1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29
30 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
31
32 typedef struct {
33 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
34 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
35 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
36
37 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
38
39 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
40 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
42 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
43
44 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45
46 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
47
48 /*
49 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
50 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
51 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
52 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 *
54 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
55 * (transition not allowed)
56 */
ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)57 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
58 {
59 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
60
61 /*
62 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
63 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
64 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 */
66 switch (st->hand_state) {
67 default:
68 break;
69
70 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
71 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
74 return 1;
75 }
76 break;
77 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
78 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
79 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
80 return 1;
81 }
82 break;
83 }
84 /* Fall through */
85
86 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
87 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
88 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
91 return 1;
92 }
93 } else {
94 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
95 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
96 return 1;
97 }
98 }
99 break;
100
101 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
102 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 return 1;
106 }
107 } else {
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
110 return 1;
111 }
112 }
113 break;
114
115 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
116 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
117 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
118 return 1;
119 }
120 break;
121
122 case TLS_ST_OK:
123 /*
124 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
125 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 */
127 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
128 break;
129
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
131 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
133 return 1;
134 }
135
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 break;
141 }
142
143 /* No valid transition found */
144 return 0;
145 }
146
147 /*
148 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
149 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
150 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
151 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 *
153 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
154 * (transition not allowed)
155 */
ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)156 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
157 {
158 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
159
160 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
161 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
162 goto err;
163 return 1;
164 }
165
166 switch (st->hand_state) {
167 default:
168 break;
169
170 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
171 case TLS_ST_OK:
172 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
175 return 1;
176 }
177 break;
178
179 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
180 /*
181 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
182 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * OR
184 * 2) If we did request one then
185 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * AND
187 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
188 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 */
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
191 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
192 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
193 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
194 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
195 /*
196 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
197 * not going to accept it because we require a client
198 * cert.
199 */
200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
202 return 0;
203 }
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
205 return 1;
206 }
207 } else {
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
209 return 1;
210 }
211 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
214 return 1;
215 }
216 }
217 break;
218
219 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
222 return 1;
223 }
224 break;
225
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
227 /*
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
233 * set.
234 */
235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
237 /*
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
242 */
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
244 return 1;
245 }
246 } else {
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
249 return 1;
250 }
251 }
252 break;
253
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
257 return 1;
258 }
259 break;
260
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
266 return 1;
267 }
268 } else {
269 #endif
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 return 1;
273 }
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 }
276 #endif
277 break;
278
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 break;
286 #endif
287
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
291 return 1;
292 }
293 break;
294 }
295
296 err:
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
299 BIO *rbio;
300
301 /*
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
304 */
305 s->init_num = 0;
306 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
307 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
310 return 0;
311 }
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
313 return 0;
314 }
315
316 /*
317 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
318 *
319 * Valid return values are:
320 * 1: Yes
321 * 0: No
322 */
send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)323 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
324 {
325 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
326
327 /*
328 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
329 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
330 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
331 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
332 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
333 * key exchange.
334 */
335 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
336 /*
337 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
338 * provided
339 */
340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
341 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
342 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
343 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
344 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
345 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
346 #endif
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
348 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
349 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
350 #endif
351 ) {
352 return 1;
353 }
354
355 return 0;
356 }
357
358 /*
359 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
360 *
361 * Valid return values are:
362 * 1: Yes
363 * 0: No
364 */
send_certificate_request(SSL * s)365 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
366 {
367 if (
368 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
369 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
370 /*
371 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
372 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
373 */
374 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
375 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
376 /*
377 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
378 * a second time:
379 */
380 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
381 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
382 /*
383 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
384 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
385 * RFC 2246):
386 */
387 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
388 /*
389 * ... except when the application insists on
390 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
391 * this for SSL 3)
392 */
393 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
394 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
395 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
396 /*
397 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
398 * are omitted
399 */
400 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
401 return 1;
402 }
403
404 return 0;
405 }
406
407 /*
408 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
409 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
410 * client.
411 */
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL * s)412 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
413 {
414 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
415
416 /*
417 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
418 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
419 */
420
421 switch (st->hand_state) {
422 default:
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
425 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
426
427 case TLS_ST_OK:
428 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 }
432 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 }
436 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 }
440 /* Try to read from the client instead */
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
442
443 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446
447 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
448 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
449 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
451 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
453 else
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456
457 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
458 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
460 else
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463
464 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
465 if (s->hit)
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
467 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
469 else
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
471
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473
474 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
475 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
476 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 } else {
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
480 }
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482
483 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486
487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490
491 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494
495 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
497
498 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
499 /*
500 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
501 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
502 * immediately.
503 */
504 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
505 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
506 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
507 /*
508 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
509 * handshake at this point.
510 */
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 }
514 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
516 else
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519
520 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
521 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
524
525 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
526 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
527 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
528 * been configured for.
529 */
530 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
533 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
535 }
536 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 }
538 }
539
540 /*
541 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
542 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
543 */
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL * s)544 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
545 {
546 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
547
548 /*
549 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
550 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
551 */
552
553 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
554 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
555
556 switch (st->hand_state) {
557 default:
558 /* Shouldn't happen */
559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
561
562 case TLS_ST_OK:
563 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
564 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
566 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 }
569 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
570 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
572 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
573 }
574 /* Fall through */
575
576 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
577 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
579
580 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583
584 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
586 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
587 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
588 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
589 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 } else {
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
594 }
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596
597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
598 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
599
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
601 if (s->hit) {
602 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
604 else
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
606 } else {
607 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
608 /* normal PSK or SRP */
609 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
610 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
612 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
614 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
616 } else {
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
618 }
619 }
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
621
622 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
623 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 }
627 /* Fall through */
628
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
630 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 }
634 /* Fall through */
635
636 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
637 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 }
641 /* Fall through */
642
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646
647 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
649
650 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
651 if (s->hit) {
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
656 } else {
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
658 }
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660
661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
664
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
668
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
670 if (s->hit) {
671 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
672 }
673 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
674 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
675 }
676 }
677
678 /*
679 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
680 * the server to the client.
