xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 3fc36ee018bb836bd1796067cf4ef8683f166ebc)
1 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.55 2016/01/27 00:53:12 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  *
14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24  */
25 
26 #include "includes.h"
27 
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <sys/stat.h>
30 #include <sys/wait.h>
31 
32 #include <errno.h>
33 #include <fcntl.h>
34 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
35 # include <paths.h>
36 #endif
37 #include <pwd.h>
38 #include <signal.h>
39 #include <stdio.h>
40 #include <stdarg.h>
41 #include <string.h>
42 #include <time.h>
43 #include <unistd.h>
44 #include <limits.h>
45 
46 #include "xmalloc.h"
47 #include "ssh.h"
48 #include "ssh2.h"
49 #include "packet.h"
50 #include "buffer.h"
51 #include "log.h"
52 #include "misc.h"
53 #include "servconf.h"
54 #include "compat.h"
55 #include "key.h"
56 #include "hostfile.h"
57 #include "auth.h"
58 #include "pathnames.h"
59 #include "uidswap.h"
60 #include "auth-options.h"
61 #include "canohost.h"
62 #ifdef GSSAPI
63 #include "ssh-gss.h"
64 #endif
65 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
66 #include "authfile.h"
67 #include "match.h"
68 #include "ssherr.h"
69 #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
70 #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
71 
72 /* import */
73 extern ServerOptions options;
74 extern u_char *session_id2;
75 extern u_int session_id2_len;
76 
77 static int
78 userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
79 {
80 	Buffer b;
81 	Key *key = NULL;
82 	char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
83 	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
84 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
85 	int have_sig, pktype;
86 	int authenticated = 0;
87 
88 	if (!authctxt->valid) {
89 		debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
90 		return 0;
91 	}
92 	have_sig = packet_get_char();
93 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
94 		debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
95 		/* no explicit pkalg given */
96 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
97 		buffer_init(&b);
98 		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
99 		/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
100 		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
101 		buffer_free(&b);
102 	} else {
103 		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
104 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
105 	}
106 	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
107 	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
108 		/* this is perfectly legal */
109 		logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
110 		    __func__, pkalg);
111 		goto done;
112 	}
113 	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
114 	if (key == NULL) {
115 		error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
116 		goto done;
117 	}
118 	if (key->type != pktype) {
119 		error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
120 		    "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
121 		goto done;
122 	}
123 	if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
124 	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
125 		logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
126 		    "signature scheme");
127 		goto done;
128 	}
129 	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
130 	if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
131 		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
132 		goto done;
133 	}
134 	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
135 	    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
136 		logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
137 		    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
138 		goto done;
139 	}
140 
141 	if (have_sig) {
142 		debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s",
143 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
144 		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
145 		packet_check_eom();
146 		buffer_init(&b);
147 		if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
148 			buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
149 		} else {
150 			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
151 		}
152 		/* reconstruct packet */
153 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
154 		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
155 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
156 		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
157 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
158 		free(userstyle);
159 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
160 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
161 		    "ssh-userauth" :
162 		    authctxt->service);
163 		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
164 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
165 		} else {
166 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
167 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
168 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
169 		}
170 		buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
171 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
172 		buffer_dump(&b);
173 #endif
174 		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
175 
176 		/* test for correct signature */
177 		authenticated = 0;
178 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
179 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
180 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
181 			authenticated = 1;
182 			/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
183 			auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
184 			key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
185 		}
186 		buffer_free(&b);
187 		free(sig);
188 	} else {
189 		debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
190 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
191 		packet_check_eom();
192 
193 		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
194 		/*
195 		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
196 		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
197 		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
198 		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
199 		 * issue? -markus
200 		 */
201 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
202 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
203 			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
204 			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
205 			packet_send();
206 			packet_write_wait();
207 			authctxt->postponed = 1;
208 		}
209 	}
210 	if (authenticated != 1)
211 		auth_clear_options();
212 done:
213 	debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
214 	if (key != NULL)
215 		key_free(key);
216 	free(pkalg);
217 	free(pkblob);
218 	free(fp);
219 	return authenticated;
220 }
221 
222 void
223 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
224 {
225 	char *fp, *extra;
226 	va_list ap;
227 	int i;
228 
229 	extra = NULL;
230 	if (fmt != NULL) {
231 		va_start(ap, fmt);
232 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
233 		va_end(ap);
234 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
235 			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
236 	}
237 
238 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
239 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
240 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
241 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
242 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
243 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
244 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
245 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
246 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
247 		free(fp);
248 	} else {
249 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
250 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
251 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
252 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
253 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
254 		free(fp);
255 	}
256 	free(extra);
257 }
258 
259 /*
260  * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
261  * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
262  * and its members.
