1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include "../ssl_local.h"
11 #include <openssl/trace.h>
12 #include <openssl/rand.h>
13 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
14 #include "record_local.h"
15 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
16
17 static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
18 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
19 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
20 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
21 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
22 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
23 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
24 };
25
26 static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
27 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
28 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
29 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
30 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
31 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
32 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
33 };
34
35 /*
36 * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
37 */
SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD * r,size_t num_recs)38 void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
39 {
40 unsigned char *comp;
41 size_t i;
42
43 for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
44 comp = r[i].comp;
45
46 memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
47 r[i].comp = comp;
48 }
49 }
50
SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD * r,size_t num_recs)51 void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
52 {
53 size_t i;
54
55 for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
56 OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
57 r[i].comp = NULL;
58 }
59 }
60
SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD * r,const unsigned char * seq_num)61 void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
62 {
63 memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
64 }
65
66 /*
67 * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
68 * for us in the buffer.
69 */
ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL * s)70 static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
71 {
72 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
73 size_t left, len;
74 unsigned char *p;
75
76 rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
77
78 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf);
79 if (p == NULL)
80 return 0;
81
82 left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
83
84 if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
85 return 0;
86
87 p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf);
88
89 /*
90 * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
91 * etc later
92 */
93 if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
94 return 0;
95
96 p += 3;
97 n2s(p, len);
98
99 if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len)
100 return 0;
101
102 return 1;
103 }
104
early_data_count_ok(SSL * s,size_t length,size_t overhead,int send)105 int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send)
106 {
107 uint32_t max_early_data;
108 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
109
110 /*
111 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
112 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
113 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
114 */
115 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
116 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
117 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
119 return 0;
120 }
121 sess = s->psksession;
122 }
123
124 if (!s->server)
125 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
126 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
127 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
128 else
129 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
130 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
131
132 if (max_early_data == 0) {
133 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
134 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
135 return 0;
136 }
137
138 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
139 max_early_data += overhead;
140
141 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
142 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
143 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
144 return 0;
145 }
146 s->early_data_count += length;
147
148 return 1;
149 }
150
151 /*
152 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
153 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
154 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
155 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
156 */
157 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
158
159 #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2
160 /*-
161 * Call this to get new input records.
162 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
163 * or non-blocking IO.
164 * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
165 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
166 * rr[i].data, - data
167 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes
168 * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
169 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
170 * |max_pipelines|
171 */
172 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
ssl3_get_record(SSL * s)173 int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
174 {
175 int enc_err, rret;
176 int i;
177 size_t more, n;
178 SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
179 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
180 SSL_SESSION *sess;
181 unsigned char *p;
182 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
183 unsigned int version;
184 size_t mac_size = 0;
185 int imac_size;
186 size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
187 PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
188 int using_ktls;
189 SSL_MAC_BUF *macbufs = NULL;
190 int ret = -1;
191
192 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
193 rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
194 max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
195 if (max_recs == 0)
196 max_recs = 1;
197 sess = s->session;
198
199 /*
200 * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
201 * then it is from before enabling ktls.
202 */
203 using_ktls = BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0;
204
205 do {
206 thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
207
208 /* check if we have the header */
209 if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
210 (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
211 < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
212 size_t sslv2len;
213 unsigned int type;
214
215 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
216 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
217 num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
218 if (rret <= 0) {
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
220 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) || rret == 0)
221 return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
222 switch (errno) {
223 case EBADMSG:
224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
225 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
226 break;
227 case EMSGSIZE:
228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
229 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
230 break;
231 case EINVAL:
232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
233 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
234 break;
235 default:
236 break;
237 }
238 #endif
239 return rret;
240 }
241 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
242
243 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
244 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer),
245 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) {
246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 return -1;
248 }
249 sslv2pkt = pkt;
250 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len)
251 || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) {
252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
253 return -1;
254 }
255 /*
256 * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
257 */
258 if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
259 && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0
260 && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
261 /*
262 * SSLv2 style record
263 *
264 * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
265 * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
266 * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
267 * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
268 * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
269 */
270 thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
271 thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
272
273 thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
274
275 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
276 - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
278 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
279 return -1;
280 }
281
282 if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
284 return -1;
285 }
286 } else {
287 /* SSLv3+ style record */
288
289 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
290 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
291 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
292 || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
293 if (s->msg_callback)
294 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
295 s->msg_callback_arg);
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 return -1;
298 }
299 thisrr->type = type;
300 thisrr->rec_version = version;
301
302 if (s->msg_callback)
303 s->msg_callback(0, version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
304 s->msg_callback_arg);
305
306 /*
307 * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field
308 * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the
309 * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3
310 * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for
311 * that explicitly
312 */
313 if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
314 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING
315 && version != (unsigned int)s->version) {
316 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
317 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
318 if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
319 /*
320 * The record is using an incorrect version number,
321 * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
322 * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
323 * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
324 * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
325 * end.
