xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/auth.c (revision 2e3f49888ec8851bafb22011533217487764fdb0)
1 /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.160 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  *
14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24  */
25 
26 #include "includes.h"
27 
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <sys/stat.h>
30 #include <sys/socket.h>
31 #include <sys/wait.h>
32 
33 #include <netinet/in.h>
34 
35 #include <stdlib.h>
36 #include <errno.h>
37 #include <fcntl.h>
38 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
39 # include <paths.h>
40 #endif
41 #include <pwd.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
43 #include <login.h>
44 #endif
45 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
46 #include <shadow.h>
47 #endif
48 #include <stdarg.h>
49 #include <stdio.h>
50 #include <string.h>
51 #include <unistd.h>
52 #include <limits.h>
53 #include <netdb.h>
54 #include <time.h>
55 
56 #include "xmalloc.h"
57 #include "match.h"
58 #include "groupaccess.h"
59 #include "log.h"
60 #include "sshbuf.h"
61 #include "misc.h"
62 #include "servconf.h"
63 #include "sshkey.h"
64 #include "hostfile.h"
65 #include "auth.h"
66 #include "auth-options.h"
67 #include "canohost.h"
68 #include "uidswap.h"
69 #include "packet.h"
70 #include "loginrec.h"
71 #ifdef GSSAPI
72 #include "ssh-gss.h"
73 #endif
74 #include "authfile.h"
75 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
76 #include "ssherr.h"
77 #include "channels.h"
78 #include "blacklist_client.h"
79 
80 /* import */
81 extern ServerOptions options;
82 extern struct include_list includes;
83 extern int use_privsep;
84 extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
85 extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
86 extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
87 
88 /* Debugging messages */
89 static struct sshbuf *auth_debug;
90 
91 /*
92  * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
93  * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
94  * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
95  * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
96  * listed there, false will be returned.
97  * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
98  * Otherwise true is returned.
99  */
100 int
101 allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
102 {
103 	struct stat st;
104 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
105 	u_int i;
106 	int r;
107 
108 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
109 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
110 		return 0;
111 
112 	if (!options.use_pam && platform_locked_account(pw)) {
113 		logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
114 		    pw->pw_name);
115 		return 0;
116 	}
117 
118 	/*
119 	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
120 	 * are chrooting.
121 	 */
122 	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
123 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
124 		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
125 		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
126 
127 		if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) {
128 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
129 			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
130 			free(shell);
131 			return 0;
132 		}
133 		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
134 		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
135 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
136 			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
137 			free(shell);
138 			return 0;
139 		}
140 		free(shell);
141 	}
142 
143 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
144 	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
145 		hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
146 		ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
147 	}
148 
149 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
150 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
151 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
152 			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
153 			    options.deny_users[i]);
154 			if (r < 0) {
155 				fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
156 				    options.deny_users[i]);
157 			} else if (r != 0) {
158 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
159 				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
160 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
161 				return 0;
162 			}
163 		}
164 	}
165 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
166 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
167 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
168 			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
169 			    options.allow_users[i]);
170 			if (r < 0) {
171 				fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
172 				    options.allow_users[i]);
173 			} else if (r == 1)
174 				break;
175 		}
176 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
177 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
178 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
179 			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
180 			return 0;
181 		}
182 	}
183 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
184 		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
185 		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
186 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
187 			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
188 			return 0;
189 		}
190 
191 		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
192 		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
193 			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
194 			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
195 				ga_free();
196 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
197 				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
198 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
199 				return 0;
200 			}
201 		/*
202 		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
203 		 * isn't listed there
204 		 */
205 		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
206 			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
207 			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
208 				ga_free();
209 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
210 				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
211 				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
212 				return 0;
213 			}
214 		ga_free();
215 	}
216 
217 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
218 	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg))
219 		return 0;
220 #endif
221 
222 	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
223 	return 1;
224 }
225 
226 /*
227  * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
228  * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
229  */
230 static char *
231 format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
232 {
233 	const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
234 	const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
235 	char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL;
236 
237 	if (key == NULL)
238 		return NULL;
239 
240 	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
241 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
242 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
243 		cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