263  */
264 static int
265 split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
266 {
267 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
268 	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
269 	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
270 
271 	*argvp = NULL;
272 	*argcp = 0;
273 
274 	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
275 		/* Skip leading whitespace */
276 		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
277 			continue;
278 
279 		/* Start of a token */
280 		quote = 0;
281 		if (s[i] == '\\' &&
282 		    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
283 			i++;
284 		else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
285 			quote = s[i++];
286 
287 		argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
288 		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
289 		argv[argc] = NULL;
290 
291 		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
292 		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
293 			if (s[i] == '\\') {
294 				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
295 				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
296 				    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
297 					i++; /* Skip '\' */
298 					arg[j++] = s[i];
299 				} else {
300 					/* Unrecognised escape */
301 					arg[j++] = s[i];
302 				}
303 			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
304 				break; /* done */
305 			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
306 				break; /* done */
307 			else
308 				arg[j++] = s[i];
309 		}
310 		if (s[i] == '\0') {
311 			if (quote != 0) {
312 				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
313 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
314 				goto out;
315 			}
316 			break;
317 		}
318 	}
319 	/* Success */
320 	*argcp = argc;
321 	*argvp = argv;
322 	argc = 0;
323 	argv = NULL;
324 	r = 0;
325  out:
326 	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
327 		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
328 			free(argv[i]);
329 		free(argv);
330 	}
331 	return r;
332 }
333 
334 /*
335  * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
336  * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
337  */
338 static char *
339 assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
340 {
341 	int i, j, ws, r;
342 	char c, *ret;
343 	struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
344 
345 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
346 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
347 
348 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
349 		ws = 0;
350 		sshbuf_reset(arg);
351 		for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
352 			r = 0;
353 			c = argv[i][j];
354 			switch (c) {
355 			case ' ':
356 			case '\t':
357 				ws = 1;
358 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
359 				break;
360 			case '\\':
361 			case '\'':
362 			case '"':
363 				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
364 					break;
365 				/* FALLTHROUGH */
366 			default:
367 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
368 				break;
369 			}
370 			if (r != 0)
371 				fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
372 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
373 		}
374 		if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
375 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
376 		    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
377 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
378 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
379 	}
380 	if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
381 		fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
382 	memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
383 	ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
384 	sshbuf_free(buf);
385 	sshbuf_free(arg);
386 	return ret;
387 }
388 
389 /*
390  * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
391  * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
392  * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
393  */
394 static pid_t
395 subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
396     int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
397 {
398 	FILE *f;
399 	struct stat st;
400 	int devnull, p[2], i;
401 	pid_t pid;
402 	char *cp, errmsg[512];
403 	u_int envsize;
404 	char **child_env;
405 
406 	*child = NULL;
407 
408 	debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
409 	    tag, command, pw->pw_name);
410 
411 	/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
412 	if (*av[0] != '/') {
413 		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
414 		return 0;
415 	}
416 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
417 	if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
418 		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
419 		    av[0], strerror(errno));
420 		restore_uid();
421 		return 0;
422 	}
423 	if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
424 	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
425 		error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
426 		restore_uid();
427 		return 0;
428 	}
429 
430 	/*
431 	 * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
432 	 * authorized_keys output.
