1 /* 2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 11 #include "../ssl_locl.h" 12 #include "statem_locl.h" 13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 14 15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0 16 17 /* 18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for 19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for 20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen, 21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie 22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing. 23 */ 24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \ 25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) 26 27 /* 28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes + 29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id 30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression 31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension 32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie 33 */ 34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \ 35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \ 36 + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE) 37 38 /* 39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right 40 */ 41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 43 { 44 unsigned int ilen; 45 const unsigned char *data; 46 47 /* Parse the length byte */ 48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) 49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { 50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, 51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); 52 return 0; 53 } 54 55 /* Check that the extension matches */ 56 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { 57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, 58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); 59 return 0; 60 } 61 62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, 63 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { 64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, 65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); 66 return 0; 67 } 68 69 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; 70 71 return 1; 72 } 73 74 /*- 75 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 76 * 77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 90 * the value of the Host: field. 91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 94 * extension. 95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 96 */ 97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 99 { 100 unsigned int servname_type; 101 PACKET sni, hostname; 102 103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) 104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ 105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { 106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 108 return 0; 109 } 110 111 /* 112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366 113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations, 114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types. 115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types 116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other 117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. 118 * 119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, 120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. 121 */ 122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) 123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { 125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 127 return 0; 128 } 129 130 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, 133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 135 return 0; 136 } 137 138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { 139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, 140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 142 return 0; 143 } 144 145 /* 146 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage. 147 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well. 148 */ 149 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); 150 s->ext.hostname = NULL; 151 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) { 152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 154 return 0; 155 } 156 157 s->servername_done = 1; 158 } 159 if (s->hit) { 160 /* 161 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST 162 * fall back to a full handshake. 163 */ 164 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) 165 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, 166 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); 167 168 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) 169 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 170 } 171 172 return 1; 173 } 174 175 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 176 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 177 { 178 unsigned int value; 179 180 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { 181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, 182 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 183 return 0; 184 } 185 186 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */ 187 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { 188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 189 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, 190 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); 191 return 0; 192 } 193 194 /* 195 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session 196 * including session resumptions. 197 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session ! 198 */ 199 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) { 200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 201 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, 202 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); 203 return 0; 204 } 205 206 /* 207 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us 208 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello. 209 */ 210 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; 211 return 1; 212 } 213 214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 215 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 216 size_t chainidx) 217 { 218 PACKET srp_I; 219 220 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) 221 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { 222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 223 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, 224 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 225 return 0; 226 } 227 228 /* 229 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user 230 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. 231 */ 232 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { 233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, 234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 235 return 0; 236 } 237 238 return 1; 239 } 240 #endif 241 242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 243 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 244 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 245 { 246 PACKET ec_point_format_list; 247 248 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) 249 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { 250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, 251 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 252 return 0; 253 } 254 255 if (!s->hit) { 256 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, 257 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats, 258 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) { 259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 260 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 261 return 0; 262 } 263 } 264 265 return 1; 266 } 267 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 268 269 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 270 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 271 { 272 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && 273 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), 274 PACKET_remaining(pkt), 275 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { 276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 277 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 278 return 0; 279 } 280 281 return 1; 282 } 283 284 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 285 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 286 { 287 PACKET supported_sig_algs; 288 289 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) 290 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { 291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 292 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 293 return 0; 294 } 295 296 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) { 297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 298 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 299 return 0; 300 } 301 302 return 1; 303 } 304 305 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 306 size_t chainidx) 307 { 308 PACKET supported_sig_algs; 309 310 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) 311 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { 312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 313 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 314 return 0; 315 } 316 317 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) { 318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 319 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 320 return 0; 321 } 322 323 return 1; 324 } 325 326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP 327 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 328 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 329 { 330 PACKET responder_id_list, exts; 331 332 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */ 333 if (s->hit) 334 return 1; 335 336 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ 337 if (x != NULL) 338 return 1; 339 340 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { 341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 342 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 343 return 0; 344 } 345 346 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 347 /* 348 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. 