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Searched refs:CAP_BPF (Results 1 – 20 of 20) sorted by relevance

/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/
H A Dcap_helpers.h12 #ifndef CAP_BPF
13 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
H A Dtest_loader.c771 1ULL << CAP_PERFMON | 1ULL << CAP_BPF); in drop_capabilities()
/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/
H A Dverifier_mtu.c10 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF|CAP_NET_ADMIN)
H A Dverifier_spill_fill.c1250 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
1268 __caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF) in __caps_unpriv() argument
H A Dbpf_misc.h143 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
/linux/tools/bpf/bpftool/
H A Dfeature.c1072 #ifdef CAP_BPF in handle_perms()
1073 capability(CAP_BPF), in handle_perms()
1092 #ifdef CAP_BPF in handle_perms()
1093 if (CAP_IS_SUPPORTED(CAP_BPF)) in handle_perms()
1135 #ifdef CAP_BPF in handle_perms()
/linux/include/uapi/linux/
H A Dcapability.h412 #define CAP_BPF 39 macro
/linux/include/linux/
H A Dcapability.h202 return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); in bpf_capable()
H A Dfilter.h1306 if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_jit_blinding_enabled()
/linux/kernel/bpf/
H A Dtoken.c146 if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_token_create()
H A Dsyscall.c1221 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in map_check_btf()
1404 if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create()
1439 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) in map_create()
2782 bpf_cap = bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_prog_load()
5114 if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) { in bpf_btf_load()
H A Dhelpers.c1961 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_base_func_proto()
H A Dcore.c696 !bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in bpf_prog_kallsyms_add()
H A Dverifier.c23075 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF); in bpf_check()
/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/
H A Dunpriv_bpf_disabled.c18 #define ALL_CAPS ((2ULL << CAP_BPF) - 1)
H A Dtc_bpf.c405 ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps); in tc_bpf_non_root()
H A Dtoken.c59 return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) | in drop_priv_caps()
/linux/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/
H A Dnet.rst108 CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root user name space.
H A Dkernel.rst1624 once disabled, calling ``bpf()`` without ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` or ``CAP_BPF``
/linux/net/core/
H A Dfilter.c8692 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()
8704 if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF)) in cg_skb_is_valid_access()