433 	 */
434 	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
435 		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
436 		restore_uid();
437 		return 0;
438 	}
439 
440 	/*
441 	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
442 	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
443 	 */
444 	restore_uid();
445 
446 	switch ((pid = fork())) {
447 	case -1: /* error */
448 		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
449 		close(p[0]);
450 		close(p[1]);
451 		return 0;
452 	case 0: /* child */
453 		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
454 		envsize = 5;
455 		child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
456 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
457 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
458 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
459 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
460 		if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
461 			child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
462 
463 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
464 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
465 
466 		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
467 			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
468 			    strerror(errno));
469 			_exit(1);
470 		}
471 		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
472 		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
473 		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
474 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
475 			_exit(1);
476 		}
477 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
478 
479 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
480 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
481 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
482 			    strerror(errno));
483 			_exit(1);
484 		}
485 		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
486 			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
487 			    strerror(errno));
488 			_exit(1);
489 		}
490 		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
491 		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
492 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
493 			_exit(1);
494 		}
495 
496 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
497 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
498 		_exit(127);
499 	default: /* parent */
500 		break;
501 	}
502 
503 	close(p[1]);
504 	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
505 		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
506 		close(p[0]);
507 		/* Don't leave zombie child */
508 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
509 		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
510 			;
511 		return 0;
512 	}
513 	/* Success */
514 	debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
515 	*child = f;
516 	return pid;
517 }
518 
519 /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
520 static int
521 exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
522 {
523 	int status;
524 
525 	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
526 		if (errno != EINTR) {
527 			error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
528 			return -1;
529 		}
530 	}
531 	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
532 		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
533 		return -1;
534 	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
535 		error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
536 		return -1;
537 	}
538 	return 0;
539 }
540 
541 static int
542 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
543 {
544 	char *result;
545 	u_int i;
546 
547 	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
548 
549 	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
550 		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
551 		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
552 			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
553 			    result);
554 			free(result);
555 			return 1;
556 		}
557 	}
558 	return 0;
559 }
560 
561 static int
562 process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
563     struct sshkey_cert *cert)
564 {
565 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
566 	u_long linenum = 0;
567 	u_int i;
568 
569 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
570 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
571 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
572 			;
573 		/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
574 		if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
575 			*ep = '\0';
576 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
577 			continue;
578 		/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
579 		ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
580 		while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
581 			*ep-- = '\0';
582 		/*
583 		 * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
584 		 * key options.
585 		 */
586 		line_opts = NULL;
587 		if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
588 		    (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
589 			for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
590 				;
591 			line_opts = cp;
592 			cp = ep;
593 		}
594 		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
595 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
596 				debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
597 				    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
598 				    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
599 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
600 				    file, linenum) != 1)
601 					continue;
602 				return 1;
603 			}
604 		}
605 	}
606 	return 0;
607 }
608 
609 static int
610 match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
611 {
612 	FILE *f;
613 	int success;
614 
615 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
616 	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
617 	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
618 		restore_uid();
619 		return 0;
620 	}
621 	success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
622 	fclose(f);
623 	restore_uid();
624 	return success;
625 }
626 
627 /*
628  * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
629  * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
630  */
631 static int
632 match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
633 {
634 	FILE *f = NULL;
635 	int ok, found_principal = 0;
636 	struct passwd *pw;
637 	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
638 	pid_t pid;
639 	char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
640 	void (*osigchld)(int);
641 
642 	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
643 		return 0;
644 	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
645 		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
646 		    "skipping");
647 		return 0;
648 	}
649 
650 	/*
651 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
652 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
653 	 */