326 */
327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
328 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
329 return -1;
330 }
331 /*
332 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
333 */
334 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
335 }
336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
337 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
338 return -1;
339 }
340
341 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
342 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
343 /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
344 * that we have. */
345 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
346 if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
347 strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
348 strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
349 strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
351 return -1;
352 } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
354 SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
355 return -1;
356 }
357
358 /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
360 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
361 return -1;
362 } else {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
364 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
365 return -1;
366 }
367 }
368
369 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
370 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
371 && !using_ktls) {
372 if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
373 && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
374 || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
375 && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
376 || s->statem.enc_read_state
377 != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
379 SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
380 return -1;
381 }
382 if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
384 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
385 return -1;
386 }
387 }
388
389 if (thisrr->length >
390 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
392 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
393 return -1;
394 }
395 }
396
397 /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
398 }
399
400 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
401 size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
402
403 /* KTLS strips the inner record type. */
404 if (using_ktls)
405 len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
406
407 if (thisrr->length > len) {
408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
409 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
410 return -1;
411 }
412 } else {
413 size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
414
415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
416 /*
417 * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
418 * does not include the compression overhead anyway.
419 */
420 if (s->expand == NULL)
421 len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
422 #endif
423
424 /* KTLS may use all of the buffer */
425 if (using_ktls)
426 len = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
427
428 if (thisrr->length > len) {
429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
430 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
431 return -1;
432 }
433 }
434
435 /*
436 * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
437 * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
438 * record
439 */
440 if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
441 more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
442 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
443 } else {
444 more = thisrr->length;
445 }
446
447 if (more > 0) {
448 /* now s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
449
450 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n);
451 if (rret <= 0)
452 return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */
453 }
454
455 /* set state for later operations */
456 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
457
458 /*
459 * At this point, s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
460 * + thisrr->length, or s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
461 * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->rlayer.packet
462 */
463 if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
464 thisrr->input =
465 &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
466 } else {
467 thisrr->input =
468 &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
469 }
470
471 /*
472 * ok, we can now read from 's->rlayer.packet' data into 'thisrr'.
473 * thisrr->input points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied
474 * into thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression.
475 * When the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer,
476 * thisrr->input will be updated to point at the new buffer
477 */
478
479 /*
480 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
481 * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
482 */
483
484 /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
485 thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
486 thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;
487
488 /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
489 thisrr->read = 0;
490
491 num_recs++;
492
493 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
494 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
495 RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
496 } while (num_recs < max_recs
497 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
498 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
499 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
500 && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
501 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) != 0
502 && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
503
504 if (num_recs == 1
505 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
506 && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
507 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
508 /*
509 * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01
510 */
511 if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) {
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
513 SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE);
514 return -1;
515 }
516 /*
517 * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty
518 * handshake record
519 */
520 thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
521 RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
522 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
523 > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
525 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE);
526 return -1;
527 }
528 thisrr->read = 1;
529 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
530
531 return 1;
532 }
533
534 if (using_ktls)
535 goto skip_decryption;
536
537 if (s->read_hash != NULL) {
538 const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash);
539
540 if (tmpmd != NULL) {
541 imac_size = EVP_MD_get_size(tmpmd);
542 if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
544 return -1;
545 }
546 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
547 }
548 }
549
550 /*
551 * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
552 * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
553 */
554 if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
555 unsigned char *mac;
556
557 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
558 thisrr = &rr[j];
559
560 if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
562 return -1;
563 }
564 thisrr->length -= mac_size;
565 mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
566 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
567 if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
569 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
570 return -1;
571 }
572 }
573 /*
574 * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
575 * record
576 */
577 mac_size = 0;
578 }
579
580 if (mac_size > 0) {
581 macbufs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*macbufs) * num_recs);
582 if (macbufs == NULL) {
583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
584 return -1;
585 }
586 }
587
588 ERR_set_mark();
589 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0, macbufs, mac_size);
590
591 /*-
592 * enc_err is:
593 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
594 * decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
595 * 1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
596 */
597 if (enc_err == 0) {
598 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
599 /* SSLfatal() already got called */
600 ERR_clear_last_mark();
601 goto end;
602 }
603 if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
604 /*
605 * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt will fail here. We treat
606 * it like an empty record.
