1 /* 2 * validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * This software is open source. 7 * 8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 10 * are met: 11 * 12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, 13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, 16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation 17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 18 * 19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may 20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 21 * specific prior written permission. 22 * 23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS 24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT 25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR 26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT 27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR 30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF 31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING 32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS 33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 34 */ 35 36 /** 37 * \file 38 * 39 * This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries. 40 * According to RFC 4034. 41 */ 42 #include "config.h" 43 #include <ctype.h> 44 #include "validator/validator.h" 45 #include "validator/val_anchor.h" 46 #include "validator/val_kcache.h" 47 #include "validator/val_kentry.h" 48 #include "validator/val_utils.h" 49 #include "validator/val_nsec.h" 50 #include "validator/val_nsec3.h" 51 #include "validator/val_neg.h" 52 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h" 53 #include "validator/autotrust.h" 54 #include "services/cache/dns.h" 55 #include "services/cache/rrset.h" 56 #include "util/data/dname.h" 57 #include "util/module.h" 58 #include "util/log.h" 59 #include "util/net_help.h" 60 #include "util/regional.h" 61 #include "util/config_file.h" 62 #include "util/fptr_wlist.h" 63 #include "sldns/rrdef.h" 64 #include "sldns/wire2str.h" 65 #include "sldns/str2wire.h" 66 67 /** Max number of RRSIGs to validate at once, suspend query for later. */ 68 #define MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE 8 69 /** Max number of validation suspends allowed, error out otherwise. */ 70 #define MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS 16 71 72 /* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */ 73 static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, 74 struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, 75 struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin, int* suspend); 76 77 78 /* Updates the suplied EDE (RFC8914) code selectively so we don't lose 79 * a more specific code */ 80 static void 81 update_reason_bogus(struct reply_info* rep, sldns_ede_code reason_bogus) 82 { 83 if(reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_NONE) return; 84 if(reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS 85 && rep->reason_bogus != LDNS_EDE_NONE 86 && rep->reason_bogus != LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS) return; 87 rep->reason_bogus = reason_bogus; 88 } 89 90 91 /** fill up nsec3 key iterations config entry */ 92 static int 93 fill_nsec3_iter(struct val_env* ve, char* s, int c) 94 { 95 char* e; 96 int i; 97 free(ve->nsec3_keysize); 98 free(ve->nsec3_maxiter); 99 ve->nsec3_keysize = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); 100 ve->nsec3_maxiter = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); 101 if(!ve->nsec3_keysize || !ve->nsec3_maxiter) { 102 log_err("out of memory"); 103 return 0; 104 } 105 for(i=0; i<c; i++) { 106 ve->nsec3_keysize[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); 107 if(s == e) { 108 log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); 109 return 0; 110 } 111 s = e; 112 ve->nsec3_maxiter[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); 113 if(s == e) { 114 log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); 115 return 0; 116 } 117 s = e; 118 if(i>0 && ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1] >= ve->nsec3_keysize[i]) { 119 log_err("nsec3 key iterations not ascending: %d %d", 120 (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1], 121 (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i]); 122 return 0; 123 } 124 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator nsec3cfg keysz %d mxiter %d", 125 (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i], (int)ve->nsec3_maxiter[i]); 126 } 127 return 1; 128 } 129 130 /** apply config settings to validator */ 131 static int 132 val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env, 133 struct config_file* cfg) 134 { 135 int c; 136 val_env->bogus_ttl = (uint32_t)cfg->bogus_ttl; 137 if(!env->anchors) 138 env->anchors = anchors_create(); 139 if(!env->anchors) { 140 log_err("out of memory"); 141 return 0; 142 } 143 if (env->key_cache) 144 val_env->kcache = env->key_cache; 145 if(!val_env->kcache) 146 val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg); 147 if(!val_env->kcache) { 148 log_err("out of memory"); 149 return 0; 150 } 151 env->key_cache = val_env->kcache; 152 if(!anchors_apply_cfg(env->anchors, cfg)) { 153 log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config"); 154 return 0; 155 } 156 val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override; 157 val_env->skew_min = cfg->val_sig_skew_min; 158 val_env->skew_max = cfg->val_sig_skew_max; 159 val_env->max_restart = cfg->val_max_restart; 160 c = cfg_count_numbers(cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); 161 if(c < 1 || (c&1)) { 162 log_err("validator: unparsable or odd nsec3 key " 163 "iterations: %s", cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); 164 return 0; 165 } 166 val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count = c/2; 167 if(!fill_nsec3_iter(val_env, cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations, c/2)) { 168 log_err("validator: cannot apply nsec3 key iterations"); 169 return 0; 170 } 171 if (env->neg_cache) 172 val_env->neg_cache = env->neg_cache; 173 if(!val_env->neg_cache) 174 val_env->neg_cache = val_neg_create(cfg, 175 val_env->nsec3_maxiter[val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count-1]); 176 if(!val_env->neg_cache) { 177 log_err("out of memory"); 178 return 0; 179 } 180 env->neg_cache = val_env->neg_cache; 181 return 1; 182 } 183 184 #ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND 185 void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void); 186 #endif 187 int 188 val_init(struct module_env* env, int id) 189 { 190 struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1, 191 sizeof(struct val_env)); 192 if(!val_env) { 193 log_err("malloc failure"); 194 return 0; 195 } 196 env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env; 197 env->need_to_validate = 1; 198 lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock); 199 lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus, 200 sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus)); 201 #ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND 202 ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(); 203 #endif 204 if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) { 205 log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings."); 206 return 0; 207 } 208 if(env->cfg->disable_edns_do) { 209 struct trust_anchor* anchor = anchors_find_any_noninsecure( 210 env->anchors); 211 if(anchor) { 212 char b[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+2]; 213 dname_str(anchor->name, b); 214 log_warn("validator: disable-edns-do is enabled, but there is a trust anchor for '%s'. Since DNSSEC could not work, the disable-edns-do setting is turned off. Continuing without it.", b); 215 lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); 216 env->cfg->disable_edns_do = 0; 217 } 218 } 219 220 return 1; 221 } 222 223 void 224 val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id) 225 { 226 struct val_env* val_env; 227 if(!env || !env->modinfo[id]) 228 return; 229 val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; 230 lock_basic_destroy(&val_env->bogus_lock); 231 anchors_delete(env->anchors); 232 env->anchors = NULL; 233 key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache); 234 env->key_cache = NULL; 235 neg_cache_delete(val_env->neg_cache); 236 env->neg_cache = NULL; 237 free(val_env->nsec3_keysize); 238 free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter); 239 free(val_env); 240 env->modinfo[id] = NULL; 241 } 242 243 /** fill in message structure */ 244 static struct val_qstate* 245 val_new_getmsg(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq) 246 { 247 if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 248 /* create a message to verify */ 249 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation"); 250 vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)regional_alloc(qstate->region, 251 sizeof(struct dns_msg)); 252 if(!vq->orig_msg) 253 return NULL; 254 vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo; 255 vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)regional_alloc( 256 qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info)); 257 if(!vq->orig_msg->rep) 258 return NULL; 259 memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info)); 260 vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf) 261 |BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD)); 262 vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1; 263 vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NONE; 264 } else { 265 vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg; 266 } 267 vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo; 268 /* chase reply will be an edited (sub)set of the orig msg rrset ptrs */ 269 vq->chase_reply = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, 270 vq->orig_msg->rep, 271 sizeof(struct reply_info) - sizeof(struct rrset_ref)); 272 if(!vq->chase_reply) 273 return NULL; 274 if(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > RR_COUNT_MAX) 275 return NULL; /* protect against integer overflow */ 276 vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, 277 vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets, sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) 278 * vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count); 279 if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets) 280 return NULL; 281 vq->rrset_skip = 0; 282 return vq; 283 } 284 285 /** allocate new validator query state */ 286 static struct val_qstate* 287 val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) 288 { 289 struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)regional_alloc( 290 qstate->region, sizeof(*vq)); 291 log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]); 292 if(!vq) 293 return NULL; 294 memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); 295 qstate->minfo[id] = vq; 296 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 297 return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq); 298 } 299 300 /** reset validator query state for query restart */ 301 static void 302 val_restart(struct val_qstate* vq) 303 { 304 struct comm_timer* temp_timer; 305 int restart_count; 306 if(!vq) return; 307 temp_timer = vq->suspend_timer; 308 restart_count = vq->restart_count+1; 309 memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); 310 vq->suspend_timer = temp_timer; 311 vq->restart_count = restart_count; 312 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 313 } 314 315 /** 316 * Exit validation with an error status 317 * 318 * @param qstate: query state 319 * @param id: validator id. 320 * @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing. 321 */ 322 static int 323 val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) 324 { 325 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; 326 qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL; 327 return 0; 328 } 329 330 /** 331 * Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation 332 * process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was 333 * on in the original request, or the response is a kind of message that 334 * is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL, REFUSED, etc.) 335 * 336 * @param qstate: query state. 337 * @param ret_rc: rcode for this message (if noerror - examine ret_msg). 338 * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL; look at rcode instead. 339 * @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not 340 * mean we can actually validate this response). 341 */ 342 static int 343 needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, int ret_rc, 344 struct dns_msg* ret_msg) 345 { 346 int rcode; 347 348 /* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then you could think 349 * that we don't bother to validate anything. 350 * But this is signalled internally with the valrec flag. 351 * User queries are validated with BIT_CD to make our cache clean 352 * so that bogus messages get retried by the upstream also for 353 * downstream validators that set BIT_CD. 354 * For DNS64 bit_cd signals no dns64 processing, but we want to 355 * provide validation there too */ 356 /* 357 if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) { 358 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit"); 359 return 0; 360 } 361 */ 362 if(qstate->is_valrec) { 363 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response, is valrec" 364 "(validation recursion lookup)"); 365 return 0; 366 } 367 368 if(ret_rc != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR || !ret_msg) 369 rcode = ret_rc; 370 else rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(ret_msg->rep->flags); 371 372 if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) { 373 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) { 374 char rc[16]; 375 rc[0]=0; 376 (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc)); 377 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s", rc); 378 } 379 return 0; 380 } 381 382 /* cannot validate positive RRSIG response. (negatives can) */ 383 if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG && 384 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && ret_msg && 385 ret_msg->rep->an_numrrsets > 0) { 386 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate RRSIG, no sigs on sigs."); 387 return 0; 388 } 389 return 1; 390 } 391 392 /** 393 * Check to see if the response has already been validated. 394 * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL 395 * @return true if the response has already been validated 396 */ 397 static int 398 already_validated(struct dns_msg* ret_msg) 399 { 400 /* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */ 401 if (ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus) 402 { 403 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated: %s", 404 sec_status_to_string(ret_msg->rep->security)); 405 return 1; 406 } 407 return 0; 408 } 409 410 /** 411 * Generate a request for DNS data. 412 * 413 * @param qstate: query state that is the parent. 414 * @param id: module id. 415 * @param name: what name to query for. 416 * @param namelen: length of name. 417 * @param qtype: query type. 418 * @param qclass: query class. 419 * @param flags: additional flags, such as the CD bit (BIT_CD), or 0. 420 * @param newq: If the subquery is newly created, it is returned, 421 * otherwise NULL is returned 422 * @param detached: true if this qstate should not attach to the subquery 423 * @return false on alloc failure. 424 */ 425 static int 426 generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name, 427 size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass, uint16_t flags, 428 struct module_qstate** newq, int detached) 429 { 430 struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; 431 struct query_info ask; 432 int valrec; 433 ask.qname = name; 434 ask.qname_len = namelen; 435 ask.qtype = qtype; 436 ask.qclass = qclass; 437 ask.local_alias = NULL; 438 log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask); 439 /* enable valrec flag to avoid recursion to the same validation 440 * routine, this lookup is simply a lookup. */ 441 valrec = 1; 442 443 fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_detect_cycle(qstate->env->detect_cycle)); 444 if((*qstate->env->detect_cycle)(qstate, &ask, 445 (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec)) { 446 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not generate request: cycle detected"); 447 return 0; 448 } 449 450 if(detached) { 451 struct mesh_state* sub = NULL; 452 fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_add_sub( 453 qstate->env->add_sub)); 454 if(!(*qstate->env->add_sub)(qstate, &ask, 455 (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq, &sub)){ 456 log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory"); 457 return 0; 458 } 459 } 460 else { 461 fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub( 462 qstate->env->attach_sub)); 463 if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask, 464 (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq)){ 465 log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory"); 466 return 0; 467 } 468 } 469 /* newq; validator does not need state created for that 470 * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ 471 if(*newq) { 472 /* add our blacklist to the query blacklist */ 473 sock_list_merge(&(*newq)->blacklist, (*newq)->region, 474 vq->chain_blacklist); 475 } 476 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery; 477 return 1; 478 } 479 480 /** 481 * Generate, send and detach key tag signaling query. 