| /linux/fs/ |
| H A D | pidfs.c | 99 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; member 199 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs = attr->xattrs; in pidfs_free_attr_work() local 201 if (xattrs) { in pidfs_free_attr_work() 202 simple_xattrs_free(xattrs, NULL); in pidfs_free_attr_work() 203 kfree(xattrs); in pidfs_free_attr_work() 232 if (likely(!attr->xattrs)) in pidfs_free_pid() 819 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; in pidfs_listxattr() local 821 xattrs = READ_ONCE(attr->xattrs); in pidfs_listxattr() 822 if (!xattrs) in pidfs_listxattr() 825 return simple_xattr_list(inode, xattrs, buf, size); in pidfs_listxattr() [all …]
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| /linux/security/integrity/evm/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 32 bool "Additional SMACK xattrs" 36 Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation. 38 In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux, 41 Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and 53 Allow userland to provide additional xattrs for HMAC calculation. 55 When this option is enabled, root can add additional xattrs to the
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| H A D | evm_main.c | 97 int i, xattrs; in evm_init_config() 99 xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames); in evm_init_config() 102 for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) { in evm_init_config() 126 * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. in evm_hmac_disabled() 362 * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs in evm_read_protected_xattrs() 575 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable 616 /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though 645 /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though in evm_inode_set_acl_change() 701 /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though in evm_inode_set_acl() 718 * Writing other xattrs i 89 int i, xattrs; evm_init_config() local 1014 evm_inode_init_security(struct inode * inode,struct inode * dir,const struct qstr * qstr,struct xattr * xattrs,int * xattr_count) evm_inode_init_security() argument [all...] |
| H A D | evm.h | 62 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ 85 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs,
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| H A D | evm_crypto.c | 221 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs. in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() 262 * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() 406 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs, in evm_init_hmac() 421 for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) { in evm_init_hmac() 399 evm_init_hmac(struct inode * inode,const struct xattr * xattrs,char * hmac_val) evm_init_hmac() argument
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| /linux/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/ |
| H A D | ipe.rst | 25 控制机制,因此扩展属性(xattrs)也必须受到保护。这就引出了 49 那么攻击者就可以清除所有的扩展属性(xattrs)——包括 52 使用DM-Verity,由于xattrs被保存为Merkel树的一部分,
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| /linux/fs/smb/client/ |
| H A D | reparse.c | 609 struct wsl_xattr xattrs[] = { in wsl_set_xattrs() local 624 num_xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(xattrs) - 1; in wsl_set_xattrs() 626 num_xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(xattrs); in wsl_set_xattrs() 629 xattrs[i].next = ALIGN(sizeof(*ea) + name_size + in wsl_set_xattrs() 630 xattrs[i].size, 4); in wsl_set_xattrs() 631 dlen += xattrs[i].next; in wsl_set_xattrs() 641 next = xattrs[i].next; in wsl_set_xattrs() 645 ea->ea_value_length = cpu_to_le16(xattrs[i].size); in wsl_set_xattrs() 646 memcpy(ea->ea_data, xattrs[i].name, name_size); in wsl_set_xattrs() 648 &xattrs[i].value, xattrs[i].size); in wsl_set_xattrs()
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| /linux/fs/ceph/ |
| H A D | xattr.c | 801 struct ceph_inode_xattr **xattrs = NULL; in __build_xattrs() local 822 xattrs = kzalloc_objs(struct ceph_inode_xattr *, numattr, in __build_xattrs() 825 if (!xattrs) in __build_xattrs() 829 xattrs[i] = kmalloc_obj(struct ceph_inode_xattr, in __build_xattrs() 831 if (!xattrs[i]) in __build_xattrs() 839 kfree(xattrs[i]); in __build_xattrs() 840 kfree(xattrs); in __build_xattrs() 841 xattrs = NULL; in __build_xattrs() 855 0, 0, &xattrs[numattr]); in __build_xattrs() 860 kfree(xattrs); in __build_xattrs() [all …]
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| /linux/net/ |
| H A D | socket.c | 314 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; member 331 si->xattrs = NULL; in sock_alloc_inode() 350 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs = si->xattrs; in sock_evict_inode() local 352 if (xattrs) { in sock_evict_inode() 353 simple_xattrs_free(xattrs, NULL); in sock_evict_inode() 354 kfree(xattrs); in sock_evict_inode() 446 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; in sockfs_user_xattr_get() local 448 xattrs = READ_ONCE(SOCKFS_I(inode)->xattrs); in sockfs_user_xattr_get() 449 if (!xattrs) in sockfs_user_xattr_get() 452 return simple_xattr_get(xattrs, name, value, size); in sockfs_user_xattr_get() [all …]