681 */
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
683 {
684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
685
686 switch (st->hand_state) {
687 default:
688 /* No pre work to be done */
689 break;
690
691 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
692 s->shutdown = 0;
693 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
694 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
695 break;
696
697 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
698 s->shutdown = 0;
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
701 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
702 st->use_timer = 0;
703 }
704 break;
705
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
708 /*
709 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
710 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
711 */
712 st->use_timer = 1;
713 }
714 break;
715
716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
719 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
720 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
721 }
722 #endif
723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
724
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
727 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
728 /*
729 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
730 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
731 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
732 *
733 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
734 */
735 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
736 }
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 /*
739 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
740 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
741 */
742 st->use_timer = 0;
743 }
744 break;
745
746 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
747 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
748 break;
749 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
750 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
751 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
752 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
754 return WORK_ERROR;
755 }
756 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
758 return WORK_ERROR;
759 }
760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
761 /*
762 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
763 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
764 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
765 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
766 */
767 st->use_timer = 0;
768 }
769 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
770
771 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
772 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
773 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
774 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
775 /* Fall through */
776
777 case TLS_ST_OK:
778 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
779 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
780 }
781
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
783 }
784
conn_is_closed(void)785 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
786 {
787 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
788 #if defined(EPIPE)
789 case EPIPE:
790 return 1;
791 #endif
792 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
793 case ECONNRESET:
794 return 1;
795 #endif
796 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
797 case WSAECONNRESET:
798 return 1;
799 #endif
800 default:
801 return 0;
802 }
803 }
804
805 /*
806 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
807 * server to the client.
808 */
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)809 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
810 {
811 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
812
813 s->init_num = 0;
814
815 switch (st->hand_state) {
816 default:
817 /* No post work to be done */
818 break;
819
820 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
821 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
822 return WORK_MORE_A;
823 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
825 return WORK_ERROR;
826 }
827 break;
828
829 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
830 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 return WORK_MORE_A;
832 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
833 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
835 return WORK_ERROR;
836 }
837 /*
838 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
839 * treat like it was the first packet
840 */
841 s->first_packet = 1;
842 break;
843
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
845 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
846 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
847 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
848 return WORK_MORE_A;
849 break;
850 }
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
852 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
853 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
854 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
855 size_t labellen;
856
857 /*
858 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
859 * SCTP used.
860 */
861 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
862 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
863
864 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
865 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
866 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
867 labellen += 1;
868
869 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
870 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
871 labellen, NULL, 0,
872 0) <= 0) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
874 return WORK_ERROR;
875 }
876
877 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
878 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
879 }
880 #endif
881 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
882 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
883 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
884 break;
885 /* Fall through */
886
887 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
888 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
889 if (!statem_flush(s))
890 return WORK_MORE_A;
891 break;
892 }
893
894 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
895 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
896 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
897 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
898 /* SSLfatal() already called */
899 return WORK_ERROR;
900 }
901
902 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
903 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
904 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
905 /* SSLfatal() already called */
906 return WORK_ERROR;
907 }
908 /*
909 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
910 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
911 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
912 */
913 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
914 break;
915 }
916
917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
918 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
919 /*
920 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
921 * no SCTP used.
922 */
923 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
924 0, NULL);
925 }
926 #endif
927 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
928 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
929 {
930 /* SSLfatal() already called */
931 return WORK_ERROR;
932 }
933
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
935 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
936 break;
937
938 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
939 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
940 return WORK_MORE_A;
941 break;
942
943 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
944 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
945 return WORK_MORE_A;
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
947 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
948 /*
949 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
950 * no SCTP used.
951 */
952 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
953 0, NULL);
954 }
955 #endif
956 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
957 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
958 size_t dummy;
959 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
960 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
961 &dummy)
962 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
963 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
964 /* SSLfatal() already called */
965 return WORK_ERROR;
966 }
967 break;
968
969 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
970 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
971 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
972 return WORK_MORE_A;
973 }
974 break;
975
976 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
977 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
978 return WORK_MORE_A;
979 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
980 /* SSLfatal() already called */
981 return WORK_ERROR;
982 }
983 break;
984
985 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
986 clear_sys_error();
987 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
988 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
989 && conn_is_closed()) {
990 /*
991 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
992 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
993 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
994 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
995 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
996 */
997 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
998 break;
999 }
1000
1001 return WORK_MORE_A;
1002 }
1003 break;
1004 }
1005
1006 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1007 }
1008
1009 /*
1010 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1011 * server
1012 *
1013 * Valid return values are:
1014 * 1: Success
1015 * 0: Error
1016 */
ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)1017 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1018 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1019 {
1020 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1021
1022 switch (st->hand_state) {
1023 default:
1024 /* Shouldn't happen */
1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1026 return 0;
1027
1028 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1030 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1031 else
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1034 break;
1035
1036 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1037 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1038 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1039 break;
1040
1041 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1042 /* No construction function needed */
1043 *confunc = NULL;
1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1045 break;
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1050 break;
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1055 break;
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1060 break;
1061
1062
1063 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1064 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1065 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1066 break;
1067
1068 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1069 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1070 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1071 break;
1072
1073 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1074 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1075 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1076 break;
1077
1078 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1079 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1080 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1081 break;
1082
1083 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1084 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1085 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1086 break;
1087
1088 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1089 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1090 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1091 break;
1092
1093 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1094 *confunc = NULL;
1095 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1096 break;
1097
1098 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1099 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1100 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1101 break;
1102
1103 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1104 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1105 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1106 break;
1107 }
1108
1109 return 1;
1110 }
1111
1112 /*
1113 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1114 * calculated as follows:
1115 *
1116 * 2 + # client_version
1117 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1118 * 1 + # length of session_id
1119 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1120 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1121 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1122 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1123 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1124 * 2 + # length of extensions
1125 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1126 */
1127 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1128
1129 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1130 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1131
1132 /*
1133 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1134 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1135 */
ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL * s)1136 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1137 {
1138 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1139
1140 switch (st->hand_state) {
1141 default:
1142 /* Shouldn't happen */
1143 return 0;
1144
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1146 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1147
1148 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1149 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1150
1151 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1152 return s->max_cert_list;
1153
1154 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1155 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1156
1157 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1158 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1159
1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1162 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1163 #endif
1164
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1166 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1167
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1169 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1170
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1172 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1173 }
1174 }
1175
1176 /*
1177 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1178 */
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1179 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1180 {
1181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1182
1183 switch (st->hand_state) {
1184 default:
1185 /* Shouldn't happen */
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1188
1189 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1190 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1191
1192 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1193 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1194
1195 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1196 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1197
1198 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1199 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1200
1201 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1202 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1203
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1205 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1206 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1207 #endif
1208
1209 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1210 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1211
1212 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1213 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1214
1215 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1216 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1217
1218 }
1219 }
1220
1221 /*
1222 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1223 * from the client
1224 */
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)1225 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1226 {
