| /linux/security/ |
| H A D | commoncap.c | 231 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in cap_capget() argument
239 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; in cap_capget()
275 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in cap_capset() argument
279 !cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset()
285 if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset()
300 new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; in cap_capset()
309 *inheritable)); in cap_capset()
646 (new->cap_inheritable.val & caps->inheritable.val); in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
739 cpu_caps->inheritable.val = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[0].inheritable); in get_vfs_caps_from_disk()
747 cpu_caps->inheritable.val += (u64)le32_to_cpu(caps->data[1].inheritable) << 32; in get_vfs_caps_from_disk()
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| H A D | security.c | 588 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument
591 return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget()
609 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument
612 return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable, in security_capset()
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| /linux/fs/btrfs/ |
| H A D | props.c | 32 int inheritable; member
384 .inheritable = 1
406 if (!h->inheritable) in btrfs_inode_inherit_props()
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| /linux/kernel/ |
| H A D | auditsc.c | 1311 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); in audit_log_fcaps()
1442 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); in show_special()
1708 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
1711 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
1715 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
2234 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; in audit_copy_fcaps()
2781 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2787 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2792 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2812 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; in __audit_log_capset()
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| H A D | audit.h | 58 kernel_cap_t inheritable; member
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| /linux/include/linux/ |
| H A D | security.h | 179 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
182 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
342 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
346 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
674 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument
677 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget()
683 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument
686 return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capset()
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| H A D | lsm_hook_defs.h | 40 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
42 const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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| /linux/Documentation/security/ |
| H A D | credentials.rst | 149 - Set of inheritable capabilities
161 inheritable set might also be so constrained.
166 The inheritable capabilities are the ones that may get passed across
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| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/ |
| H A D | numa_memory_policy.rst | 53 it is inheritable, and indeed is inherited, across both fork()
106 are NOT inheritable across exec(). Thus, only NUMA-aware
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| /linux/security/apparmor/ |
| H A D | lsm.c | 165 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in apparmor_capget() argument
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| /linux/security/selinux/ |
| H A D | hooks.c | 2133 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in selinux_capget() argument
2141 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in selinux_capset() argument
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| /linux/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| H A D | vfs.rst | 1380 and the parent VFS mount record to provide inheritable mount
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| H A D | proc.rst | 283 CapInh bitmap of inheritable capabilities
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