Home
last modified time | relevance | path

Searched refs:access (Results 1 – 25 of 1516) sorted by relevance

12345678910>>...61

/linux/security/landlock/
H A Daudit.c89 const access_mask_t access) in log_blockers() argument
91 const unsigned long access_mask = access; in log_blockers()
95 for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_mask, BITS_PER_TYPE(access)) { in log_blockers()
188 for (ssize_t i = ARRAY_SIZE(masks->access) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { in get_denied_layer()
189 if (masks->access[i] & *access_request) { in get_denied_layer()
190 *access_request &= masks->access[i]; in get_denied_layer()
208 .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | in test_get_denied_layer()
210 .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | in test_get_denied_layer()
212 .access[2] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR, in test_get_denied_layer()
214 access_mask_t access; in test_get_denied_layer() local
[all …]
H A Dfs.c411 for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_parent->access); i++) { in may_refer()
412 access_mask_t child_access = src_parent->access[i] & in may_refer()
413 src_child->access[i]; in may_refer()
414 access_mask_t parent_access = new_parent->access[i]; in may_refer()
460 .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | in test_no_more_access()
464 .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | in test_no_more_access()
468 .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, in test_no_more_access()
471 .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, in test_no_more_access()
474 .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, in test_no_more_access()
475 .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, in test_no_more_access()
[all …]
H A Druleset.c256 this->layers[0].access |= (*layers)[0].access; in insert_rule()
293 .access = ~0, in build_check_layer()
301 BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); in build_check_layer()
307 const access_mask_t access) in landlock_insert_rule() argument
310 .access = access, in landlock_insert_rule()
352 layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access; in merge_tree()
651 masks->access[layer->level - 1] &= ~layer->access; in landlock_unmask_layers()
654 for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->access); i++) { in landlock_unmask_layers()
655 if (masks->access[i]) in landlock_unmask_layers()
711 masks->access[i] = access_request & handled; in landlock_init_layer_masks()
[all …]
/linux/drivers/iommu/iommufd/
H A Ddevice.c1071 static int iommufd_access_change_ioas(struct iommufd_access *access, in iommufd_access_change_ioas() argument
1074 u32 iopt_access_list_id = access->iopt_access_list_id; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1075 struct iommufd_ioas *cur_ioas = access->ioas; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1078 lockdep_assert_held(&access->ioas_lock); in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1081 if (cur_ioas != access->ioas_unpin) in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1091 access->ioas = NULL; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1094 rc = iopt_add_access(&new_ioas->iopt, access); in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1096 access->ioas = cur_ioas; in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1103 if (!iommufd_access_is_internal(access) && access->ops->unmap) { in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
1104 mutex_unlock(&access->ioas_lock); in iommufd_access_change_ioas()
[all …]
H A Dviommu.c253 struct iommufd_access *access, in iommufd_hw_queue_destroy_access() argument
259 iommufd_access_unpin_pages(access, aligned_iova, in iommufd_hw_queue_destroy_access()
261 iommufd_access_detach_internal(access); in iommufd_hw_queue_destroy_access()
262 iommufd_access_destroy_internal(ictx, access); in iommufd_hw_queue_destroy_access()
272 if (hw_queue->access) in iommufd_hw_queue_destroy()
274 hw_queue->access, in iommufd_hw_queue_destroy()
295 struct iommufd_access *access; in iommufd_hw_queue_alloc_phys() local
319 access = iommufd_access_create_internal(viommu->ictx); in iommufd_hw_queue_alloc_phys()
320 if (IS_ERR(access)) { in iommufd_hw_queue_alloc_phys()
321 rc = PTR_ERR(access); in iommufd_hw_queue_alloc_phys()
[all …]
/linux/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/
H A Drxe_mw.c51 struct rxe_mw *mw, struct rxe_mr *mr, int access) in rxe_check_bind_mw() argument
61 if (unlikely((access & IB_ZERO_BASED))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
94 if (unlikely(mr->access & IB_ZERO_BASED)) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
100 if (unlikely(!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_MW_BIND))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
107 if (unlikely((access & in rxe_check_bind_mw()
109 !(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
116 if (access & IB_ZERO_BASED) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
136 struct rxe_mw *mw, struct rxe_mr *mr, int access) in rxe_do_bind_mw() argument
141 mw->access = access; in rxe_do_bind_mw()
172 int access = wqe->wr.wr.mw.access; in rxe_bind_mw() local
[all …]
H A Drxe_mr.c48 void rxe_mr_init(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init() argument
60 mr->access = access; in rxe_mr_init()
67 void rxe_mr_init_dma(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_dma() argument
69 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_dma()
130 bool persistent = !!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_FLUSH_PERSISTENT); in rxe_mr_fill_pages_from_sgt()
193 int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_user() argument
198 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_user()
200 umem = ib_umem_get(&rxe->ib_dev, start, length, access); in rxe_mr_init_user()
262 bool persistent = !!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_FLUSH_PERSISTENT); in rxe_set_page()
417 int access, in copy_data() argument
[all …]
/linux/security/
H A Ddevice_cgroup.c38 short access; member
118 walk->access |= ex->access; in dev_exception_add()
146 walk->access &= ~ex->access; in dev_exception_rm()
147 if (!walk->access) { in dev_exception_rm()
247 static void seq_putaccess(struct seq_file *m, short access) in seq_putaccess() argument
249 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) in seq_putaccess()
