/linux/include/trace/events/ |
H A D | module.h | diff 66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 Thu Mar 13 02:41:30 CET 2014 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature.
This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y.
Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules.
With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module.
Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt).
Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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/linux/Documentation/ABI/testing/ |
H A D | sysfs-module | diff 66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 Thu Mar 13 02:41:30 CET 2014 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature.
This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y.
Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules.
With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module.
Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt).
Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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/linux/kernel/ |
H A D | tracepoint.c | diff 66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 Thu Mar 13 02:41:30 CET 2014 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature.
This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y.
Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules.
With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module.
Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt).
Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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H A D | panic.c | diff 66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 Thu Mar 13 02:41:30 CET 2014 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature.
This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y.
Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules.
With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module.
Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt).
Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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/linux/include/linux/ |
H A D | kernel.h | diff 66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 Thu Mar 13 02:41:30 CET 2014 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature.
This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y.
Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules.
With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module.
Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt).
Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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