1227 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1228
1229 switch (st->hand_state) {
1230 default:
1231 /* Shouldn't happen */
1232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 return WORK_ERROR;
1234
1235 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1236 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1237
1238 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1239 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1240 }
1241 }
1242
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1244 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL * s)1245 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1246 {
1247 int ret;
1248 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1249
1250 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1251 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1252 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1253 /*
1254 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1255 * login name
1256 */
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1258 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1259 return -1;
1260 } else {
1261 ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
1262 if (ret < 0)
1263 return 0;
1264 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, al,
1266 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1267 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1268 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1269 return -1;
1270 }
1271 }
1272 }
1273 return 1;
1274 }
1275 #endif
1276
dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET * pkt,unsigned char * cookie,size_t cookie_len)1277 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1278 size_t cookie_len)
1279 {
1280 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1282 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1283 return 0;
1284
1285 return 1;
1286 }
1287
dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)1288 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1289 {
1290 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1291 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1292 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1293 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1294 cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1299
1300 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1301 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 return 0;
1304 }
1305
1306 return 1;
1307 }
1308
1309 /*-
1310 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1311 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1312 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1313 * SNI,
1314 * elliptic_curves
1315 * ec_point_formats
1316 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1317 *
1318 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1319 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1320 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1321 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1322 */
ssl_check_for_safari(SSL * s,const CLIENTHELLO_MSG * hello)1323 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1324 {
1325 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1326 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1327 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1328 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1329 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1330 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1331 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1332
1333 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1334 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1335 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1336 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1337 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1338 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1339 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1340 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1341 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1342 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1343 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1344 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1345 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1346 };
1347 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1348 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1349 unsigned int type;
1350 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1351 size_t ext_len;
1352
1353 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1354
1355 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1356 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1357 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1358 return;
1359 }
1360
1361 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1362 return;
1363
1364 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1365 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1366
1367 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1368 ext_len);
1369 }
1370
1371 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1372 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1373 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1374
tls_process_client_hello(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1375 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1376 {
1377 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1378 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1379 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1380 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1381
1382 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1383 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1384 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1386 goto err;
1387 }
1388 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
1389 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1390 && (s->options
1391 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1393 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1394 }
1395 s->renegotiate = 1;
1396 s->new_session = 1;
1397 }
1398
1399 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1400 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1402 goto err;
1403 }
1404
1405 /*
1406 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1407 */
1408 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1409 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1410
1411 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1412 unsigned int mt;
1413
1414 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1415 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1417 goto err;
1418 }
1419
1420 /*-
1421 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1422 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1423 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1424 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1425 * Byte Content
1426 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1427 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1428 * 3-4 version
1429 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1430 * 7-8 session_id_length
1431 * 9-10 challenge_length
1432 * ... ...
1433 */
1434
1435 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1436 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1437 /*
1438 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1439 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1440 * in the first place
1441 */
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1443 goto err;
1444 }
1445 }
1446
1447 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1449 goto err;
1450 }
1451
1452 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1453 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1454 /*
1455 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1456 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1457 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1458 */
1459 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1460 PACKET challenge;
1461
1462 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1463 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1464 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1466 goto err;
1467 }
1468
1469 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1471 goto err;
1472 }
1473
1474 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1475 ciphersuite_len)
1476 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1477 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1478 /* No extensions. */
1479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1481 goto err;
1482 }
1483 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1484
1485 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1486 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1487 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1488 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1489 */
1490 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1491 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1492 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1494 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1495 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1496 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1497 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 goto err;
1500 }
1501
1502 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1503 } else {
1504 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1505 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1506 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1507 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1508 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1509 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1511 goto err;
1512 }
1513
1514 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1517 goto err;
1518 }
1519 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1520 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1521 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1523 goto err;
1524 }
1525 /*
1526 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1527 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1528 * So check cookie length...
1529 */
1530 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1531 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1532 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1533 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1534 }
1535 }
1536 }
1537
1538 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1540 goto err;
1541 }
1542
1543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1545 goto err;
1546 }
1547
1548 /* Could be empty. */
1549 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1550 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1551 } else {
1552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1555 goto err;
1556 }
1557 }
1558 }
1559
1560 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1561 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1562 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 goto err;
1565 }
1566
1567 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1568 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1569 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1570 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1571 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1572 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1573 goto err;
1574 }
1575 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1576
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1578
1579 err:
1580 if (clienthello != NULL)
1581 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1582 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1583
1584 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1585 }
1586
tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL * s)1587 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1588 {
1589 unsigned int j;
1590 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 int protverr;
1592 size_t loop;
1593 unsigned long id;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1595 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1596 #endif
1597 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1598 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1599 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1600 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1601 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1602
1603 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1604 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1605 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1606 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1607 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1609 break;
1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1611 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1612 return -1;
1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1614 default:
1615 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1616 goto err;
1617 }
1618 }
1619
1620 /* Set up the client_random */
1621 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1622
1623 /* Choose the version */
1624
1625 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1626 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1627 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1628 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1629 /*
1630 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1631 * support it.
1632 */
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1634 goto err;
1635 }
1636 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1637 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1638 }
1639 /*
1640 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1641 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1642 */
1643 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1644 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1645 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1646 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1647 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1648 } else {
1649 protverr = 0;
1650 }
1651
1652 if (protverr) {
1653 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1654 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1655 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1656 }
1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1658 goto err;
1659 }
1660
1661 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1662 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666
1667 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1668 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1669 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1670 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1671 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1672 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1674 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1675 goto err;
1676 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1677 }
1678 /* default verification */
1679 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1680 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1681 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1683 goto err;
1684 }
1685 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1686 }
1687 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1688 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1689 if (protverr != 0) {
1690 s->version = s->client_version;
1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1692 goto err;
1693 }
1694 }
1695 }
1696
1697 s->hit = 0;
1698
1699 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1700 clienthello->isv2) ||
1701 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1702 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1703 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1704 goto err;
1705 }
1706
1707 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1708 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1709 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1710 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1711 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1712 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1713 if (s->renegotiate) {
1714 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1716 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1717 goto err;
1718 }
1719 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1720 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1721 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1722 /*
1723 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1724 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1725 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1726 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1727 * an insecure downgrade.