251 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in seq_putaccess()
253 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in seq_putaccess()
299 seq_putaccess(m, ex->access); in devcgroup_seq_show()
322 u32 major, u32 minor, short access) in match_exception() argument
[all …]
/linux/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/damon/
H A Dstart.rst40 The commands below show the memory access pattern of a program at the moment of
45 $ sudo damo report access
48 0 addr 86.182 TiB size 8.000 KiB access 0 % age 14.900 s
49 1 addr 86.182 TiB size 8.000 KiB access 60 % age 0 ns
50 2 addr 86.182 TiB size 3.422 MiB access 0 % age 4.100 s
51 3 addr 86.182 TiB size 2.004 MiB access 95 % age 2.200 s
52 4 addr 86.182 TiB size 29.688 MiB access 0 % age 14.100 s
53 5 addr 86.182 TiB size 29.516 MiB access 0 % age 16.700 s
54 6 addr 86.182 TiB size 29.633 MiB access 0 % age 17.900 s
55 7 addr 86.182 TiB size 117.652 MiB access 0 % age 18.400 s
[all …]
/linux/sound/core/
H A Dcontrol_led.c49 unsigned int access; member
82 static inline unsigned int access_to_group(unsigned int access) in access_to_group() argument
84 return ((access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_LED_MASK) >> in access_to_group()
93 static struct snd_ctl_led *snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access() argument
95 unsigned int group = access_to_group(access); in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access()
138 static void snd_ctl_led_set_state(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int access, in snd_ctl_led_set_state() argument
146 led = snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(access); in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
164 lctl->access = access; in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
201 unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_remove() argument
208 if (lctl && (access == 0 || access != lctl->access)) { in snd_ctl_led_remove()
[all …]
/linux/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/
H A DSmack.rst10 Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access
33 access to systems that use them as Smack does.
50 load the Smack access rules
53 report if a process with one label has access
85 Used to make access control decisions. In almost all cases
95 label does not allow all of the access permitted to a process
102 the Smack rule (more below) that permitted the write access
110 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
115 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
131 access
[all …]
/linux/kernel/kcsan/
H A Dkcsan_test.c152 } access[2]; member
159 const bool is_assert = (r->access[0].type | r->access[1].type) & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT; in __report_matches()
182 if (r->access[1].fn) { in __report_matches()
187 scnprintf(tmp[0], sizeof(tmp[0]), "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
188 scnprintf(tmp[1], sizeof(tmp[1]), "%pS", r->access[1].fn); in __report_matches()
191 cmp < 0 ? r->access[0].fn : r->access[1].fn, in __report_matches()
192 cmp < 0 ? r->access[1].fn : r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
194 scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in __report_matches()
204 if (!r->access[1].fn) in __report_matches()
209 const int ty = r->access[i].type; in __report_matches()
[all …]
/linux/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/
H A Dfs_test.c600 __u64 access; in TEST_F_FORK() local
621 for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) { in TEST_F_FORK()
622 path_beneath_dir.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
627 path_beneath_file.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
630 if (access & ACCESS_FILE) { in TEST_F_FORK()
660 __u64 access; in TEST_F_FORK() local
674 for (access = 1ULL << 63; access != ACCESS_LAST; access >>= 1) { in TEST_F_FORK()
675 path_beneath.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
692 __u64 access; in TEST_F_FORK() local
701 for (access = 1; access > 0; access <<= 1) { in TEST_F_FORK()
[all …]
/linux/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/dma/
H A Duser.c87 args->v0.version, args->v0.target, args->v0.access, in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
90 dmaobj->access = args->v0.access; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
120 switch (dmaobj->access) { in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
122 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_VM; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
125 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
128 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_WO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
131 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RW; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
/linux/drivers/platform/chrome/
H A Dcros_ec_lpc_mec.c129 enum cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_access_mode access, new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec() local
145 access = ACCESS_TYPE_BYTE; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
147 access = ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
154 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
182 if (new_access != access || in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
183 access != ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT) { in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
184 access = new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
185 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
/linux/fs/afs/
H A Dsecurity.c164 h += permits->permits[i].access; in afs_hash_permits()
201 if (permits->permits[i].access != caller_access) { in afs_cache_permit()
266 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
270 new->permits[j].access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_cache_permit()
277 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
360 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit_rcu()
400 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit()
435 afs_access_t access; in afs_permission() local
449 !afs_check_permit_rcu(vnode, key, &access)) in afs_permission()
463 ret = afs_check_permit(vnode, key, &access); in afs_permission()
[all …]
/linux/Documentation/core-api/
H A Dunaligned-memory-access.rst14 when it comes to memory access. This document presents some details about
19 The definition of an unaligned access
26 access.
