1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
30
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
32 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
33
34 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
35 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
36 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
37 WPACKET *pkt);
38
39 /*
40 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
41 *
42 * Return values are:
43 * 1: Yes
44 * 0: No
45 */
cert_req_allowed(SSL * s)46 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
47 {
48 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
49 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
50 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
51 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 return 0;
53
54 return 1;
55 }
56
57 /*
58 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
59 *
60 * Return values are:
61 * 1: Yes
62 * 0: No
63 */
key_exchange_expected(SSL * s)64 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
65 {
66 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
67
68 /*
69 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
70 * ciphersuite or for SRP
71 */
72 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
73 | SSL_kSRP)) {
74 return 1;
75 }
76
77 return 0;
78 }
79
80 /*
81 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
82 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
83 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
84 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
85 *
86 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
87 * (transition not allowed)
88 */
ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)89 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
90 {
91 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
92
93 /*
94 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
95 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
96 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
97 */
98
99 switch (st->hand_state) {
100 default:
101 break;
102
103 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
104 /*
105 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
106 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
107 */
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
110 return 1;
111 }
112 break;
113
114 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
117 return 1;
118 }
119 break;
120
121 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
122 if (s->hit) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
125 return 1;
126 }
127 } else {
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
130 return 1;
131 }
132 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
133 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
134 return 1;
135 }
136 }
137 break;
138
139 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
142 return 1;
143 }
144 break;
145
146 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
149 return 1;
150 }
151 break;
152
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
156 return 1;
157 }
158 break;
159
160 case TLS_ST_OK:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
163 return 1;
164 }
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
167 return 1;
168 }
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
170 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
171 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
172 # error Internal DTLS version error
173 #endif
174 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
175 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
176 /*
177 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
178 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
179 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
180 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
181 */
182 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
184 return 0;
185 }
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
187 return 1;
188 }
189 }
190 break;
191 }
192
193 /* No valid transition found */
194 return 0;
195 }
196
197 /*
198 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
199 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
200 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
201 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
202 *
203 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
204 * (transition not allowed)
205 */
ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL * s,int mt)206 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
207 {
208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
209 int ske_expected;
210
211 /*
212 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
213 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
214 */
215 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
216 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
217 goto err;
218 return 1;
219 }
220
221 switch (st->hand_state) {
222 default:
223 break;
224
225 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
226 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
228 return 1;
229 }
230
231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
232 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
233 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
234 return 1;
235 }
236 }
237 break;
238
239 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
240 /*
241 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
242 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
243 * HelloRetryRequest.
244 */
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
247 return 1;
248 }
249 break;
250
251 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
252 if (s->hit) {
253 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
260 return 1;
261 }
262 } else {
263 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
264 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
265 return 1;
266 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
267 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
268 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
269 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
270 /*
271 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
272 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
273 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
274 * the server is resuming.
275 */
276 s->hit = 1;
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
278 return 1;
279 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
280 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 } else {
286 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
287 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
288 if (ske_expected
289 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
293 return 1;
294 }
295 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
296 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
298 return 1;
299 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
301 return 1;
302 }
303 }
304 }
305 break;
306
307 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
308 /*
309 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
310 * |ext.status_expected| is set
311 */
312 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
314 return 1;
315 }
316 /* Fall through */
317
318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
319 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
320 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
321 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
322 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
325 return 1;
326 }
327 goto err;
328 }
329 /* Fall through */
330
331 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
333 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
335 return 1;
336 }
337 goto err;
338 }
339 /* Fall through */
340
341 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
344 return 1;
345 }
346 break;
347
348 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
349 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
352 return 1;
353 }
354 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
356 return 1;
357 }
358 break;
359
360 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
363 return 1;
364 }
365 break;
366
367 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
368 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
369 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
370 return 1;
371 }
372 break;
373
374 case TLS_ST_OK:
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
377 return 1;
378 }
379 break;
380 }
381
382 err:
383 /* No valid transition found */
384 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
385 BIO *rbio;
386
387 /*
388 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
389 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
390 */
391 s->init_num = 0;
392 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
393 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
394 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
395 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
396 return 0;
397 }
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
399 return 0;
400 }
401
402 /*
403 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
404 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
405 * server.