349 */ 350 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; 351 return 1; 352 } 353 354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { 355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 356 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 357 return 0; 358 } 359 360 /* 361 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 362 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 363 */ 364 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); 365 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { 366 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 367 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { 368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 369 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 370 return 0; 371 } 372 } else { 373 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; 374 } 375 376 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { 377 OCSP_RESPID *id; 378 PACKET responder_id; 379 const unsigned char *id_data; 380 381 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) 382 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { 383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 384 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 385 return 0; 386 } 387 388 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); 389 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ 390 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, 391 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); 392 if (id == NULL) { 393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 394 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 395 return 0; 396 } 397 398 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { 399 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 401 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 402 403 return 0; 404 } 405 406 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { 407 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 409 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 410 411 return 0; 412 } 413 } 414 415 /* Read in request_extensions */ 416 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { 417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 418 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 419 return 0; 420 } 421 422 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { 423 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); 424 425 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, 426 X509_EXTENSION_free); 427 s->ext.ocsp.exts = 428 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); 429 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { 430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 431 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 432 return 0; 433 } 434 } 435 436 return 1; 437 } 438 #endif 439 440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 441 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 442 size_t chainidx) 443 { 444 /* 445 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 446 * renegotiation. 447 */ 448 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 449 s->s3->npn_seen = 1; 450 451 return 1; 452 } 453 #endif 454 455 /* 456 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN 457 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. 458 */ 459 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 460 size_t chainidx) 461 { 462 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; 463 464 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 465 return 1; 466 467 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) 468 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { 469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, 470 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 471 return 0; 472 } 473 474 save_protocol_list = protocol_list; 475 do { 476 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ 477 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) 478 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { 479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, 480 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 481 return 0; 482 } 483 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); 484 485 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); 486 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; 487 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; 488 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, 489 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { 490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, 491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 492 return 0; 493 } 494 495 return 1; 496 } 497 498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 499 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 500 size_t chainidx) 501 { 502 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; 503 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; 504 int i, srtp_pref; 505 PACKET subpkt; 506 507 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ 508 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) 509 return 1; 510 511 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ 512 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 513 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { 514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 515 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); 516 return 0; 517 } 518 519 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); 520 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 521 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ 522 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); 523 524 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { 525 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { 526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 527 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); 528 return 0; 529 } 530 531 /* 532 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than 533 * current match. 534 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this 535 * does nothing. 536 */ 537 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { 538 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = 539 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); 540 541 if (sprof->id == id) { 542 s->srtp_profile = sprof; 543 srtp_pref = i; 544 break; 545 } 546 } 547 } 548 549 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ 550 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { 551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 552 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); 553 return 0; 554 } 555 556 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) 557 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { 558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 559 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); 560 return 0; 561 } 562 563 return 1; 564 } 565 #endif 566 567 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 568 size_t chainidx) 569 { 570 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) 571 s->ext.use_etm = 1; 572 573 return 1; 574 } 575 576 /* 577 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains 578 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 579 */ 580 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 581 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 582 { 583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 584 PACKET psk_kex_modes; 585 unsigned int mode; 586 587 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) 588 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { 589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, 590 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 591 return 0; 592 } 593 594 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { 595 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) 596 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; 597 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE 598 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) 599 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; 600 } 601 #endif 602 603 return 1; 604 } 605 606 /* 607 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains 608 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 609 */ 610 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 611 size_t chainidx) 612 { 613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 614 unsigned int group_id; 615 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; 616 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups; 617 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups; 618 int found = 0; 619 620 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) 621 return 1; 622 623 /* Sanity check */ 624 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { 625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 627 return 0; 628 } 629 630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { 631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 632 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 633 return 0; 634 } 635 636 /* Get our list of supported groups */ 637 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups); 638 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ 639 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); 640 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) { 641 /* 642 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent, 643 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that 644 * extension. 645 */ 646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 647 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION); 648 return 0; 649 } 650 651 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) { 652 /* 653 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR 654 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an 655 * error 656 */ 657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 658 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); 659 return 0; 660 } 661 662 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { 663 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) 664 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) 665 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { 666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 667 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 668 return 0; 669 } 670 671 /* 672 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the 673 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. 