1728 */
1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1730 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1731 goto err;
1732 }
1733 }
1734 }
1735
1736 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1737 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1738 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1739 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1740
1741 if (cipher == NULL) {
1742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1743 goto err;
1744 }
1745 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1746 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1747 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1748 /*
1749 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1750 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1751 */
1752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1753 goto err;
1754 }
1755 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1756 }
1757
1758 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1759 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1760 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1761 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1763 goto err;
1764 }
1765
1766 /*
1767 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1768 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1769 *
1770 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1771 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1772 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1773 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1774 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1775 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1776 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1777 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1778 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1779 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1780 * ignored.
1781 */
1782 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1783 (s->new_session &&
1784 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1785 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1787 goto err;
1788 }
1789 } else {
1790 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1791 if (i == 1) {
1792 /* previous session */
1793 s->hit = 1;
1794 } else if (i == -1) {
1795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1796 goto err;
1797 } else {
1798 /* i == 0 */
1799 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1801 goto err;
1802 }
1803 }
1804 }
1805
1806 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1807 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1808 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1809 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1810 }
1811
1812 /*
1813 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1814 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1815 */
1816 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1817 j = 0;
1818 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1819
1820 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1821 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1822 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1823 }
1824 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1825 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1826 if (trc_out != NULL)
1827 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1828 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1829 if (c->id == id) {
1830 j = 1;
1831 break;
1832 }
1833 }
1834 if (j == 0) {
1835 /*
1836 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1837 * to reuse it
1838 */
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1840 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1841 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1845 }
1846
1847 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1848 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1849 break;
1850 }
1851
1852 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1853 /* no compress */
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857
1858 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1859 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1860
1861 /* TLS extensions */
1862 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1863 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1865 goto err;
1866 }
1867
1868 /*
1869 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1870 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1871 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1872 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1873 */
1874 {
1875 unsigned char *pos;
1876 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1877 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1879 goto err;
1880 }
1881 }
1882
1883 if (!s->hit
1884 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1885 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1886 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1887 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1888 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1889 /*
1890 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1891 * backwards compat reasons
1892 */
1893 int master_key_length;
1894
1895 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1896 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1897 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1898 &pref_cipher,
1899 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1900 && master_key_length > 0) {
1901 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1902 s->hit = 1;
1903 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1904 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1905
1906 ciphers = NULL;
1907
1908 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1909 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1910 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1911 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1912 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1914 goto err;
1915 }
1916
1917 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1918 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1919 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1920 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1921 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1922 }
1923 }
1924
1925 /*
1926 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1927 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1928 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1929 */
1930 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1931 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1932 /*
1933 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1934 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1935 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1936 */
1937 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1939 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942 }
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1944 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1945 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1946 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1947 unsigned int k;
1948 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1949 /* Can't disable compression */
1950 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1952 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1953 goto err;
1954 }
1955 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1956 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1957 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1958 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1959 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1960 break;
1961 }
1962 }
1963 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1965 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1966 goto err;
1967 }
1968 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1969 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1970 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1971 break;
1972 }
1973 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1975 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1976 goto err;
1977 }
1978 } else if (s->hit) {
1979 comp = NULL;
1980 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1981 /* See if we have a match */
1982 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1983 unsigned int o;
1984
1985 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1986 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1987 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1988 v = comp->id;
1989 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1990 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1991 done = 1;
1992 break;
1993 }
1994 }
1995 if (done)
1996 break;
1997 }
1998 if (done)
1999 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2000 else
2001 comp = NULL;
2002 }
2003 #else
2004 /*
2005 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2006 * using compression.
2007 */
2008 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2010 goto err;
2011 }
2012 #endif
2013
2014 /*
2015 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2016 */
2017
2018 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2019 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2020 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2021 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2023 goto err;
2024 }
2025 ciphers = NULL;
2026 }
2027
2028 if (!s->hit) {
2029 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2030 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2031 #else
2032 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2033 #endif
2034 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2035 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2036 goto err;
2037 }
2038 }
2039
2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2041 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2042 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2043 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2044 s->clienthello = NULL;
2045 return 1;
2046 err:
2047 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2048 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2049 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2050 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2051 s->clienthello = NULL;
2052
2053 return 0;
2054 }
2055
2056 /*
2057 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2058 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2059 */
tls_handle_status_request(SSL * s)2060 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2061 {
2062 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2063
2064 /*
2065 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2066 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2067 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2068 * influence which certificate is sent
2069 */
2070 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2071 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2072 int ret;
2073
2074 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2075 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2076 /*
2077 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2078 * et al can pick it up.
2079 */
2080 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2081 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2082 switch (ret) {
2083 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2085 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2086 break;
2087 /* status request response should be sent */
2088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2089 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2090 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2091 break;
2092 /* something bad happened */
2093 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2094 default:
2095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2096 return 0;
2097 }
2098 }
2099 }
2100
2101 return 1;
2102 }
2103
2104 /*
2105 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2106 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2107 */
tls_handle_alpn(SSL * s)2108 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2109 {
2110 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2111 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2112
2113 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2114 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2115 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2116 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2117 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2118
2119 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2120 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2121 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2122 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2123 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2125 return 0;
2126 }
2127 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2129 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2130 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2131 #endif
2132
2133 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2134 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2135 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2136 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2137 selected_len) != 0) {
2138 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2139 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2140
2141 if (!s->hit) {
2142 /*
2143 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2144 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2145 * selected ALPN.
2146 */
2147 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2150 return 0;
2151 }
2152 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2153 selected_len);
2154 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2157 return 0;
2158 }
2159 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2160 }
2161 }
2162
2163 return 1;
2164 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
2166 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2167 return 0;
2168 }
2169 /*
2170 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2171 * present.
2172 */
2173 }
2174
2175 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2176 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2177 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2178 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2179 }
2180
2181 return 1;
2182 }
2183
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)2184 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2185 {
2186 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2187
2188 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2189 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2190 if (rv == 0) {
2191 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2192 goto err;
2193 }
2194 if (rv < 0)
2195 return WORK_MORE_A;
2196 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2197 }
2198 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2199 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2200 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2201 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2202 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2203 if (rv == 0) {
2204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2205 goto err;
2206 }
2207 if (rv < 0) {
2208 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2209 return WORK_MORE_B;
2210 }
2211 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2212 }
2213
2214 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2215 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2216 cipher =
2217 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2218
2219 if (cipher == NULL) {
2220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2221 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2222 goto err;
2223 }
2224 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2225 }
2226 if (!s->hit) {
2227 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal already called */
2229 goto err;
2230 }
2231 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2232 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2233 s->session->not_resumable =
2234 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2235 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2236 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2237 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2238 /* do not send a session ticket */
2239 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2240 }
2241 } else {
2242 /* Session-id reuse */
2243 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2244 }
2245
2246 /*-
2247 * we now have the following setup.
