1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include "internal/e_os.h"
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <limits.h>
14 #include <errno.h>
15 #include <assert.h>
16 #include "../ssl_local.h"
17 #include "../quic/quic_local.h"
18 #include <openssl/evp.h>
19 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
20 #include <openssl/rand.h>
21 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
22 #include "record_local.h"
23 #include "internal/packet.h"
24 #include "internal/comp.h"
25 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
26
RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER * rl,SSL_CONNECTION * s)27 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
28 {
29 rl->s = s;
30 }
31
RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER * rl)32 int RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
33 {
34 int ret = 1;
35
36 /* Clear any buffered records we no longer need */
37 while (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
38 ret &= ssl_release_record(rl->s,
39 &(rl->tlsrecs[rl->curr_rec++]),
40 0);
41
42
43 rl->wnum = 0;
44 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
45 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
46 rl->wpend_tot = 0;
47 rl->wpend_type = 0;
48 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
49 rl->alert_count = 0;
50 rl->num_recs = 0;
51 rl->curr_rec = 0;
52
53 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
54 rl->rrlnext = NULL;
55
56 if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL)
57 rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */
58 if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL)
59 rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */
60 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
61 rl->rrlmethod = NULL;
62 rl->wrlmethod = NULL;
63 rl->rrlnext = NULL;
64 rl->rrl = NULL;
65 rl->wrl = NULL;
66
67 if (rl->d)
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
69
70 return ret;
71 }
72
RECORD_LAYER_reset(RECORD_LAYER * rl)73 int RECORD_LAYER_reset(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
74 {
75 int ret;
76
77 ret = RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
78
79 /* We try and reset both record layers even if one fails */
80 ret &= ssl_set_new_record_layer(rl->s,
81 SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s)
82 ? DTLS_ANY_VERSION : TLS_ANY_VERSION,
83 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ,
84 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0,
85 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
86 NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL);
87
88 ret &= ssl_set_new_record_layer(rl->s,
89 SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s)
90 ? DTLS_ANY_VERSION : TLS_ANY_VERSION,
91 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
92 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0,
93 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
94 NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL);
95
96 /* SSLfatal already called in the event of failure */
97 return ret;
98 }
99
100 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)101 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
102 {
103 return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
104 }
105
106 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)107 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
108 {
109 return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
110 || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
111 }
112
RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)113 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
114 {
115 return rl->wpend_tot > 0;
116 }
117
ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION * s)118 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
119 {
120 uint32_t max_early_data;
121 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
122
123 /*
124 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
125 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
126 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
127 */
128 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
129 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
130 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
132 return 0;
133 }
134 sess = s->psksession;
135 }
136
137 if (!s->server)
138 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
139 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
140 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
141 else
142 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
143 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
144
145 return max_early_data;
146 }
147
ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION * s,size_t length,size_t overhead,int send)148 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t length,
149 size_t overhead, int send)
150 {
151 uint32_t max_early_data;
152
153 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
154
155 if (max_early_data == 0) {
156 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
157 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
158 return 0;
159 }
160
161 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
162 max_early_data += overhead;
163
164 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
165 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
166 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
167 return 0;
168 }
169 s->early_data_count += length;
170
171 return 1;
172 }
173
ssl3_pending(const SSL * s)174 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
175 {
176 size_t i, num = 0;
177 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
178
179 if (sc == NULL)
180 return 0;
181
182 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
183 TLS_RECORD *rdata;
184 pitem *item, *iter;
185
186 iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data);
187 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
188 rdata = item->data;
189 num += rdata->length;
190 }
191 }
192
193 for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) {
194 if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
195 return num;
196 num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length;
197 }
198
199 num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl);
200
201 return num;
202 }
203
SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX * ctx,size_t len)204 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
205 {
206 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
207 }
208
SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL * s,size_t len)209 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
210 {
211 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
212
213 if (sc == NULL || IS_QUIC(s))
214 return;
215 sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len;
216 }
217
SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL * s)218 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
219 {
220 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
221 const char *lng;
222
223 if (sc == NULL)
224 return NULL;
225
226 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
227 return "unknown";
228
229 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng);
230
231 return lng;
232 }
233
SSL_rstate_string(const SSL * s)234 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
235 {
236 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
237 const char *shrt;
238
239 if (sc == NULL)
240 return NULL;
241
242 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
243 return "unknown";
244
245 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL);
246
247 return shrt;
248 }
249
tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION * s,uint8_t type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t len)250 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type,
251 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
252 {
253 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0)
254 return 0;
255
256 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
257 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
258 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
259 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
