xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 19fae0f66023a97a9b464b3beeeabb2081f575b3)
1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org>
3  * Copyright (c) 2015,2017,2019,2020,2023 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
4  *
5  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
6  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
7  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
8  *
9  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
10  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
11  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
12  * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
13  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
14  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
15  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
16  */
17 
18 /*
19  * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
20  * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
21  * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
22  *
23  * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
24  * E.g.
25  *   auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
26  */
27 /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
28 
29 #if 0
30 /*
31  * For older toolchains, it may be necessary to use the kernel
32  * headers directly.
33  */
34 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
35 # include <asm/siginfo.h>
36 # define __have_siginfo_t 1
37 # define __have_sigval_t 1
38 # define __have_sigevent_t 1
39 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
40 #endif
41 
42 #include "includes.h"
43 
44 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
45 
46 #include <sys/types.h>
47 #include <sys/resource.h>
48 #include <sys/prctl.h>
49 #include <sys/mman.h>
50 #include <sys/syscall.h>
51 
52 #include <linux/futex.h>
53 #include <linux/net.h>
54 #include <linux/audit.h>
55 #include <linux/filter.h>
56 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
57 #include <elf.h>
58 
59 #include <asm/unistd.h>
60 #ifdef __s390__
61 #include <asm/zcrypt.h>
62 #endif
63 
64 #include <errno.h>
65 #include <signal.h>
66 #include <stdarg.h>
67 #include <stddef.h>  /* for offsetof */
68 #include <stdio.h>
69 #include <stdlib.h>
70 #include <string.h>
71 #include <unistd.h>
72 
73 #include "log.h"
74 #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
75 #include "xmalloc.h"
76 
77 /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
78 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
79 
80 /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
81 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
82 # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
83 # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
84 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
85 
86 #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
87 # define ARG_LO_OFFSET  0
88 # define ARG_HI_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
89 #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
90 # define ARG_LO_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
91 # define ARG_HI_OFFSET  0
92 #else
93 #error "Unknown endianness"
94 #endif
95 
96 /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
97 #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
98 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
99 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
100 #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
101 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
102 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
103 #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
104 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
105 	/* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \
106 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
107 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
108 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
109 	    ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
110 	/* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \
111 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
112 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
113 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
114 	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
115 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
116 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
117 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
118 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
119 /* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */
120 #define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \
121 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
122 	/* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
123 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
124 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
125 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
126 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \
127 	/* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
128 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
129 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
130 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
131 	    ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
132 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \
133 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
134 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
135 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
136 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
137 /* Deny unless syscall argument contains only values in mask */
138 #define SC_DENY_UNLESS_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask, _errno) \
139 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
140 	/* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
141 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
142 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
143 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
144 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 3), \
145 	/* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
146 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
147 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
148 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
149 	    ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
150 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 1, 0), \
151 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)), \
152 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
153 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
154 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
155 #define SC_DENY_UNLESS_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val, _errno) \
156 /* Special handling for futex(2) that combines a bitmap and operation number */
157 #if defined(__NR_futex) || defined(__NR_futex_time64)
158 #define SC_FUTEX_MASK (FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME)
159 #define SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(_nr, _op) \
160 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
161 	/* load syscall argument, low word */ \
162 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
163 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
164 	/* mask off allowed bitmap values, low word */ \
165 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~(SC_FUTEX_MASK & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
166 	/* test operation number, low word */ \
167 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, ((_op) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 4), \
168 	/* load syscall argument, high word */ \
169 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
170 	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
171 	/* mask off allowed bitmap values, high word */ \
172 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
173 	    ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)SC_FUTEX_MASK >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
174 	/* test operation number, high word */ \
175 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
176 	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_op) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
177 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
178 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
179 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
180 
181 /* Use this for both __NR_futex and __NR_futex_time64 */
182 # define SC_FUTEX(_nr) \
183 	SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAIT), \
184 	SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET), \
185 	SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAKE), \
186 	SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET), \
187 	SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_REQUEUE), \
188 	SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE)
189 #endif /* __NR_futex || __NR_futex_time64 */
190 
191 #if defined(__NR_mmap) || defined(__NR_mmap2)
192 # ifdef MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE
193 #  define SC_MMAP_FLAGS MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE
194 # else
195 #  define SC_MMAP_FLAGS MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED
196 # endif /* MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE */
197 /* Use this for both __NR_mmap and __NR_mmap2 variants */
198 # define SC_MMAP(_nr) \
199 	SC_DENY_UNLESS_ARG_MASK(_nr, 3, SC_MMAP_FLAGS, EINVAL), \
200 	SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE)
201 #endif /* __NR_mmap || __NR_mmap2 */
202 
203 /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
204 static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
205 	/* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
206 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
207 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
208 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
209 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
210 	/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
211 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
212 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
213 
214 	/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
215 #ifdef __NR_lstat
216 	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
217 #endif
218 #ifdef __NR_lstat64
219 	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
220 #endif
221 #ifdef __NR_fstat
222 	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
223 #endif
224 #ifdef __NR_fstat64
225 	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
226 #endif
227 #ifdef __NR_fstatat64
228 	SC_DENY(__NR_fstatat64, EACCES),
229 #endif
230 #ifdef __NR_open
231 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
232 #endif