482 * 483 * @param qstate: query state. 484 * @param id: module id. 485 * @param ta: trust anchor, locked. 486 * @return false on a processing error. 487 */ 488 static int 489 generate_keytag_query(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, 490 struct trust_anchor* ta) 491 { 492 /* 3 bytes for "_ta", 5 bytes per tag (4 bytes + "-") */ 493 #define MAX_LABEL_TAGS (LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN-3)/5 494 size_t i, numtag; 495 uint16_t tags[MAX_LABEL_TAGS]; 496 char tagstr[LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN+1] = "_ta"; /* +1 for NULL byte */ 497 size_t tagstr_left = sizeof(tagstr) - strlen(tagstr); 498 char* tagstr_pos = tagstr + strlen(tagstr); 499 uint8_t dnamebuf[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+1]; /* +1 for label length byte */ 500 size_t dnamebuf_len = sizeof(dnamebuf); 501 uint8_t* keytagdname; 502 struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; 503 enum module_ext_state ext_state = qstate->ext_state[id]; 504 505 numtag = anchor_list_keytags(ta, tags, MAX_LABEL_TAGS); 506 if(numtag == 0) 507 return 0; 508 509 for(i=0; i<numtag; i++) { 510 /* Buffer can't overflow; numtag is limited to tags that fit in 511 * the buffer. */ 512 snprintf(tagstr_pos, tagstr_left, "-%04x", (unsigned)tags[i]); 513 tagstr_left -= strlen(tagstr_pos); 514 tagstr_pos += strlen(tagstr_pos); 515 } 516 517 sldns_str2wire_dname_buf_origin(tagstr, dnamebuf, &dnamebuf_len, 518 ta->name, ta->namelen); 519 if(!(keytagdname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, 520 dnamebuf, dnamebuf_len))) { 521 log_err("could not generate key tag query: out of memory"); 522 return 0; 523 } 524 525 log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "generate keytag query", keytagdname, 526 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass); 527 if(!generate_request(qstate, id, keytagdname, dnamebuf_len, 528 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass, 0, &newq, 1)) { 529 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "failed to generate key tag signaling request"); 530 return 0; 531 } 532 533 /* Not interested in subquery response. Restore the ext_state, 534 * that might be changed by generate_request() */ 535 qstate->ext_state[id] = ext_state; 536 537 return 1; 538 } 539 540 /** 541 * Get keytag as uint16_t from string 542 * 543 * @param start: start of string containing keytag 544 * @param keytag: pointer where to store the extracted keytag 545 * @return: 1 if keytag was extracted, else 0. 546 */ 547 static int 548 sentinel_get_keytag(char* start, uint16_t* keytag) { 549 char* keytag_str; 550 char* e = NULL; 551 keytag_str = calloc(1, SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN + 1 /* null byte */); 552 if(!keytag_str) 553 return 0; 554 memmove(keytag_str, start, SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN); 555 keytag_str[SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN] = '\0'; 556 *keytag = (uint16_t)strtol(keytag_str, &e, 10); 557 if(!e || *e != '\0') { 558 free(keytag_str); 559 return 0; 560 } 561 free(keytag_str); 562 return 1; 563 } 564 565 /** 566 * Prime trust anchor for use. 567 * Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor. 568 * The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed. 569 * 570 * @param qstate: query state. 571 * @param vq: validator query state. 572 * @param id: module id. 573 * @param toprime: what to prime. 574 * @return false on a processing error. 575 */ 576 static int 577 prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 578 int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime) 579 { 580 struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; 581 int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen, 582 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0); 583 584 if(newq && qstate->env->cfg->trust_anchor_signaling && 585 !generate_keytag_query(qstate, id, toprime)) { 586 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "keytag signaling query failed"); 587 return 0; 588 } 589 590 if(!ret) { 591 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not prime trust anchor"); 592 return 0; 593 } 594 /* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that 595 * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ 596 vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing 597 from the validator inform_super() routine */ 598 /* store trust anchor name for later lookup when prime returns */ 599 vq->trust_anchor_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, 600 toprime->name, toprime->namelen); 601 vq->trust_anchor_len = toprime->namelen; 602 vq->trust_anchor_labs = toprime->namelabs; 603 if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) { 604 log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); 605 return 0; 606 } 607 return 1; 608 } 609 610 /** 611 * Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets. 612 * They must be validly signed with the given key. 613 * Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them. 614 * Allows unsigned CNAME after a DNAME that expands the DNAME. 615 * 616 * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the 617 * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been 618 * completed. 619 * 620 * @param qstate: query state. 621 * @param vq: validator query state. 622 * @param env: module env for verify. 623 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 624 * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. 625 * @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 626 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 627 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 628 * suspend to continue the effort later. 629 * @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message 630 * fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus. 631 */ 632 static int 633 validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 634 struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 635 struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry, 636 int* suspend) 637 { 638 uint8_t* sname; 639 size_t i, slen; 640 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 641 enum sec_status sec; 642 int num_verifies = 0, verified, have_state = 0; 643 char* reason = NULL; 644 sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS; 645 *suspend = 0; 646 if(vq->msg_signatures_state) { 647 /* Pick up the state, and reset it, may not be needed now. */ 648 vq->msg_signatures_state = 0; 649 have_state = 1; 650 } 651 652 /* validate the ANSWER section */ 653 for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { 654 if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index) 655 continue; 656 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 657 /* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME. 658 * Because of the normalization routines in the iterator, 659 * there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME 660 * (unless qtype=DNAME in the answer part). */ 661 if(i>0 && ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->rk.type) == 662 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && 663 ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME && 664 ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure && 665 dname_strict_subdomain_c(s->rk.dname, chase_reply->rrsets[i-1]->rk.dname) 666 ) { 667 /* CNAME was synthesized by our own iterator */ 668 /* since the DNAME verified, mark the CNAME as secure */ 669 ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->security = 670 sec_status_secure; 671 ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->trust = 672 rrset_trust_validated; 673 continue; 674 } 675 676 /* Verify the answer rrset */ 677 sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason, 678 &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified); 679 /* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this 680 * message is BAD. */ 681 if(sec != sec_status_secure) { 682 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " 683 "has failed ANSWER rrset:", s->rk.dname, 684 ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); 685 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 686 if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) 687 errinf(qstate, "for CNAME"); 688 else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) 689 errinf(qstate, "for DNAME"); 690 errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); 691 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 692 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus); 693 694 return 0; 695 } 696 697 num_verifies += verified; 698 if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE && 699 i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional? 700 chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets: 701 chase_reply->rrset_count)) { 702 /* If the number of RRSIGs exceeds the maximum in 703 * one go, suspend. Only suspend if there is a next 704 * rrset to verify, i+1<loopmax. Store where to 705 * continue later. */ 706 *suspend = 1; 707 vq->msg_signatures_state = 1; 708 vq->msg_signatures_index = i; 709 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation " 710 "suspended"); 711 return 0; 712 } 713 } 714 715 /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ 716 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 717 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 718 if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index) 719 continue; 720 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 721 sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason, 722 &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate, 723 &verified); 724 /* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, 725 * we have a bad message. */ 726 if(sec != sec_status_secure) { 727 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " 728 "has failed AUTHORITY rrset:", s->rk.dname, 729 ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); 730 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 731 errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); 732 errinf_rrset(qstate, s); 733 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 734 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus); 735 return 0; 736 } 737 num_verifies += verified; 738 if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE && 739 i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional? 740 chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets: 741 chase_reply->rrset_count)) { 742 *suspend = 1; 743 vq->msg_signatures_state = 1; 744 vq->msg_signatures_index = i; 745 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation " 746 "suspended"); 747 return 0; 748 } 749 } 750 751 /* If set, the validator should clean the additional section of 752 * secure messages. */ 753 if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional) 754 return 1; 755 /* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */ 756 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; 757 i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) { 758 if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index) 759 continue; 760 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 761 /* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */ 762 /* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */ 763 val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen); 764 765 verified = 0; 766 if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0) 767 (void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, 768 &reason, NULL, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate, 769 &verified); 770 /* the additional section can fail to be secure, 771 * it is optional, check signature in case we need 772 * to clean the additional section later. */ 773 num_verifies += verified; 774 if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE && 775 i+1 < chase_reply->rrset_count) { 776 *suspend = 1; 777 vq->msg_signatures_state = 1; 778 vq->msg_signatures_index = i; 779 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation " 780 "suspended"); 781 return 0; 782 } 783 } 784 785 return 1; 786 } 787 788 void 789 validate_suspend_timer_cb(void* arg) 790 { 791 struct module_qstate* qstate = (struct module_qstate*)arg; 792 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer, continue"); 793 mesh_run(qstate->env->mesh, qstate->mesh_info, module_event_pass, 794 NULL); 795 } 796 797 /** Setup timer to continue validation of msg signatures later */ 798 static int 799 validate_suspend_setup_timer(struct module_qstate* qstate, 800 struct val_qstate* vq, int id, enum val_state resume_state) 801 { 802 struct timeval tv; 803 int usec, slack, base; 804 if(vq->suspend_count >= MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS) { 805 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer: " 806 "reached MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS (%d); error out", 807 MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS); 808 errinf(qstate, "max validation suspends reached, " 809 "too many RRSIG validations"); 810 return 0; 811 } 812 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer, set for suspend"); 813 vq->state = resume_state; 814 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_reply; 815 if(!vq->suspend_timer) { 816 vq->suspend_timer = comm_timer_create( 817 qstate->env->worker_base, 818 validate_suspend_timer_cb, qstate); 819 if(!vq->suspend_timer) { 820 log_err("validate_suspend_setup_timer: " 821 "out of memory for comm_timer_create"); 822 return 0; 823 } 824 } 825 /* The timer is activated later, after other events in the event 826 * loop have been processed. The query state can also be deleted, 827 * when the list is full and query states are dropped. */ 828 /* Extend wait time if there are a lot of queries or if this one 829 * is taking long, to keep around cpu time for ordinary queries. */ 830 usec = 50000; /* 50 msec */ 831 slack = 0; 832 if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states) 833 slack += 3; 834 else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/2) 835 slack += 2; 836 else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/4) 837 slack += 1; 838 if(vq->suspend_count > 3) 839 slack += 3; 840 else if(vq->suspend_count > 0) 841 slack += vq->suspend_count; 842 if(slack != 0 && slack <= 12 /* No numeric overflow. */) { 843 usec = usec << slack; 844 } 845 /* Spread such timeouts within 90%-100% of the original timer. */ 846 base = usec * 9/10; 847 usec = base + ub_random_max(qstate->env->rnd, usec-base); 848 tv.tv_usec = (usec % 1000000); 849 tv.tv_sec = (usec / 1000000); 850 vq->suspend_count ++; 851 comm_timer_set(vq->suspend_timer, &tv); 852 return 1; 853 } 854 855 /** 856 * Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding 857 * and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral). 858 * The positive response has a mangled authority section. 859 * Remove that authority section and the additional section. 860 * @param rep: reply 861 * @return true if a wrongly truncated response. 862 */ 863 static int 864 detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep) 865 { 866 size_t i; 867 /* only NS in authority, and it is bogus */ 868 if(rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 || rep->an_numrrsets == 0) 869 return 0; 870 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) 871 return 0; 872 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ] 873 ->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure) 874 return 0; 875 /* answer section is present and secure */ 876 for(i=0; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 877 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ] 878 ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure) 879 return 0; 880 } 881 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncating to minimal response"); 882 return 1; 883 } 884 885 /** 886 * For messages that are not referrals, if the chase reply contains an 887 * unsigned NS record in the authority section it could have been 888 * inserted by a (BIND) forwarder that thinks the zone is insecure, and 889 * that has an NS record without signatures in cache. Remove the NS 890 * record since the reply does not hinge on that record (in the authority 891 * section), but do not remove it if it removes the last record from the 892 * answer+authority sections. 893 * @param chase_reply: the chased reply, we have a key for this contents, 894 * so we should have signatures for these rrsets and not having 895 * signatures means it will be bogus. 896 * @param orig_reply: original reply, remove NS from there as well because 897 * we cannot mark the NS record as DNSSEC valid because it is not 898 * validated by signatures. 