607 */
608
609 /*
610 * Remove any errors from the stack. Decryption failures are normal
611 * behaviour.
612 */
613 ERR_pop_to_mark();
614
615 thisrr = &rr[0];
616
617 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length,
618 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
619 /* SSLfatal() already called */
620 goto end;
621 }
622
623 thisrr->length = 0;
624 thisrr->read = 1;
625 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
626 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
627 ret = 1;
628 goto end;
629 }
630 ERR_clear_last_mark();
631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
632 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
633 goto end;
634 } else {
635 ERR_clear_last_mark();
636 }
637 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
638 BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length);
639 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr[0].data, rr[0].length, 4);
640 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
641
642 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
643 if ((sess != NULL)
644 && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
645 && (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
646 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
647
648 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
649 SSL_MAC_BUF *thismb = &macbufs[j];
650 thisrr = &rr[j];
651
652 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
653 if (i == 0 || thismb == NULL || thismb->mac == NULL
654 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, thismb->mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
655 enc_err = 0;
656 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
657 enc_err = 0;
658 }
659 }
660
661 if (enc_err == 0) {
662 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
663 /* We already called SSLfatal() */
664 goto end;
665 }
666 /*
667 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
668 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
669 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
670 * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
671 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
672 */
673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
674 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
675 goto end;
676 }
677
678 skip_decryption:
679
680 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
681 thisrr = &rr[j];
682
683 /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
684 if (s->expand != NULL) {
685 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
687 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
688 goto end;
689 }
690 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE,
692 SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
693 goto end;
694 }
695 }
696
697 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
698 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
699 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
700 /*
701 * The following logic are irrelevant in KTLS: the kernel provides
702 * unprotected record and thus record type represent the actual
703 * content type, and padding is already removed and thisrr->type and
704 * thisrr->length should have the correct values.
705 */
706 if (!using_ktls) {
707 size_t end;
708
709 if (thisrr->length == 0
710 || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
712 goto end;
713 }
714
715 /* Strip trailing padding */
716 for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
717 end--)
718 continue;
719
720 thisrr->length = end;
721 thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
722 }
723 if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
724 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
725 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
727 goto end;
728 }
729 if (s->msg_callback)
730 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
731 &thisrr->type, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
732 }
733
734 /*
735 * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in
736 * length.
737 */
738 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
739 && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
740 || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
741 && thisrr->length == 0) {
742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
743 goto end;
744 }
745
746 /*
747 * Usually thisrr->length is the length of a single record, but when
748 * KTLS handles the decryption, thisrr->length may be larger than
749 * SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH because the kernel may have coalesced
750 * multiple records.
751 * Therefore we have to rely on KTLS to check the plaintext length
752 * limit in the kernel.
753 */
754 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !using_ktls) {
755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
756 goto end;
757 }
758
759 /*
760 * Check if the received packet overflows the current
761 * Max Fragment Length setting.
762 * Note: USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT and KTLS are mutually exclusive.
