1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
30 #include "internal/comp.h"
31 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
32
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
34 PACKET *pkt);
35 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 PACKET *pkt);
37
38 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
39 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
40 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
41 WPACKET *pkt);
42
received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION * sc)43 static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
44 {
45 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
46 }
47
48 /*
49 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
50 *
51 * Return values are:
52 * 1: Yes
53 * 0: No
54 */
cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION * s)55 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
56 {
57 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
58 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
59 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
60 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
61 return 0;
62
63 return 1;
64 }
65
66 /*
67 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
68 *
69 * Return values are:
70 * 1: Yes
71 * 0: No
72 */
key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION * s)73 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
74 {
75 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
76
77 /*
78 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
79 * ciphersuite or for SRP
80 */
81 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSRP)) {
82 return 1;
83 }
84
85 return 0;
86 }
87
88 /*
89 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
90 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
91 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
92 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
93 *
94 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
95 * (transition not allowed)
96 */
ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int mt)97 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
98 {
99 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
100
101 /*
102 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
103 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
104 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
105 */
106
107 switch (st->hand_state) {
108 default:
109 break;
110
111 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
112 /*
113 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
114 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
115 */
116 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
117 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
118 return 1;
119 }
120 break;
121
122 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
125 return 1;
126 }
127 break;
128
129 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
130 if (s->hit) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
133 return 1;
134 }
135 } else {
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
142 return 1;
143 }
144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
145 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
146 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
148 return 1;
149 }
150 #endif
151 }
152 break;
153
154 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
157 return 1;
158 }
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
160 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
161 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
163 return 1;
164 }
165 #endif
166 break;
167
168 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
169 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
172 return 1;
173 }
174 break;
175
176 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
177 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
178 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
179 return 1;
180 }
181 break;
182
183 case TLS_ST_OK:
184 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
185 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
186 return 1;
187 }
188 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
190 return 1;
191 }
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
193 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
194 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
195 #error Internal DTLS version error
196 #endif
197 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
198 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
199 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
200 /*
201 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
202 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
203 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
204 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
205 */
206 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
208 return 0;
209 }
210 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
211 return 1;
212 }
213 }
214 break;
215 }
216
217 /* No valid transition found */
218 return 0;
219 }
220
221 /*
222 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
223 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
224 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
225 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
226 *
227 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
228 * (transition not allowed)
229 */
ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s,int mt)230 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
231 {
232 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
233 int ske_expected;
234
235 /*
236 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
237 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
238 */
239 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
240 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
241 goto err;
242 return 1;
243 }
244
245 switch (st->hand_state) {
246 default:
247 break;
248
249 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
252 return 1;
253 }
254
255 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
256 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
257 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
258 return 1;
259 }
260 }
261 break;
262
263 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
264 /*
265 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
266 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
267 * HelloRetryRequest.
268 */
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
271 return 1;
272 }
273 break;
274
275 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
276 if (s->hit) {
277 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
278 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
280 return 1;
281 }
282 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
283 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
284 return 1;
285 }
286 } else {
287 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
288 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
289 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
290 return 1;
291 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
292 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
293 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
294 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
295 /*
296 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
297 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
298 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
299 * the server is resuming.
300 */
301 s->hit = 1;
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
303 return 1;
304 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
305 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
306 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
308 return 1;
309 }
310 } else {
311 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
312 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
313 if (ske_expected
314 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
315 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
316 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
318 return 1;
319 }
320 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
321 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
322 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 return 1;
324 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
326 return 1;
327 }
328 }
329 }
330 break;
331
332 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
333 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
334 /*
335 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
336 * |ext.status_expected| is set
337 */
338 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
340 return 1;
341 }
342 /* Fall through */
343
344 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
345 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
346 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
347 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
350 return 1;
351 }
352 goto err;
353 }
354 /* Fall through */
355
356 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
358 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
360 return 1;
361 }
362 goto err;
363 }
364 /* Fall through */
365
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
369 return 1;
370 }
371 break;
372
373 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
374 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
377 return 1;
378 }
379 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
381 return 1;
382 }
383 break;
384
385 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
386 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
388 return 1;
389 }
390 break;
391
392 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
393 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
394 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
395 return 1;
396 }
397 break;
398
399 case TLS_ST_OK:
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
402 return 1;
403 }
404 break;
405 }
406
407 err:
408 /* No valid transition found */
409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
410 BIO *rbio;
411
412 /*
413 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
414 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
415 */
416 s->init_num = 0;
417 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
418 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
419 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
420 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
421 return 0;
422 }
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
424 return 0;
425 }
426
do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION * sc)427 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
428 {
429 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
430 return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
431 && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
432 }
433
434 /*
435 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
436 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
437 * server.
438 */
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s)439 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
440 {
441 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
442
443 /*
444 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
445 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
446 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
447 */
448 switch (st->hand_state) {
449 default:
450 /* Shouldn't happen */
451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
453
454 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
455 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
456 if (do_compressed_cert(s))
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
458 else
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 }
462 /*
463 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
464 * we already sent close_notify
465 */
466 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
469 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
470 }
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473
474 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
475 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
476 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
478 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
479 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
481 else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
485 else
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
487
488 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490
491 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
492 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED && !SSL_NO_EOED(s)) {
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 }
496 /* Fall through */
497
498 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
499 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
500 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
502 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
504 else
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
506 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
507
508 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
509 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
510 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
511 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
512 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514
515 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518
519 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
520 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
521 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
522 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525
526 case TLS_ST_OK:
527 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
530 }
531
532 /* Try to read from the server instead */
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
534 }
535 }
536
537 /*
538 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
539 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
540 */
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION * s)541 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
542 {
543 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
544
545 /*
546 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
547 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
548 * later
549 */
550 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
551 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
552
553 switch (st->hand_state) {
554 default:
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
558
559 case TLS_ST_OK:
560 if (!s->renegotiate) {
561 /*
562 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
563 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
564 */
565 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
566 }
567 /* Renegotiation */
568 /* fall thru */
569 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
574 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
575 && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
576 /*
577 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
578 * actually selected a version yet.
579 */
580 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 else
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 }
586 /*
587 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
588 * we will be sent
589 */
590 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
591 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
592
593 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
594 /*
595 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
596 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
597 * because we did early data.
598 */
599 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
600 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
602 else
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605
606 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
607 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
608 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
609
610 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613
614 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
615 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
616 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
618 else
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
621
622 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625
626 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
627 /*
628 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
629 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
630 */
631 /*
632 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
633 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
634 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
635 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
636 */
637 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
639 } else {
640 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
641 }
642 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
644 }
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646
647 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
648 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650
651 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
652 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
653 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
654 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
656 } else {
657 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
659 #else
660 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
662 else
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
664 #endif
665 }
666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
667
668 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
669 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
670 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
671 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
672 #endif
673
674 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
675 if (s->hit) {
676 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
677 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
678 } else {
679 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
680 }
681
682 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
683 if (s->hit) {
684 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
685 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
686 } else {
687 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
688 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
689 }
690
691 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
692 /*
693 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
694 * convenient time.
