| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ |
| H A D | verifier_kfunc_perfmon.c | 15 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
27 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
41 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
52 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
67 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
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| H A D | verifier_mtu.c | 10 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF|CAP_NET_ADMIN)
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| H A D | verifier_loops1.c | 292 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
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| H A D | verifier_spill_fill.c | 1278 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
1296 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
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| H A D | bpf_misc.h | 175 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
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| /linux/tools/perf/util/ |
| H A D | cap.h | 17 #ifndef CAP_BPF
18 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
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| H A D | bpf-filter.c | 634 if (perf_cap__capable(CAP_BPF)) in check_bpf_filter_capable()
644 pr_err("Error: BPF filter only works for users with the CAP_BPF capability!\n" in check_bpf_filter_capable()
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| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ |
| H A D | cap_helpers.h | 13 #ifndef CAP_BPF macro
14 #define CAP_BPF 39
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| H A D | test_loader.c | 1019 1ULL << CAP_PERFMON | 1ULL << CAP_BPF); in drop_capabilities()
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| H A D | test_verifier.c | 71 1ULL << CAP_BPF)
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| /linux/include/linux/ |
| H A D | capability.h | 202 return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); in bpf_capable()
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| H A D | filter.h | 1464 if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_jit_blinding_enabled()
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| /linux/kernel/bpf/ |
| H A D | token.c | 146 if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_token_create()
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| H A D | syscall.c | 1285 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in map_check_btf()
1481 if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create_alloc()
1518 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create_alloc()
2885 /* equivalent to SOCKET_FILTER. need CAP_BPF only */ in is_perfmon_prog_type()
2977 bpf_cap = bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF); in BTF_ID_LIST_GLOBAL_SINGLE()
5601 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in bpf_btf_get_fd_by_id()
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| H A D | core.c | 674 !bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_prog_kallsyms_add()
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| H A D | helpers.c | 2124 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_base_func_proto()
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| H A D | verifier.c | 2945 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); in add_subprogs()
2948 "loading or calling other BPF functions requires CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN", in add_subprogs()
3001 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); in add_kfuncs()
3004 "calling kernel functions requires CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN", in add_kfuncs()
18917 verbose(env, "CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON are required to use arena\n"); in check_map_prog_compatibility()
21235 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_check()
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| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ |
| H A D | unpriv_bpf_disabled.c | 14 * an old /usr/include/linux/capability.h and be < CAP_BPF; as a result
15 * CAP_BPF would not be included in ALL_CAPS. Instead use CAP_BPF as
19 #define ALL_CAPS ((2ULL << CAP_BPF) - 1)
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| H A D | tc_bpf.c | 405 ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps); in tc_bpf_non_root()
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| H A D | token.c | 66 return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) | in restore_priv_caps()
520 * CAP_BPF inside current userns to create privileged map; let's test in userns_map_create()
521 * that neither BPF token alone nor namespaced CAP_BPF is sufficient in userns_map_create()
527 /* no token, no CAP_BPF -> fail */ in userns_map_create()
536 /* token without CAP_BPF -> fail */ in userns_map_create()
545 /* get back effective local CAP_BPF (and CAP_SYS_ADMIN) */ in userns_map_create()
550 /* CAP_BPF without token -> fail */ in userns_map_create()
559 /* finally, namespaced CAP_BPF + token -> success */ in userns_map_create()
591 * CAP_BPF inside current userns to create privileged map; let's test in userns_btf_load()
592 * that neither BPF token alone nor namespaced CAP_BPF i in userns_btf_load()
[all...] |
| /linux/Documentation/bpf/ |
| H A D | signing.rst | 26 privileges (``CAP_BPF`` and any program-type-specific capability, subject to
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| H A D | kfuncs.rst | 496 bpf_base_func_proto(). A program loaded with CAP_BPF alone is rejected at load
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| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/ |
| H A D | kernel.rst | 1675 once disabled, calling ``bpf()`` without ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` or ``CAP_BPF``
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| /linux/net/core/ |
| H A D | filter.c | 9169 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
9181 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
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