233 #ifdef __NR_openat
234 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
235 #endif
236 #ifdef __NR_newfstatat
237 	SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
238 #endif
239 #ifdef __NR_stat
240 	SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
241 #endif
242 #ifdef __NR_stat64
243 	SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
244 #endif
245 #ifdef __NR_shmget
246 	SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES),
247 #endif
248 #ifdef __NR_shmat
249 	SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES),
250 #endif
251 #ifdef __NR_shmdt
252 	SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES),
253 #endif
254 #ifdef __NR_ipc
255 	SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES),
256 #endif
257 #ifdef __NR_statx
258 	SC_DENY(__NR_statx, EACCES),
259 #endif
260 
261 	/* Syscalls to permit */
262 #ifdef __NR_brk
263 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
264 #endif
265 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
266 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
267 #endif
268 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
269 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
270 #endif
271 #ifdef __NR_close
272 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
273 #endif
274 #ifdef __NR_exit
275 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
276 #endif
277 #ifdef __NR_exit_group
278 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
279 #endif
280 #ifdef __NR_futex
281 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
282 #endif
283 #ifdef __NR_futex_time64
284 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex_time64),
285 #endif
286 #ifdef __NR_geteuid
287 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
288 #endif
289 #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
290 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
291 #endif
292 #ifdef __NR_getpgid
293 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
294 #endif
295 #ifdef __NR_getpid
296 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
297 #endif
298 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
299 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
300 #endif
301 #ifdef __NR_gettid
302 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
303 #endif
304 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
305 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
306 #endif
307 #ifdef __NR_getuid
308 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
309 #endif
310 #ifdef __NR_getuid32
311 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
312 #endif
313 #ifdef __NR_madvise
314 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_NORMAL),
315 # ifdef MADV_FREE
316 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_FREE),
317 # endif
318 # ifdef MADV_DONTNEED
319 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTNEED),
320 # endif
321 # ifdef MADV_DONTFORK
322 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTFORK),
323 # endif
324 # ifdef MADV_DONTDUMP
325 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTDUMP),
326 # endif
327 # ifdef MADV_WIPEONFORK
328 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_WIPEONFORK),
329 # endif
330 	SC_DENY(__NR_madvise, EINVAL),
331 #endif
332 #ifdef __NR_mmap
333 	SC_MMAP(__NR_mmap),
334 #endif
335 #ifdef __NR_mmap2
336 	SC_MMAP(__NR_mmap2),
337 #endif
338 #ifdef __NR_mprotect
339 	SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
340 #endif
341 #ifdef __NR_mremap
342 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
343 #endif
344 #ifdef __NR_munmap
345 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
346 #endif
347 #ifdef __NR_nanosleep
348 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep),
349 #endif
350 #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep
351 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep),
352 #endif
353 #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64
354 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),
355 #endif
356 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
357 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
358 #endif
359 #ifdef __NR__newselect
360 	SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
361 #endif
362 #ifdef __NR_ppoll
363 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll),
364 #endif
365 #ifdef __NR_ppoll_time64
366 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll_time64),
367 #endif
368 #ifdef __NR_poll
369 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
370 #endif
371 #ifdef __NR_pselect6
372 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
373 #endif
374 #ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
375 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
376 #endif
377 #ifdef __NR_read
378 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
379 #endif
380 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
381 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
382 #endif
383 #ifdef __NR_select
384 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
385 #endif
386 #ifdef __NR_shutdown
387 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
388 #endif
389 #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
390 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
391 #endif
392 #ifdef __NR_time
393 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
394 #endif
395 #ifdef __NR_write
396 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
397 #endif
398 #ifdef __NR_writev
399 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_writev),
400 #endif
401 #ifdef __NR_socketcall
402 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
403 	SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES),
404 #endif
405 #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
406 	/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
407 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
408 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
409 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
410 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
411 	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
412 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
413 #endif
414 #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
415 	/*
416 	 * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
417 	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
418 	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
419 	 */
420 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
421 #endif
422 
423 	/* Default deny */
424 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
425 };
426 
427 static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
428 	.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
429 	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
430 };
431 
432 struct ssh_sandbox {
433 	pid_t child_pid;
434 };
435 
436 struct ssh_sandbox *
437 ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
438 {
439 	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
440 
441 	/*
442 	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
443 	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
444 	 */
445 	debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
446 	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
447 	box->child_pid = 0;
448 
449 	return box;
450 }
451 
452 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
453 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
454 void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx);
455 
456 static void
457 ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
458 {
459 	char msg[256];
460 
461 	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
462 	    "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
463 	    __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
464 	mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, 0, msg, pmonitor);
465 	_exit(1);
466 }
467 
468 static void
469 ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
470 {
471 	struct sigaction act;
472 	sigset_t mask;
473 
474 	debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
475 	memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
476 	sigemptyset(&mask);
477 	sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
478 
479 	act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
480 	act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
481 	if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
482 		fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
483 	if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
484 		fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
485 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
486 }
487 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
488 
489 void
490 ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
491 {
492 	struct rlimit rl_zero, rl_one = {.rlim_cur = 1, .rlim_max = 1};
493 	int nnp_failed = 0;
494 
495 	/* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
496 	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
497 	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
498 		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
499 			__func__, strerror(errno));
500 	/*
501 	 * Cannot use zero for nfds, because poll(2) will fail with
502 	 * errno=EINVAL if npfds>RLIMIT_NOFILE.
503 	 */
504 	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_one) == -1)
505 		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
506 			__func__, strerror(errno));
507 	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
508 		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
509 			__func__, strerror(errno));
510 
511 #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
512 	ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
513 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
514 
515 	debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
516 	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
517 		debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
518 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
519 		nnp_failed = 1;
520 	}
521 	debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
522 	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
523 		debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
524 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
525 	else if (nnp_failed)
526 		fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
527 		    "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
528 }
529 
530 void
531 ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
532 {
533 	free(box);
534 	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
535 }
536 
537 void
538 ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
539 {
540 	box->child_pid = child_pid;
541 }
542 
543 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
544