1 /* 2 * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org> 3 * 4 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any 5 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above 6 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. 7 * 8 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES 9 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 10 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR 11 * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES 12 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN 13 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF 14 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. 15 */ 16 17 /* 18 * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose 19 * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, 20 * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. 21 * 22 * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. 23 * E.g. 24 * auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid> 25 */ 26 /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ 27 28 /* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */ 29 30 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 31 /* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */ 32 # include <asm/siginfo.h> 33 # define __have_siginfo_t 1 34 # define __have_sigval_t 1 35 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 36 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ 37 38 #include "includes.h" 39 40 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 41 42 #include <sys/types.h> 43 #include <sys/resource.h> 44 #include <sys/prctl.h> 45 46 #include <linux/net.h> 47 #include <linux/audit.h> 48 #include <linux/filter.h> 49 #include <linux/seccomp.h> 50 #include <elf.h> 51 52 #include <asm/unistd.h> 53 54 #include <errno.h> 55 #include <signal.h> 56 #include <stdarg.h> 57 #include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */ 58 #include <stdio.h> 59 #include <stdlib.h> 60 #include <string.h> 61 #include <unistd.h> 62 63 #include "log.h" 64 #include "ssh-sandbox.h" 65 #include "xmalloc.h" 66 67 /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ 68 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL 69 70 /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ 71 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 72 # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL 73 # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 74 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ 75 76 /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ 77 #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ 78 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ 79 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) 80 #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ 81 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ 82 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) 83 #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ 84 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \ 85 /* load first syscall argument */ \ 86 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ 87 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \ 88 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \ 89 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ 90 /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ 91 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ 92 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) 93 94 /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ 95 static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { 96 /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ 97 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 98 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), 99 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), 100 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), 101 /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ 102 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 103 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), 104 105 /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ 106 #ifdef __NR_fstat 107 SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES), 108 #endif 109 #ifdef __NR_fstat64 110 SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES), 111 #endif 112 #ifdef __NR_open 113 SC_DENY(open, EACCES), 114 #endif 115 #ifdef __NR_openat 116 SC_DENY(openat, EACCES), 117 #endif 118 #ifdef __NR_newfstatat 119 SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES), 120 #endif 121 #ifdef __NR_stat 122 SC_DENY(stat, EACCES), 123 #endif 124 #ifdef __NR_stat64 125 SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES), 126 #endif 127 128 /* Syscalls to permit */ 129 #ifdef __NR_brk 130 SC_ALLOW(brk), 131 #endif 132 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime 133 SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime), 134 #endif 135 #ifdef __NR_close 136 SC_ALLOW(close), 137 #endif 138 #ifdef __NR_exit 139 SC_ALLOW(exit), 140 #endif 141 #ifdef __NR_exit_group 142 SC_ALLOW(exit_group), 143 #endif 144 #ifdef __NR_getpgid 145 SC_ALLOW(getpgid), 146 #endif 147 #ifdef __NR_getpid 148 SC_ALLOW(getpid), 149 #endif 150 #ifdef __NR_getrandom 151 SC_ALLOW(getrandom), 152 #endif 153 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday 154 SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), 155 #endif 156 #ifdef __NR_madvise 157 SC_ALLOW(madvise), 158 #endif 159 #ifdef __NR_mmap 160 SC_ALLOW(mmap), 161 #endif 162 #ifdef __NR_mmap2 163 SC_ALLOW(mmap2), 164 #endif 165 #ifdef __NR_mremap 166 SC_ALLOW(mremap), 167 #endif 168 #ifdef __NR_munmap 169 SC_ALLOW(munmap), 170 #endif 171 #ifdef __NR__newselect 172 SC_ALLOW(_newselect), 173 #endif 174 #ifdef __NR_poll 175 SC_ALLOW(poll), 176 #endif 177 #ifdef __NR_pselect6 178 SC_ALLOW(pselect6), 179 #endif 180 #ifdef __NR_read 181 SC_ALLOW(read), 182 #endif 183 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask 184 SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask), 185 #endif 186 #ifdef __NR_select 187 SC_ALLOW(select), 188 #endif 189 #ifdef __NR_shutdown 190 SC_ALLOW(shutdown), 191 #endif 192 #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask 193 SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask), 194 #endif 195 #ifdef __NR_time 196 SC_ALLOW(time), 197 #endif 198 #ifdef __NR_write 199 SC_ALLOW(write), 200 #endif 201 #ifdef __NR_socketcall 202 SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), 203 #endif 204 205 /* Default deny */ 206 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), 207 }; 208 209 static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { 210 .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), 211 .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, 212 }; 213 214 struct ssh_sandbox { 215 pid_t child_pid; 216 }; 217 218 struct ssh_sandbox * 219 ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) 220 { 221 struct ssh_sandbox *box; 222 223 /* 224 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need 225 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. 226 */ 227 debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); 228 box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); 229 box->child_pid = 0; 230 231 return box; 232 } 233 234 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 235 extern struct monitor *pmonitor; 236 void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx); 237 238 static void 239 ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) 240 { 241 char msg[256]; 242 243 snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), 244 "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", 245 __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); 246 mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor); 247 _exit(1); 248 } 249 250 static void 251 ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) 252 { 253 struct sigaction act; 254 sigset_t mask; 255 256 debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); 257 memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); 258 sigemptyset(&mask); 259 sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); 260 261 act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; 262 act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; 263 if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) 264 fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); 265 if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) 266 fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", 267 __func__, strerror(errno)); 268 } 269 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ 270 271 void 272 ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) 273 { 274 struct rlimit rl_zero; 275 int nnp_failed = 0; 276 277 /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ 278 rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; 279 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) 280 fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", 281 __func__, strerror(errno)); 282 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) 283 fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", 284 __func__, strerror(errno)); 285 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) 286 fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", 287 __func__, strerror(errno)); 288 289 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 290 ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); 291 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ 292 293 debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); 294 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { 295 debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", 296 __func__, strerror(errno)); 297 nnp_failed = 1; 298 } 299 debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); 300 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) 301 debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", 302 __func__, strerror(errno)); 303 else if (nnp_failed) 304 fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " 305 "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); 306 } 307 308 void 309 ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) 310 { 311 free(box); 312 debug3("%s: finished", __func__); 313 } 314 315 void 316 ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) 317 { 318 box->child_pid = child_pid; 319 } 320 321 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ 322