763 */
764 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
765 && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) {
766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
767 goto end;
768 }
769
770 thisrr->off = 0;
771 /*-
772 * So at this point the following is true
773 * thisrr->type is the type of record
774 * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
775 * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte
776 * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
777 */
778
779 /* just read a 0 length packet */
780 if (thisrr->length == 0) {
781 RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
782 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
783 > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
785 goto end;
786 }
787 } else {
788 RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
789 }
790 }
791
792 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) {
793 thisrr = &rr[0];
794 if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
795 && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) {
796 /* SSLfatal already called */
797 goto end;
798 }
799 }
800
801 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
802 ret = 1;
803 end:
804 if (macbufs != NULL) {
805 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
806 if (macbufs[j].alloced)
807 OPENSSL_free(macbufs[j].mac);
808 }
809 OPENSSL_free(macbufs);
810 }
811 return ret;
812 }
813
ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL * ssl,SSL3_RECORD * rr)814 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
815 {
816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
817 int i;
818
819 if (rr->comp == NULL) {
820 rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
821 OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
822 }
823 if (rr->comp == NULL)
824 return 0;
825
826 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
827 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
828 if (i < 0)
829 return 0;
830 else
831 rr->length = i;
832 rr->data = rr->comp;
833 #endif
834 return 1;
835 }
836
ssl3_do_compress(SSL * ssl,SSL3_RECORD * wr)837 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
838 {
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
840 int i;
841
842 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
843 (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD),
844 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
845 if (i < 0)
846 return 0;
847 else
848 wr->length = i;
849
850 wr->input = wr->data;
851 #endif
852 return 1;
853 }
854
855 /*-
856 * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls SSLfatal on
857 * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
858 * report a bad_record_mac
859 *
860 * Returns:
861 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
862 * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
863 */
ssl3_enc(SSL * s,SSL3_RECORD * inrecs,size_t n_recs,int sending,SSL_MAC_BUF * mac,size_t macsize)864 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
865 SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize)
866 {
867 SSL3_RECORD *rec;
868 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
869 size_t l, i;
870 size_t bs;
871 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
872
873 rec = inrecs;
874 /*
875 * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
876 */
877 if (n_recs != 1)
878 return 0;
879 if (sending) {
880 ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
881 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
882 enc = NULL;
883 else
884 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
885 } else {
886 ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
887 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
888 enc = NULL;
889 else
890 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
891 }
892
893 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
894 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
895 rec->input = rec->data;
896 } else {
897 int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
898
899 l = rec->length;
900 bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
901
902 /* COMPRESS */
903
904 if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
905 /*
906 * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
907 * padding on the provider side.
908 */
909 i = bs - (l % bs);
910
911 /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
912 l += i;
913 /*
914 * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
915 * padding length.
916 */
917 memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
918 rec->length += i;
919 rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
920 }
921
922 if (!sending) {
923 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
924 /* Publicly invalid */
925 return 0;
926 }
927 /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
928 }
929
930 if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL) {
931 int outlen;
932
933 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
934 (unsigned int)l))
935 return 0;
936 rec->length = outlen;
937
938 if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
939 /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
940 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
941
942 /* Get the MAC */
943 mac->alloced = 0;
944
945 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
946 (void **)&mac->mac,
947 macsize);
948 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
949
950 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
951 /* Shouldn't normally happen */
952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
953 return 0;
954 }
955 }
956 } else {
957 if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
958 /* Shouldn't happen */
959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
960 return 0;
961 }
962
963 if (!sending)
964 return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
965 rec->orig_len,
966 rec->data,
967 (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
968 (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
969 bs,
970 macsize,
971 s->ctx->libctx);
972 }
973 }
974 return 1;
975 }
976
977 #define MAX_PADDING 256
978 /*-
979 * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
980 * error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
981 * a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
982 *
983 * Returns:
984 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
985 * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
986 * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
987 */
tls1_enc(SSL * s,SSL3_RECORD * recs,size_t n_recs,int sending,SSL_MAC_BUF * macs,size_t macsize)988 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
989 SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize)
990 {
991 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
992 size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
993 unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
994 unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
995 int i, pad = 0, tmpr;
996 size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
997 unsigned char padval;
998 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
999 int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
1000 : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
1001
1002 if (n_recs == 0) {
1003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006
1007 if (sending) {
1008 if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
1009 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
1010 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
1011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 return 0;
1013 }
1014 }
1015 ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
1016 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
1017 enc = NULL;
1018 else {
1019 int ivlen;
1020
1021 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
1022 /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