244 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
245 		xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
246 		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
247 		    key->cert->key_id,
248 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
249 		    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
250 		    cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp,
251 		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
252 		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
253 		free(fp);
254 		free(cafp);
255 	} else {
256 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
257 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
258 		xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
259 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
260 		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
261 		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
262 		free(fp);
263 	}
264 	return ret;
265 }
266 
267 void
268 auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial,
269     const char *method, const char *submethod)
270 {
271 	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
272 	int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
273 	const char *authmsg;
274 	char *extra = NULL;
275 
276 	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
277 		return;
278 
279 	/* Raise logging level */
280 	if (authenticated == 1 ||
281 	    !authctxt->valid ||
282 	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
283 	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
284 		level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
285 
286 	if (authctxt->postponed)
287 		authmsg = "Postponed";
288 	else if (partial)
289 		authmsg = "Partial";
290 	else {
291 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
292 		if (authenticated)
293 			BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK, "ssh");
294 	}
295 
296 	if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
297 		if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
298 			extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
299 	}
300 
301 	do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
302 	    authmsg,
303 	    method,
304 	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
305 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
306 	    authctxt->user,
307 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
308 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
309 	    extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
310 	    extra != NULL ? extra : "");
311 
312 	free(extra);
313 
314 #if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) || defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
315 	if (authenticated == 0 && !(authctxt->postponed || partial)) {
316 		/* Log failed login attempt */
317 # ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
318 		if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
319 		    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
320 		    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
321 			record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user,
322 			    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
323 # endif
324 # ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
325 		audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
326 # endif
327 	}
328 #endif
329 #if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) && defined(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)
330 	if (authenticated)
331 		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
332 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
333 		    loginmsg);
334 #endif
335 }
336 
337 void
338 auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh)
339 {
340 	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
341 
342 	error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
343 	    "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
344 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
345 	    authctxt->user,
346 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
347 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
348 	ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures");
349 	/* NOTREACHED */
350 }
351 
352 /*
353  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
354  */
355 int
356 auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
357 {
358 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
359 	case PERMIT_YES:
360 		return 1;
361 	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
362 		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
363 		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
364 		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
365 			return 1;
366 		break;
367 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
368 		if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
369 			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
370 			return 1;
371 		}
372 		break;
373 	}
374 	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
375 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
376 	return 0;
377 }
378 
379 
380 /*
381  * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
382  * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
383  * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
384  *
385  * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
386  */
387 char *
388 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
389 {
390 	char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX];
391 	int i;
392 
393 	snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
394 	    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
395 	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
396 	    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
397 
398 	/*
399 	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
400 	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
401 	 */
402 	if (path_absolute(file))
403 		return (file);
404 
405 	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
406 	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
407 		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
408 	free(file);
409 	return (xstrdup(ret));
410 }
411 
412 char *
413 authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
414 {
415 	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
416 		return NULL;
417 	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
418 }
419 
420 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
421 HostStatus
422 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
423     const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
424 {
425 	char *user_hostfile;
426 	struct stat st;
427 	HostStatus host_status;
428 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
429 	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
430 
431 	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
432 	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile, 0);
433 	if (userfile != NULL) {
434 		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
435 		if (options.strict_modes &&
436 		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
437 		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
438 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
439 			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
440 			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
441 			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
442 			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
