xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c (revision abac203368a6069d3d557a71a60a843707694d65)
1 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  *
14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24  */
25 
26 #include "includes.h"
27 
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <sys/stat.h>
30 #include <sys/wait.h>
31 
32 #include <errno.h>
33 #include <fcntl.h>
34 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
35 # include <paths.h>
36 #endif
37 #include <pwd.h>
38 #include <signal.h>
39 #include <stdio.h>
40 #include <stdarg.h>
41 #include <string.h>
42 #include <time.h>
43 #include <unistd.h>
44 #include <limits.h>
45 
46 #include "xmalloc.h"
47 #include "ssh.h"
48 #include "ssh2.h"
49 #include "packet.h"
50 #include "buffer.h"
51 #include "log.h"
52 #include "misc.h"
53 #include "servconf.h"
54 #include "compat.h"
55 #include "key.h"
56 #include "hostfile.h"
57 #include "auth.h"
58 #include "pathnames.h"
59 #include "uidswap.h"
60 #include "auth-options.h"
61 #include "canohost.h"
62 #ifdef GSSAPI
63 #include "ssh-gss.h"
64 #endif
65 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
66 #include "authfile.h"
67 #include "match.h"
68 #include "ssherr.h"
69 #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
70 #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
71 
72 /* import */
73 extern ServerOptions options;
74 extern u_char *session_id2;
75 extern u_int session_id2_len;
76 
77 static int
78 userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
79 {
80 	Buffer b;
81 	Key *key = NULL;
82 	char *pkalg, *userstyle;
83 	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
84 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
85 	int have_sig, pktype;
86 	int authenticated = 0;
87 
88 	if (!authctxt->valid) {
89 		debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
90 		return 0;
91 	}
92 	have_sig = packet_get_char();
93 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
94 		debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
95 		/* no explicit pkalg given */
96 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
97 		buffer_init(&b);
98 		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
99 		/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
100 		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
101 		buffer_free(&b);
102 	} else {
103 		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
104 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
105 	}
106 	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
107 	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
108 		/* this is perfectly legal */
109 		logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
110 		    pkalg);
111 		goto done;
112 	}
113 	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
114 	if (key == NULL) {
115 		error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
116 		goto done;
117 	}
118 	if (key->type != pktype) {
119 		error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
120 		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
121 		goto done;
122 	}
123 	if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
124 	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
125 		logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
126 		    "signature scheme");
127 		goto done;
128 	}
129 	if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
130 		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
131 		goto done;
132 	}
133 	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
134 	    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
135 		logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
136 		    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
137 		goto done;
138 	}
139 
140 	if (have_sig) {
141 		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
142 		packet_check_eom();
143 		buffer_init(&b);
144 		if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
145 			buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
146 		} else {
147 			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
148 		}
149 		/* reconstruct packet */
150 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
151 		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
152 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
153 		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
154 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
155 		free(userstyle);
156 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
157 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
158 		    "ssh-userauth" :
159 		    authctxt->service);
160 		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
161 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
162 		} else {
163 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
164 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
165 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
166 		}
167 		buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
168 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
169 		buffer_dump(&b);
170 #endif
171 		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
172 
173 		/* test for correct signature */
174 		authenticated = 0;
175 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
176 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
177 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
178 			authenticated = 1;
179 			/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
180 			auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
181 			key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
182 		}
183 		buffer_free(&b);
184 		free(sig);
185 	} else {
186 		debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
187 		packet_check_eom();
188 
189 		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
190 		/*
191 		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
192 		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
193 		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
194 		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
195 		 * issue? -markus
196 		 */
197 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
198 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
199 			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
200 			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
201 			packet_send();
202 			packet_write_wait();
203 			authctxt->postponed = 1;
204 		}
205 	}
206 	if (authenticated != 1)
207 		auth_clear_options();
208 done:
209 	debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
210 	if (key != NULL)
211 		key_free(key);
212 	free(pkalg);
213 	free(pkblob);
214 	return authenticated;
215 }
216 
217 void
218 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
219 {
220 	char *fp, *extra;
221 	va_list ap;
222 	int i;
223 
224 	extra = NULL;
225 	if (fmt != NULL) {
226 		va_start(ap, fmt);
227 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
228 		va_end(ap);
229 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
230 			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
231 	}
232 
233 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
234 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
235 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
236 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
237 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
238 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
239 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
240 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
241 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
242 		free(fp);
243 	} else {
244 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
245 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
246 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
247 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
248 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
249 		free(fp);
250 	}
251 	free(extra);
252 }
253 
254 /*
255  * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
256  * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
257  * and its members.