1023 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
1024 && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1025 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
1026 else
1027 ivlen = 0;
1028 if (ivlen > 1) {
1029 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1030 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
1031 /*
1032 * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
1033 * happen?? (steve)
1034 */
1035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1036 return 0;
1037 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
1038 ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
1039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042 }
1043 }
1044 }
1045 } else {
1046 if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash)) {
1047 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->read_hash);
1048 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
1049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 return 0;
1051 }
1052 }
1053 ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
1054 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
1055 enc = NULL;
1056 else
1057 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
1058 }
1059
1060 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
1061 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1062 memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
1063 recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
1064 }
1065 } else {
1066 int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
1067
1068 bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
1069
1070 if (n_recs > 1) {
1071 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
1072 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
1073 /*
1074 * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
1075 * cipher doesn't support pipelining
1076 */
1077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1078 return 0;
1079 }
1080 }
1081 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1082 reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
1083
1084 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
1085 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
1086 unsigned char *seq;
1087
1088 seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
1089 : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
1090
1091 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1092 /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
1093 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
1094
1095 s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
1096 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
1097 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
1098 memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
1099 } else {
1100 memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
1101 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
1102 ++seq[i];
1103 if (seq[i] != 0)
1104 break;
1105 }
1106 }
1107
1108 buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
1109 buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
1110 buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
1111 buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
1112 buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
1113 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
1114 EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
1115 if (pad <= 0) {
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 return 0;
1118 }
1119
1120 if (sending) {
1121 reclen[ctr] += pad;
1122 recs[ctr].length += pad;
1123 }
1124
1125 } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
1126 /*
1127 * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
1128 * padding on the provider side.
1129 */
1130 padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
1131
1132 /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
1133
1134 if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
1135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1136 return 0;
1137 }
1138 /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
1139 padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
1140 for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
1141 recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
1142 reclen[ctr] += padnum;
1143 recs[ctr].length += padnum;
1144 }
1145
1146 if (!sending) {
1147 if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
1148 /* Publicly invalid */
1149 return 0;
1150 }
1151 }
1152 }
1153 if (n_recs > 1) {
1154 /* Set the output buffers */
1155 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1156 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
1157 }
1158 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
1159 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
1160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1161 return 0;
1162 }
1163 /* Set the input buffers */
1164 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1165 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
1166 }
1167 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
1168 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
1169 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
1170 (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
1171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1172 return 0;
1173 }
1174 }
1175
1176 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
1177 unsigned char *seq;
1178 int decrement_seq = 0;
1179
1180 /*
1181 * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
1182 * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
1183 * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
1184 */
1185 if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
1186 decrement_seq = 1;
1187
1188 seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
1189 : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
1190 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 return 0;
1193 }
1194 }
1195
1196 if (provided) {
1197 int outlen;
1198
1199 /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
1200 if (n_recs > 1) {
1201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 return 0;
1203 }
1204
1205 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
1206 (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
1207 return 0;
1208 recs[0].length = outlen;
1209
1210 /*
1211 * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
1212 * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
1213 * any explicit IV
1214 */
1215 if (!sending) {
1216 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
1217 recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1218 recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1219 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
1220 recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1221 recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1222 } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
1223 recs[0].data += bs;
1224 recs[0].input += bs;
1225 recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
1226 }
1227
1228 /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
1229 if (macs != NULL) {
1230 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
1231
1232 /* Get the MAC */
1233 macs[0].alloced = 0;
1234
1235 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
1236 (void **)&macs[0].mac,
1237 macsize);
1238 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1239
1240 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
1241 /* Shouldn't normally happen */
1242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1243 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 return 0;
1245 }
1246 }
1247 }
1248 } else {
1249 /* Legacy cipher */
1250
1251 tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
1252 (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
1253 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