654 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
655 
656 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
657 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
658 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
659 	pw = getpwnam(username);
660 	if (pw == NULL) {
661 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
662 		    username, strerror(errno));
663 		goto out;
664 	}
665 
666 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
667 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
668 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
669 		    "invalid quotes", command);
670 		goto out;
671 	}
672 	if (ac == 0) {
673 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
674 		    command);
675 		goto out;
676 	}
677 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
678 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
679 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
680 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
681 		    (char *)NULL);
682 		if (tmp == NULL)
683 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
684 		free(av[i]);
685 		av[i] = tmp;
686 	}
687 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
688 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
689 
690 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
691 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
692 		goto out;
693 
694 	uid_swapped = 1;
695 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
696 
697 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
698 
699 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
700 		goto out;
701 
702 	/* Read completed successfully */
703 	found_principal = ok;
704  out:
705 	if (f != NULL)
706 		fclose(f);
707 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
708 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
709 		free(av[i]);
710 	free(av);
711 	if (uid_swapped)
712 		restore_uid();
713 	free(command);
714 	free(username);
715 	return found_principal;
716 }
717 /*
718  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
719  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
720  */
721 static int
722 check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
723 {
724 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
725 	const char *reason;
726 	int found_key = 0;
727 	u_long linenum = 0;
728 	Key *found;
729 	char *fp;
730 
731 	found_key = 0;
732 
733 	found = NULL;
734 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
735 		char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
736 		if (found != NULL)
737 			key_free(found);
738 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
739 		auth_clear_options();
740 
741 		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
742 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
743 			;
744 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
745 			continue;
746 
747 		if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
748 			/* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
749 			int quoted = 0;
750 			debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
751 			key_options = cp;
752 			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
753 				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
754 					cp++;	/* Skip both */
755 				else if (*cp == '"')
756 					quoted = !quoted;
757 			}
758 			/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
759 			for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
760 				;
761 			if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
762 				debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
763 				/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
764 				continue;
765 			}
766 		}
767 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
768 			if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
769 				continue;
770 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
771 			    linenum) != 1)
772 				continue;
773 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
774 				continue;
775 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
776 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
777 				continue;
778 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
779 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
780 			/*
781 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
782 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
783 			 * their username in the certificate principals list.
784 			 */
785 			if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
786 			    !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
787 			    key->cert)) {
788 				reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
789 				    "authorized principal";
790  fail_reason:
791 				free(fp);
792 				error("%s", reason);
793 				auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
794 				continue;
795 			}
796 			if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
797 			    authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
798 			    &reason) != 0)
799 				goto fail_reason;
800 			if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
801 				free(fp);
802 				continue;
803 			}
804 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
805 			    "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
806 			    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
807 			    key_type(found), fp, file);
808 			free(fp);
809 			found_key = 1;
810 			break;
811 		} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
812 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
813 			    linenum) != 1)
814 				continue;
815 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
816 				continue;
817 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
818 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
819 				continue;
820 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
821 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
822 			free(fp);
823 			found_key = 1;
824 			break;
825 		}
826 	}
827 	if (found != NULL)
828 		key_free(found);
829 	if (!found_key)
830 		debug2("key not found");
831 	return found_key;
832 }
833 
834 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
835 static int
836 user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
837 {
838 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
839 	const char *reason;
840 	int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
841 
842 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
843 		return 0;
844 
845 	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
846 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
847 		return 0;
848 
849 	if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
850 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
851 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
852 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
853 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
854 		goto out;
855 	}
856 	/*
857 	 * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
858 	 * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
859 	 * against the username.
