1 /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.101 2013/02/06 00:22:21 dtucker Exp $ */ 2 /* 3 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 7 * are met: 8 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 10 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 12 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 13 * 14 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR 15 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES 16 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. 17 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, 18 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 19 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, 20 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY 21 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 22 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF 23 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 24 */ 25 26 #include "includes.h" 27 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); 28 29 #include <sys/types.h> 30 #include <sys/stat.h> 31 #include <sys/param.h> 32 33 #include <netinet/in.h> 34 35 #include <errno.h> 36 #include <fcntl.h> 37 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H 38 # include <paths.h> 39 #endif 40 #include <pwd.h> 41 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H 42 #include <login.h> 43 #endif 44 #ifdef USE_SHADOW 45 #include <shadow.h> 46 #endif 47 #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H 48 #include <libgen.h> 49 #endif 50 #include <stdarg.h> 51 #include <stdio.h> 52 #include <string.h> 53 #include <unistd.h> 54 55 #include "xmalloc.h" 56 #include "match.h" 57 #include "groupaccess.h" 58 #include "log.h" 59 #include "buffer.h" 60 #include "servconf.h" 61 #include "key.h" 62 #include "hostfile.h" 63 #include "auth.h" 64 #include "auth-options.h" 65 #include "canohost.h" 66 #include "uidswap.h" 67 #include "misc.h" 68 #include "packet.h" 69 #include "loginrec.h" 70 #ifdef GSSAPI 71 #include "ssh-gss.h" 72 #endif 73 #include "authfile.h" 74 #include "monitor_wrap.h" 75 #include "krl.h" 76 77 /* import */ 78 extern ServerOptions options; 79 extern int use_privsep; 80 extern Buffer loginmsg; 81 extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; 82 83 /* Debugging messages */ 84 Buffer auth_debug; 85 int auth_debug_init; 86 87 /* 88 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed 89 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false 90 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed 91 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't 92 * listed there, false will be returned. 93 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. 94 * Otherwise true is returned. 95 */ 96 int 97 allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) 98 { 99 struct stat st; 100 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; 101 u_int i; 102 #ifdef USE_SHADOW 103 struct spwd *spw = NULL; 104 #endif 105 106 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ 107 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) 108 return 0; 109 110 #ifdef USE_SHADOW 111 if (!options.use_pam) 112 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); 113 #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 114 if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) 115 return 0; 116 #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ 117 #endif /* USE_SHADOW */ 118 119 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ 120 passwd = pw->pw_passwd; 121 #ifdef USE_SHADOW 122 if (spw != NULL) 123 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF 124 passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); 125 #else 126 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; 127 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ 128 #endif 129 130 /* check for locked account */ 131 if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { 132 int locked = 0; 133 134 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING 135 if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) 136 locked = 1; 137 #endif 138 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX 139 if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, 140 strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) 141 locked = 1; 142 #endif 143 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR 144 if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) 145 locked = 1; 146 #endif 147 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF 148 free((void *) passwd); 149 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ 150 if (locked) { 151 logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", 152 pw->pw_name); 153 return 0; 154 } 155 } 156 157 /* 158 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we 159 * are chrooting. 160 */ 161 if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || 162 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { 163 char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? 164 _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ 165 166 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { 167 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " 168 "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); 169 xfree(shell); 170 return 0; 171 } 172 if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || 173 (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { 174 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " 175 "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); 176 xfree(shell); 177 return 0; 178 } 179 xfree(shell); 180 } 181 182 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || 183 options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { 184 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); 185 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); 186 } 187 188 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ 189 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { 190 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) 191 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, 192 options.deny_users[i])) { 193 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " 194 "because listed in DenyUsers", 195 pw->pw_name, hostname); 196 return 0; 197 } 198 } 199 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ 200 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { 201 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) 202 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, 203 options.allow_users[i])) 204 break; 205 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ 206 if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { 207 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " 208 "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); 209 return 0; 210 } 211 } 212 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { 213 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ 214 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { 215 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " 216 "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); 217 return 0; 218 } 219 220 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ 221 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) 222 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, 223 options.num_deny_groups)) { 224 ga_free(); 225 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " 226 "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", 227 pw->pw_name, hostname); 228 return 0; 229 } 230 /* 231 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups 232 * isn't listed there 233 */ 234 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) 235 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, 236 options.num_allow_groups)) { 237 ga_free(); 238 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " 239 "because none of user's groups are listed " 240 "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); 241 return 0; 242 } 243 ga_free(); 244 } 245 246 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 247 if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg)) 248 return 0; 249 #endif 250 251 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ 252 return 1; 253 } 254 255 void 256 auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, 257 const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info) 258 { 259 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; 260 char *authmsg; 261 262 if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) 263 return; 264 265 /* Raise logging level */ 266 if (authenticated == 1 || 267 !authctxt->valid || 268 authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || 269 strcmp(method, "password") == 0) 270 authlog = logit; 271 272 if (authctxt->postponed) 273 authmsg = "Postponed"; 274 else if (partial) 275 authmsg = "Partial"; 276 else 277 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; 278 279 authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", 280 authmsg, 281 method, 282 submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, 283 authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", 284 authctxt->user, 285 get_remote_ipaddr(), 286 get_remote_port(), 287 info); 288 289 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 290 if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && 291 (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || 292 strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || 293 strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) 294 record_failed_login(authctxt->user, 295 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); 296 # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 297 if (authenticated) 298 sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, 299 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg); 300 # endif 301 #endif 302 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 303 if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) 304 audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); 305 #endif 306 } 307 308 /* 309 * Check whether root logins are disallowed. 310 */ 311 int 312 auth_root_allowed(const char *method) 313 { 314 switch (options.permit_root_login) { 315 case PERMIT_YES: 316 return 1; 317 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: 318 if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) 319 return 1; 320 break; 321 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: 322 if (forced_command) { 323 logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); 324 return 1; 325 } 326 break; 327 } 328 logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); 329 return 0; 330 } 331 332 333 /* 334 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename 335 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', 336 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. 337 * 338 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. 339 */ 340 char * 341 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) 342 { 343 char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN]; 344 int i; 345 346 file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, 347 "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); 348 349 /* 350 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward 351 * compatible and prepend the '%h/' 352 */ 353 if (*file == '/') 354 return (file); 355 356 i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); 357 if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) 358 fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); 359 xfree(file); 360 return (xstrdup(ret)); 361 } 362 363 char * 364 authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) 365 { 366 if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL || 367 strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0) 368 return NULL; 369 return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); 370 } 371 372 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ 373 HostStatus 374 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, 375 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) 376 { 377 char *user_hostfile; 378 struct stat st; 379 HostStatus host_status; 380 struct hostkeys *hostkeys; 381 const struct hostkey_entry *found; 382 383 hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); 384 load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile); 385 if (userfile != NULL) { 386 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); 387 if (options.strict_modes && 388 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && 389 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || 390 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { 391 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " 392 "bad owner or modes for %.200s", 393 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); 394 auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", 395 user_hostfile); 396 } else { 397 temporarily_use_uid(pw); 398 load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile); 399 restore_uid(); 400 } 401 xfree(user_hostfile); 402 } 403 host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); 404 if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) 405 error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", 406 found->host); 407 else if (host_status == HOST_OK) 408 debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__, 409 found->host, found->file, found->line); 410 else 411 debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host); 412 413 free_hostkeys(hostkeys); 414 415 return host_status; 416 } 417 418 /* 419 * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components 420 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of 421 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. 422 * 423 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? 424 * 425 * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to 426 * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an 427 * error buffer plus max size as arguments. 428 * 429 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure 430 */ 431 int 432 auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, 433 uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) 434 { 435 char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; 436 char *cp; 437 int comparehome = 0; 438 struct stat st; 439 440 if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { 441 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, 442 strerror(errno)); 443 return -1; 444 } 445 if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) 446 comparehome = 1; 447 448 if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { 449 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); 450 return -1; 451 } 452 if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || 453 (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { 454 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", 455 buf); 456 return -1; 457 } 458 459 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ 460 for (;;) { 461 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { 462 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); 463 return -1; 464 } 465 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); 466 467 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || 468 (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || 469 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { 470 snprintf(err, errlen, 471 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); 472 return -1; 473 } 474 475 /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ 476 if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) 477 break; 478 479 /* 480 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, 481 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too 482 */ 483 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) 484 break; 485 } 486 return 0; 487 } 488 489 /* 490 * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to 491 * avoid races. 