1 /* 2 * Copyright 2019-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 /* Dispatch functions for gcm mode */ 11 12 #include <openssl/rand.h> 13 #include <openssl/proverr.h> 14 #include "prov/ciphercommon.h" 15 #include "prov/ciphercommon_gcm.h" 16 #include "prov/providercommon.h" 17 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" 18 19 static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len); 20 static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, 21 size_t len); 22 static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, 23 const unsigned char *in, size_t len); 24 static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 25 size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, 26 size_t len); 27 28 /* 29 * Called from EVP_CipherInit when there is currently no context via 30 * the new_ctx() function 31 */ 32 void ossl_gcm_initctx(void *provctx, PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, size_t keybits, 33 const PROV_GCM_HW *hw) 34 { 35 ctx->pad = 1; 36 ctx->mode = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE; 37 ctx->taglen = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; 38 ctx->tls_aad_len = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; 39 ctx->ivlen = (EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); 40 ctx->keylen = keybits / 8; 41 ctx->hw = hw; 42 ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx); 43 } 44 45 /* 46 * Called by EVP_CipherInit via the _einit and _dinit functions 47 */ 48 static int gcm_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, 49 const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, 50 const OSSL_PARAM params[], int enc) 51 { 52 PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; 53 54 if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) 55 return 0; 56 57 ctx->enc = enc; 58 59 if (iv != NULL) { 60 if (ivlen == 0 || ivlen > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { 61 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); 62 return 0; 63 } 64 ctx->ivlen = ivlen; 65 memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ivlen); 66 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; 67 } 68 69 if (key != NULL) { 70 if (keylen != ctx->keylen) { 71 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); 72 return 0; 73 } 74 if (!ctx->hw->setkey(ctx, key, ctx->keylen)) 75 return 0; 76 ctx->tls_enc_records = 0; 77 } 78 return ossl_gcm_set_ctx_params(ctx, params); 79 } 80 81 int ossl_gcm_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, 82 const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, 83 const OSSL_PARAM params[]) 84 { 85 return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params, 1); 86 } 87 88 int ossl_gcm_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, 89 const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, 90 const OSSL_PARAM params[]) 91 { 92 return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params, 0); 93 } 94 95 /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ 96 static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) 97 { 98 int n = 8; 99 unsigned char c; 100 101 do { 102 --n; 103 c = counter[n]; 104 ++c; 105 counter[n] = c; 106 if (c > 0) 107 return; 108 } while (n > 0); 109 } 110 111 static int getivgen(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) 112 { 113 if (!ctx->iv_gen 114 || !ctx->key_set 115 || !ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) 116 return 0; 117 if (olen == 0 || olen > ctx->ivlen) 118 olen = ctx->ivlen; 119 memcpy(out, ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - olen, olen); 120 /* 121 * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need 122 * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. 123 */ 124 ctr64_inc(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - 8); 125 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; 126 return 1; 127 } 128 129 static int setivinv(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *in, size_t inl) 130 { 131 if (!ctx->iv_gen 132 || !ctx->key_set 133 || ctx->enc) 134 return 0; 135 136 memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - inl, in, inl); 137 if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) 138 return 0; 139 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; 140 return 1; 141 } 142 143 int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) 144 { 145 PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; 146 OSSL_PARAM *p; 147 size_t sz; 148 149 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN); 150 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->ivlen)) { 151 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 152 return 0; 153 } 154 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); 155 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->keylen)) { 156 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 157 return 0; 158 } 159 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAGLEN); 160 if (p != NULL) { 161 size_t taglen = (ctx->taglen != UNINITIALISED_SIZET) ? ctx->taglen : 162 GCM_TAG_MAX_SIZE; 163 164 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, taglen)) { 165 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 166 return 0; 167 } 168 } 169 170 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV); 171 if (p != NULL) { 172 if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED) 173 return 0; 174 if (ctx->ivlen > p->data_size) { 175 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); 176 return 0; 177 } 178 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen) 179 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr(p, &ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) { 180 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 181 return 0; 182 } 183 } 184 185 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_UPDATED_IV); 186 if (p != NULL) { 187 if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED) 188 return 0; 189 if (ctx->ivlen > p->data_size) { 190 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); 191 return 0; 192 } 193 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen) 194 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr(p, &ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) { 195 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 196 return 0; 197 } 198 } 199 200 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD); 201 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz)) { 202 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 203 return 0; 204 } 205 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); 206 if (p != NULL) { 207 sz = p->data_size; 208 if (sz == 0 209 || sz > EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN 210 || !ctx->enc 211 || ctx->taglen == UNINITIALISED_SIZET) { 212 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); 213 return 0; 214 } 215 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->buf, sz)) { 216 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); 217 return 0; 218 } 219 } 220 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_GET_IV_GEN); 221 if (p != NULL) { 222 if (p->data == NULL 223 || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING 224 || !getivgen(ctx, p->data, p->data_size)) 225 return 0; 226 } 227 return 1; 228 } 229 230 int ossl_gcm_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) 231 { 232 PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; 233 const OSSL_PARAM *p; 234 size_t sz; 235 void *vp; 236 237 if (params == NULL) 238 return 1; 239 240 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); 241 if (p != NULL) { 242 vp = ctx->buf; 243 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &vp, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN, &sz)) { 244 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); 245 return 0; 246 } 247 if (sz == 0 || ctx->enc) { 248 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); 249 return 0; 250 } 251 ctx->taglen = sz; 252 } 253 254 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN); 255 if (p != NULL) { 256 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) { 257 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); 258 return 0; 259 } 260 if (sz == 0 || sz > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { 261 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); 262 return 0; 263 } 264 ctx->ivlen = sz; 265 } 266 267 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD); 268 if (p != NULL) { 269 if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { 270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); 271 return 0; 272 } 273 sz = gcm_tls_init(ctx, p->data, p->data_size); 274 if (sz == 0) { 275 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_AAD); 276 return 0; 277 } 278 ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz = sz; 279 } 280 281 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_IV_FIXED); 282 if (p != NULL) { 283 if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { 284 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); 285 return 0; 286 } 287 if (gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(ctx, p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { 288 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); 289 return 0; 290 } 291 } 292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_SET_IV_INV); 293 if (p != NULL) { 294 if (p->data == NULL 295 || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING 296 || !setivinv(ctx, p->data, p->data_size)) 297 return 0; 298 } 299 300 301 return 1; 302 } 303 304 int ossl_gcm_stream_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, 305 size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) 306 { 307 PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; 308 309 if (inl == 0) { 310 *outl = 0; 311 return 1; 312 } 313 314 if (outsize < inl) { 315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); 316 return 0; 317 } 318 319 if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) { 320 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED); 321 return 0; 322 } 323 return 1; 324 } 325 326 int ossl_gcm_stream_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, 327 size_t outsize) 328 { 329 PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; 330 int i; 331 332 if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) 333 return 0; 334 335 i = gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, NULL, 0); 336 if (i <= 0) 337 return 0; 338 339 *outl = 0; 340 return 1; 341 } 342 343 int ossl_gcm_cipher(void *vctx, 344 unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize, 345 const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) 346 { 347 PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; 348 349 if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) 350 return 0; 351 352 if (outsize < inl) { 353 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); 354 return 0; 355 } 356 357 if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) 358 return 0; 359 360 *outl = inl; 361 return 1; 362 } 363 364 /* 365 * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" 366 * 367 * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. 368 * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a 369 * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of 370 * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). 