899 */ 900 static void 901 remove_spurious_authority(struct reply_info* chase_reply, 902 struct reply_info* orig_reply) 903 { 904 size_t i, found = 0; 905 int remove = 0; 906 /* if no answer and only 1 auth RRset, do not remove that one */ 907 if(chase_reply->an_numrrsets == 0 && chase_reply->ns_numrrsets == 1) 908 return; 909 /* search authority section for unsigned NS records */ 910 for(i = chase_reply->an_numrrsets; 911 i < chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 912 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 913 chase_reply->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 914 if(ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS 915 && d->rrsig_count == 0) { 916 found = i; 917 remove = 1; 918 break; 919 } 920 } 921 /* see if we found the entry */ 922 if(!remove) return; 923 log_rrset_key(VERB_ALGO, "Removing spurious unsigned NS record " 924 "(likely inserted by forwarder)", chase_reply->rrsets[found]); 925 926 /* find rrset in orig_reply */ 927 for(i = orig_reply->an_numrrsets; 928 i < orig_reply->an_numrrsets+orig_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 929 if(ntohs(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS 930 && query_dname_compare(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 931 chase_reply->rrsets[found]->rk.dname) == 0) { 932 /* remove from orig_msg */ 933 val_reply_remove_auth(orig_reply, i); 934 break; 935 } 936 } 937 /* remove rrset from chase_reply */ 938 val_reply_remove_auth(chase_reply, found); 939 } 940 941 /** 942 * Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the 943 * question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. 944 * 945 * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. 946 * 947 * @param env: module env for verify. 948 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 949 * @param qchase: query that was made. 950 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. 951 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 952 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 953 * @param qstate: query state for the region. 954 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table. 955 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations. 956 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 957 * suspend to continue the effort later. 958 */ 959 static void 960 validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 961 struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, 962 struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate, 963 struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend) 964 { 965 uint8_t* wc = NULL; 966 size_t wl; 967 int wc_cached = 0; 968 int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; 969 int nsec3s_seen = 0; 970 size_t i; 971 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 972 *suspend = 0; 973 974 /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ 975 for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { 976 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 977 978 /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard 979 * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be 980 * made in the authority section. */ 981 if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) { 982 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive response has " 983 "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, 984 ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); 985 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 986 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 987 return; 988 } 989 if(wc && !wc_cached && env->cfg->aggressive_nsec) { 990 rrset_cache_update_wildcard(env->rrset_cache, s, wc, wl, 991 env->alloc, *env->now); 992 wc_cached = 1; 993 } 994 995 } 996 997 /* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be 998 * the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */ 999 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 1000 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1001 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1002 1003 /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a 1004 * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove 1005 * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard 1006 * was used. */ 1007 if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { 1008 if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { 1009 wc_NSEC_ok = 1; 1010 } 1011 /* if not, continue looking for proof */ 1012 } 1013 1014 /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and 1015 * we have NSEC3 records */ 1016 if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 1017 nsec3s_seen = 1; 1018 } 1019 } 1020 1021 /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already 1022 * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 1023 * records. */ 1024 if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen && 1025 nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 1026 enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, 1027 chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, 1028 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc, 1029 &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations); 1030 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 1031 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive wildcard response is " 1032 "insecure"); 1033 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1034 return; 1035 } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 1036 wc_NSEC_ok = 1; 1037 } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) { 1038 *suspend = 1; 1039 return; 1040 } 1041 } 1042 1043 /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard 1044 * response, fail. */ 1045 if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { 1046 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive response was wildcard " 1047 "expansion and did not prove original data " 1048 "did not exist"); 1049 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1050 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1051 return; 1052 } 1053 1054 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response"); 1055 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1056 } 1057 1058 /** 1059 * Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a 1060 * NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of making 1061 * certain that the authority section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname 1062 * does exist and the qtype doesn't. 1063 * 1064 * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. 1065 * 1066 * @param env: module env for verify. 1067 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 1068 * @param qchase: query that was made. 1069 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. 1070 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 1071 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 1072 * @param qstate: query state for the region. 1073 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table. 1074 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations. 1075 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 1076 * suspend to continue the effort later. 1077 */ 1078 static void 1079 validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 1080 struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, 1081 struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate, 1082 struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend) 1083 { 1084 /* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to 1085 * validate. */ 1086 /* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here -- 1087 * instead, they are chased down into individual CNAME validations, 1088 * and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER 1089 * validation.) */ 1090 1091 /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ 1092 int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/ 1093 uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the 1094 proven closest encloser. */ 1095 uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ 1096 int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ 1097 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 1098 size_t i; 1099 *suspend = 0; 1100 1101 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 1102 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1103 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1104 /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove 1105 * NODATA. 1106 * This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */ 1107 if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { 1108 if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { 1109 has_valid_nsec = 1; 1110 /* sets wc-encloser if wildcard applicable */ 1111 } 1112 if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { 1113 ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); 1114 } 1115 if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { 1116 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); 1117 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1118 return; 1119 } 1120 } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 1121 nsec3s_seen = 1; 1122 } 1123 } 1124 1125 /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ 1126 1127 /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exist 1128 * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC 1129 * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ 1130 if(wc && !ce) 1131 has_valid_nsec = 0; 1132 else if(wc && ce) { 1133 if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { 1134 has_valid_nsec = 0; 1135 } 1136 } 1137 1138 if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen && 1139 nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 1140 enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nodata(env, ve, 1141 chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, 1142 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, 1143 &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations); 1144 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 1145 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response is insecure"); 1146 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1147 return; 1148 } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 1149 has_valid_nsec = 1; 1150 } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) { 1151 /* check is incomplete; suspend */ 1152 *suspend = 1; 1153 return; 1154 } 1155 } 1156 1157 if(!has_valid_nsec) { 1158 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA " 1159 "status with NSEC/NSEC3"); 1160 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) 1161 log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply); 1162 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1163 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1164 return; 1165 } 1166 1167 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response."); 1168 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1169 } 1170 1171 /** 1172 * Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN 1173 * Rcode. 1174 * This consists of making certain that the authority section NSEC proves 1175 * that the qname doesn't exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist.. 1176 * 1177 * The answer and authority RRsets must have already been verified as secure. 1178 * 1179 * @param env: module env for verify. 1180 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 1181 * @param qchase: query that was made. 1182 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. 1183 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 1184 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 1185 * @param rcode: adjusted RCODE, in case of RCODE/proof mismatch leniency. 1186 * @param qstate: query state for the region. 1187 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table. 1188 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations. 1189 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 1190 * suspend to continue the effort later. 1191 */ 1192 static void 1193 validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 1194 struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, 1195 struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* rcode, 1196 struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 1197 int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend) 1198 { 1199 int has_valid_nsec = 0; 1200 int has_valid_wnsec = 0; 1201 int nsec3s_seen = 0; 1202 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 1203 size_t i; 1204 uint8_t* ce; 1205 int ce_labs = 0; 1206 int prev_ce_labs = 0; 1207 *suspend = 0; 1208 1209 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 1210 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1211 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1212 if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { 1213 if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) 1214 has_valid_nsec = 1; 1215 ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); 1216 ce_labs = dname_count_labels(ce); 1217 /* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */ 1218 if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs || 1219 (ce_labs == prev_ce_labs && 1220 has_valid_wnsec == 0)) { 1221 if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, 1222 qchase->qname_len)) 1223 has_valid_wnsec = 1; 1224 else 1225 has_valid_wnsec = 0; 1226 } 1227 prev_ce_labs = ce_labs; 1228 if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { 1229 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); 1230 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1231 return; 1232 } 1233 } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) 1234 nsec3s_seen = 1; 1235 } 1236 1237 if((!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) && nsec3s_seen && 1238 nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 1239 /* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case 1240 * NSEC3s end up in the answer (due to qtype=NSEC3 or so) */ 1241 chase_reply->security = nsec3_prove_nameerror(env, ve, 1242 chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 1243 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, 1244 &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations); 1245 if(chase_reply->security == sec_status_unchecked) { 1246 *suspend = 1; 1247 return; 1248 } else if(chase_reply->security != sec_status_secure) { 1249 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response failed nsec, " 1250 "nsec3 proof was %s", sec_status_to_string( 1251 chase_reply->security)); 1252 return; 1253 } 1254 has_valid_nsec = 1; 1255 has_valid_wnsec = 1; 1256 } 1257 1258 /* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */ 1259 if(!has_valid_nsec) { 1260 validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey, 1261 qstate, vq, nsec3_calculations, suspend); 1262 if(*suspend) return; 1263 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " 1264 "qname does not exist"); 1265 /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */ 1266 if(chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) { 1267 *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; 1268 } else { 1269 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1270 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1271 } 1272 return; 1273 } 1274 1275 if(!has_valid_wnsec) { 1276 validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey, 1277 qstate, vq, nsec3_calculations, suspend); 1278 if(*suspend) return; 1279 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " 1280 "covering wildcard does not exist"); 1281 /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */ 1282 if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) { 1283 *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; 1284 } else { 1285 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1286 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1287 } 1288 return; 1289 } 1290 1291 /* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */ 1292 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response."); 1293 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1294 } 1295 1296 /** 1297 * Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset 1298 * as the current validation status. 1299 * 1300 * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the 1301 * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been 1302 * completed. 1303 * 1304 * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. 1305 */ 1306 static void 1307 validate_referral_response(struct reply_info* chase_reply) 1308 { 1309 size_t i; 1310 enum sec_status s; 1311 /* message security equals lowest rrset security */ 1312 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1313 for(i=0; i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) { 1314 s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i] 1315 ->entry.data)->security; 1316 if(s < chase_reply->security) 1317 chase_reply->security = s; 1318 } 1319 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validated part of referral response as %s", 1320 sec_status_to_string(chase_reply->security)); 1321 } 1322 1323 /** 1324 * Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a 1325 * qtype==ANY question, with answers. This does no checking that all 1326 * types are present. 