258  */
259 static int
260 split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
261 {
262 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
263 	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
264 	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
265 
266 	*argvp = NULL;
267 	*argcp = 0;
268 
269 	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
270 		/* Skip leading whitespace */
271 		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
272 			continue;
273 
274 		/* Start of a token */
275 		quote = 0;
276 		if (s[i] == '\\' &&
277 		    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
278 			i++;
279 		else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
280 			quote = s[i++];
281 
282 		argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
283 		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
284 		argv[argc] = NULL;
285 
286 		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
287 		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
288 			if (s[i] == '\\') {
289 				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
290 				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
291 				    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
292 					i++; /* Skip '\' */
293 					arg[j++] = s[i];
294 				} else {
295 					/* Unrecognised escape */
296 					arg[j++] = s[i];
297 				}
298 			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
299 				break; /* done */
300 			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
301 				break; /* done */
302 			else
303 				arg[j++] = s[i];
304 		}
305 		if (s[i] == '\0') {
306 			if (quote != 0) {
307 				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
308 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
309 				goto out;
310 			}
311 			break;
312 		}
313 	}
314 	/* Success */
315 	*argcp = argc;
316 	*argvp = argv;
317 	argc = 0;
318 	argv = NULL;
319 	r = 0;
320  out:
321 	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
322 		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
323 			free(argv[i]);
324 		free(argv);
325 	}
326 	return r;
327 }
328 
329 /*
330  * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
331  * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
332  */
333 static char *
334 assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
335 {
336 	int i, j, ws, r;
337 	char c, *ret;
338 	struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
339 
340 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
341 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
342 
343 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
344 		ws = 0;
345 		sshbuf_reset(arg);
346 		for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
347 			r = 0;
348 			c = argv[i][j];
349 			switch (c) {
350 			case ' ':
351 			case '\t':
352 				ws = 1;
353 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
354 				break;
355 			case '\\':
356 			case '\'':
357 			case '"':
358 				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
359 					break;
360 				/* FALLTHROUGH */
361 			default:
362 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
363 				break;
364 			}
365 			if (r != 0)
366 				fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
367 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
368 		}
369 		if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
370 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
371 		    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
372 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
373 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
374 	}
375 	if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
376 		fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
377 	memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
378 	ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
379 	sshbuf_free(buf);
380 	sshbuf_free(arg);
381 	return ret;
382 }
383 
384 /*
385  * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
386  * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
387  * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
388  */
389 static pid_t
390 subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
391     int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
392 {
393 	FILE *f;
394 	struct stat st;
395 	int devnull, p[2], i;
396 	pid_t pid;
397 	char *cp, errmsg[512];
398 	u_int envsize;
399 	char **child_env;
400 
401 	*child = NULL;
402 
403 	debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
404 	    tag, command, pw->pw_name);
405 
406 	/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
407 	if (*av[0] != '/') {
408 		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
409 		return 0;
410 	}
411 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
412 	if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
413 		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
414 		    av[0], strerror(errno));
415 		restore_uid();
416 		return 0;
417 	}
418 	if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
419 	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
420 		error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
421 		restore_uid();
422 		return 0;
423 	}
424 
425 	/*
426 	 * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
427 	 * authorized_keys output.
428 	 */
429 	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
430 		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
431 		restore_uid();
432 		return 0;
433 	}
434 
435 	/*
436 	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
437 	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
438 	 */
439 	restore_uid();
440 
441 	switch ((pid = fork())) {
442 	case -1: /* error */
443 		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
444 		close(p[0]);
445 		close(p[1]);
446 		return 0;
447 	case 0: /* child */
448 		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
449 		envsize = 5;
450 		child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
451 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
452 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
453 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
454 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
455 		if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
456 			child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
457 
458 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
459 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
460 
461 		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
462 			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
463 			    strerror(errno));
464 			_exit(1);
465 		}
466 		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
467 		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
468 		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
469 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
470 			_exit(1);
471 		}
472 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
473 
474 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
475 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
476 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
477 			    strerror(errno));
478 			_exit(1);
479 		}
480 		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
481 			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
482 			    strerror(errno));
483 			_exit(1);
484 		}
485 		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
486 		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
487 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
488 			_exit(1);
489 		}
490 
491 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
492 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
493 		_exit(127);
494 	default: /* parent */
495 		break;
496 	}
497 
498 	close(p[1]);
499 	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
500 		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
501 		close(p[0]);
502 		/* Don't leave zombie child */
503 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
504 		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
505 			;
506 		return 0;
507 	}
508 	/* Success */
509 	debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
510 	*child = f;
511 	return pid;
512 }
513 
514 /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
515 static int
516 exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
517 {
518 	int status;
519 
520 	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
521 		if (errno != EINTR) {
522 			error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
523 			return -1;
524 		}
525 	}
526 	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
527 		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
528 		return -1;
529 	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
530 		error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
531 		return -1;
532 	}
533 	return 0;
534 }
535 
536 static int
537 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
538 {
539 	char *result;
540 	u_int i;
541 
542 	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
543 
544 	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
545 		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
546 		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
547 			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
548 			    result);
549 			free(result);
550 			return 1;
551 		}
552 	}
553 	return 0;
554 }
555 
556 static int
557 process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
558     struct sshkey_cert *cert)
559 {
560 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
561 	u_long linenum = 0;
562 	u_int i;
563 
564 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
565 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
566 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
567 			;
568 		/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
569 		if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
570 			*ep = '\0';
571 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
572 			continue;
573 		/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
574 		ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
575 		while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
576 			*ep-- = '\0';
577 		/*
578 		 * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
579 		 * key options.