1254 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
1255 ? (tmpr < 0)
1256 : (tmpr == 0)) {
1257 /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
1258 return 0;
1259 }
1260
1261 if (!sending) {
1262 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1263 /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
1264 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
1265 recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1266 recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1267 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1268 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
1269 recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1270 recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1271 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1272 } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
1273 if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
1274 return 0;
1275 recs[ctr].data += bs;
1276 recs[ctr].input += bs;
1277 recs[ctr].length -= bs;
1278 recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
1279 }
1280
1281 /*
1282 * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
1283 * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
1284 */
1285 if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
1286 recs[ctr].orig_len,
1287 recs[ctr].data,
1288 (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
1289 (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
1290 : NULL,
1291 bs,
1292 pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
1293 (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
1294 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
1295 s->ctx->libctx))
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298 }
1299 }
1300 }
1301 return 1;
1302 }
1303
1304 /*
1305 * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
1306 * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
1307 */
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX * ctx)1308 char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
1309 {
1310 switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)) {
1311 case NID_md5:
1312 case NID_sha1:
1313 case NID_sha224:
1314 case NID_sha256:
1315 case NID_sha384:
1316 case NID_sha512:
1317 return 1;
1318 default:
1319 return 0;
1320 }
1321 }
1322
n_ssl3_mac(SSL * ssl,SSL3_RECORD * rec,unsigned char * md,int sending)1323 int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1324 {
1325 unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
1326 const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
1327 unsigned char *p, rec_char;
1328 size_t md_size;
1329 size_t npad;
1330 int t;
1331
1332 if (sending) {
1333 mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
1334 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1335 hash = ssl->write_hash;
1336 } else {
1337 mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
1338 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1339 hash = ssl->read_hash;
1340 }
1341
1342 t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
1343 if (t <= 0)
1344 return 0;
1345 md_size = t;
1346 npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
1347
1348 if (!sending
1349 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
1350 && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
1351 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1352 return 0;
1353 #else
1354 /*
1355 * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
1356 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
1357 * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
1358 */
1359
1360 /*-
1361 * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
1362 * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
1363 *
1364 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
1365 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
1366 * total size.
1367 */
1368 unsigned char header[75];
1369 size_t j = 0;
1370 memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
1371 j += md_size;
1372 memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
1373 j += npad;
1374 memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
1375 j += 8;
1376 header[j++] = rec->type;
1377 header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
1378 header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
1379
1380 /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
1381 if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
1382 md, &md_size,
1383 header, rec->input,
1384 rec->length, rec->orig_len,
1385 mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
1386 return 0;
1387 #endif
1388 } else {
1389 unsigned int md_size_u;
1390 /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
1391 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1392
1393 if (md_ctx == NULL)
1394 return 0;
1395
1396 rec_char = rec->type;
1397 p = md;
1398 s2n(rec->length, p);
1399 if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
1400 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
1401 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
1402 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
1403 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
1404 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
1405 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
1406 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1407 || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
1408 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
1409 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
1410 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
1411 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
1412 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1413 return 0;
1414 }
1415
1416 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1417 }
1418
1419 ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
1420 return 1;
1421 }
1422
tls1_mac(SSL * ssl,SSL3_RECORD * rec,unsigned char * md,int sending)1423 int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1424 {
1425 unsigned char *seq;
1426 EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
1427 size_t md_size;
1428 int i;
1429 EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
1430 unsigned char header[13];
1431 int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
1432 : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
1433 int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
1434 : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
1435 int t;
1436 int ret = 0;
1437
1438 if (sending) {
1439 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1440 hash = ssl->write_hash;
1441 } else {
1442 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1443 hash = ssl->read_hash;
1444 }
1445
1446 t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
1447 if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
1448 return 0;
1449 md_size = t;
1450
1451 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
1452 if (stream_mac) {
1453 mac_ctx = hash;
1454 } else {
1455 hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1456 if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
1457 goto end;
1458 }
1459 mac_ctx = hmac;
1460 }
1461
1462 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && tlstree_mac && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
1463 goto end;
1464 }
1465
1466 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
1467 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
1468
1469 s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
1470 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
1471 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
1472
1473 memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
1474 } else
1475 memcpy(header, seq, 8);
1476
1477 header[8] = rec->type;
1478 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
1479 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
1480 header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