2248 * client_random
2249 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2250 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2251 * compression - basically ignored right now
2252 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2253 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2254 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2255 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2256 */
2257
2258 /*
2259 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2260 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2261 */
2262 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2264 goto err;
2265 }
2266 /*
2267 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2268 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2269 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2270 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2271 */
2272 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2274 goto err;
2275 }
2276
2277 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2278 }
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2280 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2281 int ret;
2282 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2283 /*
2284 * callback indicates further work to be done
2285 */
2286 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2287 return WORK_MORE_C;
2288 }
2289 if (ret < 0) {
2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2291 goto err;
2292 }
2293 }
2294 #endif
2295
2296 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2297 err:
2298 return WORK_ERROR;
2299 }
2300
tls_construct_server_hello(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2301 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2302 {
2303 int compm;
2304 size_t sl, len;
2305 int version;
2306 unsigned char *session_id;
2307 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2308
2309 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2311 /*
2312 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2313 * tls_process_client_hello()
2314 */
2315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2316 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2317 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2318 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2320 return 0;
2321 }
2322
2323 /*-
2324 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2325 * back in the server hello:
2326 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2327 * we send back the old session ID.
2328 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2329 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2330 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2331 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2332 * session ID.
2333 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2334 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2335 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2336 * regardless
2337 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2338 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2339 * to send back.
2340 */
2341 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2342 && !s->hit)
2343 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2344
2345 if (usetls13) {
2346 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2347 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2348 } else {
2349 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2350 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2351 }
2352
2353 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2355 return 0;
2356 }
2357
2358 /* set up the compression method */
2359 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2360 compm = 0;
2361 #else
2362 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2363 compm = 0;
2364 else
2365 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2366 #endif
2367
2368 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2369 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2370 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2372 return 0;
2373 }
2374
2375 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2376 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2377 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2378 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2379 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2380 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2381 NULL, 0)) {
2382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2383 return 0;
2384 }
2385
2386 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2387 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2388 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2389 s->session = NULL;
2390 s->hit = 0;
2391
2392 /*
2393 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2394 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2395 */
2396 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2398 return 0;
2399 }
2400 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2401 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2403 return 0;
2404 }
2405
2406 return 1;
2407 }
2408
tls_construct_server_done(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2409 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2410 {
2411 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2412 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2413 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2414 return 0;
2415 }
2416 }
2417 return 1;
2418 }
2419
tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2420 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2421 {
2422 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2423 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2424 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2425 int curve_id = 0;
2426 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2427 int i;
2428 unsigned long type;
2429 BIGNUM *r[4];
2430 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2431 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2432 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2433 int freer = 0, ret = 0;
2434
2435 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2437 goto err;
2438 }
2439
2440 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2442 goto err;
2443 }
2444
2445 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2446
2447 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2449 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2450 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2451 } else
2452 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2453 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2454 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2455 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2456
2457 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2458 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2459 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2461 goto err;
2462 }
2463 pkdhp = pkdh;
2464 } else {
2465 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2466 }
2467 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2468 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2469 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024));
2470 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2472 goto err;
2473 }
2474 pkdhp = pkdh;
2475 }
2476 #endif
2477 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2479 goto err;
2480 }
2481 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2482 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2484 goto err;
2485 }
2486 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2488 goto err;
2489 }
2490
2491 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2492 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2494 goto err;
2495 }
2496
2497 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2498 pkdh = NULL;
2499
2500 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2501 freer = 1;
2502 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
2503 &r[0])
2504 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
2505 &r[1])
2506 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2507 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 goto err;
2510 }
2511 } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2512
2513 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2515 goto err;
2516 }
2517
2518 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2519 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2520 if (curve_id == 0) {
2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2522 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2526 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2527 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2528 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2529 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2530 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2531 goto err;
2532 }
2533
2534 /* Encode the public key. */
2535 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2536 &encodedPoint);
2537 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2539 goto err;
2540 }
2541
2542 /*
2543 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2544 * can set these to NULLs
2545 */
2546 r[0] = NULL;
2547 r[1] = NULL;
2548 r[2] = NULL;
2549 r[3] = NULL;
2550 } else
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2552 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2553 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2554 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2555 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2557 goto err;
2558 }
2559 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2560 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2561 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2562 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2563 } else
2564 #endif
2565 {
2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2567 goto err;
2568 }
2569
2570 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2571 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2572 lu = NULL;
2573 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2575 goto err;
2576 }
2577
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2579 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2580 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2581 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2582
2583 /*
2584 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2585 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2586 */
2587 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2588 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2589 len)) {
2590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2591 goto err;
2592 }
2593 }
2594 #endif
2595
2596 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2597 unsigned char *binval;
2598 int res;
2599
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2601 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2602 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2603 } else
2604 #endif
2605 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2606
2607 if (!res) {
2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2609 goto err;
2610 }
2611
2612 /*-
2613 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2614 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2615 * as the prime
2616 */
2617 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2618 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2619
2620 if (len > 0) {
2621 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2623 goto err;
2624 }
2625 memset(binval, 0, len);
2626 }
2627 }
2628
2629 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2630 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2632 goto err;
2633 }
2634
2635 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2636 }
2637
2638 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2639 /*
2640 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2641 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2642 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2643 * point itself
2644 */
2645 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2646 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2648 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2650 goto err;
2651 }
2652 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2653 encodedPoint = NULL;
2654 }
2655
2656 /* not anonymous */
2657 if (lu != NULL) {
2658 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2659 const EVP_MD *md;
2660 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2661 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2662
2663 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
2664 /* Should never happen */
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2666 goto err;
2667 }
2668 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2669 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2671 goto err;
2672 }
2673 /* send signature algorithm */
2674 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2676 goto err;
2677 }
2678
2679 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2680 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2681 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
2682 NULL) <= 0) {
2683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2684 goto err;
2685 }
2686 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2687 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2688 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2690 goto err;