674 */ 675 if (found) 676 continue; 677 678 /* 679 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group 680 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent. 681 */ 682 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 683 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id 684 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) { 685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 686 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); 687 return 0; 688 } 689 690 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ 691 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) { 692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 693 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); 694 return 0; 695 } 696 697 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ 698 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) { 699 /* Share not suitable */ 700 continue; 701 } 702 703 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) { 704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 705 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); 706 return 0; 707 } 708 709 s->s3->group_id = group_id; 710 711 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, 712 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), 713 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { 714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 715 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); 716 return 0; 717 } 718 719 found = 1; 720 } 721 #endif 722 723 return 1; 724 } 725 726 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 727 size_t chainidx) 728 { 729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 730 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id; 731 EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; 732 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 733 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie; 734 WPACKET hrrpkt; 735 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata; 736 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 737 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE]; 738 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen; 739 unsigned long tm, now; 740 741 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */ 742 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL 743 || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 744 return 1; 745 746 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) { 747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 748 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 749 return 0; 750 } 751 752 raw = cookie; 753 data = PACKET_data(&raw); 754 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw); 755 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 756 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { 757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 758 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 759 return 0; 760 } 761 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw); 762 763 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */ 764 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 765 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, 766 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, 767 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext 768 .cookie_hmac_key)); 769 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { 770 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 771 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 774 return 0; 775 } 776 777 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; 778 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 779 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data, 780 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0 781 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { 782 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 783 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 786 return 0; 787 } 788 789 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 790 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 791 792 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { 793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 794 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 795 return 0; 796 } 797 798 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) { 799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 800 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 801 return 0; 802 } 803 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */ 804 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) 805 return 1; 806 807 /* 808 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the 809 * HMAC above. 810 */ 811 812 /* Check the version number is sane */ 813 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) { 814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 815 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 816 return 0; 817 } 818 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { 819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 820 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); 821 return 0; 822 } 823 824 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) { 825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 826 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 827 return 0; 828 } 829 830 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie); 831 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) { 832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 833 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 834 return 0; 835 } 836 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id 837 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher 838 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) { 839 /* 840 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is 841 * in the cookie. Something must have changed. 842 */ 843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 844 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); 845 return 0; 846 } 847 848 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share) 849 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm) 850 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash) 851 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie) 852 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { 853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 854 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 855 return 0; 856 } 857 858 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */ 859 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 860 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) { 861 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */ 862 return 1; 863 } 864 865 /* Verify the app cookie */ 866 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie), 867 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) { 868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 869 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 870 return 0; 871 } 872 873 /* 874 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original 875 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash. 876 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions 877 */ 878 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) { 879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 881 return 0; 882 } 883 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) 884 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt) 885 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION) 886 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 887 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id, 888 s->tmp_session_id_len) 889 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt, 890 &ciphlen) 891 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0) 892 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) { 893 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 896 return 0; 897 } 898 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) 899 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) 900 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version) 901 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { 902 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 905 return 0; 906 } 907 if (key_share) { 908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) 909 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) 910 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id) 911 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { 912 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 915 return 0; 916 } 917 } 918 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) 919 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) 920 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen) 921 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */ 922 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */ 923 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */ 924 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen) 925 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) { 926 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 929 return 0; 930 } 931 932 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */ 933 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash), 934 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr, 935 hrrlen)) { 936 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 937 return 0; 938 } 939 940 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */ 941 s->hello_retry_request = 1; 942 943 s->ext.cookieok = 1; 944 #endif 945 946 return 1; 947 } 948 949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 950 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 951 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 952 { 953 PACKET supported_groups_list; 954 955 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ 956 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) 957 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 958 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { 959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 960 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 961 return 0; 962 } 963 964 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups); 966 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL; 967 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; 968 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list, 969 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups, 970 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) { 971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 972 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 974 return 0; 975 } 976 } 977 978 return 1; 979 } 980 #endif 981 982 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 983 size_t chainidx) 984 { 985 /* The extension must always be empty */ 986 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 988 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 989 return 0; 990 } 991 992 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; 993 994 return 1; 995 } 996 997 998 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 999 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1000 { 1001 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1003 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1004 return 0; 1005 } 1006 1007 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1009 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1010 return 0; 1011 } 1012 1013 return 1; 1014 } 1015 1016 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick, 1017 SSL_SESSION **sess) 1018 { 1019 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL; 1020 1021 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; 1022 1023 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) { 1024 case 0: 1025 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY; 1026 1027 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH: 1028 break; 1029 1030 default: 1031 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; 1032 } 1033 1034 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick), 1035 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); 1036 1037 if (tmpsess == NULL) 1038 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; 1039 1040 *sess = tmpsess; 1041 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; 1042 } 1043 1044 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1045 size_t