1481 header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
1482
1483 if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl)
1484 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
1485 && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
1486 OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
1487
1488 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
1489 &rec->orig_len);
1490 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1491
1492 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
1493 tls_hmac_params)) {
1494 goto end;
1495 }
1496 }
1497
1498 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
1499 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
1500 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
1501 goto end;
1502 }
1503
1504 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1505 BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
1506 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
1507 BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
1508 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
1509 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1510
1511 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
1512 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1513 ++seq[i];
1514 if (seq[i] != 0)
1515 break;
1516 }
1517 }
1518 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1519 BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
1520 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
1521 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1522 ret = 1;
1523 end:
1524 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1525 return ret;
1526 }
1527
dtls1_process_record(SSL * s,DTLS1_BITMAP * bitmap)1528 int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1529 {
1530 int i;
1531 int enc_err;
1532 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1533 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1534 int imac_size;
1535 size_t mac_size = 0;
1536 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1537 size_t max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1538 SSL_MAC_BUF macbuf = { NULL, 0 };
1539 int ret = 0;
1540
1541 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1542 sess = s->session;
1543
1544 /*
1545 * At this point, s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
1546 * and we have that many bytes in s->rlayer.packet
1547 */
1548 rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1549
1550 /*
1551 * ok, we can now read from 's->rlayer.packet' data into 'rr'. rr->input
1552 * points at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by
1553 * either the decryption or by the decompression. When the data is 'copied'
1554 * into the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
1555 */
1556
1557 /*
1558 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
1559 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
1560 */
1561
1562 /* check is not needed I believe */
1563 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
1564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1565 return 0;
1566 }
1567
1568 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
1569 rr->data = rr->input;
1570 rr->orig_len = rr->length;
1571
1572 if (s->read_hash != NULL) {
1573 const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash);
1574
1575 if (tmpmd != NULL) {
1576 imac_size = EVP_MD_get_size(tmpmd);
1577 if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1579 return 0;
1580 }
1581 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
1582 }
1583 }
1584
1585 if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
1586 unsigned char *mac;
1587
1588 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1590 return 0;
1591 }
1592 rr->length -= mac_size;
1593 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
1594 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
1595 if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
1597 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
1598 return 0;
1599 }
1600 /*
1601 * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
1602 * record
1603 */
1604 mac_size = 0;
1605 }
1606
1607 /*
1608 * Set a mark around the packet decryption attempt. This is DTLS, so
1609 * bad packets are just ignored, and we don't want to leave stray
1610 * errors in the queue from processing bogus junk that we ignored.
1611 */
1612 ERR_set_mark();
1613 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0, &macbuf, mac_size);
1614
1615 /*-
1616 * enc_err is:
1617 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
1618 * decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
1619 * 1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
1620 */
1621 if (enc_err == 0) {
1622 ERR_pop_to_mark();
1623 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1624 /* SSLfatal() got called */
1625 goto end;
1626 }
1627 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
1628 rr->length = 0;
1629 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1630 goto end;
1631 }
1632 ERR_clear_last_mark();
1633 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1634 BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %zd\n", rr->length);
1635 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr->data, rr->length, 4);
1636 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1637
1638 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
1639 if ((sess != NULL)
1640 && !SSL_READ_ETM(s)
1641 && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
1642 && (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
1643 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
1644
1645 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
1646 if (i == 0 || macbuf.mac == NULL
1647 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, macbuf.mac, mac_size) != 0)
1648 enc_err = 0;
1649 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
1650 enc_err = 0;
1651 }
1652
1653 if (enc_err == 0) {
1654 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
1655 rr->length = 0;
1656 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1657 goto end;
1658 }
1659
1660 /* r->length is now just compressed */
1661 if (s->expand != NULL) {
1662 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
1664 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1665 goto end;
1666 }
1667 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
1669 goto end;
1670 }
1671 }
1672
1673 /* use current Max Fragment Length setting if applicable */
1674 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1675 max_plain_length = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1676
1677 /* send overflow if the plaintext is too long now it has passed MAC */
1678 if (rr->length > max_plain_length) {
1679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1680 goto end;
1681 }
1682
1683 rr->off = 0;
1684 /*-
1685 * So at this point the following is true
1686 * ssl->s3.rrec.type is the type of record
1687 * ssl->s3.rrec.length == number of bytes in record
1688 * ssl->s3.rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
1689 * ssl->s3.rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
1690 * after use :-).
1691 */
1692
1693 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
1694 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1695
1696 /* Mark receipt of record. */
1697 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
1698
1699 ret = 1;
1700 end:
1701 if (macbuf.alloced)
1702 OPENSSL_free(macbuf.mac);
1703 return ret;
1704 }
1705
1706 /*
1707 * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
1708 */
1709 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
1710 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
1711 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer)))
1712
1713 /*-
1714 * Call this to get a new input record.
1715 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
1716 * or non-blocking IO.