860 	 */
861 	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
862 		if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
863 			found_principal = 1;
864 	}
865 	/* Try querying command if specified */
866 	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert))
867 		found_principal = 1;
868 	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
869 	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
870             options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
871 	if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
872 		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
873  fail_reason:
874 		error("%s", reason);
875 		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
876 		goto out;
877 	}
878 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
879 	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
880 		goto fail_reason;
881 	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
882 		goto out;
883 
884 	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
885 	    "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
886 	    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
887 	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
888 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
889 	ret = 1;
890 
891  out:
892 	free(principals_file);
893 	free(ca_fp);
894 	return ret;
895 }
896 
897 /*
898  * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
899  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
900  */
901 static int
902 user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
903 {
904 	FILE *f;
905 	int found_key = 0;
906 
907 	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
908 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
909 
910 	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
911 	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
912 		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
913 		fclose(f);
914 	}
915 
916 	restore_uid();
917 	return found_key;
918 }
919 
920 /*
921  * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
922  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
923  */
924 static int
925 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
926 {
927 	FILE *f = NULL;
928 	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
929 	struct passwd *pw;
930 	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
931 	pid_t pid;
932 	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
933 	char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
934 	void (*osigchld)(int);
935 
936 	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
937 		return 0;
938 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
939 		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
940 		return 0;
941 	}
942 
943 	/*
944 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
945 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
946 	 */
947 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
948 
949 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
950 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
951 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
952 	pw = getpwnam(username);
953 	if (pw == NULL) {
954 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
955 		    username, strerror(errno));
956 		goto out;
957 	}
958 
959 	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
960 	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
961 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
962 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
963 		goto out;
964 	}
965 	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
966 		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
967 		goto out;
968 	}
969 
970 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
971 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
972 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
973 		    command);
974 		goto out;
975 	}
976 	if (ac == 0) {
977 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
978 		    command);
979 		goto out;
980 	}
981 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
982 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
983 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
984 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
985 		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
986 		    "f", key_fp,
987 		    "k", keytext,
988 		    (char *)NULL);
989 		if (tmp == NULL)
990 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
991 		free(av[i]);
992 		av[i] = tmp;
993 	}
994 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
995 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
996 
997 	/*
998 	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
999 	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
1000 	 * target username as a single argument.
1001 	 */
1002 	if (ac == 1) {
1003 		av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
1004 		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
1005 		av[2] = NULL;
1006 		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
1007 		free(command);
1008 		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
1009 	}
1010 
1011 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
1012 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
1013 		goto out;
1014 
1015 	uid_swapped = 1;
1016 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
1017 
1018 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
1019 
1020 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
1021 		goto out;
1022 
1023 	/* Read completed successfully */
1024 	found_key = ok;
1025  out:
1026 	if (f != NULL)
1027 		fclose(f);
1028 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
1029 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
1030 		free(av[i]);
1031 	free(av);
1032 	if (uid_swapped)
1033 		restore_uid();
1034 	free(command);
1035 	free(username);
1036 	free(key_fp);
1037 	free(keytext);
1038 	return found_key;
1039 }
1040 
1041 /*
1042  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
1043  */
1044 int
1045 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
1046 {
1047 	u_int success, i;
1048 	char *file;
1049 
1050 	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
1051 		return 0;
1052 	if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
1053 		return 0;
1054 
1055 	success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
1056 	if (success)
1057 		return success;
1058 
1059 	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
1060 	if (success > 0)
1061 		return success;
1062 
1063 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
1064 
1065 		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
1066 			continue;
1067 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
1068 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
1069 
1070 		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
1071 		free(file);
1072 	}
1073 
1074 	return success;
1075 }
1076 
1077 /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
1078 void
1079 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
1080 {
1081 	struct sshkey **tmp;
1082 
1083 	if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
1084 	    (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
1085 	    authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
1086 		fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
1087 	authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
1088 	authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
1089 	authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
1090 }
1091 
1092 /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
1093 int
1094 auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
1095 {
1096 	u_int i;
1097 
1098 	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
1099 		if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
1100 			return 1;
1101 		}
1102 	}
1103 	return 0;
1104 }
1105 
1106 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
1107 	"publickey",
1108 	userauth_pubkey,
1109 	&options.pubkey_authentication
1110 };
1111