260 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
262 return -1;
263 }
264 return 1;
265 }
266
267 /*
268 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
269 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
270 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * ssl,uint8_t type,const void * buf_,size_t len,size_t * written)271 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
272 size_t *written)
273 {
274 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
275 size_t tot;
276 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
277 int i;
278 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
279 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
280 unsigned int recversion;
281
282 if (s == NULL)
283 return -1;
284
285 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
286 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
287 /*
288 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
289 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
290 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
291 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
292 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
293 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
294 * report the error in a way the user will notice
295 */
296 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
297 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0)
298 && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
300 return -1;
301 }
302
303 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
304 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
305 /* SSLfatal() already called */
306 return -1;
307 }
308
309 s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
310
311 /*
312 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
313 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
314 * doing that first.
315 */
316 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
317 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
318 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
319
320 /*
321 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
322 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
323 * messages yet.
324 */
325 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
326 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
327 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
328 /* SSLfatal() already called */
329 if (i < 0)
330 return i;
331 if (i == 0) {
332 return -1;
333 }
334 }
335
336 i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len);
337 if (i < 0) {
338 /* SSLfatal() already called */
339 return i;
340 } else if (i > 0) {
341 /* Retry needed */
342 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
343 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl));
344 if (i <= 0) {
345 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
346 return i;
347 }
348 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
349 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
350 } /* else no retry required */
351
352 if (tot == 0) {
353 /*
354 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
355 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
356 */
357 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
358 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
359 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
360 }
361
362 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
363 *written = tot;
364 return 1;
365 }
366
367 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
368 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) {
369 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
370 if (i <= 0) {
371 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
372 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
373 return i;
374 }
375 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
376 }
377
378 n = (len - tot);
379
380 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
381 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
382
383 if (max_send_fragment == 0
384 || split_send_fragment == 0
385 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
386 /*
387 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
388 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
389 */
390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
391 return -1;
392 }
393
394 /*
395 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
396 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
397 */
398 recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
399 if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
400 && !s->renegotiate
401 && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
402 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
403 recversion = TLS1_VERSION;
404
405 for (;;) {
406 size_t tmppipelen, remain;
407 size_t j, lensofar = 0;
408
409 /*
410 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
411 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
412 */
413 maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n,
414 max_send_fragment,
415 &split_send_fragment);
416 /*
417 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
418 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
419 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
420 * configured by the user.
421 */
422 if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines)
423 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
424
425 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
426 maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES;
427
428 if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 return -1;
431 }
432
433 if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
434 /*
435 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
436 * pipelines
437 */
438 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
439 tmpls[j].type = type;
440 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
441 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment);
442 tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment;
443 }
444 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
445 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment;
446 } else {
447 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
448 tmppipelen = n / maxpipes;
449 remain = n % maxpipes;
450 /*
451 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
452 * pipelines
453 */
454 if (remain > 0)
455 tmppipelen++;
456 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
457 tmpls[j].type = type;
458 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
459 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar;
460 tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen;
461 lensofar += tmppipelen;
462 if (j + 1 == remain)
463 tmppipelen--;
464 }
465 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
466 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n;
467 }
468
469 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
470 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes));
471 if (i <= 0) {
472 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
473 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
474 return i;
475 }
476
477 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n
478 || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
479 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) {
480 *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
481 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
482 return 1;
483 }
484
485 n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
486 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
487 }
488 }
489
ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int writing,int ret,char * file,int line)490 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret,
491 char *file, int line)
492 {
493 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
494
495 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
496 s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING;
497 ret = -1;
498 } else {
499 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
500 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) {
501 if (writing) {
502 /*
503 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
504 * as fatal.