580 		 */
581 		line_opts = NULL;
582 		if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
583 		    (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
584 			for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
585 				;
586 			line_opts = cp;
587 			cp = ep;
588 		}
589 		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
590 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
591 				debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
592 				    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
593 				    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
594 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
595 				    file, linenum) != 1)
596 					continue;
597 				return 1;
598 			}
599 		}
600 	}
601 	return 0;
602 }
603 
604 static int
605 match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
606 {
607 	FILE *f;
608 	int success;
609 
610 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
611 	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
612 	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
613 		restore_uid();
614 		return 0;
615 	}
616 	success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
617 	fclose(f);
618 	restore_uid();
619 	return success;
620 }
621 
622 /*
623  * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
624  * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
625  */
626 static int
627 match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
628 {
629 	FILE *f = NULL;
630 	int ok, found_principal = 0;
631 	struct passwd *pw;
632 	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
633 	pid_t pid;
634 	char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
635 	void (*osigchld)(int);
636 
637 	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
638 		return 0;
639 	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
640 		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
641 		    "skipping");
642 		return 0;
643 	}
644 
645 	/*
646 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
647 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
648 	 */
649 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
650 
651 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
652 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
653 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
654 	pw = getpwnam(username);
655 	if (pw == NULL) {
656 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
657 		    username, strerror(errno));
658 		goto out;
659 	}
660 
661 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
662 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
663 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
664 		    "invalid quotes", command);
665 		goto out;
666 	}
667 	if (ac == 0) {
668 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
669 		    command);
670 		goto out;
671 	}
672 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
673 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
674 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
675 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
676 		    (char *)NULL);
677 		if (tmp == NULL)
678 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
679 		free(av[i]);
680 		av[i] = tmp;
681 	}
682 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
683 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
684 
685 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
686 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
687 		goto out;
688 
689 	uid_swapped = 1;
690 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
691 
692 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
693 
694 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
695 		goto out;
696 
697 	/* Read completed successfully */
698 	found_principal = ok;
699  out:
700 	if (f != NULL)
701 		fclose(f);
702 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
703 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
704 		free(av[i]);
705 	free(av);
706 	if (uid_swapped)
707 		restore_uid();
708 	free(command);
709 	free(username);
710 	return found_principal;
711 }
712 /*
713  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
714  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
715  */
716 static int
717 check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
718 {
719 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
720 	const char *reason;
721 	int found_key = 0;
722 	u_long linenum = 0;
723 	Key *found;
724 	char *fp;
725 
726 	found_key = 0;
727 
728 	found = NULL;
729 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
730 		char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
731 		if (found != NULL)
732 			key_free(found);
733 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
734 		auth_clear_options();
735 
736 		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
737 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
738 			;
739 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
740 			continue;
741 
742 		if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
743 			/* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
744 			int quoted = 0;
745 			debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
746 			key_options = cp;
747 			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
748 				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
749 					cp++;	/* Skip both */
750 				else if (*cp == '"')
751 					quoted = !quoted;
752 			}
753 			/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
754 			for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
755 				;
756 			if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
757 				debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
758 				/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
759 				continue;
760 			}
761 		}
762 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
763 			if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
764 				continue;
765 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
766 			    linenum) != 1)
767 				continue;
768 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
769 				continue;
770 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
771 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
772 				continue;
773 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
774 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
775 			/*
776 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
777 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
778 			 * their username in the certificate principals list.
779 			 */
780 			if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
781 			    !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
782 			    key->cert)) {
783 				reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
784 				    "authorized principal";
785  fail_reason:
786 				free(fp);
787 				error("%s", reason);
788 				auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
789 				continue;
790 			}
791 			if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
792 			    authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
793 			    &reason) != 0)
794 				goto fail_reason;
795 			if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
796 				free(fp);
797 				continue;
798 			}
799 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
800 			    "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
801 			    key_type(found), fp, file);
802 			free(fp);
803 			found_key = 1;
804 			break;
805 		} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
806 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
807 			    linenum) != 1)
808 				continue;
809 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
810 				continue;
811 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
812 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
813 				continue;
814 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
815 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
816 			free(fp);
817 			found_key = 1;
818 			break;
819 		}
820 	}
821 	if (found != NULL)
822 		key_free(found);
823 	if (!found_key)
824 		debug2("key not found");
825 	return found_key;
826 }
827 
828 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
829 static int
830 user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
831 {
832 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
833 	const char *reason;
834 	int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
835 
836 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
837 		return 0;
838 
839 	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
840 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
841 		return 0;
842 
843 	if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
844 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
845 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
846 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
847 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
848 		goto out;
849 	}
850 	/*
851 	 * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
852 	 * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
853 	 * against the username.