695 */
696 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
697 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
699 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
700 }
701 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
702 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
703 }
704 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
705 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
706 }
707 }
708
709 /*
710 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
711 * the client to the server.
712 */
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)713 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
714 {
715 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
716
717 switch (st->hand_state) {
718 default:
719 /* No pre work to be done */
720 break;
721
722 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
723 s->shutdown = 0;
724 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
725 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
726 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
727 /* SSLfatal() already called */
728 return WORK_ERROR;
729 }
730 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
731 /*
732 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
733 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
734 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
735 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
736 */
737 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
738 TLS_ANY_VERSION,
739 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
740 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
741 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
742 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL,
743 NULL)) {
744 /* SSLfatal already called */
745 return WORK_ERROR;
746 }
747 }
748 break;
749
750 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
751 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
752 if (s->hit) {
753 /*
754 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
755 * messages unless we need to.
756 */
757 st->use_timer = 0;
758 }
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
760 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
761 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
762 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
763 }
764 #endif
765 }
766 break;
767
768 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
769 /*
770 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
771 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
772 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
773 */
774 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
775 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
776 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
777 /* Fall through */
778
779 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
780 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
781
782 case TLS_ST_OK:
783 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
784 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
785 }
786
787 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
788 }
789
790 /*
791 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
792 * client to the server.
793 */
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)794 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
795 {
796 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
797 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
798
799 s->init_num = 0;
800
801 switch (st->hand_state) {
802 default:
803 /* No post work to be done */
804 break;
805
806 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
807 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
808 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
809 /*
810 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
811 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
812 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
813 */
814 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
815 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
816 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
818 return WORK_ERROR;
819 }
820 }
821 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
822 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
823 return WORK_MORE_A;
824 }
825
826 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
827 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
828 s->first_packet = 1;
829 }
830 break;
831
832 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
833 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
835 return WORK_ERROR;
836 }
837 break;
838
839 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
840 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
841 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
842 break;
843 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
844 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
845 /*
846 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
847 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
848 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
849 */
850 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
851 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
852 return WORK_ERROR;
853 break;
854 }
855 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
857 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
858 #else
859 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
860 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
861 else
862 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
863 #endif
864 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return WORK_ERROR;
867 }
868
869 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
870 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
872 return WORK_ERROR;
873 }
874
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
876 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
877 /*
878 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
879 * no SCTP used.
880 */
881 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
882 0, NULL);
883 }
884 #endif
885 break;
886
887 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
889 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
890 /*
891 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
892 * no SCTP used.
893 */
894 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
895 0, NULL);
896 }
897 #endif
898 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
899 return WORK_MORE_B;
900
901 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
902 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
903 /* SSLfatal() already called */
904 return WORK_ERROR;
905 }
906 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
907 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
908 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
909 /* SSLfatal() already called */
910 return WORK_ERROR;
911 }
912 /*
913 * For QUIC we deferred setting up these keys until now so
914 * that we can ensure write keys are always set up before read
915 * keys.
916 */
917 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)
918 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
919 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
920 /* SSLfatal() already called */
921 return WORK_ERROR;
922 }
923 }
924 }
925 break;
926
927 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
928 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
929 return WORK_MORE_A;
930 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
931 /* SSLfatal() already called */
932 return WORK_ERROR;
933 }
934 break;
935 }
936
937 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
938 }
939
940 /*
941 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
942 * client
943 *
944 * Valid return values are:
945 * 1: Success
946 * 0: Error
947 */
ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)948 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
949 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
950 {
951 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
952
953 switch (st->hand_state) {
954 default:
955 /* Shouldn't happen */
956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
957 return 0;
958
959 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
960 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
961 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
962 else
963 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
964 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
965 break;
966
967 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
968 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
969 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
970 break;
971
972 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
973 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
974 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
975 break;
976
977 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
978 *confunc = NULL;
979 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
980 break;
981
982 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
983 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
984 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
985 break;
986
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
988 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
989 *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
990 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
991 break;
992 #endif
993
994 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
995 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
996 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
997 break;
998
999 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
1000 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1001 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1002 break;
1003
1004 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
1005 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
1006 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
1007 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
1008 break;
1009 #endif
1010 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
1011 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1012 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1013 break;
1014
1015 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
1016 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1017 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1018 break;
1019 }
1020
1021 return 1;
1022 }
1023
1024 /*
1025 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1026 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1027 */
ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION * s)1028 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1029 {
1030 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1031
1032 switch (st->hand_state) {
1033 default:
1034 /* Shouldn't happen */
1035 return 0;
1036
1037 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1038 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1039
1040 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1041 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
1042
1043 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1045 return s->max_cert_list;
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1048 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1049
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1051 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1052
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1054 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1055
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1057 /*
1058 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1059 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1060 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1061 */
1062 return s->max_cert_list;
1063
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1065 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1068 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1069 return 3;
1070 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1073 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1074 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1075
1076 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1077 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1078
1079 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1080 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1081
1082 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1083 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1084 }
1085 }
1086
1087 /*
1088 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1089 */
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1090 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1091 PACKET *pkt)
1092 {
1093 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1094
1095 switch (st->hand_state) {
1096 default:
1097 /* Shouldn't happen */
1098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1100
1101 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1102 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1103
1104 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1105 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1106
1107 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1108 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1109
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1111 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1112 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1113 #endif
1114
1115 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1116 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1117
1118 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1119 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1120
1121 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1122 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1123
1124 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1125 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1126
1127 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1128 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1129
1130 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1131 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1132
1133 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1134 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1135
1136 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1137 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1138
1139 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1140 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1141
1142 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1143 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1144
1145 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1146 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1147 }
1148 }
1149
1150 /*
1151 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1152 * from the server
1153 */
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)1154 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1155 WORK_STATE wst)
1156 {
1157 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1158
1159 switch (st->hand_state) {
1160 default:
1161 /* Shouldn't happen */
1162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return WORK_ERROR;
1164
1165 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1166 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1167 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1168
1169 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1170 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1171 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1172 }
1173 }
1174
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)1175 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1176 {
1177 unsigned char *p;
1178 size_t sess_id_len;
1179 int i, protverr;
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1181 SSL_COMP *comp;
1182 #endif
1183 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1184 unsigned char *session_id;
1185 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1186
1187 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1188 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1189 if (protverr != 0) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1191 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1192 }
1193
1194 if (sess == NULL
1195 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1196 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1197 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1198 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1200 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1201 }
1202 }
1203 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1204
1205 p = s->s3.client_random;
1206
1207 /*
1208 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1209 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1210 */
1211 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1212 size_t idx;
1213 i = 1;
1214 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1215 if (p[idx]) {
1216 i = 0;
1217 break;
1218 }
1219 }
1220 } else {
1221 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1222 }
1223
1224 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random), DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1226 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1227 }
1228
1229 /*-
1230 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1231 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1232 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1233 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1234 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1235 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1236 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1237 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1238 * 1.0.