505 */
506 ERR_new();
507 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
508 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
509 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL);
510 ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
511 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) {
512 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
513 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
514 } else {
515 ERR_new();
516 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
517 /*
518 * This reason code is part of the API and may be used by
519 * applications for control flow decisions.
520 */
521 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
522 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL);
523 }
524 } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) {
525 int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl);
526
527 if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) {
528 ERR_new();
529 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
530 ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL);
531 }
532 /*
533 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
534 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
535 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
536 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
537 */
538 }
539 /*
540 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
541 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
542 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
543 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
544 */
545 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF)
546 ret = 0;
547 else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR)
548 ret = -1;
549 }
550
551 return ret;
552 }
553
554 /*
555 * Release data from a record.
556 * If length == 0 then we will release the entire record.
557 */
ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION * s,TLS_RECORD * rr,size_t length)558 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr, size_t length)
559 {
560 assert(rr->length >= length);
561 if (rr->rechandle != NULL) {
562 if (length == 0)
563 length = rr->length;
564 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
565 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
566 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
567 rr->rechandle,
568 length)) <= 0) {
569 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
570 return 0;
571 }
572
573 if (length == rr->length)
574 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
575 } else if (length == 0 || length == rr->length) {
576 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
577 OPENSSL_free(rr->allocdata);
578 rr->allocdata = NULL;
579 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
580 }
581 rr->length -= length;
582 if (rr->length > 0)
583 rr->off += length;
584 else
585 rr->off = 0;
586
587 return 1;
588 }
589
590 /*-
591 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
592 * 'type' is one of the following:
593 *
594 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when tls_get_message_header and tls_get_message_body
595 * call us)
596 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
597 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
598 *
599 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read an SSL/TLS record first
600 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
601 *
602 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
603 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
604 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
605 * argument is non NULL.
606 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
607 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
608 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
609 * Change cipher spec protocol
610 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
611 * Alert protocol
612 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
613 * Handshake protocol
614 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
615 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
616 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
617 * Application data protocol
618 * none of our business
619 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * ssl,uint8_t type,uint8_t * recvd_type,unsigned char * buf,size_t len,int peek,size_t * readbytes)620 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type,
621 unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
622 int peek, size_t *readbytes)
623 {
624 int i, j, ret;
625 size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes;
626 TLS_RECORD *rr;
627 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
628 int is_tls13;
629 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
630
631 is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
632
633 if ((type != 0
634 && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
635 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
636 || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
638 return -1;
639 }
640
641 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
642 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
643 {
644 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
645 unsigned char *dst = buf;
646 unsigned int k;
647
648 /* peek == 0 */
649 n = 0;
650 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
651 *dst++ = *src++;
652 len--;
653 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
654 n++;
655 }
656 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
657 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
658 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
659
660 if (recvd_type != NULL)
661 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
662
663 *readbytes = n;
664 return 1;
665 }
666
667 /*
668 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
669 */
670
671 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
672 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
673 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
674 /* SSLfatal() already called */
675 if (i < 0)
676 return i;
677 if (i == 0)
678 return -1;
679 }
680 start:
681 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
682
683 /*-
684 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
685 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
686 * rr[i].data, - data
687 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
688 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
689 */
690 /* get new records if necessary */
691 if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) {
692 s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
693 do {
694 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs];
695
696 ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
697 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
698 &rr->rechandle,
699 &rr->version, &rr->type,
700 &rr->data, &rr->length,
701 NULL, NULL));
702 if (ret <= 0) {
703 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
704 return ret;
705 }
706 rr->off = 0;
707 s->rlayer.num_recs++;
708 } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl)
709 && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
710 }
711 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec];
712
713 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
714 && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
715 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
717 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
718 return -1;
719 }
720
721 /*
722 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
723 * record that isn't an alert.