406 */
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL * s)407 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
408 {
409 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
410
411 /*
412 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
413 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
414 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
415 */
416 switch (st->hand_state) {
417 default:
418 /* Shouldn't happen */
419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
423 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 }
427 /*
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
430 */
431 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
435 }
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438
439 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
440 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
441 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
443 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
444 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
446 else
447 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
448 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450
451 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
452 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 }
456 /* Fall through */
457
458 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
459 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
460 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
461 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463
464 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
465 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
466 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
467 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469
470 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473
474 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
476 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480
481 case TLS_ST_OK:
482 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 }
486
487 /* Try to read from the server instead */
488 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
489 }
490 }
491
492 /*
493 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
494 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 */
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL * s)496 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 {
498 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
499
500 /*
501 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
502 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
503 * later
504 */
505 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
506 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507
508 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 default:
510 /* Shouldn't happen */
511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
513
514 case TLS_ST_OK:
515 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 /*
517 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
518 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 */
520 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 }
522 /* Renegotiation */
523 /* fall thru */
524 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527
528 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
529 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
530 /*
531 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
532 * actually selected a version yet.
533 */
534 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
536 else
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 }
540 /*
541 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
542 * we will be sent
543 */
544 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
545
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
547 /*
548 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
549 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
550 * because we did early data.
551 */
552 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
553 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
555 else
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558
559 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
560 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
561
562 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
564 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
567 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
569 else
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576
577 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
578 /*
579 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
580 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
581 */
582 /*
583 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
584 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
585 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
586 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
587 */
588 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
590 } else {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
592 }
593 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
595 }
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597
598 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
603 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
605 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
607 } else {
608 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
610 #else
611 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
613 else
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
615 #endif
616 }
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618
619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 #endif
624
625 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
626 if (s->hit) {
627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 } else {
630 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
631 }
632
633 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
634 if (s->hit) {
635 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 } else {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 }
641
642 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
643 /*
644 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
645 * convenient time.
646 */
647 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
648 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
650 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
651 }
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 }
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
657 }
658 }
659
660 /*
661 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
662 * the client to the server.
663 */
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)664 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
665 {
666 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
669 default:
670 /* No pre work to be done */
671 break;
672
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 s->shutdown = 0;
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
676 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
677 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
679 return WORK_ERROR;
680 }
681 }
682 break;
683
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 if (s->hit) {
687 /*
688 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
689 * messages unless we need to.
690 */
691 st->use_timer = 0;
692 }
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
697 }
698 #endif
699 }
700 break;
701
702 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
703 /*
704 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
705 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
706 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
707 */
708 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
709 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
710 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
711 /* Fall through */
712
713 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
714 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
715
716 case TLS_ST_OK:
717 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
719 }
720
721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
722 }
723
724 /*
725 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
726 * client to the server.
727 */
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)728 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
729 {
730 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
731
732 s->init_num = 0;
733
734 switch (st->hand_state) {
735 default:
736 /* No post work to be done */
737 break;
738
739 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
740 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
741 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
742 /*
743 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
744 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
745 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
746 */
747 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
748 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
751 return WORK_ERROR;
752 }
753 }
754 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
755 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
756 return WORK_MORE_A;
757 }
758
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
760 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
761 s->first_packet = 1;
762 }
763 break;
764
765 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
766 /*
767 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
768 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
769 */
770 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
771 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
772 break;
773
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
775 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
777 return WORK_ERROR;
778 }
779 break;
780
781 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
783 break;
784 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
785 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
786 /*
787 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
788 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
789 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
790 */
791 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
793 return WORK_ERROR;
794 break;
795 }
796 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
798 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
799 #else
800 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
801 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
802 else
803 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
804 #endif
805 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
807 return WORK_ERROR;
808 }
809
810 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
811 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
813 return WORK_ERROR;
814 }
815
816 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
818 if (s->hit) {
819 /*
820 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
821 * no SCTP used.
822 */
823 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
824 0, NULL);
825 }
826 #endif
827
828 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
829 }
830 break;
831
832 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
835 /*
836 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
837 * no SCTP used.