1239 *
1240 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1241 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1242 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1243 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1244 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1245 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1246 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1247 * know that is maximum server supports.
1248 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1249 * containing version 1.0.
1250 *
1251 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1252 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1253 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1254 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1255 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1256 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1257 * the negotiated version.
1258 *
1259 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1260 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1261 */
1262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1263 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1266 }
1267
1268 /* Session ID */
1269 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1270 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1271 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1272 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1273 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1274 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1275 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1276 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1277 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1278 sess_id_len, 0)
1279 <= 0) {
1280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1282 }
1283 } else {
1284 sess_id_len = 0;
1285 }
1286 } else {
1287 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1288 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1289 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1290 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1291 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1292 }
1293 }
1294 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1295 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, sess_id_len))
1296 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1299 }
1300
1301 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1302 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1303 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1304 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1305 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1308 }
1309 }
1310
1311 /* Ciphers supported */
1312 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1315 }
1316
1317 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1318 pkt)) {
1319 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1320 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1321 }
1322 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1324 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1325 }
1326
1327 /* COMPRESSION */
1328 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1331 }
1332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1333 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1334 && sctx->comp_methods
1335 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1336 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1337 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1338 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1339 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1340 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1343 }
1344 }
1345 }
1346 #endif
1347 /* Add the NULL method */
1348 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1351 }
1352
1353 /* TLS extensions */
1354 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1356 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1357 }
1358
1359 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1360 }
1361
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1362 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1363 {
1364 size_t cookie_len;
1365 PACKET cookiepkt;
1366
1367 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1368 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1370 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1371 }
1372
1373 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1374 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1376 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1377 }
1378
1379 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1381 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1382 }
1383 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1384
1385 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1386 }
1387
set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION * s,const unsigned char * cipherchars)1388 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1389 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1390 {
1391 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1392 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1393 int i;
1394 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1395
1396 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1397 if (c == NULL) {
1398 /* unknown cipher */
1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1400 return 0;
1401 }
1402 /*
1403 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1404 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1405 */
1406 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1408 return 0;
1409 }
1410
1411 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1412 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1413 if (i < 0) {
1414 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1416 return 0;
1417 }
1418
1419 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1420 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1421 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1423 return 0;
1424 }
1425
1426 /*
1427 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1428 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1429 * set and use it for comparison.
1430 */
1431 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1432 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1433 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1434 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1435 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1436
1437 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 return 0;
1440 }
1441 /*
1442 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1443 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1444 */
1445 if (md == NULL
1446 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1448 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1449 return 0;
1450 }
1451 } else {
1452 /*
1453 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1454 * ciphersuite.
1455 */
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1457 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1458 return 0;
1459 }
1460 }
1461 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1462
1463 return 1;
1464 }
1465
tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1466 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1467 {
1468 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1469 size_t session_id_len;
1470 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1471 int hrr = 0;
1472 unsigned int compression;
1473 unsigned int sversion;
1474 unsigned int context;
1475 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1476 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1477 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1479 SSL_COMP *comp;
1480 #endif
1481
1482 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1484 goto err;
1485 }
1486
1487 /* load the server random */
1488 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1489 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1490 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1491 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1492 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1494 goto err;
1495 }
1496 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1497 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1498 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1500 goto err;
1501 }
1502 hrr = 1;
1503 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1505 goto err;
1506 }
1507 } else {
1508 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1510 goto err;
1511 }
1512 }
1513
1514 /* Get the session-id. */
1515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1517 goto err;
1518 }
1519 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1520 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1521 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1523 goto err;
1524 }
1525
1526 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1528 goto err;
1529 }
1530
1531 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1533 goto err;
1534 }
1535
1536 /* TLS extensions */
1537 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1538 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1539 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1540 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1542 goto err;
1543 }
1544
1545 if (!hrr) {
1546 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1547 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1548 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1549 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1551 goto err;
1552 }
1553
1554 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1556 goto err;
1557 }
1558 }
1559
1560 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1561 if (compression != 0) {
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1563 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1564 goto err;
1565 }
1566
1567 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1568 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1569 session_id_len)
1570 != 0) {
1571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1572 goto err;
1573 }
1574 }
1575
1576 if (hrr) {
1577 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1578 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1579 goto err;
1580 }
1581
1582 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1583 }
1584
1585 /*
1586 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1587 * are appropriate for this version.
1588 */
1589 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1590 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1591 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1593 goto err;
1594 }
1595
1596 s->hit = 0;
1597
1598 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1599 /*
1600 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1601 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1602 */
1603 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1605 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1606 goto err;
1607 }
1608
1609 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1610 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1611 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1612 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1614 goto err;
1615 }
1616 } else {
1617 /*
1618 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1619 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1620 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1621 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1622 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1623 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1624 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1625 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1626 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1627 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1628 */
1629 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1630 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1631 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1632 /*
1633 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1634 * backwards compat reasons
1635 */
1636 int master_key_length;
1637
1638 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1639 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ussl, s->session->master_key,
1640 &master_key_length,
1641 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1642 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1643 && master_key_length > 0) {
1644 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1645 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1646 } else {
1647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 goto err;
1649 }
1650 }
1651
1652 if (session_id_len != 0
1653 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1654 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1655 session_id_len)
1656 == 0)
1657 s->hit = 1;
1658 }
1659
1660 if (s->hit) {
1661 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1662 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1663 /* actually a client application bug */
1664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1665 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1666 goto err;
1667 }
1668 } else {
1669 /*
1670 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1671 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1672 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1673 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1674 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1675 */
1676 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1677 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1678 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1680 goto err;
1681 }
1682 }
1683
1684 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1685 /*
1686 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1687 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1688 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1689 * used for resumption.
1690 */
1691 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1692 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1693 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1694 if (session_id_len > 0)
1695 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1696 session_id_len);
1697 }
1698 }
1699
1700 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1701 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1703 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1704 goto err;
1705 }
1706 /*
1707 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1708 * version.
1709 */
1710 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1711 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1712
1713 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1714 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717
1718 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1719 if (compression != 0) {
1720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1721 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1722 goto err;
1723 }
1724 /*
1725 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1726 * using compression.