724 */
725 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
726 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
727
728 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
729
730 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
731 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
732 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
734 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
735 return -1;
736 }
737
738 /*
739 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
740 * 'peek' mode)
741 */
742 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
743 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
744 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
745 return 0;
746 }
747
748 if (type == rr->type
749 || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
750 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
751 && !is_tls13)) {
752 /*
753 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
754 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
755 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
756 */
757 /*
758 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
759 * doing a handshake for the first time
760 */
761 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
762 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
764 return -1;
765 }
766
767 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
768 && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
769 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
771 return -1;
772 }
773
774 if (recvd_type != NULL)
775 *recvd_type = rr->type;
776
777 if (len == 0) {
778 /*
779 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
780 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
781 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
782 */
783 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
784 return -1;
785
786 return 0;
787 }
788
789 totalbytes = 0;
790 curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec;
791 do {
792 if (len - totalbytes > rr->length)
793 n = rr->length;
794 else
795 n = len - totalbytes;
796
797 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
798 buf += n;
799 if (peek) {
800 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
801 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
802 return -1;
803 } else {
804 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
805 return -1;
806 }
807 if (rr->length == 0
808 || (peek && n == rr->length)) {
809 rr++;
810 curr_rec++;
811 }
812 totalbytes += n;
813 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
814 && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs
815 && totalbytes < len);
816 if (totalbytes == 0) {
817 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
818 goto start;
819 }
820 *readbytes = totalbytes;
821 return 1;
822 }
823
824 /*
825 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
826 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
827 * were actually expecting a CCS).
828 */
829
830 /*
831 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
832 */
833 if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
834 /*
835 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
836 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
837 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
838 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
839 */
840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
841 return -1;
842 }
843
844 if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
845 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
846 /*
847 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
848 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
849 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
850 * if we are a server.
851 */
852 s->version = rr->version;
853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
854 return -1;
855 }
856
857 /*-
858 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
859 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
860 */
861
862 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
863 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
864 const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off;
865 PACKET alert;
866
867 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
868 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
869 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
870 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
872 return -1;
873 }
874
875 if (s->msg_callback)
876 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
877 s->msg_callback_arg);
878
879 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
880 cb = s->info_callback;
881 else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
882 cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
883
884 if (cb != NULL) {
885 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
886 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
887 }
888
889 if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
890 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
891 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
892 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
893 return -1;
894
895 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
896 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
898 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
899 return -1;
900 }
901 }
902
903 /*
904 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
905 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
906 */
907 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
908 goto start;
909 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
910 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
911 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
912 return 0;
913 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
914 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
915 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
916 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
917 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
918 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
919 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
920 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
921 return -1;
922 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
923 return 0;
924 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
925 /*
926 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
927 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
928 * alert because if the application tried to renegotiate it
929 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
930 * the future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care
931 * if the peer refused it where we carry on.
932 */
933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
934 return -1;
935 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
936 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
937 goto start;
938 }
939
940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
941 return -1;
942 }
943
944 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
945 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
946 BIO *rbio;
947
948 /*
949 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
950 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
951 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
952 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
953 * sent close_notify.
954 */
955 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
956 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
957 return -1;
958
959 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
960 goto start;
961
962 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
963 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
964 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
965 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
966 return -1;
967 }
968 } else {
969 /*
970 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
971 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
972 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
973 * above.
974 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
975 */
976 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
977 return -1;
978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
979 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
980 return -1;
981 }
982 }
983
984 /*
985 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
986 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
987 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
988 * that we're just going to discard.
989 */
990 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
991 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
992 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
993 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
994
995 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
996 if (rr->length < n)
997 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
998
999 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1000 if (n > 0) {
1001 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n);
1002 *dest_len += n;
1003 }
1004 /*
1005 * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it
1006 * is zero length
1007 */
1008 if ((n > 0 || rr->length == 0) && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
1009 return -1;
1010
1011 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1012 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1013 }
1014
1015 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1017 return -1;
1018 }
1019
1020 /*
1021 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1022 * protocol violation)
1023 */
1024 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1025 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1026 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1027
1028 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1029 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1030
1031 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
1032 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1033 if (i < 0)
1034 return i;
1035 if (i == 0) {
1036 return -1;
1037 }
1038
1039 /*
1040 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1041 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1042 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1043 */
1044 if (ined)
1045 return -1;
1046
1047 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1048 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1049 BIO *bio;
1050 /*
1051 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1052 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1053 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1054 * problems in the blocking world
1055 */
1056 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1057 bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
1058 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1059 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1060 return -1;
1061 }
1062 }
1063 goto start;
1064 }
1065
1066 switch (rr->type) {
1067 default:
1068 /*
1069 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1070 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1071 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1072 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1073 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1074 */
1075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1076 return -1;
1077 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1078 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1079 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1080 /*
1081 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1082 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1083 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1084 */
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1086 return -1;
1087 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1088 /*
1089 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1090 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1091 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1092 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1093 * started), we will indulge it.