1717 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
1718 * ssl->s3.rrec.type - is the type of record
1719 * ssl->s3.rrec.data - data
1720 * ssl->s3.rrec.length - number of bytes
1721 */
1722 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
dtls1_get_record(SSL * s)1723 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
1724 {
1725 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
1726 int rret;
1727 size_t more, n;
1728 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1729 unsigned char *p = NULL;
1730 unsigned short version;
1731 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
1732 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
1733
1734 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1735
1736 again:
1737 /*
1738 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
1739 * This is a non-blocking operation.
1740 */
1741 if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) {
1742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1743 return -1;
1744 }
1745
1746 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
1747 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
1748 return 1;
1749
1750 /* get something from the wire */
1751
1752 /* check if we have the header */
1753 if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
1754 (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1755 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1756 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n);
1757 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
1758 if (rret <= 0) {
1759 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1760 return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
1761 }
1762
1763 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
1764 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
1765 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1766 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1767 goto again;
1768 }
1769
1770 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
1771
1772 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
1773
1774 if (s->msg_callback)
1775 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1776 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1777
1778 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
1779 rr->type = *(p++);
1780 ssl_major = *(p++);
1781 ssl_minor = *(p++);
1782 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
1783
1784 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
1785 n2s(p, rr->epoch);
1786
1787 memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6);
1788 p += 6;
1789
1790 n2s(p, rr->length);
1791 rr->read = 0;
1792
1793 /*
1794 * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
1795 * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
1796 */
1797 if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1798 if (version != s->version) {
1799 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
1800 rr->length = 0;
1801 rr->read = 1;
1802 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1803 goto again;
1804 }
1805 }
1806
1807 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
1808 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
1809 rr->length = 0;
1810 rr->read = 1;
1811 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1812 goto again;
1813 }
1814
1815 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
1816 /* record too long, silently discard it */
1817 rr->length = 0;
1818 rr->read = 1;
1819 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1820 goto again;
1821 }
1822
1823 /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */
1824 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
1825 && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session) + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD) {
1826 /* record too long, silently discard it */
1827 rr->length = 0;
1828 rr->read = 1;
1829 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1830 goto again;
1831 }
1832
1833 /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
1834 }
1835
1836 /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
1837
1838 if (rr->length >
1839 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1840 /* now s->rlayer.packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
1841 more = rr->length;
1842 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
1843 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
1844 if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
1845 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1846 /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */
1847 return -1;
1848 }
1849 rr->length = 0;
1850 rr->read = 1;
1851 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1852 goto again;
1853 }
1854
1855 /*
1856 * now n == rr->length, and s->rlayer.packet_length ==
1857 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
1858 */
1859 }
1860 /* set state for later operations */
1861 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
1862
1863 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
1864 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
1865 if (bitmap == NULL) {
1866 rr->length = 0;
1867 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
1868 goto again; /* get another record */
1869 }
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1871 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
1872 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1873 #endif
1874 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
1875 if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
1876 rr->length = 0;
1877 rr->read = 1;
1878 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
1879 goto again; /* get another record */
1880 }
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1882 }
1883 #endif
1884
1885 /* just read a 0 length packet */
1886 if (rr->length == 0) {
1887 rr->read = 1;
1888 goto again;
1889 }
1890
1891 /*
1892 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
1893 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
1894 * processed at this time.
1895 */
1896 if (is_next_epoch) {
1897 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
1898 if (dtls1_buffer_record (s,
1899 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
1900 rr->seq_num) < 0) {
1901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1902 return -1;
1903 }
1904 }
1905 rr->length = 0;
1906 rr->read = 1;
1907 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1908 goto again;
1909 }
1910
1911 if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
1912 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1913 /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */
1914 return -1;
1915 }
1916 rr->length = 0;
1917 rr->read = 1;
1918 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
1919 goto again; /* get another record */
1920 }
1921
1922 return 1;
1923
1924 }
1925
dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL * s,size_t len,unsigned char * seq,size_t off)1926 int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off)
1927 {
1928 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1929
1930 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1931 memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
1932
1933 rr->length = len;
1934 rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1935 memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num));
1936 rr->off = off;
1937
1938 s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf;
1939 s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len;
1940 rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1941
1942 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
1943 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <= 0) {
1944 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1945 return 0;
1946 }
1947
1948 return 1;
1949 }
1950