2691 }
2692 }
2693 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2694 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2695 paramlen);
2696 if (tbslen == 0) {
2697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2698 goto err;
2699 }
2700
2701 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2702 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2703 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2704 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2705 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2706 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2708 goto err;
2709 }
2710 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2711 }
2712
2713 ret = 1;
2714 err:
2715 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2716 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2717 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2718 if (freer) {
2719 BN_free(r[0]);
2720 BN_free(r[1]);
2721 BN_free(r[2]);
2722 BN_free(r[3]);
2723 }
2724 return ret;
2725 }
2726
tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2727 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2728 {
2729 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2730 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2731 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2732 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2733 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2734 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
2735 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2740 s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
2741 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
2742 s->pha_context_len)) {
2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 return 0;
2745 }
2746 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2747 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2749 return 0;
2750 }
2751 } else {
2752 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 return 0;
2755 }
2756 }
2757
2758 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2759 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2760 0)) {
2761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764 goto done;
2765 }
2766
2767 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2768 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2769 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 return 0;
2772 }
2773
2774 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2775 const uint16_t *psigs;
2776 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2777
2778 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2779 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2780 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2781 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2783 return 0;
2784 }
2785 }
2786
2787 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2788 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2789 return 0;
2790 }
2791
2792 done:
2793 s->certreqs_sent++;
2794 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2795 return 1;
2796 }
2797
tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2798 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2799 {
2800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2801 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2802 size_t psklen;
2803 PACKET psk_identity;
2804
2805 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2807 return 0;
2808 }
2809 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2811 return 0;
2812 }
2813 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2815 return 0;
2816 }
2817
2818 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2820 return 0;
2821 }
2822
2823 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2824 psk, sizeof(psk));
2825
2826 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2828 return 0;
2829 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2830 /*
2831 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2832 */
2833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2834 return 0;
2835 }
2836
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2838 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2839 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2840
2841 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2842 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2844 return 0;
2845 }
2846
2847 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2848
2849 return 1;
2850 #else
2851 /* Should never happen */
2852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 return 0;
2854 #endif
2855 }
2856
tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2857 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2858 {
2859 size_t outlen;
2860 PACKET enc_premaster;
2861 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2862 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2863 int ret = 0;
2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2865 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2866
2867 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2868 if (rsa == NULL) {
2869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2870 return 0;
2871 }
2872
2873 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2874 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2875 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2876 } else {
2877 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2878 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2880 return 0;
2881 }
2882 }
2883
2884 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2885 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
2886 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2888 return 0;
2889 }
2890
2891 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
2892 if (ctx == NULL) {
2893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2894 goto err;
2895 }
2896
2897 /*
2898 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2899 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2900 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
2901 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
2902 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
2903 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
2904 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
2905 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
2906 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2907 */
2908 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
2909 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2911 goto err;
2912 }
2913
2914 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
2915 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
2916 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
2917 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
2918 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
2919 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
2920 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
2921
2922 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
2923 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
2924 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2925 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2927 goto err;
2928 }
2929
2930 /*
2931 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
2932 * we double check anyway.
2933 */
2934 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2935 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2937 goto err;
2938 }
2939
2940 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
2941 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2942 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
2943 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2944 goto err;
2945 }
2946
2947 ret = 1;
2948 err:
2949 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2950 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
2951 return ret;
2952 }
2953
tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2954 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2955 {
2956 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2957 unsigned int i;
2958 const unsigned char *data;
2959 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2960 int ret = 0;
2961
2962 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2964 goto err;
2965 }
2966 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
2967 if (skey == NULL) {
2968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2969 goto err;
2970 }
2971
2972 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2974 goto err;
2975 }
2976 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2977 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2979 goto err;
2980 }
2981 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2982 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
2984 goto err;
2985 }
2986
2987 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
2988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2989 goto err;
2990 }
2991
2992 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2993 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2994 goto err;
2995 }
2996
2997 ret = 1;
2998 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2999 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3000 err:
3001 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3002 return ret;
3003 }
3004
tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3005 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3006 {
3007 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3008 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3009 int ret = 0;
3010
3011 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3012 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3014 goto err;
3015 } else {
3016 unsigned int i;
3017 const unsigned char *data;
3018
3019 /*
3020 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3021 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3022 */
3023
3024 /* Get encoded point length */
3025 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3026 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3028 goto err;
3029 }
3030 if (skey == NULL) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3032 goto err;
3033 }
3034
3035 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3036 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3038 goto err;
3039 }
3040
3041 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
3043 goto err;
3044 }
3045 }
3046
3047 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3048 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3049 goto err;
3050 }
3051
3052 ret = 1;
3053 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3054 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3055 err:
3056 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3057
3058 return ret;
3059 }
3060
tls_process_cke_srp(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3061 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3062 {
3063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3064 unsigned int i;
3065 const unsigned char *data;
3066
3067 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3068 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3070 return 0;
3071 }
3072 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3074 return 0;
3075 }
3076 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3078 return 0;
3079 }
3080 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3081 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3082 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3084 return 0;
3085 }
3086
3087 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3088 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3089 return 0;
3090 }
3091
3092 return 1;
3093 #else
3094 /* Should never happen */
3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 return 0;
3097 #endif
3098 }
3099
tls_process_cke_gost(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3100 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3101 {
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3103 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3104 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3105 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3106 const unsigned char *start;
3107 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3108 unsigned long alg_a;
3109 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3110 const unsigned char *ptr;
3111 int ret = 0;
3112
3113 /* Get our certificate private key */
3114 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3115 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3116 /*
3117 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3118 */
3119 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3120 if (pk == NULL) {
3121 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3122 }
3123 if (pk == NULL) {
3124 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3125 }
3126 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3127 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3128 }
3129
3130 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3131 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3133 return 0;
3134 }
3135 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3137 goto err;
3138 }
3139 /*
3140 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3141 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3142 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3143 * client certificate for authorization only.
