 3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3207 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3208 goto err; 3209 } 3210 3211 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 3212 /* Generate session key 3213 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function 3214 */ 3215 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { 3216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3218 goto err; 3219 }; 3220 /* 3221 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context 3222 * data 3223 */ 3224 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 3225 if (ukm_hash == NULL 3226 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 3227 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, 3228 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 3229 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, 3230 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 3231 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { 3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3234 goto err; 3235 } 3236 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); 3237 ukm_hash = NULL; 3238 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, 3239 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { 3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3241 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3242 goto err; 3243 } 3244 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ 3245 /* 3246 * Encapsulate it into sequence 3247 */ 3248 msglen = 255; 3249 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { 3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3251 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); 3252 goto err; 3253 } 3254 3255 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) 3256 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) 3257 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { 3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3260 goto err; 3261 } 3262 3263 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3264 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; 3265 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; 3266 3267 return 1; 3268 err: 3269 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 3270 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 3271 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); 3272 return 0; 3273 #else 3274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, 3275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3276 return 0; 3277 #endif 3278 } 3279 3280 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3281 { 3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3283 unsigned char *abytes = NULL; 3284 3285 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL 3286 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), 3287 &abytes)) { 3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, 3289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3290 return 0; 3291 } 3292 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); 3293 3294 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 3295 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 3296 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 3297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, 3298 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3299 return 0; 3300 } 3301 3302 return 1; 3303 #else 3304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, 3305 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3306 return 0; 3307 #endif 3308 } 3309 3310 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3311 { 3312 unsigned long alg_k; 3313 3314 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3315 3316 /* 3317 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so 3318 * no need to do so here. 3319 */ 3320 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) 3321 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) 3322 goto err; 3323 3324 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { 3325 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) 3326 goto err; 3327 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { 3328 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) 3329 goto err; 3330 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { 3331 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) 3332 goto err; 3333 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 3334 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) 3335 goto err; 3336 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 3337 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) 3338 goto err; 3339 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { 3340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3341 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3342 goto err; 3343 } 3344 3345 return 1; 3346 err: 3347 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); 3348 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; 3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 3350 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); 3351 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; 3352 #endif 3353 return 0; 3354 } 3355 3356 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) 3357 { 3358 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 3359 size_t pmslen = 0; 3360 3361 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; 3362 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; 3363 3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 3365 /* Check for SRP */ 3366 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { 3367 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { 3368 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3369 goto err; 3370 } 3371 return 1; 3372 } 3373 #endif 3374 3375 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 3376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3377 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3378 goto err; 3379 } 3380 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { 3381 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3382 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ 3383 pms = NULL; 3384 pmslen = 0; 3385 goto err; 3386 } 3387 pms = NULL; 3388 pmslen = 0; 3389 3390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 3391 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3392 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; 3393 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; 3394 3395 /* 3396 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP 3397 * used. 3398 */ 3399 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, 3400 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); 3401 3402 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, 3403 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, 3404 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { 3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3406 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, 3407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3408 goto err; 3409 } 3410 3411 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, 3412 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); 3413 } 3414 #endif 3415 3416 return 1; 3417 err: 3418 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); 3419 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; 3420 return 0; 3421 } 3422 3423 /* 3424 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check 3425 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client 3426 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. 3427 */ 3428 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3429 { 3430 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ 3431 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) 3432 return 0; 3433 /* 3434 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also 3435 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. 3436 */ 3437 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && 3438 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) 3439 return 0; 3440 return 1; 3441 } 3442 3443 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 3444 { 3445 X509 *x509 = NULL; 3446 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 3447 int i; 3448 3449 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { 3450 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ 3451 if (s->cert->cert_cb) { 3452 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 3453 if (i < 0) { 3454 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 3455 return WORK_MORE_A; 3456 } 3457 if (i == 0) { 3458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3459 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3460 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); 3461 return WORK_ERROR; 3462 } 3463 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 3464 } 3465 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { 3466 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { 3467 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 3468 } 3469 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3470 } 3471 3472 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ 3473 wst = WORK_MORE_B; 3474 } 3475 3476 /* We need to get a client cert */ 3477 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { 3478 /* 3479 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 3480 * return(-1); We then get retied later 3481 */ 3482 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); 3483 if (i < 0) { 3484 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 3485 return WORK_MORE_B; 3486 } 3487 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 3488 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { 3489 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) 3490 i = 0; 3491 } else if (i == 1) { 3492 i = 0; 3493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3494 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); 3495 } 3496 3497 X509_free(x509); 3498 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3499 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) 3500 i = 0; 3501 if (i == 0) { 3502 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3503 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; 3504 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); 3505 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3506 } else { 3507 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; 3508 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 3509 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3510 return WORK_ERROR; 3511 } 3512 } 3513 } 3514 3515 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) 3516 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 3517 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 3518 } 3519 3520 /* Shouldn't ever get here */ 3521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3523 return WORK_ERROR; 3524 } 3525 3526 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3527 { 3528 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 3529 if (s->pha_context == NULL) { 3530 /* no context available, add 0-length context */ 3531 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { 3532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3534 return 0; 3535 } 3536 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { 3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3539 return 0; 3540 } 3541 } 3542 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, 3543 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL 3544 : s->cert->key)) { 3545 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3546 return 0; 3547 } 3548 3549 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) 3550 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 3551 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 3552 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { 3553 /* 3554 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent 3555 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. 