1727 */
1728 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732 #else
1733 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1735 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1736 goto err;
1737 }
1738 if (compression == 0)
1739 comp = NULL;
1740 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1742 goto err;
1743 } else {
1744 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1745 compression);
1746 }
1747
1748 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1750 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1751 goto err;
1752 } else {
1753 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1754 }
1755 #endif
1756
1757 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1759 goto err;
1760 }
1761
1762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1763 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1764 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1765 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1766 size_t labellen;
1767
1768 /*
1769 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1770 * no SCTP used.
1771 */
1772 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1773 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1774
1775 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1776 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1777 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1778 labellen += 1;
1779
1780 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1781 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1782 labelbuffer,
1783 labellen, NULL, 0, 0)
1784 <= 0) {
1785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1786 goto err;
1787 }
1788
1789 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1790 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1791 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1792 }
1793 #endif
1794
1795 /*
1796 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1797 * we're done with this message
1798 */
1799 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1800 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1801 || !tls13_store_handshake_traffic_hash(s)) {
1802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1803 goto err;
1804 }
1805 /*
1806 * If we're not doing early-data and we're not going to send a dummy CCS
1807 * (i.e. no middlebox compat mode) then we can change the write keys
1808 * immediately. Otherwise we have to defer this until after all possible
1809 * early data is written. We could just always defer until the last
1810 * moment except QUIC needs it done at the same time as the read keys
1811 * are changed. Since QUIC doesn't do TLS early data or need middlebox
1812 * compat this doesn't cause a problem.
1813 */
1814 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)
1815 || (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
1816 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0)) {
1817 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1818 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
1819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1820 goto err;
1821 }
1822 }
1823 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1824 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
1825 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1826 goto err;
1827 }
1828 }
1829
1830 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1831 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1832 err:
1833 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1834 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1835 }
1836
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * extpkt)1837 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1838 PACKET *extpkt)
1839 {
1840 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1841
1842 /*
1843 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1844 * the old wrlmethod.
1845 */
1846 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1847 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
1848 TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1849 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
1850 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
1851 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1852 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
1853 /* SSLfatal already called */
1854 goto err;
1855 }
1856 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1857 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
1858
1859 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1860 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1861 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1862 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1864 goto err;
1865 }
1866
1867 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1868 extensions = NULL;
1869
1870 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1871 /*
1872 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1873 * ClientHello will not change
1874 */
1875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1876 goto err;
1877 }
1878
1879 /*
1880 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1881 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1882 */
1883 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1884 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1885 goto err;
1886 }
1887
1888 /*
1889 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1890 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1891 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1892 * for HRR messages.
1893 */
1894 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1895 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1896 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1897 goto err;
1898 }
1899
1900 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1901 err:
1902 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1903 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1904 }
1905
tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,PACKET * pkt)1906 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
1907 {
1908 EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
1909
1910 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
1911 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1912 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1913 }
1914
1915 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
1916 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1917 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1918 }
1919
1920 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
1921 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
1922
1923 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1924 }
1925
tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,WORK_STATE wst)1926 static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
1927 WORK_STATE wst)
1928 {
1929 size_t certidx;
1930 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1931 int v_ok;
1932
1933 if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
1934 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1935 SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
1936 return WORK_ERROR;
1937 }
1938
1939 if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1940 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1941
1942 ERR_set_mark();
1943 v_ok = ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk);
1944 if (v_ok <= 0 && sc->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
1945 ERR_clear_last_mark();
1946 SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
1947 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1948 return WORK_ERROR;
1949 }
1950 ERR_pop_to_mark(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1951 if (v_ok > 0 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
1952 return WORK_MORE_A;
1953 }
1954
1955 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
1956 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc)))
1957 == NULL) {
1958 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1959 return WORK_ERROR;
1960 }
1961
1962 /*
1963 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1964 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1965 * type.
1966 */
1967 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1968 if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1969 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE);
1970 return WORK_ERROR;
1971 }
1972 }
1973
1974 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
1975 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
1976 sc->session->peer = NULL;
1977 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1978 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1979 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
1980
1981 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1982 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)
1983 && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
1984 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
1985 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1986 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1987 return WORK_ERROR;
1988 }
1989
1990 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1991 }
1992
1993 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)1994 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1995 PACKET *pkt)
1996 {
1997 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1998 X509 *x = NULL;
1999 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2000 size_t chainidx;
2001 unsigned int context = 0;
2002 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2003
2004 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
2005 return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt);
2006 if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
2008 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2009 goto err;
2010 }
2011
2012 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2014 goto err;
2015 }
2016
2017 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
2018 || context != 0
2019 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
2020 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
2021 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2023 goto err;
2024 }
2025 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
2026 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
2027 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2029 goto err;
2030 }
2031
2032 certstart = certbytes;
2033 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
2034 if (x == NULL) {
2035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2036 goto err;
2037 }
2038 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
2039 cert_len)
2040 == NULL) {
2041 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2042 goto err;
2043 }
2044
2045 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
2046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2047 goto err;
2048 }
2049
2050 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2051 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2052 PACKET extensions;
2053
2054 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2056 goto err;
2057 }
2058 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2059 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
2060 NULL, chainidx == 0)
2061 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
2062 rawexts, x, chainidx,
2063 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2064 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2065 /* SSLfatal already called */
2066 goto err;
2067 }
2068 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2069 }
2070
2071 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2073 goto err;
2074 }
2075 x = NULL;
2076 }
2077 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2078
2079 err:
2080 X509_free(x);
2081 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
2082 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
2083 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2084 }
2085
2086 /*
2087 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
2088 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
2089 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
2090 */
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)2091 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2092 WORK_STATE wst)
2093 {
2094 X509 *x;
2095 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2096 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2097 size_t certidx;
2098 int i;
2099
2100 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
2101 return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst);
2102
2103 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
2104 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2105
2106 /*
2107 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
2108 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
2109 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
2110 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
2111 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
2112 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
2113 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
2114 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
2115 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
2116 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
2117 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
2118 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
2119 */
2120 ERR_set_mark();
2121 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
2122 if (i <= 0 && s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
2123 ERR_clear_last_mark();
2124 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
2125 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2126 return WORK_ERROR;
2127 }
2128 ERR_pop_to_mark(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
2129 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
2130 return WORK_MORE_A;
2131
2132 /*
2133 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
2134 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
2135 */
2136 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
2137
2138 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2139
2140 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
2141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2142 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
2143 return WORK_ERROR;
2144 }
2145
2146 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx,
2147 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)))
2148 == NULL) {
2149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2150 return WORK_ERROR;
2151 }
2152 /*
2153 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
2154 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
2155 * type.