1327 * 1328 * NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records 1329 * here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the 1330 * upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead 1331 * treating them as referrals. 1332 * 1333 * NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon 1334 * clarification. Clarification draft -05 says to not check all types are 1335 * present. 1336 * 1337 * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the 1338 * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been 1339 * completed. 1340 * 1341 * @param env: module env for verify. 1342 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 1343 * @param qchase: query that was made. 1344 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. 1345 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 1346 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 1347 * @param qstate: query state for the region. 1348 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table. 1349 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations. 1350 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 1351 * suspend to continue the effort later. 1352 */ 1353 static void 1354 validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 1355 struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, 1356 struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate, 1357 struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend) 1358 { 1359 /* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */ 1360 /* but check if a wildcard response is given, then check NSEC/NSEC3 1361 * for qname denial to see if wildcard is applicable */ 1362 uint8_t* wc = NULL; 1363 size_t wl; 1364 int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; 1365 int nsec3s_seen = 0; 1366 size_t i; 1367 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 1368 *suspend = 0; 1369 1370 if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) { 1371 log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY"); 1372 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1373 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1374 return; 1375 } 1376 1377 /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ 1378 for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { 1379 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1380 1381 /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard 1382 * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be 1383 * made in the authority section. */ 1384 if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) { 1385 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive ANY response" 1386 " has inconsistent wildcard sigs:", 1387 s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), 1388 ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); 1389 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1390 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1391 return; 1392 } 1393 } 1394 1395 /* if it was a wildcard, check for NSEC/NSEC3s in both answer 1396 * and authority sections (NSEC may be moved to the ANSWER section) */ 1397 if(wc != NULL) 1398 for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; 1399 i++) { 1400 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1401 1402 /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a 1403 * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove 1404 * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard 1405 * was used. */ 1406 if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { 1407 if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { 1408 wc_NSEC_ok = 1; 1409 } 1410 /* if not, continue looking for proof */ 1411 } 1412 1413 /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and 1414 * we have NSEC3 records */ 1415 if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 1416 nsec3s_seen = 1; 1417 } 1418 } 1419 1420 /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already 1421 * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 1422 * records. */ 1423 if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen && 1424 nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 1425 /* look both in answer and auth section for NSEC3s */ 1426 enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, 1427 chase_reply->rrsets, 1428 chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, 1429 qchase, kkey, wc, &vq->nsec3_cache_table, 1430 nsec3_calculations); 1431 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 1432 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive ANY wildcard response is " 1433 "insecure"); 1434 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1435 return; 1436 } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 1437 wc_NSEC_ok = 1; 1438 } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) { 1439 *suspend = 1; 1440 return; 1441 } 1442 } 1443 1444 /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard 1445 * response, fail. */ 1446 if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { 1447 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive ANY response was wildcard " 1448 "expansion and did not prove original data " 1449 "did not exist"); 1450 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1451 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1452 return; 1453 } 1454 1455 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response"); 1456 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1457 } 1458 1459 /** 1460 * Validate CNAME response, or DNAME+CNAME. 1461 * This is just like a positive proof, except that this is about a 1462 * DNAME+CNAME. Possible wildcard proof. 1463 * Difference with positive proof is that this routine refuses 1464 * wildcarded DNAMEs. 1465 * 1466 * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. 1467 * 1468 * @param env: module env for verify. 1469 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 1470 * @param qchase: query that was made. 1471 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. 1472 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 1473 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 1474 * @param qstate: query state for the region. 1475 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table. 1476 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations. 1477 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 1478 * suspend to continue the effort later. 1479 */ 1480 static void 1481 validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 1482 struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, 1483 struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate, 1484 struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend) 1485 { 1486 uint8_t* wc = NULL; 1487 size_t wl; 1488 int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; 1489 int nsec3s_seen = 0; 1490 size_t i; 1491 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 1492 *suspend = 0; 1493 1494 /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */ 1495 for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { 1496 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1497 1498 /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard 1499 * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be 1500 * made in the authority section. */ 1501 if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) { 1502 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has " 1503 "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, 1504 ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); 1505 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1506 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1507 return; 1508 } 1509 1510 /* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597. 1511 * Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because 1512 * its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */ 1513 if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && 1514 ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) { 1515 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a " 1516 "wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname, 1517 ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); 1518 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1519 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1520 return; 1521 } 1522 1523 /* If we have found a CNAME, stop looking for one. 1524 * The iterator has placed the CNAME chain in correct 1525 * order. */ 1526 if (ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { 1527 break; 1528 } 1529 } 1530 1531 /* AUTHORITY section */ 1532 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 1533 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1534 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1535 1536 /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a 1537 * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove 1538 * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard 1539 * was used. */ 1540 if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { 1541 if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { 1542 wc_NSEC_ok = 1; 1543 } 1544 /* if not, continue looking for proof */ 1545 } 1546 1547 /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and 1548 * we have NSEC3 records */ 1549 if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 1550 nsec3s_seen = 1; 1551 } 1552 } 1553 1554 /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already 1555 * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 1556 * records. */ 1557 if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen && 1558 nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 1559 enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, 1560 chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, 1561 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc, 1562 &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations); 1563 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 1564 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is " 1565 "insecure"); 1566 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1567 return; 1568 } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 1569 wc_NSEC_ok = 1; 1570 } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) { 1571 *suspend = 1; 1572 return; 1573 } 1574 } 1575 1576 /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard 1577 * response, fail. */ 1578 if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { 1579 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard " 1580 "expansion and did not prove original data " 1581 "did not exist"); 1582 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1583 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1584 return; 1585 } 1586 1587 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response"); 1588 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1589 } 1590 1591 /** 1592 * Validate CNAME NOANSWER response, no more data after a CNAME chain. 1593 * This can be a NODATA or a NAME ERROR case, but not both at the same time. 1594 * We don't know because the rcode has been set to NOERROR by the CNAME. 1595 * 1596 * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. 1597 * 1598 * @param env: module env for verify. 1599 * @param ve: validator env for verify. 1600 * @param qchase: query that was made. 1601 * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. 1602 * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches 1603 * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). 1604 * @param qstate: query state for the region. 1605 * @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table. 1606 * @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations. 1607 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 1608 * suspend to continue the effort later. 1609 */ 1610 static void 1611 validate_cname_noanswer_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 1612 struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, 1613 struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate, 1614 struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend) 1615 { 1616 int nodata_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then NODATA has been proven.*/ 1617 uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the 1618 proven closest encloser. */ 1619 uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ 1620 int nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; /* if true, nameerror has been proven */ 1621 int nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0; 1622 int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ 1623 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; 1624 size_t i; 1625 uint8_t* nsec_ce; /* Used to find the NSEC with the longest ce */ 1626 int ce_labs = 0; 1627 int prev_ce_labs = 0; 1628 *suspend = 0; 1629 1630 /* the AUTHORITY section */ 1631 for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ 1632 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1633 s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; 1634 1635 /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove 1636 * NODATA. This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. 1637 * Also try to prove NAMEERROR, and absence of a wildcard */ 1638 if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { 1639 if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { 1640 nodata_valid_nsec = 1; 1641 /* set wc encloser if wildcard applicable */ 1642 } 1643 if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { 1644 ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); 1645 nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; 1646 } 1647 nsec_ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); 1648 ce_labs = dname_count_labels(nsec_ce); 1649 /* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */ 1650 if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs || 1651 (ce_labs == prev_ce_labs && 1652 nxdomain_valid_wnsec == 0)) { 1653 if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, 1654 qchase->qname_len)) 1655 nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 1; 1656 else 1657 nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0; 1658 } 1659 prev_ce_labs = ce_labs; 1660 if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { 1661 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); 1662 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1663 return; 1664 } 1665 } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 1666 nsec3s_seen = 1; 1667 } 1668 } 1669 1670 /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ 1671 1672 /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists 1673 * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC 1674 * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ 1675 if(wc && !ce) 1676 nodata_valid_nsec = 0; 1677 else if(wc && ce) { 1678 if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { 1679 nodata_valid_nsec = 0; 1680 } 1681 } 1682 if(nxdomain_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_wnsec) { 1683 /* name error is missing wildcard denial proof */ 1684 nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; 1685 } 1686 1687 if(nodata_valid_nsec && nxdomain_valid_nsec) { 1688 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer proves that name " 1689 "exists and not exists, bogus"); 1690 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1691 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1692 return; 1693 } 1694 if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen && 1695 nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 1696 int nodata; 1697 enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nxornodata(env, ve, 1698 chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, 1699 chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, &nodata, 1700 &vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations); 1701 if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 1702 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response " 1703 "is insecure"); 1704 chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1705 return; 1706 } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 1707 if(nodata) 1708 nodata_valid_nsec = 1; 1709 else nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; 1710 } else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) { 1711 *suspend = 1; 1712 return; 1713 } 1714 } 1715 1716 if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec) { 1717 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response failed " 1718 "to prove status with NSEC/NSEC3"); 1719 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) 1720 log_dns_msg("Failed CNAMEnoanswer", qchase, chase_reply); 1721 chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1722 update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1723 return; 1724 } 1725 1726 if(nodata_valid_nsec) 1727 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " 1728 "NODATA response."); 1729 else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " 1730 "NAMEERROR response."); 1731 chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; 1732 } 1733 1734 /** 1735 * Process init state for validator. 