xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod (revision 2e3507c25e42292b45a5482e116d278f5515d04d)
1=pod
2
3=head1 NAME
4
5SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx,
6SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
7SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth,
8SSL_verify_cb,
9SSL_verify_client_post_handshake,
10SSL_set_post_handshake_auth,
11SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth
12- set various SSL/TLS parameters for peer certificate verification
13
14=head1 SYNOPSIS
15
16 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
17
18 typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
19
20 void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
21 void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
22 SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
23
24 void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
25 void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);
26
27 int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl);
28 void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
29 void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val);
30
31=head1 DESCRIPTION
32
33SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ctx> to be B<mode> and
34specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
35shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>.
36
37SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ssl> to be B<mode> and
38specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
39shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. In
40this case last B<verify_callback> set specifically for this B<ssl> remains. If
41no special B<callback> was set before, the default callback for the underlying
42B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the time B<ssl> was created with
43L<SSL_new(3)>. Within the callback function,
44B<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx> can be called to get the data index
45of the current SSL object that is doing the verification.
46
47In client mode B<verify_callback> may also call the L<SSL_set_retry_verify(3)>
48function on the B<SSL> object set in the I<x509_store_ctx> ex data (see
49L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>) and return 1.
50This would be typically done in case the certificate verification was not yet
51able to succeed.
52This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the calling application
53with B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY>.
54The application can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status
55information needed for the verification.
56Calling L<SSL_connect(3)> again resumes the connection attempt by retrying the
57server certificate verification step.
58This process may even be repeated if need be.
59Note that the handshake may still be aborted if a subsequent invocation of the
60callback (e.g., at a lower depth, or for a separate error condition) returns 0.
61
62SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
63verification that shall be allowed for B<ctx>.
64
65SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
66verification that shall be allowed for B<ssl>.
67
68SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth() and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth() enable the
69Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that
70post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If B<val> is 0
71then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not
72sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via
73SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() if no certificate is provided at initialization.
74
75SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() causes a CertificateRequest message to be
76sent by a server on the given B<ssl> connection. The SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag must
77be set; the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flag is optional.
78
79=head1 NOTES
80
81The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically
82or'ed B<mode> flags:
83
84=over 4
85
86=item SSL_VERIFY_NONE
87
88B<Server mode:> the server will not send a client certificate request to the
89client, so the client will not send a certificate.
90
91B<Client mode:> if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the
92server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the
93certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake
94using the L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> function.
95The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.
96
97=item SSL_VERIFY_PEER
98
99B<Server mode:> the server sends a client certificate request to the client.
100The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process
101fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
102immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
103the verification failure.
104The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
105SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE and
106SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flags.
107
108B<Client mode:> the server certificate is verified. If the verification process
109fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
110immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
111the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an
112anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.
113
114=item SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
115
116B<Server mode:> if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL
117handshake is immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert.
118This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
119
120B<Client mode:> ignored (see BUGS)
121
122=item SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
123
124B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate once during the
125connection. Do not ask for a client certificate again during
126renegotiation or post-authentication if a certificate was requested
127during the initial handshake. This flag must be used together with
128SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
129
130B<Client mode:> ignored (see BUGS)
131
132=item SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
133
134B<Server mode:> the server will not send a client certificate request
135during the initial handshake, but will send the request via
136SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(). This allows the SSL_CTX or SSL
137to be configured for post-handshake peer verification before the
138handshake occurs. This flag must be used together with
139SSL_VERIFY_PEER. TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre-TLSv1.3 connections.
140
141B<Client mode:> ignored (see BUGS)
142
143=back
144
145If the B<mode> is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set.
146
147The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
148verification procedure or using another application provided verification
149function set with
150L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>.
151The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An
152application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information
153and the verify_callback() function, but the way this information is used
154may be different.
155
156SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set a limit on the
157number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates.
158Neither the
159end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against B<depth>. If the
160certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than B<depth+2>,
161X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued.
162The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate",
163"level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum
164depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the
165trust-anchor).
166The default depth limit is 100,
167allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate CA certificates and
168a final trust anchor certificate.