chainidx) 1046 { 1047 PACKET identities, binders, binder; 1048 size_t binderoffset, hashsize; 1049 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; 1050 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0; 1051 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1052 1053 /* 1054 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so 1055 * ignore this extension 1056 */ 1057 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode 1058 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) 1059 return 1; 1060 1061 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { 1062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1063 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1064 return 0; 1065 } 1066 1067 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1068 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { 1069 PACKET identity; 1070 unsigned long ticket_agel; 1071 size_t idlen; 1072 1073 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) 1074 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { 1075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1076 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1077 return 0; 1078 } 1079 1080 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity); 1081 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL 1082 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen, 1083 &sess)) { 1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1085 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1086 return 0; 1087 } 1088 1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1090 if(sess == NULL 1091 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL 1092 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 1093 char *pskid = NULL; 1094 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 1095 unsigned int pskdatalen; 1096 1097 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) { 1098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1100 return 0; 1101 } 1102 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata, 1103 sizeof(pskdata)); 1104 OPENSSL_free(pskid); 1105 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 1106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1108 return 0; 1109 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) { 1110 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; 1111 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; 1112 1113 /* 1114 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know 1115 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec 1116 */ 1117 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); 1118 if (cipher == NULL) { 1119 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); 1120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1121 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1122 return 0; 1123 } 1124 1125 sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); 1126 if (sess == NULL 1127 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata, 1128 pskdatalen) 1129 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher) 1130 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess, 1131 TLS1_3_VERSION)) { 1132 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); 1133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1135 goto err; 1136 } 1137 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); 1138 } 1139 } 1140 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1141 1142 if (sess != NULL) { 1143 /* We found a PSK */ 1144 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0); 1145 1146 if (sesstmp == NULL) { 1147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1148 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1149 return 0; 1150 } 1151 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1152 sess = sesstmp; 1153 1154 /* 1155 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so 1156 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up. 1157 */ 1158 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); 1159 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; 1160 ext = 1; 1161 if (id == 0) 1162 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; 1163 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; 1164 } else { 1165 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems; 1166 int ret; 1167 1168 /* 1169 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if 1170 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there 1171 * is no point in using full stateless tickets. 1172 */ 1173 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 1174 || (s->max_early_data > 0 1175 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0)) 1176 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess); 1177 else 1178 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), 1179 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, 1180 &sess); 1181 1182 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) { 1183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1184 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1185 return 0; 1186 } 1187 1188 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC 1189 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { 1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1191 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1192 return 0; 1193 } 1194 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) 1195 continue; 1196 1197 /* Check for replay */ 1198 if (s->max_early_data > 0 1199 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0 1200 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) { 1201 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1202 sess = NULL; 1203 continue; 1204 } 1205 1206 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; 1207 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); 1208 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time; 1209 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; 1210 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; 1211 1212 /* 1213 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the 1214 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age 1215 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be 1216 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency). 1217 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for 1218 * rounding errors. 1219 */ 1220 if (id == 0 1221 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec 1222 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec 1223 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 1224 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { 1225 /* 1226 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it 1227 * for early data 1228 */ 1229 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; 1230 } 1231 } 1232 1233 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); 1234 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) { 1235 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */ 1236 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1237 sess = NULL; 1238 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 1239 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1240 continue; 1241 } 1242 break; 1243 } 1244 1245 if (sess == NULL) 1246 return 1; 1247 1248 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1249 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 1250 1251 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { 1252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1253 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1254 goto err; 1255 } 1256 1257 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { 1258 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { 1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1260 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1261 goto err; 1262 } 1263 } 1264 1265 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) { 1266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1267 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1268 goto err; 1269 } 1270 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 1271 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0, 1272 ext) != 1) { 1273 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1274 goto err; 1275 } 1276 1277 sess->ext.tick_identity = id; 1278 1279 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 1280 s->session = sess; 1281 return 1; 1282 err: 1283 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1284 return 0; 1285 } 1286 1287 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1288 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1289 { 1290 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, 1292 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR); 1293 return 0; 1294 } 1295 1296 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; 1297 1298 return 1; 1299 } 1300 1301 /* 1302 * Add the server's renegotiation binding 1303 */ 1304 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1305 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1306 size_t chainidx) 1307 { 1308 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1309 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1310 1311 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 1312 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1314 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 1315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, 1316 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) 1317 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, 1318 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) 1319 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1320 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, 1322 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1323 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1324 } 1325 1326 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1327 } 1328 1329 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1330 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1331 size_t chainidx) 1332 { 1333 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 1334 || s->ext.hostname == NULL) 1335 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1336 1337 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1338 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, 1340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1341 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1342 } 1343 1344 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1345 } 1346 1347 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */ 1348 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1349 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1350 size_t chainidx) 1351 { 1352 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) 1353 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1354 1355 /*- 1356 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length 1357 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. 