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| /linux/fs/overlayfs/ |
| H A D | Makefile | 9 copy_up.o export.o params.o xattrs.o
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| /linux/fs/kernfs/ |
| H A D | dir.c | 608 if (kn->iattr && kn->iattr->xattrs) { in kernfs_put() 609 simple_xattrs_free(kn->iattr->xattrs, NULL); in kernfs_put() 610 kfree(kn->iattr->xattrs); in kernfs_put() 611 kn->iattr->xattrs = NULL; in kernfs_put() 712 if (kn->iattr->xattrs) { in __kernfs_new_node() 713 simple_xattrs_free(kn->iattr->xattrs, NULL); in __kernfs_new_node() 714 kfree(kn->iattr->xattrs); in __kernfs_new_node()
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| H A D | kernfs-internal.h | 29 struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; member
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| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/cifs/ |
| H A D | todo.rst | 36 (stat, statfs, create, unlink, mkdir, xattrs) already have been improved by 49 h) implement support for security and trusted categories of xattrs
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| H A D | usage.rst | 160 Note that server ea support is required for supporting xattrs from the Linux 539 Allow getting and setting user xattrs (those attributes whose 544 Do not allow getfattr/setfattr to get/set/list xattrs
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| /linux/fs/ubifs/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 70 Saying Y here includes support for extended attributes (xattrs).
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| /linux/security/apparmor/include/ |
| H A D | policy.h | 219 char **xattrs; member
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| /linux/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| H A D | overlayfs.rst | 401 appropriate REDIRECT and METACOPY xattrs, and gain access to file on lower 403 "trusted." xattrs will require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. But it should be possible 490 When a layer containing verity xattrs is used, it means that any such 573 that have overlayfs attributes, such as whiteouts or "overlay.*" xattrs, will 577 Overlayfs specific xattrs are escaped by using a special prefix of 777 filesystem that supports xattrs.
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| /linux/security/apparmor/ |
| H A D | policy_unpack.c | 600 profile->attach.xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL); in unpack_xattrs() 601 if (!profile->attach.xattrs) in unpack_xattrs() 604 if (!aa_unpack_strdup(e, &profile->attach.xattrs[i], NULL)) in unpack_xattrs()
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| H A D | policy.c | 275 kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs[i]); in free_attachment() 276 kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs); in free_attachment()
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| H A D | domain.c | 329 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, d, attach->xattrs[i], in aa_xattrs_match()
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| /linux/Documentation/filesystems/ext4/ |
| H A D | attributes.rst | 6 Extended attributes (xattrs) are typically stored in a separate data
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| /linux/security/smack/ |
| H A D | smack_lsm.c | 57 * Smack uses multiple xattrs. 984 xattr_dupval(struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count, in xattr_dupval() argument 987 struct xattr * const xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count); in xattr_dupval() 1006 * @xattrs: where to put the attributes 1007 * @xattr_count: current number of LSM-provided xattrs (updated) 1013 struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count) in smack_inode_init_security() argument 1029 /* forced label, no need to save to xattrs */ in smack_inode_init_security() 1060 if (xattr_dupval(xattrs, xattr_count, in smack_inode_init_security() 1070 if (xattr_dupval(xattrs, xattr_count, in smack_inode_init_security() 1306 * Returns 1 to indicate that Smack "owns" the access control rights to xattrs [all...] |
| /linux/fs/squashfs/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 146 Saying Y here includes support for extended attributes (xattrs).
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| /linux/Documentation/filesystems/caching/ |
| H A D | cachefiles.rst | 73 - extended attributes (xattrs).
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| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ |
| H A D | Smack.rst | 77 Smack uses extended attributes (xattrs) to store labels on filesystem
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