Searched hist:"853 fe1bf7554155376bb3b231112cdff9ff79177" (Results 1 – 3 of 3) sorted by relevance
| /linux/drivers/cdrom/ |
| H A D | gdrom.c | diff 853fe1bf7554155376bb3b231112cdff9ff79177 Tue Feb 14 01:25:26 CET 2017 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cdrom: Make device operations read-only
Since function tables are a common target for attackers, it's best to keep
them in read-only memory. As such, this makes the CDROM device ops tables
const. This drops additionally n_minors, since it isn't used meaningfully,
and sets the only user of cdrom_dummy_generic_packet explicitly so the
variables can all be const.
Inspired by similar changes in grsecurity/PaX.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
|
| H A D | cdrom.c | diff 853fe1bf7554155376bb3b231112cdff9ff79177 Tue Feb 14 01:25:26 CET 2017 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cdrom: Make device operations read-only
Since function tables are a common target for attackers, it's best to keep
them in read-only memory. As such, this makes the CDROM device ops tables
const. This drops additionally n_minors, since it isn't used meaningfully,
and sets the only user of cdrom_dummy_generic_packet explicitly so the
variables can all be const.
Inspired by similar changes in grsecurity/PaX.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
|
| /linux/drivers/scsi/ |
| H A D | sr.c | diff 853fe1bf7554155376bb3b231112cdff9ff79177 Tue Feb 14 01:25:26 CET 2017 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cdrom: Make device operations read-only
Since function tables are a common target for attackers, it's best to keep
them in read-only memory. As such, this makes the CDROM device ops tables
const. This drops additionally n_minors, since it isn't used meaningfully,
and sets the only user of cdrom_dummy_generic_packet explicitly so the
variables can all be const.
Inspired by similar changes in grsecurity/PaX.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
|