28 The above may seem a little vague, as memory access can happen in different
32 which will compile to multiple-byte memory access instructions, namely when
47 of memory access. However, we must consider ALL supported architectures;
52 Why unaligned access is bad
55 The effects of performing an unaligned memory access vary from architecture
62 happen. The exception handler is able to correct the unaligned access,
66 unaligned access to be corrected.
[all …]
/linux/arch/arm/include/asm/
H A Darch_timer.h28 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u64 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
30 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
42 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
60 u32 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
64 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
72 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
/linux/Documentation/arch/arm/
H A Dmem_alignment.rst5 Too many problems popped up because of unnoticed misaligned memory access in
14 unaligned memory access in general. If those access are predictable, you
16 alignment trap can fixup misaligned access for the exception cases, but at
20 trap to SIGBUS any code performing unaligned access (good for debugging bad
21 code), or even fixup the access by software like for kernel code. The later
36 0 A user process performing an unaligned memory access
42 performing the unaligned access. This is of course
47 performing the unaligned access.
59 information on unaligned access occurrences plus the current mode of
/linux/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/
H A Dsja1105_dynamic_config.c886 .access = OP_WRITE,
894 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
902 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_VALID_ANYWAY),
910 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
919 .access = OP_WRITE,
927 .access = OP_WRITE,
935 .access = OP_WRITE,
943 .access = OP_WRITE,
951 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
959 .access = OP_WRITE,
[all …]
/linux/Documentation/security/
H A Dlandlock.rst12 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
20 system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
21 LSM). A Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls enforced
31 Guiding principles for safe access controls
34 * A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead
40 * Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed
47 Cf. `File descriptor access rights`_.
56 Inode access rights
59 All access rights are tied to an inode and what can be accessed through it.
68 File descriptor access rights
[all …]
/linux/drivers/dax/
H A DKconfig3 tristate "DAX: direct access to differentiated memory"
9 tristate "Device DAX: direct access mapping device"
12 Support raw access to differentiated (persistence, bandwidth,
20 tristate "PMEM DAX: direct access to persistent memory"
24 Support raw access to persistent memory. Note that this
31 tristate "HMEM DAX: direct access to 'specific purpose' memory"
48 tristate "CXL DAX: direct access to CXL RAM regions"
56 instance is created to access that unmapped-by-default address range.
57 Per usual it can remain as dedicated access via a device interface, or
70 Support access to persistent, or other performance
/linux/tools/testing/selftests/exec/
H A Dcheck-exec.c71 FIXTURE(access) in FIXTURE() argument
77 FIXTURE_VARIANT(access) in FIXTURE_VARIANT() argument
84 FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_exec) { in FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD() argument
91 FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_noexec) { in FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD() argument
98 FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_exec) { in FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD() argument
105 FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_noexec) { in FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD() argument
119 FIXTURE_SETUP(access) in FIXTURE_SETUP() argument
173 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(access) in FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT() argument
267 TEST_F(access, regular_file_empty) in TEST_F() argument
277 TEST_F(access, regular_file_elf) in TEST_F() argument
[all …]
/linux/tools/perf/Documentation/
H A Dsecurity.txt8 Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall
11 LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be
13 Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities:
127 Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux
133 and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case
139 Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance
141 more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
143 access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
148 >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
149 >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
[all …]
/linux/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/
H A Dpaging_tmpl.h109 static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access, in FNAME()
124 *access &= mask; in FNAME()
181 unsigned access; in FNAME() local
183 access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) | in FNAME()
189 access = gpte & (PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_PRESENT_MASK); in FNAME()
191 access ^= (gpte >> PT64_NX_SHIFT); in FNAME()
194 return access; in FNAME()
304 gpa_t addr, u64 access) in FNAME()
317 const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK; in FNAME()
318 const int user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK; in FNAME()
[all …]

12345678910>>...61