1094 */
1095 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1096 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1097 return -1;
1098 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1099 /*
1100 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1101 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1102 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1103 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1104 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1105 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1106 * record.
1107 */
1108 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1109 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1110 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1111 return -1;
1112 }
1113 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
1114 return -1;
1115 goto start;
1116 } else {
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1118 return -1;
1119 }
1120 }
1121 }
1122
1123 /*
1124 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1125 * format and false otherwise.
1126 */
RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1127 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1128 {
1129 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
1130 return 0;
1131 return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION;
1132 }
1133
1134 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper;
rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p,int version,int content_type,const void * buf,size_t len,void * cbarg)1135 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version,
1136 int content_type, const void *buf,
1137 size_t len, void *cbarg)
1138 {
1139 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1140 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1141
1142 if (s->msg_callback != NULL)
1143 s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
1144 s->msg_callback_arg);
1145 }
1146
1147 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper;
rlayer_security_wrapper(void * cbarg,int op,int bits,int nid,void * other)1148 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid,
1149 void *other)
1150 {
1151 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1152
1153 return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other);
1154 }
1155
1156 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper;
rlayer_padding_wrapper(void * cbarg,int type,size_t len)1157 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len)
1158 {
1159 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1160 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1161
1162 return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len,
1163 s->rlayer.record_padding_arg);
1164 }
1165
1166 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = {
1167 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data },
1168 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper },
1169 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper },
1170 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper },
1171 OSSL_DISPATCH_END
1172 };
1173
ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD * meth,void * rlarg)1174 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1175 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth,
1176 void *rlarg)
1177 {
1178 s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod = meth;
1179 s->rlayer.rlarg = rlarg;
1180 }
1181
ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int direction,int level)1182 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1183 int direction,
1184 int level)
1185 {
1186 if (s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod != NULL)
1187 return s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod;
1188
1189 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
1190 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1191 return &ossl_dtls_record_method;
1192
1193 return &ossl_tls_record_method;
1194 }
1195
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1197 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1198 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1199 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0
1200 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)))
1201 return &ossl_ktls_record_method;
1202 #endif
1203
1204 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1205 return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod
1206 : s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1207 }
1208
ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int direction)1209 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction)
1210 {
1211 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod;
1212 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl;
1213
1214 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1215 thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1216 thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl;
1217 } else {
1218 thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1219 thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
1220 }
1221
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1223 {
1224 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1225
1226 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) {
1227 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1228 SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1229 }
1230 }
1231 #endif
1232 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
1233 thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1);
1234
1235 if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL)
1236 thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines);
1237
1238 return 1;
1239 }
1240
ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int version,int direction,int level,unsigned char * secret,size_t secretlen,unsigned char * key,size_t keylen,unsigned char * iv,size_t ivlen,unsigned char * mackey,size_t mackeylen,const EVP_CIPHER * ciph,size_t taglen,int mactype,const EVP_MD * md,const SSL_COMP * comp,const EVP_MD * kdfdigest)1241 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1242 int direction, int level,
1243 unsigned char *secret, size_t secretlen,
1244 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
1245 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
1246 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
1247 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
1248 int mactype, const EVP_MD *md,
1249 const SSL_COMP *comp, const EVP_MD *kdfdigest)
1250 {
1251 OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options;
1252 OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings;
1253 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod;
1254 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL;
1255 BIO *thisbio;
1256 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1257 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth;
1258 int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0;
1259 unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE)
1260 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
1261 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1262 int use_early_data = 0;
1263 uint32_t max_early_data;
1264 COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method;
1265
1266 meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level);
1267
1268 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1269 thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1270 thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl;