2156 */
2157 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2158 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2160 return WORK_ERROR;
2161 }
2162 }
2163
2164 if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2166 return WORK_ERROR;
2167 }
2168
2169 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2170 s->session->peer = x;
2171 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2172 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
2173 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
2174 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
2175
2176 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2177 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2178 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
2179 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
2180 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
2181 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2182 return WORK_ERROR;
2183 }
2184 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2185 }
2186
2187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,PACKET * pkt)2188 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
2189 {
2190 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2191 PACKET tmppkt;
2192 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
2193
2194 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
2195 ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
2196
2197 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
2198 return ret;
2199 }
2200 #endif
2201
tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2202 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2203 {
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2205 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2206
2207 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2208
2209 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2211 return 0;
2212 }
2213
2214 /*
2215 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2216 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2217 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2218 * identity.
2219 */
2220 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2222 return 0;
2223 }
2224
2225 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2226 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2227 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2228 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2229 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2231 return 0;
2232 }
2233
2234 return 1;
2235 #else
2236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2237 return 0;
2238 #endif
2239 }
2240
tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2241 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2242 {
2243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2244 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2245
2246 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2247 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2248 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2249 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2251 return 0;
2252 }
2253
2254 if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2255 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL))
2256 == NULL
2257 || (s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2258 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL))
2259 == NULL
2260 || (s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2261 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL))
2262 == NULL
2263 || (s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2264 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL))
2265 == NULL) {
2266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2267 return 0;
2268 }
2269
2270 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2272 return 0;
2273 }
2274
2275 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2276 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2277 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2278
2279 return 1;
2280 #else
2281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2282 return 0;
2283 #endif
2284 }
2285
tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2286 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2287 {
2288 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2289 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2290 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2291 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2292 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2293 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2294 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2295 int ret = 0;
2296
2297 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2298 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2299 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2301 return 0;
2302 }
2303
2304 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2305 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2306 NULL);
2307 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2308 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2309 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2311 goto err;
2312 }
2313
2314 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2315 if (tmpl == NULL
2316 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2317 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2318 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2319 bnpub_key)
2320 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 goto err;
2323 }
2324
2325 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2326 if (pctx == NULL) {
2327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2328 goto err;
2329 }
2330 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2331 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2333 goto err;
2334 }
2335
2336 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2337 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2338 if (pctx == NULL
2339 /*
2340 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2341 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2342 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2343 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2344 */
2345 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2346 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2348 goto err;
2349 }
2350
2351 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2352 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2353 0, peer_tmp)) {
2354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2355 goto err;
2356 }
2357
2358 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2359 peer_tmp = NULL;
2360
2361 /*
2362 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2363 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2364 */
2365 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2366 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2367 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2368
2369 ret = 1;
2370
2371 err:
2372 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2373 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2374 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2375 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2376 BN_free(p);
2377 BN_free(g);
2378 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2379
2380 return ret;
2381 }
2382
tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2383 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2384 {
2385 PACKET encoded_pt;
2386 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2387
2388 /*
2389 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2390 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2391 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2392 */
2393 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397 /*
2398 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2399 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2400 */
2401 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2402 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2404 return 0;
2405 }
2406
2407 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2409 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2410 return 0;
2411 }
2412
2413 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2415 return 0;
2416 }
2417
2418 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2419 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2420 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))
2421 <= 0) {
2422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2423 return 0;
2424 }
2425
2426 /*
2427 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2428 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2429 * and ECDSA.
2430 */
2431 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2432 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2433 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2434 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2435 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2436
2437 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2438 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2439 return 1;
2440 }
2441
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2442 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2443 {
2444 long alg_k;
2445 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2446 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2447 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2448 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2449 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2450
2451 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2452
2453 save_param_start = *pkt;
2454
2455 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2456 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2457
2458 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2459 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2460 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2461 goto err;
2462 }
2463 }
2464
2465 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2466 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2467 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2468 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2469 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2470 goto err;
2471 }
2472 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2473 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2474 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2475 goto err;
2476 }
2477 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2478 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2480 goto err;
2481 }
2482 } else if (alg_k) {
2483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2484 goto err;
2485 }
2486
2487 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2488 if (pkey != NULL) {
2489 PACKET params;
2490 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2491 unsigned char *tbs;
2492 size_t tbslen;
2493 int rv;
2494
2495 /*
2496 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2497 * equals the length of the parameters.
2498 */
2499 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2500 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504
2505 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2506 unsigned int sigalg;
2507
2508 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2510 goto err;
2511 }
2512 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
2513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2514 goto err;
2515 }
2516 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2518 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
2519 goto err;
2520 }
2521
2522 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2524 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2525 goto err;
2526 }
2527 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2528 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2529 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2530
2531 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2532 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2534 goto err;
2535 }
2536
2537 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2538 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2540 goto err;
2541 }
2542
2543 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2544 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2545 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2546 NULL)
2547 <= 0) {
2548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2549 goto err;
2550 }
2551 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2552 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2553 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2554 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST)
2555 <= 0) {
2556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2557 goto err;
2558 }
2559 }
2560 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2561 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2562 if (tbslen == 0) {
2563 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2564 goto err;
2565 }
2566
2567 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2568 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2569 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2570 if (rv <= 0) {
2571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2572 goto err;
2573 }
2574 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2575 md_ctx = NULL;
2576 } else {
2577 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2578 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2579 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2580 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2581 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2583 }
2584 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2585 goto err;
2586 }
2587 /* still data left over */
2588 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592 }
2593
2594 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2595 err:
2596 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2597 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2598 }
2599
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2600 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2601 PACKET *pkt)
2602 {
2603 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2604 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL)
2605 memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2606 else
2607 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2608
2609 /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
2610 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
2611 return 0;
2612
2613 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2614 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2615 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2616
2617 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2618 /*
2619 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2620 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2621 * we just ignore it
2622 */
2623 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2624 }
2625
2626 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2627 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2628 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2629 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2630 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2631 s->pha_context = NULL;
2632 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2633
2634 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2636 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2637 }
2638
2639 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2641 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2642 }
2643 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2644 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2645 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2646 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2647 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2649 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2650 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2651 }
2652 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2653 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2655 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2656 }
2657 } else {
2658 PACKET ctypes;
2659
2660 /* get the certificate types */
2661 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2663 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2664 }
2665
2666 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2668 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2669 }
2670
2671 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2672 PACKET sigalgs;
2673
2674 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2677 }
2678
2679 /*
2680 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2681 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2682 */
2683 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2685 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2686 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2687 }
2688 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2690 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2691 }
2692 }
2693
2694 /* get the CA RDNs */
2695 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2696 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2698 }
2699 }
2700
2701 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2703 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2704 }
2705
2706 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2707 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2708
2709 /*
2710 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2711 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2712 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2713 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2714 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2715 * client_cert_cb.