1736 * Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state. 1737 * This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial 1738 * key search is done. 1739 * 1740 * Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted 1741 * to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to 1742 * validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request 1743 * event will be generated. 1744 * 1745 * @param qstate: query state. 1746 * @param vq: validator query state. 1747 * @param ve: validator shared global environment. 1748 * @param id: module id. 1749 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if 1750 * not. 1751 */ 1752 static int 1753 processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 1754 struct val_env* ve, int id) 1755 { 1756 uint8_t* lookup_name; 1757 size_t lookup_len; 1758 struct trust_anchor* anchor; 1759 enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( 1760 qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, 1761 vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); 1762 if(vq->restart_count > ve->max_restart) { 1763 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "restart count exceeded"); 1764 return val_error(qstate, id); 1765 } 1766 1767 /* correctly initialize reason_bogus */ 1768 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 1769 1770 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator classification %s", 1771 val_classification_to_string(subtype)); 1772 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL && 1773 vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { 1774 /* referral uses the rrset name as qchase, to find keys for 1775 * that rrset */ 1776 vq->qchase.qname = vq->orig_msg->rep-> 1777 rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname; 1778 vq->qchase.qname_len = vq->orig_msg->rep-> 1779 rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len; 1780 vq->qchase.qtype = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> 1781 rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type); 1782 vq->qchase.qclass = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> 1783 rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class); 1784 } 1785 lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname; 1786 lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; 1787 /* for type DS look at the parent side for keys/trustanchor */ 1788 /* also for NSEC not at apex */ 1789 if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS || 1790 (vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && 1791 vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > vq->rrset_skip && 1792 ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) == 1793 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && 1794 !(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]-> 1795 rk.flags&PACKED_RRSET_NSEC_AT_APEX))) { 1796 dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); 1797 } 1798 1799 val_mark_indeterminate(vq->chase_reply, qstate->env->anchors, 1800 qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); 1801 vq->key_entry = NULL; 1802 vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; 1803 vq->ds_rrset = 0; 1804 anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, 1805 lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); 1806 1807 /* Determine the signer/lookup name */ 1808 val_find_signer(subtype, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, 1809 vq->rrset_skip, &vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len); 1810 if(vq->signer_name != NULL && 1811 !dname_subdomain_c(lookup_name, vq->signer_name)) { 1812 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "this signer name is not a parent " 1813 "of lookupname, omitted", vq->signer_name, 0, 0); 1814 vq->signer_name = NULL; 1815 } 1816 if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { 1817 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "no signer, using", lookup_name, 1818 0, 0); 1819 } else { 1820 lookup_name = vq->signer_name; 1821 lookup_len = vq->signer_len; 1822 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "signer is", lookup_name, 0, 0); 1823 } 1824 1825 /* for NXDOMAIN it could be signed by a parent of the trust anchor */ 1826 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR && vq->signer_name && 1827 anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, lookup_name)){ 1828 lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); 1829 anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, 1830 lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); 1831 if(!anchor) { /* unsigned parent denies anchor*/ 1832 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "unsigned parent zone denies" 1833 " trust anchor, indeterminate"); 1834 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; 1835 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE); 1836 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 1837 return 1; 1838 } 1839 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trust anchor NXDOMAIN by signed parent"); 1840 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE && 1841 qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY && 1842 query_dname_compare(lookup_name, qstate->qinfo.qname) == 0) { 1843 /* is a DNSKEY so lookup a bit higher since we want to 1844 * get it from a parent or from trustanchor */ 1845 dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); 1846 } 1847 1848 if(vq->rrset_skip > 0 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || 1849 subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { 1850 /* extract this part of orig_msg into chase_reply for 1851 * the eventual VALIDATE stage */ 1852 val_fill_reply(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep, 1853 vq->rrset_skip, lookup_name, lookup_len, 1854 vq->signer_name); 1855 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) 1856 log_dns_msg("chased extract", &vq->qchase, 1857 vq->chase_reply); 1858 } 1859 1860 vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len, 1861 vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, *qstate->env->now); 1862 1863 /* there is no key and no trust anchor */ 1864 if(vq->key_entry == NULL && anchor == NULL) { 1865 /*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/ 1866 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; 1867 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE); 1868 /* go to finished state to cache this result */ 1869 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 1870 return 1; 1871 } 1872 /* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e. 1873 * the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */ 1874 else if(vq->key_entry == NULL || (anchor && 1875 dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name))) { 1876 /* trust anchor is an 'unsigned' trust anchor */ 1877 if(anchor && anchor->numDS == 0 && anchor->numDNSKEY == 0) { 1878 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1879 val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, anchor->name, 1880 qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); 1881 lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); 1882 /* go to finished state to cache this result */ 1883 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 1884 return 1; 1885 } 1886 /* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */ 1887 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "prime trust anchor"); 1888 if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, anchor)) { 1889 lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); 1890 return val_error(qstate, id); 1891 } 1892 lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); 1893 /* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event. 1894 * (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */ 1895 vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; 1896 return 0; 1897 } 1898 if(anchor) { 1899 lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); 1900 } 1901 1902 if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { 1903 /* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate 1904 * However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is 1905 * essentially proven insecure. */ 1906 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 1907 val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, 1908 qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); 1909 /* go to finished state to cache this result */ 1910 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 1911 return 1; 1912 } else if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { 1913 /* Bad keys should have the relevant EDE code and text */ 1914 sldns_ede_code ede = key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry); 1915 /* key is bad, chain is bad, reply is bogus */ 1916 errinf_dname(qstate, "key for validation", vq->key_entry->name); 1917 errinf_ede(qstate, "is marked as invalid", ede); 1918 errinf(qstate, "because of a previous"); 1919 errinf(qstate, key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)); 1920 1921 /* no retries, stop bothering the authority until timeout */ 1922 vq->restart_count = ve->max_restart; 1923 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1924 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, ede); 1925 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 1926 return 1; 1927 } 1928 1929 /* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue 1930 * processing in the next state. */ 1931 vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; 1932 return 1; 1933 } 1934 1935 /** 1936 * Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name 1937 * to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see 1938 * if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will 1939 * advance the event to the next state. 1940 * 1941 * @param qstate: query state. 1942 * @param vq: validator query state. 1943 * @param id: module id. 1944 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if 1945 * not. 1946 */ 1947 static int 1948 processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id) 1949 { 1950 uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name; 1951 size_t target_key_len; 1952 int strip_lab; 1953 struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; 1954 1955 log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey", &vq->qchase); 1956 /* We know that state.key_entry is not 0 or bad key -- if it were, 1957 * then previous processing should have directed this event to 1958 * a different state. 1959 * It could be an isnull key, which signals the DNSKEY failed 1960 * with retry and has to be looked up again. */ 1961 log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)); 1962 if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { 1963 if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 1964 vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 1965 vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { 1966 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request"); 1967 return val_error(qstate, id); 1968 } 1969 return 0; 1970 } 1971 1972 target_key_name = vq->signer_name; 1973 target_key_len = vq->signer_len; 1974 if(!target_key_name) { 1975 target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname; 1976 target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; 1977 } 1978 1979 current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name; 1980 1981 /* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */ 1982 if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) { 1983 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 1984 return 1; 1985 } 1986 1987 if(vq->empty_DS_name) { 1988 /* if the last empty nonterminal/emptyDS name we detected is 1989 * below the current key, use that name to make progress 1990 * along the chain of trust */ 1991 if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, 1992 vq->empty_DS_name) == 0) { 1993 /* do not query for empty_DS_name again */ 1994 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Cannot retrieve DS for signature"); 1995 errinf_ede(qstate, "no signatures", LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING); 1996 errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); 1997 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 1998 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING); 1999 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 2000 return 1; 2001 } 2002 current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name; 2003 } 2004 2005 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name, 2006 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); 2007 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name, 2008 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); 2009 /* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */ 2010 if(!dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name)) { 2011 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "bad signer name"); 2012 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 2013 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 2014 return 1; 2015 } 2016 /* so this value is >= -1 */ 2017 strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) - 2018 dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1; 2019 log_assert(strip_lab >= -1); 2020 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab); 2021 if(strip_lab > 0) { 2022 dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len, 2023 strip_lab); 2024 } 2025 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name, 2026 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); 2027 2028 /* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query 2029 * for the next DNSKEY. */ 2030 if(vq->ds_rrset) 2031 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DS RRset", vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); 2032 else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No DS RRset"); 2033 2034 if(vq->ds_rrset && query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 2035 vq->key_entry->name) != 0) { 2036 if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 2037 vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 2038 vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { 2039 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request"); 2040 return val_error(qstate, id); 2041 } 2042 return 0; 2043 } 2044 2045 if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 2046 target_key_name) != 0) { 2047 /* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if 2048 * there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and 2049 * thus can disprove the secure delegation we seek. 2050 * We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA 2051 * record that would be required by the iterator to supply 2052 * a completely protocol-correct response. 2053 * Uses negative cache for NSEC3 lookup of DS responses. */ 2054 /* only if cache not blacklisted, of course */ 2055 struct dns_msg* msg; 2056 int suspend; 2057 if(vq->sub_ds_msg) { 2058 /* We have a suspended DS reply from a sub-query; 2059 * process it. */ 2060 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process suspended sub DS response"); 2061 msg = vq->sub_ds_msg; 2062 process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR, 2063 msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL, &suspend); 2064 if(suspend) { 2065 /* we'll come back here later to continue */ 2066 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq, 2067 id, VAL_FINDKEY_STATE)) 2068 return val_error(qstate, id); 2069 return 0; 2070 } 2071 vq->sub_ds_msg = NULL; 2072 return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */ 2073 } else if(!qstate->blacklist && !vq->chain_blacklist && 2074 (msg=val_find_DS(qstate->env, target_key_name, 2075 target_key_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, 2076 vq->key_entry->name)) ) { 2077 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process cached DS response"); 2078 process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR, 2079 msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL, &suspend); 2080 if(suspend) { 2081 /* we'll come back here later to continue */ 2082 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq, 2083 id, VAL_FINDKEY_STATE)) 2084 return val_error(qstate, id); 2085 return 0; 2086 } 2087 return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */ 2088 } 2089 if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name, 2090 target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass, 2091 BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { 2092 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DS request"); 2093 return val_error(qstate, id); 2094 } 2095 return 0; 2096 } 2097 2098 /* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */ 2099 if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, 2100 vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 2101 vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { 2102 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request"); 2103 return val_error(qstate, id); 2104 } 2105 2106 return 0; 2107 } 2108 2109 /** 2110 * Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished, 2111 * and the right keys are available to validate the response. 