169
170The B<verify_callback> function is used to control the behaviour when the
171SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and
172receives two arguments: B<preverify_ok> indicates, whether the verification of
173the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
174(preverify_ok=0). B<x509_ctx> is a pointer to the complete context used
175for the certificate chain verification.
176
177The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
178(the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.
179At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever
180a verification error is found, the error number is stored in B<x509_ctx>
181and B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=0. By applying
182X509_CTX_store_* functions B<verify_callback> can locate the certificate
183in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is
184found for a certificate, B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=1
185before advancing to the next level.
186
187The return value of B<verify_callback> controls the strategy of the further
188verification process. If B<verify_callback> returns 0, the verification
189process is immediately stopped with "verification failed" state. If
190SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and
191the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If B<verify_callback> returns 1,
192the verification process is continued. If B<verify_callback> always returns
1931, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification
194failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can
195however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using
196L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> or by maintaining its
197own error storage managed by B<verify_callback>.
198
199If no B<verify_callback> is specified, the default callback will be used.
200Its return value is identical to B<preverify_ok>, so that any verification
201failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an
202alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.
203
204After calling SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(), the client will need to add a
205certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can
206successfully authenticate. This must be called before SSL_connect().
207
208SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() requires that verify flags have been
209previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication
210extension. When the client returns a certificate the verify callback will be
211invoked. A write operation must take place for the Certificate Request to be
212sent to the client, this can be done with SSL_do_handshake() or SSL_write_ex().
213Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time.
214
215When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket
216message is sent to the client.
217
218=head1 BUGS
219
220In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag
221is set, but whether any flags other than SSL_VERIFY_NONE are set. This can
222lead to unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags are not used as
223required.
224
225=head1 RETURN VALUES
226
227The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.
228
229The SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() function returns 1 if the request
230succeeded, and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined
231to determine the failure reason.
232
233=head1 EXAMPLES
234
235The following code sequence realizes an example B<verify_callback> function
236that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification
237failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
238more informational output.
239
240All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
241is printed on request.
242The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
243certificates.
244
245The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
246into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure
247(see L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>,
248L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>).
249
250 ...
251 typedef struct {
252   int verbose_mode;
253   int verify_depth;
254   int always_continue;
255 } mydata_t;
256 int mydata_index;
257
258 ...
259 static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
260 {
261     char    buf[256];
262     X509   *err_cert;
263     int     err, depth;
264     SSL    *ssl;
265     mydata_t *mydata;
266
267     err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
268     err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
269     depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
270
271     /*
272      * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
273      * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
274      */
275     ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
276     mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
277
278     X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
279
280     /*
281      * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
282      * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
283      * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
284      * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
285      * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
286      * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
287      * additional certificates would be logged.
288      */
289     if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
290         preverify_ok = 0;
291         err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
292         X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
293     }
294     if (!preverify_ok) {
295         printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
296                X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
297     } else if (mydata->verbose_mode) {
298         printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);
299     }
300
301     /*
302      * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
303      * it for something special
304      */
305     if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) {
306         X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
307         printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
308     }
309
310     if (mydata->always_continue)
311         return 1;
312     else
313         return preverify_ok;
314 }
315 ...
316
317 mydata_t mydata;
318
319 ...
320 mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
321
322 ...
323 SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
324                    verify_callback);
325
326 /*
327  * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
328  * an appropriate error in the logfile.
329  */
330 SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
331
332 /*
333  * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
334  * structure.
335  */
336 mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
337 SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
338
339 ...
340 SSL_accept(ssl);       /* check of success left out for clarity */
341 if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
342     if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
343         /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
344     }
345 }
346
347=head1 SEE ALSO
348
349L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_new(3)>,
350L<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)>,
351L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
352L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>,
353L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>,
354L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
355L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>,
356L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
357L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>
358
359=head1 HISTORY
360
361The SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE option, and the SSL_verify_client_post_handshake()
362and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
363
364=head1 COPYRIGHT
365
366Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
367
368Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
369this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
370in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
371L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
372
373=cut
374