371 */ 372 static int gcm_iv_generate(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, int offset) 373 { 374 int sz = ctx->ivlen - offset; 375 376 /* Must be at least 96 bits */ 377 if (sz <= 0 || ctx->ivlen < GCM_IV_DEFAULT_SIZE) 378 return 0; 379 380 /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ 381 if (RAND_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + offset, sz, 0) <= 0) 382 return 0; 383 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; 384 ctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; 385 return 1; 386 } 387 388 static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 389 size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, 390 size_t len) 391 { 392 size_t olen = 0; 393 int rv = 0; 394 const PROV_GCM_HW *hw = ctx->hw; 395 396 if (ctx->tls_aad_len != UNINITIALISED_SIZET) 397 return gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, padlen, in, len); 398 399 if (!ctx->key_set || ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_FINISHED) 400 goto err; 401 402 /* 403 * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. 404 * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that 405 * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications 406 * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. 407 */ 408 if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED) { 409 if (!ctx->enc || !gcm_iv_generate(ctx, 0)) 410 goto err; 411 } 412 413 if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_BUFFERED) { 414 if (!hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) 415 goto err; 416 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; 417 } 418 419 if (in != NULL) { 420 /* The input is AAD if out is NULL */ 421 if (out == NULL) { 422 if (!hw->aadupdate(ctx, in, len)) 423 goto err; 424 } else { 425 /* The input is ciphertext OR plaintext */ 426 if (!hw->cipherupdate(ctx, in, len, out)) 427 goto err; 428 } 429 } else { 430 /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ 431 if (!ctx->enc && ctx->taglen == UNINITIALISED_SIZET) 432 goto err; 433 if (!hw->cipherfinal(ctx, ctx->buf)) 434 goto err; 435 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; /* Don't reuse the IV */ 436 goto finish; 437 } 438 olen = len; 439 finish: 440 rv = 1; 441 err: 442 *padlen = olen; 443 return rv; 444 } 445 446 static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len) 447 { 448 unsigned char *buf; 449 size_t len; 450 451 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || aad_len != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) 452 return 0; 453 454 /* Save the aad for later use. */ 455 buf = dat->buf; 456 memcpy(buf, aad, aad_len); 457 dat->tls_aad_len = aad_len; 458 459 len = buf[aad_len - 2] << 8 | buf[aad_len - 1]; 460 /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ 461 if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) 462 return 0; 463 len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 464 465 /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ 466 if (!dat->enc) { 467 if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) 468 return 0; 469 len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; 470 } 471 buf[aad_len - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8); 472 buf[aad_len - 1] = (unsigned char)(len & 0xff); 473 /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ 474 return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; 475 } 476 477 static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, 478 size_t len) 479 { 480 /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ 481 if (len == (size_t)-1) { 482 memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); 483 ctx->iv_gen = 1; 484 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; 485 return 1; 486 } 487 /* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least 8 */ 488 if ((len < EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) 489 || (ctx->ivlen - (int)len) < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) 490 return 0; 491 if (len > 0) 492 memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); 493 if (ctx->enc 494 && RAND_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + len, ctx->ivlen - len, 0) <= 0) 495 return 0; 496 ctx->iv_gen = 1; 497 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; 498 return 1; 499 } 500 501 /* 502 * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV 503 * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, 504 * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload 505 * and verify tag. 506 */ 507 static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, 508 const unsigned char *in, size_t len) 509 { 510 int rv = 0; 511 size_t arg = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 512 size_t plen = 0; 513 unsigned char *tag = NULL; 514 515 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !ctx->key_set) 516 goto err; 517 518 /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ 519 if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) 520 goto err; 521 522 /* 523 * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness 524 * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the 525 * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting 526 * side only. 527 */ 528 if (ctx->enc && ++ctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { 529 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); 530 goto err; 531 } 532 533 /* 534 * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of 535 * buffer. 536 */ 537 if (ctx->enc) { 538 if (!getivgen(ctx, out, arg)) 539 goto err; 540 } else { 541 if (!setivinv(ctx, out, arg)) 542 goto err; 543 } 544 545 /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ 546 in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 547 out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 548 len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; 549 550 tag = ctx->enc ? out + len : (unsigned char *)in + len; 551 if (!ctx->hw->oneshot(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, tag, 552 EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { 553 if (!ctx->enc) 554 OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); 555 goto err; 556 } 557 if (ctx->enc) 558 plen = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; 559 else 560 plen = len; 561 562 rv = 1; 563 err: 564 ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; 565 ctx->tls_aad_len = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; 566 *padlen = plen; 567 return rv; 568 } 569