2112 * Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response. 2113 * 2114 * After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets, 2115 * and finished state is started. 2116 * 2117 * @param qstate: query state. 2118 * @param vq: validator query state. 2119 * @param ve: validator shared global environment. 2120 * @param id: module id. 2121 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if 2122 * not. 2123 */ 2124 static int 2125 processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 2126 struct val_env* ve, int id) 2127 { 2128 enum val_classification subtype; 2129 int rcode, suspend, nsec3_calculations = 0; 2130 2131 if(!vq->key_entry) { 2132 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed"); 2133 return val_error(qstate, id); 2134 } 2135 2136 /* This is the default next state. */ 2137 vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; 2138 2139 /* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/ 2140 if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { 2141 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Verified that %sresponse is INSECURE", 2142 vq->signer_name?"":"unsigned "); 2143 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; 2144 val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, 2145 qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); 2146 key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, 2147 qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2); 2148 return 1; 2149 } 2150 2151 if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { 2152 log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish a chain " 2153 "of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name, 2154 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class); 2155 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 2156 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, 2157 key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry)); 2158 errinf_ede(qstate, "while building chain of trust", 2159 key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry)); 2160 if(vq->restart_count >= ve->max_restart) 2161 key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, 2162 qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2); 2163 return 1; 2164 } 2165 2166 /* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was 2167 * unsigned */ 2168 if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { 2169 log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no " 2170 "signer name", &vq->qchase); 2171 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish validation of " 2172 "INSECURE status of unsigned response."); 2173 errinf_ede(qstate, "no signatures", LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING); 2174 errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); 2175 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; 2176 update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING); 2177 return 1; 2178 } 2179 subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, 2180 &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); 2181 if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) 2182 remove_spurious_authority(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep); 2183 2184 /* check signatures in the message; 2185 * answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */ 2186 if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, vq, qstate->env, ve, 2187 vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &suspend)) { 2188 if(suspend) { 2189 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq, 2190 id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2191 return val_error(qstate, id); 2192 return 0; 2193 } 2194 /* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even 2195 * with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section 2196 * for positive replies*/ 2197 if((subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY 2198 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) && 2199 detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) { 2200 /* truncate the message some more */ 2201 vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0; 2202 vq->orig_msg->rep->ar_numrrsets = 0; 2203 vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count = 2204 vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets; 2205 vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0; 2206 vq->chase_reply->ar_numrrsets = 0; 2207 vq->chase_reply->rrset_count = 2208 vq->chase_reply->an_numrrsets; 2209 qstate->errinf = NULL; 2210 } 2211 else { 2212 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains " 2213 "bad rrsets"); 2214 return 1; 2215 } 2216 } 2217 2218 switch(subtype) { 2219 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: 2220 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response"); 2221 validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve, 2222 &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, 2223 qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend); 2224 if(suspend) { 2225 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, 2226 vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2227 return val_error(qstate, id); 2228 return 0; 2229 } 2230 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive): %s", 2231 sec_status_to_string( 2232 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2233 break; 2234 2235 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: 2236 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response"); 2237 validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve, 2238 &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, 2239 qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend); 2240 if(suspend) { 2241 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, 2242 vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2243 return val_error(qstate, id); 2244 return 0; 2245 } 2246 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nodata): %s", 2247 sec_status_to_string( 2248 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2249 break; 2250 2251 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: 2252 rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags); 2253 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response"); 2254 validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve, 2255 &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &rcode, 2256 qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend); 2257 if(suspend) { 2258 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, 2259 vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2260 return val_error(qstate, id); 2261 return 0; 2262 } 2263 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nxdomain): %s", 2264 sec_status_to_string( 2265 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2266 FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags, rcode); 2267 FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->chase_reply->flags, rcode); 2268 break; 2269 2270 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: 2271 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response"); 2272 validate_cname_response(qstate->env, ve, 2273 &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, 2274 qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend); 2275 if(suspend) { 2276 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, 2277 vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2278 return val_error(qstate, id); 2279 return 0; 2280 } 2281 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname): %s", 2282 sec_status_to_string( 2283 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2284 break; 2285 2286 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: 2287 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname noanswer " 2288 "response"); 2289 validate_cname_noanswer_response(qstate->env, ve, 2290 &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, 2291 qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend); 2292 if(suspend) { 2293 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, 2294 vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2295 return val_error(qstate, id); 2296 return 0; 2297 } 2298 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname_noanswer): %s", 2299 sec_status_to_string( 2300 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2301 break; 2302 2303 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: 2304 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a referral response"); 2305 validate_referral_response(vq->chase_reply); 2306 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(referral): %s", 2307 sec_status_to_string( 2308 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2309 break; 2310 2311 case VAL_CLASS_ANY: 2312 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY " 2313 "response"); 2314 validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, 2315 vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, qstate, vq, 2316 &nsec3_calculations, &suspend); 2317 if(suspend) { 2318 if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, 2319 vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE)) 2320 return val_error(qstate, id); 2321 return 0; 2322 } 2323 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive_any): %s", 2324 sec_status_to_string( 2325 vq->chase_reply->security)); 2326 break; 2327 2328 default: 2329 log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d", 2330 subtype); 2331 } 2332 if(vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_bogus) { 2333 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) 2334 errinf(qstate, "wildcard"); 2335 else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); 2336 errinf(qstate, "proof failed"); 2337 errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); 2338 } 2339 2340 return 1; 2341 } 2342 2343 /** 2344 * The Finished state. The validation status (good or bad) has been determined. 2345 * 2346 * @param qstate: query state. 2347 * @param vq: validator query state. 2348 * @param ve: validator shared global environment. 2349 * @param id: module id. 2350 * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if 2351 * not. 2352 */ 2353 static int 2354 processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 2355 struct val_env* ve, int id) 2356 { 2357 enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( 2358 qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, 2359 vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); 2360 2361 /* store overall validation result in orig_msg */ 2362 if(vq->rrset_skip == 0) { 2363 vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security; 2364 update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->chase_reply->reason_bogus); 2365 } else if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL || 2366 vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets + 2367 vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets) { 2368 /* ignore sec status of additional section if a referral 2369 * type message skips there and 2370 * use the lowest security status as end result. */ 2371 if(vq->chase_reply->security < vq->orig_msg->rep->security) { 2372 vq->orig_msg->rep->security = 2373 vq->chase_reply->security; 2374 update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->chase_reply->reason_bogus); 2375 } 2376 } 2377 2378 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { 2379 /* for a referral, move to next unchecked rrset and check it*/ 2380 vq->rrset_skip = val_next_unchecked(vq->orig_msg->rep, 2381 vq->rrset_skip); 2382 if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { 2383 /* and restart for this rrset */ 2384 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: go to next rrset"); 2385 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; 2386 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 2387 return 1; 2388 } 2389 /* referral chase is done */ 2390 } 2391 if(vq->chase_reply->security != sec_status_bogus && 2392 subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) { 2393 /* chase the CNAME; process next part of the message */ 2394 if(!val_chase_cname(&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, 2395 &vq->rrset_skip)) { 2396 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: failed to chase CNAME"); 2397 vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus; 2398 update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 2399 } else { 2400 /* restart process for new qchase at rrset_skip */ 2401 log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: chased to", 2402 &vq->qchase); 2403 vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; 2404 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 2405 return 1; 2406 } 2407 } 2408 2409 if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { 2410 /* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are 2411 * secure (i.e. some inserted RRset for CNAME chain with 2412 * a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets 2413 * that are not secure (if clean-additional option is set) */ 2414 /* this may cause the msg to be marked bogus */ 2415 val_check_nonsecure(qstate->env, vq->orig_msg->rep); 2416 if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { 2417 log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validation success", 2418 &qstate->qinfo); 2419 if(!qstate->no_cache_store) { 2420 val_neg_addreply(qstate->env->neg_cache, 2421 vq->orig_msg->rep); 2422 } 2423 } 2424 } 2425 2426 /* if the result is bogus - set message ttl to bogus ttl to avoid 2427 * endless bogus revalidation */ 2428 if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) { 2429 /* see if we can try again to fetch data */ 2430 if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) { 2431 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, " 2432 "blacklist and retry to fetch data"); 2433 val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region, 2434 qstate->reply_origin, 0); 2435 qstate->reply_origin = NULL; 2436 qstate->errinf = NULL; 2437 val_restart(vq); 2438 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module"); 2439 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next; 2440 return 0; 2441 } 2442 2443 vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl; 2444 vq->orig_msg->rep->prefetch_ttl = 2445 PREFETCH_TTL_CALC(vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl); 2446 vq->orig_msg->rep->serve_expired_ttl = 2447 vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl + qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl; 2448 if((qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 1 || 2449 qstate->env->cfg->log_servfail) && 2450 !qstate->env->cfg->val_log_squelch) { 2451 if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level < 2 && 2452 !qstate->env->cfg->log_servfail) 2453 log_query_info(NO_VERBOSE, "validation failure", 2454 &qstate->qinfo); 2455 else { 2456 char* err_str = errinf_to_str_bogus(qstate, 2457 qstate->region); 2458 if(err_str) { 2459 log_info("%s", err_str); 2460 vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus_str = err_str; 2461 } 2462 } 2463 } 2464 /* 2465 * If set, the validator will not make messages bogus, instead 2466 * indeterminate is issued, so that no clients receive SERVFAIL. 2467 * This allows an operator to run validation 'shadow' without 2468 * hurting responses to clients. 2469 */ 2470 /* If we are in permissive mode, bogus gets indeterminate */ 2471 if(qstate->env->cfg->val_permissive_mode) 2472 vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate; 2473 } 2474 2475 if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure && 2476 qstate->env->cfg->root_key_sentinel && 2477 (qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_A || 2478 qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA)) { 2479 char* keytag_start; 2480 uint16_t keytag; 2481 if(*qstate->qinfo.qname == strlen(SENTINEL_IS) + 2482 SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN && 2483 dname_lab_startswith(qstate->qinfo.qname, SENTINEL_IS, 2484 &keytag_start)) { 2485 if(sentinel_get_keytag(keytag_start, &keytag) && 2486 !anchor_has_keytag(qstate->env->anchors, 2487 (uint8_t*)"", 1, 0, vq->qchase.qclass, keytag)) { 2488 vq->orig_msg->rep->security = 2489 sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail; 2490 } 2491 } else if(*qstate->qinfo.qname == strlen(SENTINEL_NOT) + 2492 SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN && 2493 dname_lab_startswith(qstate->qinfo.qname, SENTINEL_NOT, 2494 &keytag_start)) { 2495 if(sentinel_get_keytag(keytag_start, &keytag) && 2496 anchor_has_keytag(qstate->env->anchors, 2497 (uint8_t*)"", 1, 0, vq->qchase.qclass, keytag)) { 2498 vq->orig_msg->rep->security = 2499 sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail; 2500 } 2501 } 2502 } 2503 2504 /* Update rep->reason_bogus as it is the one being cached */ 2505 update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, errinf_to_reason_bogus(qstate)); 2506 /* store results in cache */ 2507 if(qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD) { 2508 /* if secure, this will override cache anyway, no need 2509 * to check if from parentNS */ 2510 if(!qstate->no_cache_store) { 2511 if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, 2512 vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, 0, NULL, 2513 qstate->query_flags, qstate->qstarttime)) { 2514 log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); 2515 } 2516 } 2517 } else { 2518 /* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */ 2519 /* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */ 2520 if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, 2521 vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, 0, NULL, 2522 qstate->query_flags, qstate->qstarttime)) { 2523 log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); 2524 } 2525 } 2526 qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; 2527 qstate->return_msg = vq->orig_msg; 2528 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; 2529 return 0; 2530 } 2531 2532 /** 2533 * Handle validator state. 