3144 */
3145 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3146 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3147 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3148 ERR_clear_error();
3149 }
3150
3151 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3152 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3153 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3154 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3155 if (pKX == NULL
3156 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3157 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3159 goto err;
3160 }
3161
3162 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3164 goto err;
3165 }
3166
3167 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3169 goto err;
3170 }
3171
3172 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3173 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3174
3175 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3176 inlen) <= 0) {
3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3178 goto err;
3179 }
3180 /* Generate master secret */
3181 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3182 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3184 goto err;
3185 }
3186 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3187 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3188 NULL) > 0)
3189 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3190
3191 ret = 1;
3192 err:
3193 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3194 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3195 return ret;
3196 #else
3197 /* Should never happen */
3198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3199 return 0;
3200 #endif
3201 }
3202
tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3203 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3204 {
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3206 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3207 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3208 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3209 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3210 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3211 size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
3212 int ret = 0;
3213 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3214
3215 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3217 return 0;
3218 }
3219
3220 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 goto err;
3223 }
3224
3225 /* Get our certificate private key */
3226 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3227 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3228 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3229 if (pk == NULL) {
3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3231 goto err;
3232 }
3233
3234 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3235 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3237 goto err;
3238 }
3239 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3241 goto err;
3242 }
3243
3244 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3245 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3246 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3248 goto err;
3249 }
3250
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3252 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3254 goto err;
3255 }
3256 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3257 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3258
3259 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3261 goto err;
3262 }
3263 /* Generate master secret */
3264 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3265 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3266 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3267 goto err;
3268 }
3269 ret = 1;
3270
3271 err:
3272 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3273 return ret;
3274 #else
3275 /* Should never happen */
3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3277 return 0;
3278 #endif
3279 }
3280
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3281 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3282 {
3283 unsigned long alg_k;
3284
3285 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3286
3287 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3288 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3290 goto err;
3291 }
3292
3293 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3294 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3295 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3297 goto err;
3298 }
3299 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3300 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3302 goto err;
3303 }
3304 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3305 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3306 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3307 goto err;
3308 }
3309 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3310 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3311 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3312 goto err;
3313 }
3314 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3315 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3316 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3317 goto err;
3318 }
3319 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3320 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3321 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3322 goto err;
3323 }
3324 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3325 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3327 goto err;
3328 }
3329 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3330 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3332 goto err;
3333 }
3334 } else {
3335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3336 goto err;
3337 }
3338
3339 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3340 err:
3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3342 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3343 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3344 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3345 #endif
3346 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3347 }
3348
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)3349 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3350 {
3351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3352 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3353 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3354 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3355 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3356 size_t labellen;
3357 /*
3358 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3359 * used.
3360 */
3361 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3362 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3363
3364 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3365 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3366 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3367 labellen += 1;
3368
3369 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3370 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3371 labellen, NULL, 0,
3372 0) <= 0) {
3373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3374 return WORK_ERROR;
3375 }
3376
3377 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3378 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3379 }
3380 }
3381 #endif
3382
3383 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3384 /*
3385 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3386 * the handshake_buffer
3387 */
3388 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3389 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3390 return WORK_ERROR;
3391 }
3392 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3393 } else {
3394 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3396 return WORK_ERROR;
3397 }
3398 /*
3399 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3400 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3401 */
3402 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3403 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3404 return WORK_ERROR;
3405 }
3406 }
3407
3408 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3409 }
3410
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3411 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3412 {
3413 int i;
3414 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3415 X509 *x = NULL;
3416 unsigned long l;
3417 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3418 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3419 PACKET spkt, context;
3420 size_t chainidx;
3421 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3422
3423 /*
3424 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3425 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3426 * TLSv1.3
3427 */
3428 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3429
3430 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3432 goto err;
3433 }
3434
3435 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3436 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3437 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3438 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3440 goto err;
3441 }
3442
3443 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3444 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3446 goto err;
3447 }
3448
3449 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3450 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3451 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3453 goto err;
3454 }
3455
3456 certstart = certbytes;
3457 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
3458 if (x == NULL) {
3459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3460 goto err;
3461 }
3462 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3464 goto err;
3465 }
3466
3467 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3469 goto err;
3470 }
3471
3472 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3473 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3474 PACKET extensions;
3475
3476 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3478 goto err;
3479 }
3480 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3481 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3482 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3483 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3484 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3485 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3486 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3487 goto err;
3488 }
3489 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3490 }
3491
3492 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3494 goto err;
3495 }
3496 x = NULL;
3497 }
3498
3499 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3500 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3501 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3503 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3504 goto err;
3505 }
3506 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3507 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3508 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3510 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3511 goto err;
3512 }
3513 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3514 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3516 goto err;
3517 }
3518 } else {
3519 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3520 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3521 if (i <= 0) {
3522 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3523 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3524 goto err;
3525 }
3526 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3527 if (pkey == NULL) {
3528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3529 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3530 goto err;
3531 }
3532 }
3533
3534 /*
3535 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3536 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3537 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3538 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3539 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3540 */
3541
3542 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3543 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3545 goto err;
3546 }
3547
3548 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3549 s->session = new_sess;
3550 }
3551
3552 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3553 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3554 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3555
3556 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3557 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3558 sk = NULL;
3559
3560 /*
3561 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3562 * message
3563 */
3564 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3565 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3566 goto err;
3567 }
3568
3569 /*
3570 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3571 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3572 */
3573
3574 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3575 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3576 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3577 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3578 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3579 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3580 goto err;
3581 }
3582
3583 /* Resend session tickets */
3584 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3585 }
3586
3587 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3588
3589 err:
3590 X509_free(x);
3591 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3592 return ret;
3593 }
3594
tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3595 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3596 {
3597 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3598
3599 if (cpk == NULL) {
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3601 return 0;
3602 }
3603
3604 /*
3605 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3606 * for the server Certificate message
3607 */
3608 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3610 return 0;
3611 }
3612 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3614 return 0;
3615 }
3616
3617 return 1;
3618 }
3619
create_ticket_prequel(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3620 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3621 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3622 {
3623 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)s->session->timeout;
3624
3625 /*
3626 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3627 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3628 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3629 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3630 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3631 */
3632 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3633
3634 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3635 if (s->session->timeout > ONE_WEEK_SEC)
3636 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
3637 } else if (s->hit)
3638 timeout = 0;
3639
3640 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3642 return 0;
3643 }
3644
3645 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3647 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3649 return 0;
3650 }
3651 }
3652
3653 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3654 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3656 return 0;
3657 }
3658
3659 return 1;
3660 }
3661
3662 /*
3663 * Returns 1 on success, 0 to abort construction of the ticket (non-fatal), or
3664 * -1 on fatal error
3665 */