2716 */
2717 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2718 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2719 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2720
2721 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2722 }
2723
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2724 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2725 PACKET *pkt)
2726 {
2727 unsigned int ticklen;
2728 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2729 unsigned int sess_len;
2730 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2731 PACKET nonce;
2732 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2733 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2734
2735 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2736
2737 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2738 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2739 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2740 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2741 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2742 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2743 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2744 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2746 goto err;
2747 }
2748
2749 /*
2750 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2751 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2752 * be 0 here in that instance
2753 */
2754 if (ticklen == 0)
2755 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2756
2757 /*
2758 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2759 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2760 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2761 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2762 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2763 * cache.
2764 */
2765 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2766 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2767
2768 /*
2769 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2770 * one
2771 */
2772 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2774 goto err;
2775 }
2776
2777 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2778 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2779 /*
2780 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2781 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2782 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2783 */
2784 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2785 }
2786
2787 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2788 s->session = new_sess;
2789 }
2790
2791 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2792 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2793
2794 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2795 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2796 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2797
2798 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2799 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2801 goto err;
2802 }
2803 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2805 goto err;
2806 }
2807
2808 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2809 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2810 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2811
2812 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2813 PACKET extpkt;
2814
2815 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2816 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2818 goto err;
2819 }
2820
2821 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2822 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2823 NULL, 1)
2824 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2825 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2826 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2828 goto err;
2829 }
2830 }
2831
2832 /*
2833 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2834 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2835 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2836 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2837 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2838 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2839 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2840 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2841 * ticket.
2842 */
2843 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2844 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2845 /* Error is already recorded */
2846 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 goto err;
2848 }
2849 /*
2850 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2851 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2852 */
2853 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2854 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2855 sha256, NULL)) {
2856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2857 goto err;
2858 }
2859 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2860 sha256 = NULL;
2861 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2862 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2863
2864 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2865 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2866 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2867 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2868 size_t hashlen;
2869 /* ASCII: "resumption", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
2870 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = { 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6D,
2871 0x70, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E };
2872
2873 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2874 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni > 0)) {
2875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2876 goto err;
2877 }
2878 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2879
2880 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2881 nonce_label,
2882 sizeof(nonce_label),
2883 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2884 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2885 s->session->master_key,
2886 hashlen, 1)) {
2887 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2888 goto err;
2889 }
2890 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2891
2892 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2893 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2894 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2895 }
2896
2897 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2898 err:
2899 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2900 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2901 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2902 }
2903
2904 /*
2905 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2906 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2907 */
tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2908 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2909 {
2910 size_t resplen;
2911 unsigned int type;
2912
2913 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2914 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2919 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2921 return 0;
2922 }
2923 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2924 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2925 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2927 return 0;
2928 }
2929 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2930 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2932 return 0;
2933 }
2934
2935 return 1;
2936 }
2937
tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)2938 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2939 {
2940 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2942 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2943 }
2944
2945 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2946 }
2947
2948 /*
2949 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2950 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2951 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2952 * on failure.
2953 */
tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION * s)2954 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2955 {
2956 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2957
2958 /*
2959 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2960 * the server
2961 */
2962 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2964 return 0;
2965 }
2966
2967 /*
2968 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2969 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2970 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2971 */
2972 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2973 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2974 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
2975 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2976
2977 if (ret == 0) {
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2979 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2980 return 0;
2981 }
2982 if (ret < 0) {
2983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2984 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2985 return 0;
2986 }
2987 }
2988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2989 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2990 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2991 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2992 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2993 return 0;
2994 }
2995 }
2996 #endif
2997
2998 return 1;
2999 }
3000
tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)3001 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3002 {
3003 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3004 /* should contain no data */
3005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3006 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3007 }
3008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3009 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3010 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
3012 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3013 }
3014 }
3015 #endif
3016
3017 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
3018 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3019 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3020 }
3021
3022 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3023 }
3024
tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3025 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3026 {
3027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3028 int ret = 0;
3029 /*
3030 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
3031 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
3032 * strnlen.
3033 */
3034 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
3035 size_t identitylen = 0;
3036 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
3037 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
3038 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
3039 size_t psklen = 0;
3040
3041 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
3043 goto err;
3044 }
3045
3046 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
3047
3048 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
3049 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
3050 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
3051 psk, sizeof(psk));
3052
3053 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
3054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
3056 goto err;
3057 } else if (psklen == 0) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
3059 goto err;
3060 }
3061
3062 identitylen = strlen(identity);
3063 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 goto err;
3066 }
3067
3068 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
3069 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
3070 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
3071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3072 goto err;
3073 }
3074
3075 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
3076 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
3077 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
3078 tmppsk = NULL;
3079 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3080 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
3081 tmpidentity = NULL;
3082
3083 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3085 goto err;
3086 }
3087
3088 ret = 1;
3089
3090 err:
3091 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
3092 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3093 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
3094 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
3095
3096 return ret;
3097 #else
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3099 return 0;
3100 #endif
3101 }
3102
tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3103 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3104 {
3105 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3106 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3107 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3108 size_t enclen;
3109 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3110 size_t pmslen = 0;
3111 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3112
3113 if (!received_server_cert(s)) {
3114 /*
3115 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
3116 */
3117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 return 0;
3119 }
3120
3121 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 return 0;
3124 }
3125
3126 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 return 0;
3129 }
3130
3131 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3132 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3133 if (pms == NULL) {
3134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3135 return 0;
3136 }
3137
3138 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3139 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3140 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
3141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
3142 goto err;
3143 }
3144
3145 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3146 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3148 goto err;
3149 }
3150
3151 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
3152 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3153 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3155 goto err;
3156 }
3157 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3158 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3160 goto err;
3161 }
3162 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3163 pctx = NULL;
3164
3165 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3166 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 goto err;
3169 }
3170
3171 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3172 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3173 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3174 goto err;
3175 }
3176
3177 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3178 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3179
3180 return 1;
3181 err:
3182 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3183 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3184
3185 return 0;
3186 }
3187
tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3188 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3189 {
3190 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3191 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3192 int prime_len;
3193 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
3194 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
3195 int ret = 0;
3196
3197 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3198 if (skey == NULL) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 goto err;
3201 }
3202
3203 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3204 if (ckey == NULL) {
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3206 goto err;
3207 }
3208
3209 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3210 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3211 goto err;
3212 }
3213
3214 /* send off the data */
3215
3216 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3217 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
3218 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
3219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3220 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3221 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
3222 }
3223
3224 /*
3225 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3226 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3227 * as the prime.