2534 * If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then 2535 * processing will stop. 2536 * @param qstate: query state. 2537 * @param vq: validator query state. 2538 * @param ve: validator shared global environment. 2539 * @param id: module id. 2540 */ 2541 static void 2542 val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 2543 struct val_env* ve, int id) 2544 { 2545 int cont = 1; 2546 while(cont) { 2547 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s", 2548 val_state_to_string(vq->state)); 2549 switch(vq->state) { 2550 case VAL_INIT_STATE: 2551 cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id); 2552 break; 2553 case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: 2554 cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id); 2555 break; 2556 case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: 2557 cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id); 2558 break; 2559 case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: 2560 cont = processFinished(qstate, vq, ve, id); 2561 break; 2562 default: 2563 log_warn("validator: invalid state %d", 2564 vq->state); 2565 cont = 0; 2566 break; 2567 } 2568 } 2569 } 2570 2571 void 2572 val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id, 2573 struct outbound_entry* outbound) 2574 { 2575 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; 2576 struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; 2577 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s " 2578 "event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]), 2579 strmodulevent(event)); 2580 log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: query", 2581 &qstate->qinfo); 2582 if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname) 2583 log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: chased to", 2584 &vq->qchase); 2585 (void)outbound; 2586 if(event == module_event_new || 2587 (event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) { 2588 2589 /* pass request to next module, to get it */ 2590 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module"); 2591 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module; 2592 return; 2593 } 2594 if(event == module_event_moddone) { 2595 /* check if validation is needed */ 2596 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned"); 2597 2598 if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode, 2599 qstate->return_msg)) { 2600 /* no need to validate this */ 2601 if(qstate->return_msg) 2602 qstate->return_msg->rep->security = 2603 sec_status_indeterminate; 2604 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; 2605 return; 2606 } 2607 if(already_validated(qstate->return_msg)) { 2608 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; 2609 return; 2610 } 2611 /* qclass ANY should have validation result from spawned 2612 * queries. If we get here, it is bogus or an internal error */ 2613 if(qstate->qinfo.qclass == LDNS_RR_CLASS_ANY) { 2614 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate classANY: bogus"); 2615 if(qstate->return_msg) { 2616 qstate->return_msg->rep->security = 2617 sec_status_bogus; 2618 update_reason_bogus(qstate->return_msg->rep, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS); 2619 } 2620 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; 2621 return; 2622 } 2623 /* create state to start validation */ 2624 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ 2625 if(!vq) { 2626 vq = val_new(qstate, id); 2627 if(!vq) { 2628 log_err("validator: malloc failure"); 2629 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; 2630 return; 2631 } 2632 } else if(!vq->orig_msg) { 2633 if(!val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq)) { 2634 log_err("validator: malloc failure"); 2635 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; 2636 return; 2637 } 2638 } 2639 val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); 2640 return; 2641 } 2642 if(event == module_event_pass) { 2643 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ 2644 /* continue processing, since val_env exists */ 2645 val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); 2646 return; 2647 } 2648 log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event)); 2649 qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; 2650 return; 2651 } 2652 2653 /** 2654 * Evaluate the response to a priming request. 2655 * 2656 * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset (can be NULL if none) in prime reply. 2657 * (this rrset is allocated in the wrong region, not the qstate). 2658 * @param ta: trust anchor. 2659 * @param qstate: qstate that needs key. 2660 * @param id: module id. 2661 * @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure. 2662 * The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or 2663 * represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a 2664 * Bad key (validation failed). 2665 */ 2666 static struct key_entry_key* 2667 primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 2668 struct trust_anchor* ta, struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) 2669 { 2670 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; 2671 struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL; 2672 enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked; 2673 char* reason = NULL; 2674 sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS; 2675 int downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; 2676 2677 if(!dnskey_rrset) { 2678 log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " 2679 "could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", 2680 ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); 2681 reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISSING; 2682 reason = "no DNSKEY rrset"; 2683 if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { 2684 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2685 kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, 2686 ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, 2687 reason_bogus, reason, 2688 *qstate->env->now); 2689 } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, 2690 ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, 2691 reason_bogus, reason, 2692 *qstate->env->now); 2693 if(!kkey) { 2694 log_err("out of memory: allocate fail prime key"); 2695 return NULL; 2696 } 2697 return kkey; 2698 } 2699 /* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */ 2700 kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, 2701 dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot, 2702 &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate); 2703 if(!kkey) { 2704 log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA"); 2705 return NULL; 2706 } 2707 if(key_entry_isgood(kkey)) 2708 sec = sec_status_secure; 2709 else 2710 sec = sec_status_bogus; 2711 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate keys with anchor(DS): %s", 2712 sec_status_to_string(sec)); 2713 2714 if(sec != sec_status_secure) { 2715 log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " 2716 "DNSKEY rrset is not secure", 2717 ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); 2718 /* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust 2719 * anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */ 2720 if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { 2721 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2722 kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, 2723 ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, 2724 reason_bogus, reason, 2725 *qstate->env->now); 2726 } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, 2727 ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, 2728 reason_bogus, reason, 2729 *qstate->env->now); 2730 if(!kkey) { 2731 log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key"); 2732 return NULL; 2733 } 2734 return kkey; 2735 } 2736 2737 log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Successfully primed trust anchor", 2738 ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); 2739 return kkey; 2740 } 2741 2742 /** 2743 * In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current 2744 * keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry. 2745 * 2746 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. 2747 * @param vq: validator query state 2748 * @param id: module id. 2749 * @param rcode: rcode result value. 2750 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). 2751 * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. 2752 * @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns 2753 * is_bad if the DS response fails to validate, is_null if the 2754 * DS response indicated an end to secure space, is_good if the DS 2755 * validated. It returns ke=NULL if the DS response indicated that the 2756 * request wasn't a delegation point. 2757 * @return 2758 * 0 on success, 2759 * 1 on servfail error (malloc failure), 2760 * 2 on NSEC3 suspend. 2761 */ 2762 static int 2763 ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 2764 int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, 2765 struct key_entry_key** ke) 2766 { 2767 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; 2768 char* reason = NULL; 2769 sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS; 2770 enum val_classification subtype; 2771 int verified; 2772 if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 2773 char rc[16]; 2774 rc[0]=0; 2775 (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc)); 2776 /* errors here pretty much break validation */ 2777 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS response was error, thus bogus"); 2778 errinf(qstate, rc); 2779 reason = "no DS"; 2780 reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NETWORK_ERROR; 2781 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2782 goto return_bogus; 2783 } 2784 2785 subtype = val_classify_response(BIT_RD, qinfo, qinfo, msg->rep, 0); 2786 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { 2787 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds; 2788 enum sec_status sec; 2789 ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); 2790 /* If there was no DS rrset, then we have mis-classified 2791 * this message. */ 2792 if(!ds) { 2793 log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was " 2794 "missing DS."); 2795 reason = "no DS record"; 2796 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2797 goto return_bogus; 2798 } 2799 /* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is 2800 * bogus, then we are done. */ 2801 sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds, 2802 vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified); 2803 if(sec != sec_status_secure) { 2804 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did " 2805 "not verify"); 2806 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2807 goto return_bogus; 2808 } 2809 2810 /* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure 2811 * that they are usable. */ 2812 if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) { 2813 /* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like 2814 * there was no DS. */ 2815 *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, 2816 qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, 2817 ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds), 2818 LDNS_EDE_UNSUPPORTED_DS_DIGEST, NULL, 2819 *qstate->env->now); 2820 return (*ke) == NULL; 2821 } 2822 2823 /* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */ 2824 log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DS", qinfo); 2825 *ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region, 2826 qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds, 2827 NULL, LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL, *qstate->env->now); 2828 return (*ke) == NULL; 2829 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA || 2830 subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) { 2831 /* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was 2832 * no DS. This is a pretty normal case. */ 2833 time_t proof_ttl = 0; 2834 enum sec_status sec; 2835 2836 /* make sure there are NSECs or NSEC3s with signatures */ 2837 if(!val_has_signed_nsecs(msg->rep, &reason)) { 2838 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "no NSECs: %s", reason); 2839 reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NSEC_MISSING; 2840 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2841 goto return_bogus; 2842 } 2843 2844 /* For subtype Name Error. 2845 * attempt ANS 2.8.1.0 compatibility where it sets rcode 2846 * to nxdomain, but really this is an Nodata/Noerror response. 2847 * Find and prove the empty nonterminal in that case */ 2848 2849 /* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */ 2850 sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply( 2851 qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry, 2852 &proof_ttl, &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate); 2853 switch(sec) { 2854 case sec_status_secure: 2855 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " 2856 "referral proved no DS."); 2857 *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, 2858 qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, 2859 qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, 2860 LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL, 2861 *qstate->env->now); 2862 return (*ke) == NULL; 2863 case sec_status_insecure: 2864 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " 2865 "referral proved not a delegation point"); 2866 *ke = NULL; 2867 return 0; 2868 case sec_status_bogus: 2869 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " 2870 "referral did not prove no DS."); 2871 errinf(qstate, reason); 2872 goto return_bogus; 2873 case sec_status_unchecked: 2874 default: 2875 /* NSEC proof did not work, try next */ 2876 break; 2877 } 2878 2879 if(!nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) { 2880 log_err("malloc failure in ds_response_to_ke for " 2881 "NSEC3 cache"); 2882 reason = "malloc failure"; 2883 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, 0); 2884 goto return_bogus; 2885 } 2886 sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve, 2887 msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets, 2888 msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason, 2889 &reason_bogus, qstate, &vq->nsec3_cache_table); 2890 switch(sec) { 2891 case sec_status_insecure: 2892 /* case insecure also continues to unsigned 2893 * space. If nsec3-iter-count too high or 2894 * optout, then treat below as unsigned */ 2895 case sec_status_secure: 2896 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " 2897 "referral proved no DS."); 2898 *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, 2899 qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, 2900 qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, 2901 LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL, 2902 *qstate->env->now); 2903 return (*ke) == NULL; 2904 case sec_status_indeterminate: 2905 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " 2906 "referral proved no delegation"); 2907 *ke = NULL; 2908 return 0; 2909 case sec_status_bogus: 2910 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " 2911 "referral did not prove no DS."); 2912 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2913 goto return_bogus; 2914 case sec_status_unchecked: 2915 return 2; 2916 default: 2917 /* NSEC3 proof did not work */ 2918 break; 2919 } 2920 2921 /* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so 2922 * this is BOGUS. */ 2923 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS %s ran out of options, so return " 2924 "bogus", val_classification_to_string(subtype)); 2925 reason = "no DS but also no proof of that"; 2926 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2927 goto return_bogus; 2928 