construct_stateless_ticket(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3666 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3667 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3668 {
3669 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3670 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3671 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3672 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3673 const unsigned char *const_p;
3674 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3675 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3676 size_t hlen;
3677 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3678 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3679 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3680 int iv_len, ok = -1;
3681 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3682
3683 /* get session encoding length */
3684 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3685 /*
3686 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3687 * long
3688 */
3689 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3691 goto err;
3692 }
3693 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3694 if (senc == NULL) {
3695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3696 goto err;
3697 }
3698
3699 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3700 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3701 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3703 goto err;
3704 }
3705
3706 p = senc;
3707 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3709 goto err;
3710 }
3711
3712 /*
3713 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3714 */
3715 const_p = senc;
3716 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3717 if (sess == NULL) {
3718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3719 goto err;
3720 }
3721
3722 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3723 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3724 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3726 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3727 goto err;
3728 }
3729 p = senc;
3730 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3732 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3733 goto err;
3734 }
3735 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3736
3737 /*
3738 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3739 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3740 */
3741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3742 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3743 #else
3744 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3745 #endif
3746 {
3747 int ret = 0;
3748
3749 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3750 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3751 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3752 1);
3753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3754 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3755 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3756 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3757 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
3758 #endif
3759
3760 if (ret == 0) {
3761 /*
3762 * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
3763 * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
3764 * ticket
3765 */
3766 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3767 ok = 0;
3768 goto err;
3769 }
3770 /* Put timeout and length */
3771 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3772 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3774 goto err;
3775 }
3776 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3777 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3778 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3779 return 1;
3780 }
3781 if (ret < 0) {
3782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3783 goto err;
3784 }
3785 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
3786 if (iv_len < 0) {
3787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3788 goto err;
3789 }
3790 } else {
3791 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
3792 s->ctx->propq);
3793
3794 if (cipher == NULL) {
3795 /* Error is already recorded */
3796 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3797 goto err;
3798 }
3799
3800 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
3801 if (iv_len < 0
3802 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
3803 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3804 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3805 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3806 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3807 "SHA256")) {
3808 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
3809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3810 goto err;
3811 }
3812 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
3813 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3814 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3815 }
3816
3817 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3819 goto err;
3820 }
3821
3822 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3823 /* Output key name */
3824 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3825 /* output IV */
3826 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3827 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3828 &encdata1)
3829 /* Encrypt session data */
3830 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3831 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3832 || encdata1 != encdata2
3833 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3834 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3835 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3836 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3837 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3838 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
3839 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3840 macendoffset - macoffset)
3841 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3842 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
3843 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3844 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3845 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3847 goto err;
3848 }
3849
3850 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3851 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3853 goto err;
3854 }
3855
3856 ok = 1;
3857 err:
3858 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3859 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3860 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3861 return ok;
3862 }
3863
construct_stateful_ticket(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,uint32_t age_add,unsigned char * tick_nonce)3864 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3865 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3866 {
3867 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3869 return 0;
3870 }
3871
3872 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3873 s->session->session_id_length)
3874 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3876 return 0;
3877 }
3878
3879 return 1;
3880 }
3881
tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL * s)3882 static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL *s)
3883 {
3884 /*
3885 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
3886 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
3887 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
3888 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
3889 */
3890 s->sent_tickets++;
3891 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
3892 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
3893 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
3894 }
3895
tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3896 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3897 {
3898 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3899 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3900 union {
3901 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3902 uint32_t age_add;
3903 } age_add_u;
3904 int ret = 0;
3905
3906 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3907
3908 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3909 size_t i, hashlen;
3910 uint64_t nonce;
3911 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3912 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
3913 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
3914
3915 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3916 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
3917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3918 goto err;
3919 }
3920 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
3921
3922 /*
3923 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
3924 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
3925 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
3926 */
3927 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
3928 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
3929
3930 if (new_sess == NULL) {
3931 /* SSLfatal already called */
3932 goto err;
3933 }
3934
3935 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3936 s->session = new_sess;
3937 }
3938
3939 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
3940 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3941 goto err;
3942 }
3943 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
3944 sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
3945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3946 goto err;
3947 }
3948 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3949
3950 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
3951 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
3952 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
3953 nonce >>= 8;
3954 }
3955
3956 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
3957 nonce_label,
3958 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
3959 tick_nonce,
3960 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
3961 s->session->master_key,
3962 hashlen, 1)) {
3963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3964 goto err;
3965 }
3966 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
3967
3968 s->session->time = time(NULL);
3969 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
3970 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
3971 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3972 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3973 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
3974 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3975 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
3976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3977 goto err;
3978 }
3979 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
3980 }
3981 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3982 }
3983
3984 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
3985 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
3986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3987 goto err;
3988 }
3989 /*
3990 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
3991 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
3992 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
3993 */
3994 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3995 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
3996 || (s->max_early_data > 0
3997 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
3998 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3999 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4000 goto err;
4001 }
4002 } else {
4003 int tmpret;
4004
4005 tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4006 tick_nonce);
4007 if (tmpret != 1) {
4008 if (tmpret == 0) {
4009 ret = 2; /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
4010 /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
4011 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4012 }
4013 /* else SSLfatal() already called */
4014 goto err;
4015 }
4016 }
4017
4018 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4019 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4020 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4021 NULL, 0)) {
4022 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4023 goto err;
4024 }
4025 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4026 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4027 }
4028
4029 ret = 1;
4030 err:
4031 return ret;
4032 }
4033
4034 /*
4035 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4036 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4037 */
tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)4038 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4039 {
4040 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4041 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4042 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4044 return 0;
4045 }
4046
4047 return 1;
4048 }
4049
tls_construct_cert_status(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)4050 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4051 {
4052 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4053 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4054 return 0;
4055 }
4056
4057 return 1;
4058 }
4059
4060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4061 /*
4062 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4063 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4064 */
tls_process_next_proto(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)4065 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4066 {
4067 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4068 size_t next_proto_len;
4069
4070 /*-
4071 * The payload looks like:
4072 * uint8 proto_len;
4073 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4074 * uint8 padding_len;
4075 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4076 */
4077 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4078 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4079 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4081 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4082 }
4083
4084 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4085 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4087 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4088 }
4089
4090 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4091
4092 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4093 }
4094 #endif
4095
tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)4096 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4097 {
4098 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4099 NULL, 0)) {
4100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4101 return 0;
4102 }
4103
4104 return 1;
4105 }
4106
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)4107 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4108 {
4109 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4111 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4112 }
4113
4114 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4115 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4117 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4118 }
4119
4120 /*
4121 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4122 * a record boundary.
4123 */
4124 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4126 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4127 }
4128
4129 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4130 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4131 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4132 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4133 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4134 }
4135
4136 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4137 }
4138