3228 */
3229 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
3230 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
3231 if (pad_len > 0) {
3232 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
3233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3234 goto err;
3235 }
3236 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
3237 }
3238
3239 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3241 goto err;
3242 }
3243
3244 ret = 1;
3245 err:
3246 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
3247 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3248 return ret;
3249 }
3250
tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3251 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3252 {
3253 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3254 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3255 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3256 int ret = 0;
3257
3258 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3259 if (skey == NULL) {
3260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3261 return 0;
3262 }
3263
3264 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3265 if (ckey == NULL) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3267 goto err;
3268 }
3269
3270 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3272 goto err;
3273 }
3274
3275 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3276 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3277
3278 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3280 goto err;
3281 }
3282
3283 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3285 goto err;
3286 }
3287
3288 ret = 1;
3289 err:
3290 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3291 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3292 return ret;
3293 }
3294
tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3295 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3296 {
3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3298 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3299 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3300 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3301 size_t msglen;
3302 unsigned int md_len;
3303 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3304 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3305 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3306 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3307 size_t pmslen = 0;
3308 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3309
3310 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3311 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3312
3313 /*
3314 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3315 */
3316 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3318 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3319 return 0;
3320 }
3321
3322 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3323 pkey,
3324 sctx->propq);
3325 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3327 return 0;
3328 }
3329 /*
3330 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3331 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3332 * certificate key for key exchange
3333 */
3334
3335 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3336 pmslen = 32;
3337 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3338 if (pms == NULL) {
3339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3340 goto err;
3341 }
3342
3343 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3344 /* Generate session key
3345 */
3346 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3348 goto err;
3349 };
3350 /*
3351 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3352 * data
3353 */
3354 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3355 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3356 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3357 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3358 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
3359 <= 0
3360 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3361 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
3362 <= 0
3363 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3365 goto err;
3366 }
3367 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3368 ukm_hash = NULL;
3369 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3370 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm)
3371 <= 0) {
3372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3373 goto err;
3374 }
3375 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3376 /*
3377 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3378 */
3379 msglen = 255;
3380 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3382 goto err;
3383 }
3384
3385 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3386 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3387 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3389 goto err;
3390 }
3391
3392 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3393 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3394 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3395
3396 return 1;
3397 err:
3398 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3399 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3400 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3401 return 0;
3402 #else
3403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3404 return 0;
3405 #endif
3406 }
3407
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION * s)3409 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3410 {
3411 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3412 return NID_magma_ctr;
3413 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3414 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3415
3416 return NID_undef;
3417 }
3418
ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION * s,unsigned char * dgst_buf)3419 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3420 {
3421 EVP_MD_CTX *hash = NULL;
3422 unsigned int md_len;
3423 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3424 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3425 sctx->propq);
3426
3427 if (md == NULL)
3428 return 0;
3429
3430 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3431 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3432 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3433 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3434 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3435 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3436 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3437 return 0;
3438 }
3439
3440 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3441 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3442 return 1;
3443 }
3444 #endif
3445
tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3446 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3447 {
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3449 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3450 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3451 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3452 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3453 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3454 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3455 size_t pmslen = 0;
3456 size_t msglen;
3457 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3458 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3459
3460 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3462 return 0;
3463 }
3464
3465 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3467 goto err;
3468 }
3469
3470 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3471 pmslen = 32;
3472 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3473 if (pms == NULL) {
3474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3475 goto err;
3476 }
3477
3478 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3480 goto err;
3481 }
3482
3483 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3484 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3486 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3487 goto err;
3488 }
3489
3490 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3491 pkey,
3492 sctx->propq);
3493 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3495 goto err;
3496 }
3497
3498 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3500 goto err;
3501 };
3502
3503 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3504 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3505 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst)
3506 <= 0) {
3507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3508 goto err;
3509 }
3510
3511 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3512 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL)
3513 <= 0) {
3514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3515 goto err;
3516 }
3517
3518 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3520 goto err;
3521 }
3522
3523 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3524 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3526 goto err;
3527 }
3528
3529 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3530 pkey_ctx = NULL;
3531 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3532 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3533
3534 return 1;
3535 err:
3536 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3537 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3538 return 0;
3539 #else
3540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3541 return 0;
3542 #endif
3543 }
3544
tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3545 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3546 {
3547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3548 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3549
3550 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3551 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3552 &abytes)) {
3553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3554 return 0;
3555 }
3556 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3557
3558 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3559 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3560 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3562 return 0;
3563 }
3564
3565 return 1;
3566 #else
3567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3568 return 0;
3569 #endif
3570 }
3571
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3572 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3573 WPACKET *pkt)
3574 {
3575 unsigned long alg_k;
3576
3577 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3578
3579 /*
3580 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3581 * no need to do so here.
3582 */
3583 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3584 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3585 goto err;
3586
3587 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3588 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3589 goto err;
3590 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3591 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3592 goto err;
3593 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3594 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3595 goto err;
3596 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3597 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3598 goto err;
3599 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3600 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3601 goto err;
3602 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3603 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3604 goto err;
3605 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3607 goto err;
3608 }
3609
3610 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3611 err:
3612 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3613 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3614 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3616 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3617 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3618 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3619 #endif
3620 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3621 }
3622
tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION * s)3623 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3624 {
3625 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3626 size_t pmslen = 0;
3627
3628 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3629 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3630
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3632 /* Check for SRP */
3633 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3634 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3636 goto err;
3637 }
3638 return 1;
3639 }
3640 #endif
3641
3642 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3644 goto err;
3645 }
3646 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3647 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3648 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3649 pms = NULL;
3650 pmslen = 0;
3651 goto err;
3652 }
3653 pms = NULL;
3654 pmslen = 0;
3655
3656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3657 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3658 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3659 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3660 size_t labellen;
3661 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3662
3663 /*
3664 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3665 * used.
3666 */
3667 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3668 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3669
3670 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3671 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3672 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3673 labellen += 1;
3674
3675 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3676 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3677 labellen, NULL, 0, 0)
3678 <= 0) {
3679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3680 goto err;
3681 }
3682
3683 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3684 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3685 }
3686 #endif
3687
3688 return 1;
3689 err:
3690 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3691 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3692 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3693 return 0;
3694 }
3695
3696 /*
3697 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3698 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3699 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3700 */
ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s)3701 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3702 {
3703 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3704 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3705 return 0;
3706 /*
3707 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3708 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3709 */
3710 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3711 return 0;
3712 return 1;
3713 }
3714
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WORK_STATE wst)3715 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3716 {
3717 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3718 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3719 int i;
3720 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3721
3722 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3723 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3724 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3725 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3726 if (i < 0) {
3727 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3728 return WORK_MORE_A;
3729 }
3730 if (i == 0) {
3731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3732 return WORK_ERROR;
3733 }
3734 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3735 }
3736 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3737 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3738 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3739 }
3740 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3741 }
3742
3743 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3744 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3745 }
3746
3747 /* We need to get a client cert */
3748 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3749 /*
3750 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3751 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3752 */
3753 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3754 if (i < 0) {
3755 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3756 return WORK_MORE_B;
3757 }
3758 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3759 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3760 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3761 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3762 i = 0;
3763 } else if (i == 1) {
3764 i = 0;
3765 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3766 }
3767
3768 X509_free(x509);
3769 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3770 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3771 i = 0;
3772 if (i == 0) {
3773 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3774 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3775 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3776 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3777 } else {
3778 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3779 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3780 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3781 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3782 return WORK_ERROR;
3783 }
3784 }
3785 }
3786
3787 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3788 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
3789 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3790
3791 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3792 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3793 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3794 }
3795
3796 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3798 return WORK_ERROR;
3799 }
3800
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)3801 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3802 WPACKET *pkt)
3803 {
3804 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3805 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3806
3807 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3808 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3809 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3810 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3812 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3813 }
3814 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3816 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3817 }
3818 }
3819 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2)
3820 cpk = s->cert->key;
3821 switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) {
3822 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3823 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3825 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3826 }
3827 break;
3828 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3829 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3830 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3831 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3832 }
3833 break;
3834 default:
3835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3836 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3837 }
3838
3839 /*
3840 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
3841 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
3842 * moment. We need to do it now.