838 */
839 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
840 0, NULL);
841 }
842 #endif
843 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
844 return WORK_MORE_B;
845
846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
847 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 return WORK_ERROR;
850 }
851 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
852 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
853 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 return WORK_ERROR;
856 }
857 }
858 }
859 break;
860
861 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
862 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 return WORK_MORE_A;
864 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return WORK_ERROR;
867 }
868 break;
869 }
870
871 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
872 }
873
874 /*
875 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
876 * client
877 *
878 * Valid return values are:
879 * 1: Success
880 * 0: Error
881 */
ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,confunc_f * confunc,int * mt)882 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
883 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
884 {
885 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
886
887 switch (st->hand_state) {
888 default:
889 /* Shouldn't happen */
890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
891 return 0;
892
893 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
894 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
895 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
896 else
897 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
899 break;
900
901 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
902 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
903 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
904 break;
905
906 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
907 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
908 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
909 break;
910
911 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
912 *confunc = NULL;
913 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
914 break;
915
916 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
917 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
918 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
919 break;
920
921 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
922 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
923 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
924 break;
925
926 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
927 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
928 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 break;
930
931 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
932 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
933 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
934 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
935 break;
936 #endif
937 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
938 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
939 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
940 break;
941
942 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
943 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
944 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
945 break;
946 }
947
948 return 1;
949 }
950
951 /*
952 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
953 * reading. Excludes the message header.
954 */
ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL * s)955 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
956 {
957 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
958
959 switch (st->hand_state) {
960 default:
961 /* Shouldn't happen */
962 return 0;
963
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
965 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
966
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
968 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
969
970 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
971 return s->max_cert_list;
972
973 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
974 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
975
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
977 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
978
979 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
980 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
981
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
983 /*
984 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
985 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
986 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
987 */
988 return s->max_cert_list;
989
990 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
991 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
992
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
994 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
995 return 3;
996 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
997
998 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
999 return (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1000 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1001
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1003 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1004
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1006 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1007
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1009 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1010 }
1011 }
1012
1013 /*
1014 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1015 */
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1016 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1017 {
1018 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1019
1020 switch (st->hand_state) {
1021 default:
1022 /* Shouldn't happen */
1023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1025
1026 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1027 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1028
1029 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1030 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1031
1032 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1033 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1034
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1036 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1037
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1039 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1040
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1042 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1045 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1048 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1049
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1051 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1052
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1054 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1055
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1057 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1058
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1060 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1063 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1064
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1066 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1067 }
1068 }
1069
1070 /*
1071 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1072 * from the server
1073 */
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)1074 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1075 {
1076 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1077
1078 switch (st->hand_state) {
1079 default:
1080 /* Shouldn't happen */
1081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1082 return WORK_ERROR;
1083
1084 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1085 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1086
1087 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1088 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1089 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1090 }
1091 }
1092
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)1093 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1094 {
1095 unsigned char *p;
1096 size_t sess_id_len;
1097 int i, protverr;
1098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1099 SSL_COMP *comp;
1100 #endif
1101 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1102 unsigned char *session_id;
1103
1104 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1105 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1106 if (protverr != 0) {
1107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1108 return 0;
1109 }
1110
1111 if (sess == NULL
1112 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1113 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1114 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1115 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1116 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1117 return 0;
1118 }
1119 }
1120 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1121
1122 p = s->s3.client_random;
1123
1124 /*
1125 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1126 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1127 */
1128 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1129 size_t idx;
1130 i = 1;
1131 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1132 if (p[idx]) {
1133 i = 0;
1134 break;
1135 }
1136 }
1137 } else {
1138 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1139 }
1140
1141 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1142 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 return 0;
1145 }
1146
1147 /*-
1148 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1149 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1150 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1151 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1152 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1153 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1154 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1155 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1156 * 1.0.
1157 *
1158 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1159 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1160 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1161 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1162 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1163 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1164 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1165 * know that is maximum server supports.
1166 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1167 * containing version 1.0.
1168 *
1169 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1170 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1171 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1172 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1173 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1174 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1175 * the negotiated version.
