| /linux/kernel/ |
| H A D | capability.c | 133 * and inheritable capabilities that are returned
166 kdata[0].inheritable = pI.val; kdata[1].inheritable = pI.val >> 32; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
203 * and inheritable capabilities
220 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
245 inheritable = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].inheritable, kdata[1].inheritable); in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
252 &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
224 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; SYSCALL_DEFINE2() local
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| H A D | auditsc.c | 1318 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); in audit_log_fcaps()
1456 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); in show_special()
1730 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
1733 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
1737 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
2257 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; in audit_copy_fcaps()
2813 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2819 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2824 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2844 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; in __audit_log_capset()
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| /linux/include/uapi/linux/ |
| H A D | capability.h | 47 __u32 inheritable; member
77 __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ member
88 __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ member
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| /linux/security/ |
| H A D | commoncap.c | 230 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in cap_capget() argument
238 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; in cap_capget()
274 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in cap_capset() argument
278 !cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset()
284 if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset()
299 new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; in cap_capset()
308 *inheritable)); in cap_capset()
635 (new->cap_inheritable.val & caps->inheritable.val); in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
728 cpu_caps->inheritable.val = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[0].inheritable); in get_vfs_caps_from_disk()
736 cpu_caps->inheritable.val += (u64)le32_to_cpu(caps->data[1].inheritable) << 32; in get_vfs_caps_from_disk()
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| H A D | security.c | 1096 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument
1099 return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget()
1117 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument
1120 return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable, in security_capset()
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| /linux/fs/btrfs/ |
| H A D | props.c | 32 int inheritable; member
383 .inheritable = 1
405 if (!h->inheritable) in btrfs_inode_inherit_props()
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| /linux/include/linux/ |
| H A D | capability.h | 31 kernel_cap_t inheritable; member
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| /linux/Documentation/security/ |
| H A D | credentials.rst | 149 - Set of inheritable capabilities
161 inheritable set might also be so constrained.
166 The inheritable capabilities are the ones that may get passed across
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| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/ |
| H A D | numa_memory_policy.rst | 53 it is inheritable, and indeed is inherited, across both fork()
106 are NOT inheritable across exec(). Thus, only NUMA-aware
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| /linux/security/selinux/ |
| H A D | hooks.c | 2116 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in selinux_capget() argument
2124 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in selinux_capset() argument
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| /linux/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| H A D | vfs.rst | 1386 and the parent VFS mount record to provide inheritable mount
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