/linux/drivers/target/iscsi/ |
H A D | iscsi_target_auth.c | 51 memset(chap->challenge, 0, MAX_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN); in chap_gen_challenge() 53 ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, chap->challenge_len); in chap_gen_challenge() 57 bin2hex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge, in chap_gen_challenge() 60 * Set CHAP_C, and copy the generated challenge into c_str. in chap_gen_challenge() 182 /* Tie the challenge length to the digest size */ in chap_server_open() 198 * Generate Challenge. in chap_server_open() 293 pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n"); in chap_server_compute_hash() 390 ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, chap->challenge, in chap_server_compute_hash() 393 pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for challenge\n"); in chap_server_compute_hash() 460 pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n"); in chap_server_compute_hash() [all …]
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H A D | iscsi_target_auth.h | 37 unsigned char challenge[MAX_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN]; member
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/linux/drivers/nvme/target/ |
H A D | auth.c | 281 u8 *challenge = req->sq->dhchap_c1; in nvmet_auth_host_hash() local 319 challenge = kmalloc(shash_len, GFP_KERNEL); in nvmet_auth_host_hash() 320 if (!challenge) { in nvmet_auth_host_hash() 328 challenge, shash_len); in nvmet_auth_host_hash() 347 ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, shash_len); in nvmet_auth_host_hash() 379 if (challenge != req->sq->dhchap_c1) in nvmet_auth_host_hash() 380 kfree(challenge); in nvmet_auth_host_hash() 395 u8 *challenge = req->sq->dhchap_c2; in nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash() local 433 challenge = kmalloc(shash_len, GFP_KERNEL); in nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash() 434 if (!challenge) { in nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash() [all …]
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/linux/drivers/nvme/host/ |
H A D | auth.c | 320 dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl challenge %*ph\n", in nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data() 422 u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c1; in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() local 450 challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL); in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() 451 if (!challenge) { in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() 458 chap->c1, challenge, in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() 468 ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len); in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() 499 if (challenge != chap->c1) in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() 500 kfree(challenge); in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response() 509 u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c2; in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_ctrl_response() local 528 challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL); in nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_ctrl_response() [all …]
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/linux/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/ |
H A D | i2c-arb-gpio-challenge.yaml | 4 $id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/i2c/i2c-arb-gpio-challenge.yaml# 7 title: GPIO-based I2C Arbitration Using a Challenge & Response Mechanism 14 This uses GPIO lines and a challenge & response mechanism to arbitrate who is 51 const: i2c-arb-gpio-challenge 106 compatible = "i2c-arb-gpio-challenge";
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/linux/tools/testing/selftests/net/netfilter/packetdrill/ |
H A D | conntrack_syn_challenge_ack.pkt | 2 // a challenge-ACK. 3 // Check that conntrack lets all packets pass, including the challenge ack, 24 // Challenge ACK, old incarnation.
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H A D | conntrack_synack_reuse.pkt | 2 // Challenge ACK is supposed to pass through, RST reply should clear conntrack 25 // Won't expect this: challenge ack.
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/linux/net/rxrpc/ |
H A D | rxkad.c | 624 * issue a challenge 628 struct rxkad_challenge challenge; in rxkad_issue_challenge() local 640 challenge.version = htonl(2); in rxkad_issue_challenge() 641 challenge.nonce = htonl(conn->rxkad.nonce); in rxkad_issue_challenge() 642 challenge.min_level = htonl(0); in rxkad_issue_challenge() 643 challenge.__padding = 0; in rxkad_issue_challenge() 664 iov[1].iov_base = &challenge; in rxkad_issue_challenge() 665 iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(challenge); in rxkad_issue_challenge() 786 * respond to a challenge packet 792 struct rxkad_challenge challenge; in rxkad_respond_to_challenge() local [all …]
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H A D | protocol.h | 42 #define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE 6 /* connection security challenge (SRVR->CLNT) */ 147 * Kerberos security type-2 challenge packet 150 __be32 version; /* version of this challenge type */ 171 __be32 inc_nonce; /* challenge nonce + 1 */
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/linux/drivers/staging/greybus/ |
H A D | authentication.c | 144 u8 *challenge, u8 *result, u8 *auth_response, in cap_authenticate() argument 164 memcpy(request->challenge, challenge, sizeof(request->challenge)); in cap_authenticate() 249 authenticate->challenge, in cap_ioctl()
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H A D | greybus_authentication.h | 61 __u8 challenge[32]; member
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/linux/drivers/thunderbolt/ |
H A D | domain.c | 694 * tb_domain_challenge_switch_key() - Challenge and approve switch 699 * random challenge and sends it to the switch. The switch responds to 700 * this and if the response matches our random challenge, the switch is 707 u8 challenge[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE]; in tb_domain_challenge_switch_key() local 723 get_random_bytes(challenge, sizeof(challenge)); in tb_domain_challenge_switch_key() 724 ret = tb->cm_ops->challenge_switch_key(tb, sw, challenge, response); in tb_domain_challenge_switch_key() 746 ret = crypto_shash_digest(shash, challenge, sizeof(hmac), hmac); in tb_domain_challenge_switch_key()