492 * 493 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure 494 */ 495 static int 496 secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, 497 char *err, size_t errlen) 498 { 499 struct stat st; 500 501 /* check the open file to avoid races */ 502 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { 503 snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", 504 file, strerror(errno)); 505 return -1; 506 } 507 return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); 508 } 509 510 static FILE * 511 auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, 512 int log_missing, char *file_type) 513 { 514 char line[1024]; 515 struct stat st; 516 int fd; 517 FILE *f; 518 519 if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { 520 if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT) 521 debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file, 522 strerror(errno)); 523 return NULL; 524 } 525 526 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { 527 close(fd); 528 return NULL; 529 } 530 if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { 531 logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file", 532 pw->pw_name, file_type, file); 533 close(fd); 534 return NULL; 535 } 536 unset_nonblock(fd); 537 if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { 538 close(fd); 539 return NULL; 540 } 541 if (strict_modes && 542 secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { 543 fclose(f); 544 logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); 545 auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); 546 return NULL; 547 } 548 549 return f; 550 } 551 552 553 FILE * 554 auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) 555 { 556 return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); 557 } 558 559 FILE * 560 auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) 561 { 562 return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, 563 "authorized principals"); 564 } 565 566 struct passwd * 567 getpwnamallow(const char *user) 568 { 569 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 570 extern login_cap_t *lc; 571 #ifdef BSD_AUTH 572 auth_session_t *as; 573 #endif 574 #endif 575 struct passwd *pw; 576 struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns); 577 578 ci->user = user; 579 parse_server_match_config(&options, ci); 580 581 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) 582 aix_setauthdb(user); 583 #endif 584 585 pw = getpwnam(user); 586 587 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) 588 aix_restoreauthdb(); 589 #endif 590 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN 591 /* 592 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems 593 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to 594 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the 595 * user database. 596 */ 597 if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) { 598 logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s", 599 user, pw->pw_name); 600 pw = NULL; 601 } 602 #endif 603 if (pw == NULL) { 604 logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", 605 user, get_remote_ipaddr()); 606 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 607 record_failed_login(user, 608 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); 609 #endif 610 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 611 audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); 612 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ 613 return (NULL); 614 } 615 if (!allowed_user(pw)) 616 return (NULL); 617 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 618 if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) { 619 debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); 620 return (NULL); 621 } 622 #ifdef BSD_AUTH 623 if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || 624 auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { 625 debug("Approval failure for %s", user); 626 pw = NULL; 627 } 628 if (as != NULL) 629 auth_close(as); 630 #endif 631 #endif 632 if (pw != NULL) 633 return (pwcopy(pw)); 634 return (NULL); 635 } 636 637 /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ 638 int 639 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) 640 { 641 char *key_fp; 642 643 if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) 644 return 0; 645 switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) { 646 case 0: 647 return 0; /* Not revoked */ 648 case -2: 649 break; /* Not a KRL */ 650 default: 651 goto revoked; 652 } 653 debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__, 654 options.revoked_keys_file); 655 switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) { 656 case 0: 657 /* key not revoked */ 658 return 0; 659 case -1: 660 /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */ 661 error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key " 662 "authentication"); 663 return 1; 664 case 1: 665 revoked: 666 /* Key revoked */ 667 key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); 668 error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked " 669 "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp); 670 xfree(key_fp); 671 return 1; 672 } 673 fatal("key_in_file returned junk"); 674 } 675 676 void 677 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) 678 { 679 char buf[1024]; 680 va_list args; 681 682 if (!auth_debug_init) 683 return; 684 685 va_start(args, fmt); 686 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); 687 va_end(args); 688 buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); 689 } 690 691 void 692 auth_debug_send(void) 693 { 694 char *msg; 695 696 if (!auth_debug_init) 697 return; 698 while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { 699 msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); 700 packet_send_debug("%s", msg); 701 xfree(msg); 702 } 703 } 704 705 void 706 auth_debug_reset(void) 707 { 708 if (auth_debug_init) 709 buffer_clear(&auth_debug); 710 else { 711 buffer_init(&auth_debug); 712 auth_debug_init = 1; 713 } 714 } 715 716 struct passwd * 717 fakepw(void) 718 { 719 static struct passwd fake; 720 721 memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); 722 fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; 723 fake.pw_passwd = 724 "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; 725 fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; 726 fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; 727 fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; 728 #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD 729 fake.pw_class = ""; 730 #endif 731 fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; 732 fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; 733 734 return (&fake); 735 } 736