1271 thisbio = s->rbio;
1272 } else {
1273 thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1274 thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl;
1275 thisbio = s->wbio;
1276 }
1277
1278 if (meth == NULL)
1279 meth = *thismethod;
1280
1281 if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) {
1282 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 return 0;
1284 }
1285
1286 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1287 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS,
1288 &s->options);
1289 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE,
1290 &s->mode);
1291 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1292 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN,
1293 &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len);
1294 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD,
1295 &s->rlayer.read_ahead);
1296 } else {
1297 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING,
1298 &s->rlayer.block_padding);
1299 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_HS_PADDING,
1300 &s->rlayer.hs_padding);
1301 }
1302 *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1303
1304 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1305 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1306 use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1307 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1308 stream_mac = 1;
1309
1310 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1311 tlstree = 1;
1312 } else {
1313 use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1314 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1315 stream_mac = 1;
1316
1317 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1318 tlstree = 1;
1319 }
1320
1321 if (use_etm)
1322 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM,
1323 &use_etm);
1324
1325 if (stream_mac)
1326 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC,
1327 &stream_mac);
1328
1329 if (tlstree)
1330 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE,
1331 &tlstree);
1332
1333 /*
1334 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1335 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1336 */
1337 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1338 && s->session != NULL
1339 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1340 maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1341
1342
1343 if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1344 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN,
1345 &maxfrag);
1346
1347 /*
1348 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1349 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1350 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1351 */
1352 if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1353 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1354 || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
1355 } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) {
1356 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY);
1357 }
1358 if (use_early_data) {
1359 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
1360
1361 if (max_early_data != 0)
1362 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA,
1363 &max_early_data);
1364 }
1365
1366 *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1367
1368 for (;;) {
1369 int rlret;
1370 BIO *prev = NULL;
1371 BIO *next = NULL;
1372 unsigned int epoch = 0;
1373 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)];
1374 size_t i, j;
1375
1376 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1377 prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext;
1378 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1379 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1380 epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ); /* new epoch */
1381
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1383 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1384 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1385 else
1386 #endif
1387 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1388
1389 if (next == NULL) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1391 return 0;
1392 }
1393 s->rlayer.rrlnext = next;
1394 } else {
1395 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1396 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1397 epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); /* new epoch */
1398 }
1399
1400 /*
1401 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1402 * callbacks that we don't need.
1403 */
1404 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) {
1405 switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) {
1406 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK:
1407 if (s->msg_callback == NULL)
1408 continue;
1409 break;
1410 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING:
1411 if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL)
1412 continue;
1413 break;
1414 default:
1415 break;
1416 }
1417 rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i];
1418 }
1419
1420 rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version,
1421 s->server, direction, level, epoch,
1422 secret, secretlen, key, keylen, iv,
1423 ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, taglen,
1424 mactype, md, compm, kdfdigest, prev,
1425 thisbio, next, NULL, NULL, settings,
1426 options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp, s,
1427 s->rlayer.rlarg, &newrl);
1428 BIO_free(prev);
1429 switch (rlret) {
1430 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL:
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE);
1432 return 0;
1433
1434 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR:
1435 if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) {
1436 /*
1437 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1438 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1439 */
1440 meth = *thismethod;
1441 continue;
1442 }
1443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER);
1444 return 0;
1445
1446 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS:
1447 break;
1448
1449 default:
1450 /* Should not happen */
1451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 return 0;
1453 }
1454 break;
1455 }
1456
1457 /*
1458 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1459 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1460 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1461 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1462 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1463 */
1464 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1465 || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1466 || pqueue_peek(s->d1->sent_messages) == NULL) {
1467 if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 return 0;
1470 }
1471 }
1472
1473 *thisrl = newrl;
1474 *thismethod = meth;
1475
1476 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction);
1477 }
1478
ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int vers)1479 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers)
1480 {
1481 if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)
1482 || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL))
1483 return 0;
1484 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version);
1485 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version);
1486
1487 return 1;
1488 }
1489