854 	 */
855 	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
856 		if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
857 			found_principal = 1;
858 	}
859 	/* Try querying command if specified */
860 	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert))
861 		found_principal = 1;
862 	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
863 	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
864             options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
865 	if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
866 		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
867  fail_reason:
868 		error("%s", reason);
869 		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
870 		goto out;
871 	}
872 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
873 	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
874 		goto fail_reason;
875 	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
876 		goto out;
877 
878 	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
879 	    key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
880 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
881 	ret = 1;
882 
883  out:
884 	free(principals_file);
885 	free(ca_fp);
886 	return ret;
887 }
888 
889 /*
890  * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
891  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
892  */
893 static int
894 user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
895 {
896 	FILE *f;
897 	int found_key = 0;
898 
899 	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
900 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
901 
902 	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
903 	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
904 		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
905 		fclose(f);
906 	}
907 
908 	restore_uid();
909 	return found_key;
910 }
911 
912 /*
913  * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
914  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
915  */
916 static int
917 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
918 {
919 	FILE *f = NULL;
920 	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
921 	struct passwd *pw;
922 	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
923 	pid_t pid;
924 	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
925 	char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
926 	void (*osigchld)(int);
927 
928 	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
929 		return 0;
930 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
931 		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
932 		return 0;
933 	}
934 
935 	/*
936 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
937 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
938 	 */
939 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
940 
941 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
942 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
943 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
944 	pw = getpwnam(username);
945 	if (pw == NULL) {
946 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
947 		    username, strerror(errno));
948 		goto out;
949 	}
950 
951 	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
952 	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
953 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
954 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
955 		goto out;
956 	}
957 	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
958 		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
959 		goto out;
960 	}
961 
962 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
963 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
964 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
965 		    command);
966 		goto out;
967 	}
968 	if (ac == 0) {
969 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
970 		    command);
971 		goto out;
972 	}
973 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
974 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
975 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
976 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
977 		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
978 		    "f", key_fp,
979 		    "k", keytext,
980 		    (char *)NULL);
981 		if (tmp == NULL)
982 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
983 		free(av[i]);
984 		av[i] = tmp;
985 	}
986 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
987 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
988 
989 	/*
990 	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
991 	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
992 	 * target username as a single argument.
993 	 */
994 	if (ac == 1) {
995 		av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
996 		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
997 		av[2] = NULL;
998 		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
999 		free(command);
1000 		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
1001 	}
1002 
1003 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
1004 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
1005 		goto out;
1006 
1007 	uid_swapped = 1;
1008 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
1009 
1010 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
1011 
1012 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
1013 		goto out;
1014 
1015 	/* Read completed successfully */
1016 	found_key = ok;
1017  out:
1018 	if (f != NULL)
1019 		fclose(f);
1020 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
1021 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
1022 		free(av[i]);
1023 	free(av);
1024 	if (uid_swapped)
1025 		restore_uid();
1026 	free(command);
1027 	free(username);
1028 	free(key_fp);
1029 	free(keytext);
1030 	return found_key;
1031 }
1032 
1033 /*
1034  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
1035  */
1036 int
1037 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
1038 {
1039 	u_int success, i;
1040 	char *file;
1041 
1042 	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
1043 		return 0;
1044 	if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
1045 		return 0;
1046 
1047 	success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
1048 	if (success)
1049 		return success;
1050 
1051 	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
1052 	if (success > 0)
1053 		return success;
1054 
1055 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
1056 
1057 		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
1058 			continue;
1059 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
1060 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
1061 
1062 		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
1063 		free(file);
1064 	}
1065 
1066 	return success;
1067 }
1068 
1069 /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
1070 void
1071 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
1072 {
1073 	struct sshkey **tmp;
1074 
1075 	if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
1076 	    (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
1077 	    authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
1078 		fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
1079 	authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
1080 	authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
1081 	authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
1082 }
1083 
1084 /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
1085 int
1086 auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
1087 {
1088 	u_int i;
1089 
1090 	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
1091 		if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
1092 			return 1;
1093 		}
1094 	}
1095 	return 0;
1096 }
1097 
1098 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
1099 	"publickey",
1100 	userauth_pubkey,
1101 	&options.pubkey_authentication
1102 };
1103