Searched refs:CAP_BPF (Results 1 – 17 of 17) sorted by relevance
| /linux/tools/perf/util/ |
| H A D | cap.h | 17 #ifndef CAP_BPF
18 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
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| H A D | bpf-filter.c | 634 if (perf_cap__capable(CAP_BPF, &used_root)) in check_bpf_filter_capable()
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| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ |
| H A D | cap_helpers.h | 13 #ifndef CAP_BPF macro
14 #define CAP_BPF 39
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| H A D | test_loader.c | 974 1ULL << CAP_PERFMON | 1ULL << CAP_BPF); in run_subtest()
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| H A D | test_verifier.c | 71 1ULL << CAP_BPF)
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| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ |
| H A D | verifier_mtu.c | 10 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF|CAP_NET_ADMIN)
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| H A D | verifier_spill_fill.c | 1252 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv()
1270 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv()
1250 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) __caps_unpriv() argument
1268 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) __caps_unpriv() argument
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| H A D | bpf_misc.h | 173 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
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| /linux/kernel/bpf/ |
| H A D | token.c | 146 if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_token_create()
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| H A D | syscall.c | 1268 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in map_check_btf()
1448 if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create()
1484 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create()
2906 bpf_cap = bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_prog_load()
5492 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in bpf_btf_load()
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| H A D | core.c | 671 !bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_prog_kallsyms_add()
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| H A D | verifier.c | 19941 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_check()
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| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ |
| H A D | unpriv_bpf_disabled.c | 14 * an old /usr/include/linux/capability.h and be < CAP_BPF; as a result
15 * CAP_BPF would not be included in ALL_CAPS. Instead use CAP_BPF as
19 #define ALL_CAPS ((2ULL << CAP_BPF) - 1)
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| H A D | tc_bpf.c | 405 ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps); in tc_bpf_non_root()
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| H A D | token.c | 66 return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) | in restore_priv_caps()
520 * CAP_BPF inside current userns to create privileged map; let's test in userns_map_create()
521 * that neither BPF token alone nor namespaced CAP_BPF is sufficient in userns_map_create()
527 /* no token, no CAP_BPF -> fail */ in userns_map_create()
536 /* token without CAP_BPF -> fail */ in userns_map_create()
545 /* get back effective local CAP_BPF (and CAP_SYS_ADMIN) */ in userns_map_create()
550 /* CAP_BPF without token -> fail */ in userns_map_create()
559 /* finally, namespaced CAP_BPF + token -> success */ in userns_map_create()
591 * CAP_BPF inside current userns to create privileged map; let's test in userns_btf_load()
592 * that neither BPF token alone nor namespaced CAP_BPF i in userns_btf_load()
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| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/ |
| H A D | net.rst | 108 CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root user name space.
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| /linux/net/core/ |
| H A D | filter.c | 8922 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
8934 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
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