3843 */
3844 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3845 && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)
3846 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3847 && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
3848 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
3849 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3850 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3851 /*
3852 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3853 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3854 */
3855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3856 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3857 }
3858
3859 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3860 }
3861
3862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION * sc,WPACKET * pkt)3863 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
3864 WPACKET *pkt)
3865 {
3866 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
3867 WPACKET tmppkt;
3868 BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
3869 size_t length;
3870 size_t max_length;
3871 COMP_METHOD *method;
3872 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
3873 int comp_len;
3874 int ret = 0;
3875 int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
3876
3877 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3878
3879 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
3880 goto err;
3881
3882 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3883 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
3884 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3885 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
3886 goto err;
3887 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
3888 goto err;
3889
3890 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
3891 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3892 goto out;
3893 }
3894
3895 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3896 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3897 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
3898 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
3899 goto err;
3900
3901 switch (alg) {
3902 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
3903 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3904 break;
3905 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
3906 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3907 break;
3908 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
3909 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3910 break;
3911 default:
3912 goto err;
3913 }
3914 max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
3915
3916 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
3917 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3918 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
3919 goto err;
3920
3921 comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
3922 (unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
3923 if (comp_len <= 0)
3924 goto err;
3925
3926 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
3927 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3928 goto err;
3929
3930 /*
3931 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
3932 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
3933 * moment. We need to do it now.
3934 */
3935 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
3936 && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(sc)
3937 && (sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
3938 || (sc->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
3939 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
3940 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3941 /*
3942 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3943 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3944 */
3945 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3946 goto out;
3947 }
3948 ret = 1;
3949 goto out;
3950
3951 err:
3952 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3953 out:
3954 if (buf != NULL) {
3955 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3956 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
3957 }
3958 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
3959 COMP_CTX_free(comp);
3960 return ret;
3961 }
3962 #endif
3963
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION * s)3964 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3965 {
3966 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3967 size_t idx;
3968 long alg_k, alg_a;
3969 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3970
3971 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3972 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3973
3974 /* we don't have a certificate */
3975 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3976 return 1;
3977
3978 /* This is the passed certificate */
3979 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3980 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
3981
3982 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3983 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3985 return 0;
3986 }
3987
3988 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3990 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3991 return 0;
3992 }
3993
3994 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3996 return 0;
3997 }
3998
3999 /* Early out to skip the checks below */
4000 if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
4001 return 1;
4002
4003 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
4004 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
4005 return 1;
4006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
4007 return 0;
4008 }
4009
4010 return 1;
4011 }
4012
4013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4014 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4015 {
4016 size_t len, padding_len;
4017 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
4018
4019 len = s->ext.npn_len;
4020 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
4021
4022 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
4023 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
4024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4025 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4026 }
4027
4028 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
4029
4030 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4031 }
4032 #endif
4033
tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)4034 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4035 {
4036 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
4037
4038 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4039 /* should contain no data */
4040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4041 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4042 }
4043
4044 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
4045 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
4046 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
4047 }
4048
4049 /*
4050 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
4051 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
4052 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
4053 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
4054 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
4055 */
4056 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
4057 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
4058 else
4059 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
4060
4061 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
4062 }
4063
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION * s,PACKET * pkt)4064 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
4065 PACKET *pkt)
4066 {
4067 PACKET extensions;
4068 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
4069
4070 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
4071 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4073 goto err;
4074 }
4075
4076 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
4077 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
4078 NULL, 1)
4079 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4080 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
4081 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4082 goto err;
4083 }
4084
4085 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4086 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4087
4088 err:
4089 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4090 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4091 }
4092
ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION * s,X509 ** px509,EVP_PKEY ** ppkey)4093 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
4094 {
4095 int i = 0;
4096 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4097
4098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
4099 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
4100 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
4101 if (i != 0)
4102 return i;
4103 }
4104 #endif
4105 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
4106 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
4107 return i;
4108 }
4109
ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION * s,STACK_OF (SSL_CIPHER)* sk,WPACKET * pkt)4110 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
4111 WPACKET *pkt)
4112 {
4113 int i;
4114 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
4115 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate
4116 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
4117 && ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, TLS1_VERSION, NULL)
4118 && s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION;
4119 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
4120
4121 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
4122 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
4123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
4124 return 0;
4125 }
4126
4127 if (sk == NULL) {
4128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4129 return 0;
4130 }
4131
4132 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
4133 #if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
4134 #error Max cipher length too short
4135 #endif
4136 /*
4137 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
4138 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
4139 * use TLS v1.2
4140 */
4141 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4142 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
4143 else
4144 #endif
4145 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
4146 maxlen = 0xfffe;
4147
4148 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
4149 maxlen -= 2;
4150 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
4151 maxlen -= 2;
4152
4153 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
4154 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
4155
4156 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
4157 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
4158 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
4159 continue;
4160
4161 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
4162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4163 return 0;
4164 }
4165
4166 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
4167 if (!maxverok) {
4168 int minproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
4169 int maxproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
4170
4171 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) >= 0
4172 && ssl_version_cmp(s, minproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) <= 0)
4173 maxverok = 1;
4174 }
4175
4176 totlen += len;
4177 }
4178
4179 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
4180 const char *maxvertext = !maxverok
4181 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
4182 : NULL;
4183
4184 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
4185 maxvertext);
4186 return 0;
4187 }
4188
4189 if (totlen != 0) {
4190 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
4191 static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4192 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4193 };
4194 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4196 return 0;
4197 }
4198 }
4199 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
4200 static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4201 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4202 };
4203 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4205 return 0;
4206 }
4207 }
4208 }
4209
4210 return 1;
4211 }
4212
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION * s,WPACKET * pkt)4213 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4214 {
4215 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4216 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
4217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
4218 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4219 }
4220
4221 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
4222 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4223 }
4224