3556 */ 3557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3558 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); 3559 return 0; 3560 } 3561 3562 return 1; 3563 } 3564 3565 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) 3566 { 3567 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; 3568 size_t idx; 3569 long alg_k, alg_a; 3570 3571 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3572 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3573 3574 /* we don't have a certificate */ 3575 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) 3576 return 1; 3577 3578 /* This is the passed certificate */ 3579 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); 3580 3581 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ 3582 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { 3583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3584 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, 3585 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); 3586 return 0; 3587 } 3588 3589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3590 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { 3591 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) 3592 return 1; 3593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3594 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); 3595 return 0; 3596 } 3597 #endif 3598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3599 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { 3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 3601 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, 3602 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); 3603 return 0; 3604 } 3605 #endif 3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3607 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { 3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, 3609 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3610 return 0; 3611 } 3612 #endif 3613 3614 return 1; 3615 } 3616 3617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3618 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3619 { 3620 size_t len, padding_len; 3621 unsigned char *padding = NULL; 3622 3623 len = s->ext.npn_len; 3624 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); 3625 3626 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) 3627 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { 3628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, 3629 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3630 return 0; 3631 } 3632 3633 memset(padding, 0, padding_len); 3634 3635 return 1; 3636 } 3637 #endif 3638 3639 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3640 { 3641 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { 3642 /* should contain no data */ 3643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, 3644 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3645 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3646 } 3647 3648 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { 3649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 3650 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 3651 } 3652 3653 /* 3654 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for 3655 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will 3656 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a 3657 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable 3658 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. 3659 */ 3660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 3661 SSL_renegotiate(s); 3662 else 3663 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); 3664 3665 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 3666 } 3667 3668 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) 3669 { 3670 PACKET extensions; 3671 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 3672 3673 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) 3674 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 3676 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3677 goto err; 3678 } 3679 3680 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, 3681 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, 3682 NULL, 1) 3683 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 3684 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 3685 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 3686 goto err; 3687 } 3688 3689 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3690 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 3691 3692 err: 3693 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 3694 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 3695 } 3696 3697 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) 3698 { 3699 int i = 0; 3700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE 3701 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { 3702 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, 3703 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), 3704 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 3705 if (i != 0) 3706 return i; 3707 } 3708 #endif 3709 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) 3710 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); 3711 return i; 3712 } 3713 3714 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) 3715 { 3716 int i; 3717 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; 3718 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; 3719 3720 /* Set disabled masks for this session */ 3721 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { 3722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, 3723 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); 3724 return 0; 3725 } 3726 3727 if (sk == NULL) { 3728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, 3729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3730 return 0; 3731 } 3732 3733 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH 3734 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 3735 # error Max cipher length too short 3736 # endif 3737 /* 3738 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround 3739 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we 3740 * use TLS v1.2 3741 */ 3742 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3743 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; 3744 else 3745 #endif 3746 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ 3747 maxlen = 0xfffe; 3748 3749 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) 3750 maxlen -= 2; 3751 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) 3752 maxlen -= 2; 3753 3754 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { 3755 const SSL_CIPHER *c; 3756 3757 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 3758 /* Skip disabled ciphers */ 3759 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) 3760 continue; 3761 3762 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { 3763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, 3764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3765 return 0; 3766 } 3767 3768 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ 3769 if (!maxverok) { 3770 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3771 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) 3772 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) 3773 maxverok = 1; 3774 } else { 3775 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver 3776 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) 3777 maxverok = 1; 3778 } 3779 } 3780 3781 totlen += len; 3782 } 3783 3784 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { 3785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, 3786 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); 3787 3788 if (!maxverok) 3789 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " 3790 "SSL/TLS version"); 3791 3792 return 0; 3793 } 3794 3795 if (totlen != 0) { 3796 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { 3797 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 3798 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 3799 }; 3800 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { 3801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3802 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3803 return 0; 3804 } 3805 } 3806 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { 3807 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 3808 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 3809 }; 3810 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { 3811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3812 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3813 return 0; 3814 } 3815 } 3816 } 3817 3818 return 1; 3819 } 3820 3821 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) 3822 { 3823 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY 3824 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { 3825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 3826 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 3827 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); 3828 return 0; 3829 } 3830 3831 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; 3832 return 1; 3833 } 3834