1358 */ 1359 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) 1360 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1361 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) 1362 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1364 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1365 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1366 } 1367 1368 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1369 } 1370 1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1372 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1373 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1374 size_t chainidx) 1375 { 1376 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1377 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1378 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) 1379 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL); 1380 const unsigned char *plist; 1381 size_t plistlen; 1382 1383 if (!using_ecc) 1384 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1385 1386 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1387 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1388 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1389 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) 1390 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1392 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1393 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1394 } 1395 1396 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1397 } 1398 #endif 1399 1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1401 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1402 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1403 size_t chainidx) 1404 { 1405 const uint16_t *groups; 1406 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1; 1407 1408 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */ 1409 if (s->s3->group_id == 0) 1410 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1411 1412 /* Get our list of supported groups */ 1413 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups); 1414 if (numgroups == 0) { 1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1416 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1417 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1418 } 1419 1420 /* Copy group ID if supported */ 1421 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) { 1422 uint16_t group = groups[i]; 1423 1424 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { 1425 if (first) { 1426 /* 1427 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If 1428 * so we don't need to add this extension 1429 */ 1430 if (s->s3->group_id == group) 1431 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1432 1433 /* Add extension header */ 1434 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) 1435 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ 1436 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1437 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1439 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 1440 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1441 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1442 } 1443 1444 first = 0; 1445 } 1446 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) { 1447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1448 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 1449 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1450 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1451 } 1452 } 1453 } 1454 1455 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1457 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 1458 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1459 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1460 } 1461 1462 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1463 } 1464 #endif 1465 1466 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1467 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1468 size_t chainidx) 1469 { 1470 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { 1471 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1472 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1473 } 1474 1475 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1476 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1478 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1479 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1480 } 1481 1482 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1483 } 1484 1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP 1486 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1487 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1488 size_t chainidx) 1489 { 1490 if (!s->ext.status_expected) 1491 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1492 1493 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) 1494 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1495 1496 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) 1497 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1499 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1500 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1501 } 1502 1503 /* 1504 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we 1505 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a 1506 * separate message 1507 */ 1508 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 1509 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1510 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1511 } 1512 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1514 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1515 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1516 } 1517 1518 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1519 } 1520 #endif 1521 1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1523 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1524 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1525 size_t chainidx) 1526 { 1527 const unsigned char *npa; 1528 unsigned int npalen; 1529 int ret; 1530 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; 1531 1532 s->s3->npn_seen = 0; 1533 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) 1534 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1535 1536 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1537 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); 1538 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1539 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) 1540 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { 1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, 1543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1544 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1545 } 1546 s->s3->npn_seen = 1; 1547 } 1548 1549 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1550 } 1551 #endif 1552 1553 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1554 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1555 { 1556 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) 1557 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1558 1559 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 1560 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) 1561 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1562 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1563 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, 1564 s->s3->alpn_selected_len) 1565 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1566 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1568 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1569 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1570 } 1571 1572 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1573 } 1574 1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1576 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1577 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1578 size_t chainidx) 1579 { 1580 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) 1581 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1582 1583 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1584 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1585 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) 1586 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) 1587 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) 1588 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, 1590 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1591 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1592 } 1593 1594 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1595 } 1596 #endif 1597 1598 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1599 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1600 { 1601 if (!s->ext.use_etm) 1602 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1603 1604 /* 1605 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable 1606 * for other cases too. 1607 */ 1608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD 1609 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 1610 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 1611 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { 1612 s->ext.use_etm = 0; 1613 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1614 } 1615 1616 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) 1617 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, 1619 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1620 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1621 } 1622 1623 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1624 } 1625 1626 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1627 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1628 { 1629 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) 1630 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1631 1632 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) 1633 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, 1635 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1636 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1637 } 1638 1639 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1640 } 1641 1642 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1643 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1644 size_t chainidx) 1645 { 1646 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { 1647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1648 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, 1649 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1650 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1651 } 1652 1653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) 1654 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1655 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version) 1656 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1658 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, 1659 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1660 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1661 } 1662 1663 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1664 } 1665 1666 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1667 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1668 size_t chainidx) 1669 { 1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 