| /linux/fs/crypto/ |
| H A D | hooks.c | diff aa408f835d025a839033988d3f5a2866314414ef Mon Jan 20 23:31:57 CET 2020 Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
| H A D | keysetup.c | diff aa408f835d025a839033988d3f5a2866314414ef Mon Jan 20 23:31:57 CET 2020 Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
| H A D | fname.c | diff aa408f835d025a839033988d3f5a2866314414ef Mon Jan 20 23:31:57 CET 2020 Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
| H A D | fscrypt_private.h | diff aa408f835d025a839033988d3f5a2866314414ef Mon Jan 20 23:31:57 CET 2020 Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
| /linux/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| H A D | fscrypt.rst | diff aa408f835d025a839033988d3f5a2866314414ef Mon Jan 20 23:31:57 CET 2020 Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
| /linux/include/linux/ |
| H A D | fscrypt.h | diff aa408f835d025a839033988d3f5a2866314414ef Mon Jan 20 23:31:57 CET 2020 Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|