443 			    user_hostfile);
444 		} else {
445 			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
446 			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile, 0);
447 			restore_uid();
448 		}
449 		free(user_hostfile);
450 	}
451 	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
452 	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
453 		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
454 		    host);
455 	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
456 		debug_f("key for %s found at %s:%ld",
457 		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
458 	else
459 		debug_f("key for host %s not found", host);
460 
461 	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
462 
463 	return host_status;
464 }
465 
466 struct passwd *
467 getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
468 {
469 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
470 	extern login_cap_t *lc;
471 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
472 	const char *from_host, *from_ip;
473 #endif
474 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
475 	auth_session_t *as;
476 #endif
477 #endif
478 	struct passwd *pw;
479 	struct connection_info *ci;
480 	u_int i;
481 
482 	ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
483 	ci->user = user;
484 	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
485 	log_change_level(options.log_level);
486 	log_verbose_reset();
487 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
488 		log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
489 	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
490 
491 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
492 	aix_setauthdb(user);
493 #endif
494 
495 	pw = getpwnam(user);
496 
497 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
498 	aix_restoreauthdb();
499 #endif
500 	if (pw == NULL) {
501 		BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user);
502 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
503 		    user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
504 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
505 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
506 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
507 #endif
508 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
509 		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
510 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
511 		return (NULL);
512 	}
513 	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
514 		return (NULL);
515 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
516 	if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
517 		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
518 		return (NULL);
519 	}
520 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
521 	from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
522 	from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
523 	if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
524 		debug("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
525 		    pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
526 		return (NULL);
527 	}
528 #endif /* HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK */
529 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK
530 	if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
531 		debug("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME)", pw->pw_name);
532 		return (NULL);
533 	}
534 #endif /* HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK */
535 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
536 	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
537 	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
538 		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
539 		pw = NULL;
540 	}
541 	if (as != NULL)
542 		auth_close(as);
543 #endif
544 #endif
545 	if (pw != NULL)
546 		return (pwcopy(pw));
547 	return (NULL);
548 }
549 
550 /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
551 int
552 auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
553 {
554 	char *fp = NULL;
555 	int r;
556 
557 	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
558 		return 0;
559 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
560 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
561 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
562 		error_fr(r, "fingerprint key");
563 		goto out;
564 	}
565 
566 	r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
567 	switch (r) {
568 	case 0:
569 		break; /* not revoked */
570 	case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
571 		error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
572 		    sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
573 		goto out;
574 	default:
575 		error_r(r, "Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
576 		    "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
577 		    options.revoked_keys_file);
578 		goto out;
579 	}
580 
581 	/* Success */
582 	r = 0;
583 
584  out:
585 	free(fp);
586 	return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
587 }
588 
589 void
590 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
591 {
592 	char buf[1024];
593 	va_list args;
594 	int r;
595 
596 	va_start(args, fmt);
597 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
598 	va_end(args);
599 	debug3("%s", buf);
600 	if (auth_debug != NULL)
601 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0)
602 			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_cstring");
603 }
604 
605 void
606 auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh)
607 {
608 	char *msg;
609 	int r;
610 
611 	if (auth_debug == NULL)
612 		return;
613 	while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) {
614 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
615 			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_cstring");
616 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg);
617 		free(msg);
618 	}
619 }
620 
621 void
622 auth_debug_reset(void)
623 {
624 	if (auth_debug != NULL)
625 		sshbuf_reset(auth_debug);
626 	else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
627 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
628 }
629 
630 struct passwd *
631 fakepw(void)
632 {
633 	static int done = 0;
634 	static struct passwd fake;
635 	const char hashchars[] = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
636 	    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; /* from bcrypt.c */
637 	char *cp;
638 
639 	if (done)
640 		return (&fake);
641 
642 	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
643 	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
644 	fake.pw_passwd = xstrdup("$2a$10$"
645 	    "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx");
646 	for (cp = fake.pw_passwd + 7; *cp != '\0'; cp++)
647 		*cp = hashchars[arc4random_uniform(sizeof(hashchars) - 1)];
648 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
649 	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
650 #endif
651 	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
652 	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
653 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
654 	fake.pw_class = "";
655 #endif
656 	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
657 	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
658 	done = 1;
659 
660 	return (&fake);
661 }
662 
663 /*
664  * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
665  * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
666  * called.