1671 unsigned char *encodedPoint; 1672 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; 1673 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; 1674 1675 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 1676 if (ckey != NULL) { 1677 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */ 1678 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1679 } 1680 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) 1681 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1682 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) 1683 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1685 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1687 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1688 } 1689 1690 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1691 } 1692 1693 if (ckey == NULL) { 1694 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */ 1695 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { 1696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1698 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1699 } 1700 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1701 } 1702 1703 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) 1704 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1705 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { 1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1707 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1708 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1709 } 1710 1711 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); 1712 if (skey == NULL) { 1713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1714 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1715 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1716 } 1717 1718 /* Generate encoding of server key */ 1719 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); 1720 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { 1721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1722 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1723 EVP_PKEY_free(skey); 1724 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1725 } 1726 1727 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) 1728 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1731 EVP_PKEY_free(skey); 1732 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1733 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1734 } 1735 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1736 1737 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ 1738 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; 1739 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1741 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1742 } 1743 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1744 #else 1745 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1746 #endif 1747 } 1748 1749 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1750 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1751 { 1752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 1753 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie; 1754 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2; 1755 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen; 1756 EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; 1757 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1758 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1759 1760 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 1761 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1762 1763 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) { 1764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1765 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET); 1766 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1767 } 1768 1769 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) 1770 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1771 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1772 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen) 1773 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie) 1774 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) 1775 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION) 1776 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) 1777 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, 1778 &ciphlen) 1779 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */ 1780 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) 1781 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL)) 1782 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1783 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) { 1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1786 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1787 } 1788 1789 /* 1790 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates 1791 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then 1792 * subsequently allocate them (below) 1793 */ 1794 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) 1795 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { 1796 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1797 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1798 } 1799 1800 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2) 1801 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2) 1802 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1803 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 1804 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) { 1805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1807 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1808 } 1809 1810 /* Generate the application cookie */ 1811 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) { 1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1813 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 1814 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1815 } 1816 1817 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2) 1818 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2) 1819 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1820 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen) 1821 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) { 1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1824 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1825 } 1826 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; 1827 1828 totcookielen -= startlen; 1829 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { 1830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1832 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1833 } 1834 1835 /* HMAC the cookie */ 1836 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 1837 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, 1838 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, 1839 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext 1840 .cookie_hmac_key)); 1841 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { 1842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1843 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1844 goto err; 1845 } 1846 1847 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 1848 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie, 1849 totcookielen) <= 0) { 1850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1852 goto err; 1853 } 1854 1855 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) { 1856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1858 goto err; 1859 } 1860 1861 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2) 1862 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2) 1863 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen) 1864 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1865 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1868 goto err; 1869 } 1870 1871 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1872 1873 err: 1874 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 1875 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1876 return ret; 1877 #else 1878 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1879 #endif 1880 } 1881 1882 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1883 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1884 size_t chainidx) 1885 { 1886 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1887 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1888 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1889 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1890 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1891 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1892 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1893 }; 1894 1895 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 1896 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) 1897 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) 1898 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1899 1900 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { 1901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1902 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1903 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1904 } 1905 1906 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1907 } 1908 1909 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1910 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1911 size_t chainidx) 1912 { 1913 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { 1914 if (s->max_early_data == 0) 1915 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1916 1917 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) 1918 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1919 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) 1920 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1922 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1923 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1924 } 1925 1926 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1927 } 1928 1929 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) 1930 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1931 1932 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) 1933 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1934 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, 1936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1937 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1938 } 1939 1940 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1941 } 1942 1943 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1944 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1945 { 1946 if (!s->hit) 1947 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1948 1949 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) 1950 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1951 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity) 1952 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1954 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1955 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1956 } 1957 1958 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1959 } 1960