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || 2929 subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) { 2930 /* if the CNAME matches the exact name we want and is signed 2931 * properly, then also, we are sure that no DS exists there, 2932 * much like a NODATA proof */ 2933 enum sec_status sec; 2934 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname; 2935 cname = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, qinfo->qname, 2936 qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qinfo->qclass); 2937 if(!cname) { 2938 reason = "validator classified CNAME but no " 2939 "CNAME of the queried name for DS"; 2940 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2941 goto return_bogus; 2942 } 2943 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)cname->entry.data)->rrsig_count 2944 == 0) { 2945 if(msg->rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && ntohs(msg->rep-> 2946 rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { 2947 reason = "DS got DNAME answer"; 2948 } else { 2949 reason = "DS got unsigned CNAME answer"; 2950 } 2951 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2952 goto return_bogus; 2953 } 2954 sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname, 2955 vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus, 2956 LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified); 2957 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 2958 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, " 2959 "proof that DS does not exist"); 2960 /* and that it is not a referral point */ 2961 *ke = NULL; 2962 return 0; 2963 } 2964 errinf(qstate, "CNAME in DS response was not secure."); 2965 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 2966 goto return_bogus; 2967 } else { 2968 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Encountered an unhandled type of " 2969 "DS response, thus bogus."); 2970 errinf(qstate, "no DS and"); 2971 reason = "no DS"; 2972 if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 2973 char rc[16]; 2974 rc[0]=0; 2975 (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf((int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE( 2976 msg->rep->flags), rc, sizeof(rc)); 2977 errinf(qstate, rc); 2978 } else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); 2979 errinf(qstate, "message fails to prove that"); 2980 goto return_bogus; 2981 } 2982 return_bogus: 2983 *ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, 2984 qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, 2985 reason_bogus, reason, *qstate->env->now); 2986 return (*ke) == NULL; 2987 } 2988 2989 /** 2990 * Process DS response. Called from inform_supers. 2991 * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks 2992 * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead 2993 * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. 2994 * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. 2995 * 2996 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. 2997 * @param vq: validator query state 2998 * @param id: module id. 2999 * @param rcode: rcode result value. 3000 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). 3001 * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. 3002 * @param origin: the origin of msg. 3003 * @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to 3004 * suspend to continue the effort later. 3005 */ 3006 static void 3007 process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 3008 int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, 3009 struct sock_list* origin, int* suspend) 3010 { 3011 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; 3012 struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL; 3013 uint8_t* olds = vq->empty_DS_name; 3014 int ret; 3015 *suspend = 0; 3016 vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; 3017 ret = ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske); 3018 if(ret != 0) { 3019 switch(ret) { 3020 case 1: 3021 log_err("malloc failure in process_ds_response"); 3022 vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ 3023 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3024 return; 3025 case 2: 3026 *suspend = 1; 3027 return; 3028 default: 3029 log_err("unhandled error value for ds_response_to_ke"); 3030 vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ 3031 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3032 return; 3033 } 3034 } 3035 if(dske == NULL) { 3036 vq->empty_DS_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, 3037 qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len); 3038 if(!vq->empty_DS_name) { 3039 log_err("malloc failure in empty_DS_name"); 3040 vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ 3041 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3042 return; 3043 } 3044 vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len; 3045 vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; 3046 /* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point. 3047 * Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ 3048 } else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) { 3049 vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region); 3050 if(!vq->ds_rrset) { 3051 log_err("malloc failure in process DS"); 3052 vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ 3053 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3054 return; 3055 } 3056 vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* fresh blacklist for next part*/ 3057 /* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ 3058 } else if(key_entry_isbad(dske) 3059 && vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) { 3060 vq->empty_DS_name = olds; 3061 val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); 3062 qstate->errinf = NULL; 3063 vq->restart_count++; 3064 } else { 3065 if(key_entry_isbad(dske)) { 3066 errinf_origin(qstate, origin); 3067 errinf_dname(qstate, "for DS", qinfo->qname); 3068 } 3069 /* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is, 3070 * either bad or null) should have been logged by 3071 * dsResponseToKE. */ 3072 vq->key_entry = dske; 3073 /* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */ 3074 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3075 } 3076 } 3077 3078 /** 3079 * Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers. 3080 * Sets the key entry in the state. 3081 * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks 3082 * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead 3083 * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. 3084 * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. 3085 * 3086 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY. 3087 * @param vq: validator query state 3088 * @param id: module id. 3089 * @param rcode: rcode result value. 3090 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). 3091 * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. 3092 * @param origin: the origin of msg. 3093 */ 3094 static void 3095 process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 3096 int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, 3097 struct sock_list* origin) 3098 { 3099 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; 3100 struct key_entry_key* old = vq->key_entry; 3101 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL; 3102 int downprot; 3103 char* reason = NULL; 3104 sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS; 3105 3106 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) 3107 dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); 3108 3109 if(dnskey == NULL) { 3110 /* bad response */ 3111 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to " 3112 "DNSKEY query."); 3113 3114 if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) { 3115 val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, 3116 origin, 1); 3117 qstate->errinf = NULL; 3118 vq->restart_count++; 3119 return; 3120 } 3121 reason = "No DNSKEY record"; 3122 reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISSING; 3123 vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, 3124 qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, 3125 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, reason_bogus, reason, 3126 *qstate->env->now); 3127 if(!vq->key_entry) { 3128 log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response"); 3129 /* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */ 3130 } 3131 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 3132 errinf_origin(qstate, origin); 3133 errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); 3134 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3135 return; 3136 } 3137 if(!vq->ds_rrset) { 3138 log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response"); 3139 vq->key_entry = NULL; 3140 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3141 return; 3142 } 3143 downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; 3144 vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env, 3145 ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate); 3146 3147 if(!vq->key_entry) { 3148 log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs"); 3149 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3150 return; 3151 } 3152 /* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next 3153 * state. */ 3154 if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) { 3155 if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { 3156 if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) { 3157 val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, 3158 qstate->region, origin, 1); 3159 qstate->errinf = NULL; 3160 vq->restart_count++; 3161 vq->key_entry = old; 3162 return; 3163 } 3164 verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, " 3165 "thus bogus."); 3166 errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus); 3167 errinf_origin(qstate, origin); 3168 errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); 3169 } 3170 vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; 3171 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3172 return; 3173 } 3174 vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; 3175 qstate->errinf = NULL; 3176 3177 /* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */ 3178 key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, 3179 qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2); 3180 3181 /* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */ 3182 log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DNSKEY", qinfo); 3183 } 3184 3185 /** 3186 * Process prime response 3187 * Sets the key entry in the state. 3188 * 3189 * @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor. 3190 * @param vq: validator query state 3191 * @param id: module id. 3192 * @param rcode: rcode result value. 3193 * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). 3194 * @param origin: the origin of msg. 3195 */ 3196 static void 3197 process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, 3198 int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct sock_list* origin) 3199 { 3200 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; 3201 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL; 3202 struct trust_anchor* ta = anchor_find(qstate->env->anchors, 3203 vq->trust_anchor_name, vq->trust_anchor_labs, 3204 vq->trust_anchor_len, vq->qchase.qclass); 3205 if(!ta) { 3206 /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ 3207 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 3208 if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) 3209 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; /* break a loop */ 3210 vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; 3211 return; 3212 } 3213 /* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the 3214 * current trust anchor. */ 3215 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 3216 dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, 3217 ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, 3218 ta->dclass); 3219 } 3220 3221 if(ta->autr) { 3222 if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset, 3223 qstate)) { 3224 /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ 3225 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 3226 vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; 3227 return; 3228 } 3229 } 3230 vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(dnskey_rrset, ta, qstate, id); 3231 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); 3232 if(vq->key_entry) { 3233 if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry) 3234 && vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) { 3235 val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, 3236 origin, 1); 3237 qstate->errinf = NULL; 3238 vq->restart_count++; 3239 vq->key_entry = NULL; 3240 vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; 3241 return; 3242 } 3243 vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; 3244 errinf_origin(qstate, origin); 3245 errinf_dname(qstate, "for trust anchor", ta->name); 3246 /* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */ 3247 key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, 3248 qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2); 3249 } 3250 3251 /* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/ 3252 if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry) || 3253 key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { 3254 vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; 3255 } 3256 /* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */ 3257 } 3258 3259 /* 3260 * inform validator super. 3261 * 3262 * @param qstate: query state that finished. 3263 * @param id: module id. 3264 * @param super: the qstate to inform. 3265 */ 3266 void 3267 val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, 3268 struct module_qstate* super) 3269 { 3270 struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id]; 3271 log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is", 3272 &qstate->qinfo); 3273 log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo); 3274 if(!vq) { 3275 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state"); 3276 return; 3277 } 3278 if(vq->wait_prime_ta) { 3279 vq->wait_prime_ta = 0; 3280 process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, 3281 qstate->return_msg, qstate->reply_origin); 3282 return; 3283 } 3284 if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) { 3285 int suspend; 3286 process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, 3287 qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, 3288 qstate->reply_origin, &suspend); 3289 /* If NSEC3 was needed during validation, NULL the NSEC3 cache; 3290 * it will be re-initiated if needed later on. 3291 * Validation (and the cache table) are happening/allocated in 3292 * the super qstate whilst the RRs are allocated (and pointed 3293 * to) in this sub qstate. */ 3294 if(vq->nsec3_cache_table.ct) { 3295 vq->nsec3_cache_table.ct = NULL; 3296 } 3297 if(suspend) { 3298 /* deep copy the return_msg to vq->sub_ds_msg; it will 3299 * be resumed later in the super state with the caveat 3300 * that the initial calculations will be re-caclulated 3301 * and re-suspended there before continuing. */ 3302 vq->sub_ds_msg = dns_msg_deepcopy_region( 3303 qstate->return_msg, super->region); 3304 } 3305 return; 3306 } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) { 3307 process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, 3308 qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, 3309 qstate->reply_origin); 3310 return; 3311 } 3312 log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible"); 3313 } 3314 3315 void 3316 val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) 3317 { 3318 struct val_qstate* vq; 3319 if(!qstate) 3320 return; 3321 vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; 3322 if(vq) { 3323 if(vq->suspend_timer) { 3324 comm_timer_delete(vq->suspend_timer); 3325 } 3326 } 3327 /* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */ 3328 qstate->minfo[id] = NULL; 3329 } 3330 3331 size_t 3332 val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id) 3333 { 3334 struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; 3335 if(!ve) 3336 return 0; 3337 return sizeof(*ve) + key_cache_get_mem(ve->kcache) + 3338 val_neg_get_mem(ve->neg_cache) + 3339 sizeof(size_t)*2*ve->nsec3_keyiter_count; 3340 } 3341 3342 /** 3343 * The validator function block 3344 */ 3345 static struct module_func_block val_block = { 3346 "validator", 3347 &val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super, &val_clear, 3348 &val_get_mem 3349 }; 3350 3351 struct module_func_block* 3352 val_get_funcblock(void) 3353 { 3354 return &val_block; 3355 } 3356 3357 const char* 3358 val_state_to_string(enum val_state state) 3359 { 3360 switch(state) { 3361 case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE"; 3362 case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE"; 3363 case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE"; 3364 case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE"; 3365 } 3366 return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE"; 3367 } 3368 3369