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/linux/net/ceph/ |
H A D | auth_x.c | 685 dout("handle_reply got server challenge %llx\n", in ceph_x_handle_reply() 793 void *challenge, int challenge_len, in decrypt_authorizer_challenge() argument 800 ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(secret, challenge, challenge_len); in decrypt_authorizer_challenge() 805 dp = challenge + sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header); in decrypt_authorizer_challenge() 819 void *challenge, int challenge_len) in ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge() argument 825 ret = decrypt_authorizer_challenge(&au->session_key, challenge, in ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge() 828 pr_err("failed to decrypt authorize challenge: %d", ret); in ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge() 834 pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer w/ challenge: %d", ret); in ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge()
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/linux/fs/smb/client/ |
H A D | cifsencrypt.c | 318 /* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge 374 /* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge 513 offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0])); in CalcNTLMv2_response() 528 memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key, ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE); in CalcNTLMv2_response() 530 memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key, ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE); in CalcNTLMv2_response() 532 rc = crypto_shash_update(hmacmd5, ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len); in CalcNTLMv2_response()
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H A D | sess.c | 861 unsigned int tioffset; /* challenge message target info area */ in decode_ntlmssp_challenge() 862 unsigned int tilen; /* challenge message target info area length */ in decode_ntlmssp_challenge() 867 cifs_dbg(VFS, "challenge blob len %d too small\n", blob_len); in decode_ntlmssp_challenge() 883 cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: negotiate=0x%08x challenge=0x%08x\n", __func__, in decode_ntlmssp_challenge() 908 memcpy(ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE); in decode_ntlmssp_challenge() 928 cifs_dbg(VFS, "Challenge target info alloc failure\n"); in decode_ntlmssp_challenge() 1746 cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup challenge phase\n"); in sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate() 1824 * (challenge) in sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate()
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/linux/drivers/i2c/muxes/ |
H A D | Kconfig | 15 I2C multimaster arbitration scheme using GPIOs and a challenge & 20 will be called i2c-arb-gpio-challenge.
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H A D | Makefile | 5 obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_ARB_GPIO_CHALLENGE) += i2c-arb-gpio-challenge.o
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/linux/Documentation/admin-guide/ |
H A D | thunderbolt.rst | 69 a challenge that should match the expected one based on a random key 148 Next time the device is plugged in the user can verify (challenge) the 154 If the challenge the device returns back matches the one we expect based 156 However, if the challenge fails no tunnels are created and error is
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/linux/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/ |
H A D | nf_conntrack_tcp.h | 46 /* Marks possibility for expected RFC5961 challenge ACK */
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/linux/drivers/media/usb/hdpvr/ |
H A D | hdpvr-core.c | 69 static void challenge(u8 *bytes) in challenge() function 172 v4l2_dbg(MSG_INFO, hdpvr_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, "challenge: %8ph\n", in device_authorization() 175 challenge(response); in device_authorization()
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/linux/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/tests/ |
H A D | TODO | 24 a challenge, but is worth trying. Look at selftests like
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/linux/include/linux/ |
H A D | nvme-auth.h | 36 u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen);
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/linux/drivers/firmware/tegra/ |
H A D | bpmp.c | 549 response.reply = request.challenge << 1; in tegra_bpmp_mrq_handle_ping() 564 request.challenge = 1; in tegra_bpmp_ping() 583 "ping ok: challenge: %u, response: %u, time: %lld\n", in tegra_bpmp_ping() 584 request.challenge, response.reply, in tegra_bpmp_ping()
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/linux/Documentation/ABI/testing/ |
H A D | sysfs-bus-thunderbolt | 91 2 Send a challenge based on the 32 byte hex string. If the 92 challenge response from device is valid, the device is 95 EKEYREJECTED if the challenge response did not match.
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/linux/net/netfilter/ |
H A D | nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 1082 * responds with a challenge ACK if implementing RFC5961. in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1099 /* Mark the potential for RFC5961 challenge ACK, in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1108 /* possible challenge ack reply to syn */ in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1144 /* RFC5961 compliance cause stack to send "challenge-ACK" in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1153 /* Detected RFC5961 challenge ACK */ in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1156 nf_ct_l4proto_log_invalid(skb, ct, state, "challenge-ack ignored"); in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1219 * established state to allow a possible challenge ACK. in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet() 1240 /* Reset in response to a challenge-ack we let through earlier */ in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet()
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