667  * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
668  * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
669  */
670 
671 static char *
672 remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
673 {
674 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
675 	socklen_t fromlen;
676 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
677 	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
678 	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
679 
680 	/* Get IP address of client. */
681 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
682 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
683 	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
684 	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
685 		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
686 		return xstrdup(ntop);
687 	}
688 
689 	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
690 	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
691 		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
692 
693 	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
694 	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
695 	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
696 	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
697 		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
698 		return xstrdup(ntop);
699 	}
700 
701 	/*
702 	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
703 	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
704 	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
705 	 */
706 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
707 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
708 	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
709 	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
710 		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
711 		    name, ntop);
712 		freeaddrinfo(ai);
713 		return xstrdup(ntop);
714 	}
715 
716 	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
717 	lowercase(name);
718 
719 	/*
720 	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
721 	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
722 	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
723 	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
724 	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
725 	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
726 	 * the domain).
727 	 */
728 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
729 	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
730 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
731 	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
732 		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
733 		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
734 		return xstrdup(ntop);
735 	}
736 	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
737 	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
738 		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
739 		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
740 		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
741 				break;
742 	}
743 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
744 	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
745 	if (ai == NULL) {
746 		/* Address not found for the host name. */
747 		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
748 		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
749 		return xstrdup(ntop);
750 	}
751 	return xstrdup(name);
752 }
753 
754 /*
755  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
756  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
757  * several times.
758  */
759 
760 const char *
761 auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
762 {
763 	static char *dnsname;
764 
765 	if (!use_dns)
766 		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
767 	else if (dnsname != NULL)
768 		return dnsname;
769 	else {
770 		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
771 		return dnsname;
772 	}
773 }
774 
775 /* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
776 
777 /* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
778 void
779 auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
780 {
781 	int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
782 	int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
783 	    (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
784 	int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 &&
785 	    (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0;
786 	size_t i;
787 	char msg[1024], buf[64];
788 
789 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
790 	/* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
791 	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
792 	    opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
793 	    opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
794 	    do_env ?  " environment" : "",
795 	    opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires",
796 	    opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "",
797 	    do_permitopen ?  " permitopen" : "",
798 	    do_permitlisten ?  " permitlisten" : "",
799 	    opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
800 	    opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
801 	    opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
802 	    opts->require_verify ? " uv" : "",
803 	    opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
804 	    opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
805 	    opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
806 	    opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
807 
808 	debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
809 	if (do_remote)
810 		auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);
811 
812 	if (options.permit_user_env) {
813 		for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
814 			debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
815 			if (do_remote) {
816 				auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
817 				    loc, opts->env[i]);
818 			}
819 		}
820 	}
821 
822 	/* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
823 	if (opts->valid_before != 0) {
824 		format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
825 		debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf);
826 	}
827 	if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
828 		debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
829 		    loc, opts->cert_principals);
830 	}
831 	if (opts->force_command != NULL)
832 		debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
833 	if (do_permitopen) {
834 		for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
835 			debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
836 			    loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
837 		}
838 	}
839 	if (do_permitlisten) {
840 		for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
841 			debug("%s: permitted listen: %s",
842 			    loc, opts->permitlisten[i]);
843 		}
844 	}
845 }
846 
847 /* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
848 int
849 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
850 {
851 	struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
852 	const char *emsg = NULL;
853 
854 	debug_f("setting new authentication options");
855 	if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
856 		error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
857 		return -1;
858 	}
859 	return 0;
860 }
861 
862 /* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
863 void
864 auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
865 {
866 	struct sshauthopt *restricted;
867 
868 	debug_f("restricting session");
869 
870 	/* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
871 	if ((restricted = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
872 		fatal_f("sshauthopt_new failed");
873 	restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1;
874 	restricted->restricted = 1;
875 
876 	if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
877 		fatal_f("failed to restrict session");
878 	sshauthopt_free(restricted);
879 }
880