1176 *
1177 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1178 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1179 */
1180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1181 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 return 0;
1184 }
1185
1186 /* Session ID */
1187 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1188 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1189 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1190 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1191 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1192 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1193 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1194 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1195 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1196 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 return 0;
1199 }
1200 } else {
1201 sess_id_len = 0;
1202 }
1203 } else {
1204 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1205 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1206 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1207 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1208 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1209 }
1210 }
1211 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1212 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1213 sess_id_len))
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 return 0;
1217 }
1218
1219 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1220 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1221 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1222 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1223 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 return 0;
1226 }
1227 }
1228
1229 /* Ciphers supported */
1230 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 return 0;
1233 }
1234
1235 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1236 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1237 return 0;
1238 }
1239 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 return 0;
1242 }
1243
1244 /* COMPRESSION */
1245 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 return 0;
1248 }
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1250 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1251 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1252 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1253 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1254 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1255 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1256 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 return 0;
1259 }
1260 }
1261 }
1262 #endif
1263 /* Add the NULL method */
1264 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return 0;
1267 }
1268
1269 /* TLS extensions */
1270 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1272 return 0;
1273 }
1274
1275 return 1;
1276 }
1277
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1278 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1279 {
1280 size_t cookie_len;
1281 PACKET cookiepkt;
1282
1283 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1284 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1286 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1287 }
1288
1289 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1290 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1292 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1293 }
1294
1295 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1297 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1298 }
1299 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1300
1301 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1302 }
1303
set_client_ciphersuite(SSL * s,const unsigned char * cipherchars)1304 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1305 {
1306 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1307 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1308 int i;
1309
1310 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1311 if (c == NULL) {
1312 /* unknown cipher */
1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1314 return 0;
1315 }
1316 /*
1317 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1318 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1319 */
1320 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324
1325 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1326 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1327 if (i < 0) {
1328 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1330 return 0;
1331 }
1332
1333 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1334 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1335 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1337 return 0;
1338 }
1339
1340 /*
1341 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1342 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1343 * set and use it for comparison.
1344 */
1345 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1346 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1347 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1348 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1349 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2);
1350
1351 /*
1352 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1353 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1354 */
1355 if (md == NULL
1356 || md != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1358 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1359 return 0;
1360 }
1361 } else {
1362 /*
1363 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1364 * ciphersuite.
1365 */
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1367 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1368 return 0;
1369 }
1370 }
1371 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1372
1373 return 1;
1374 }
1375
tls_process_server_hello(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1376 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1377 {
1378 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1379 size_t session_id_len;
1380 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1381 int hrr = 0;
1382 unsigned int compression;
1383 unsigned int sversion;
1384 unsigned int context;
1385 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1387 SSL_COMP *comp;
1388 #endif
1389
1390 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1392 goto err;
1393 }
1394
1395 /* load the server random */
1396 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1397 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1398 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1399 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1400 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1402 goto err;
1403 }
1404 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1405 hrr = 1;
1406 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1408 goto err;
1409 }
1410 } else {
1411 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1413 goto err;
1414 }
1415 }
1416
1417 /* Get the session-id. */
1418 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1420 goto err;
1421 }
1422 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1423 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1424 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1426 goto err;
1427 }
1428
1429 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1431 goto err;
1432 }
1433
1434 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 goto err;
1437 }
1438
1439 /* TLS extensions */
1440 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1441 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1442 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1443 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1445 goto err;
1446 }
1447
1448 if (!hrr) {
1449 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1450 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1451 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1452 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1453 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1454 goto err;
1455 }
1456
1457 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1459 goto err;
1460 }
1461 }
1462
1463 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1464 if (compression != 0) {
1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1466 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1467 goto err;
1468 }
1469
1470 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1471 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1472 session_id_len) != 0) {
1473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1474 goto err;
1475 }
1476 }
1477
1478 if (hrr) {
1479 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1480 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1481 goto err;
1482 }
1483
1484 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1485 }
1486
1487 /*
1488 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1489 * are appropriate for this version.
1490 */
1491 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1492 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1493 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1495 goto err;
1496 }
1497
1498 s->hit = 0;
1499
1500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1501 /*
1502 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1503 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1504 */
1505 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1507 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1508 goto err;
1509 }
1510
1511 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1512 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1513 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1514 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1516 goto err;
1517 }
1518 } else {
1519 /*
1520 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1521 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1522 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1523 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1524 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1525 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1526 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1527 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1528 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1529 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1530 */
1531 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1532 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1533 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1534 /*
1535 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1536 * backwards compat reasons
1537 */
1538 int master_key_length;
1539 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1540 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1541 &master_key_length,
1542 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1543 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1544 && master_key_length > 0) {
1545 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1546 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1547 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1548 } else {
1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 goto err;
1551 }
1552 }
1553
1554 if (session_id_len != 0
1555 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1556 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1557 session_id_len) == 0)
1558 s->hit = 1;
1559 }
1560
1561 if (s->hit) {
1562 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1563 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1564 /* actually a client application bug */
1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1566 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1567 goto err;
1568 }
1569 } else {
1570 /*
1571 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1572 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1573 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1574 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1575 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1576 */
1577 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1578 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1579 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1580 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1581 goto err;
1582 }
1583 }
1584
1585 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1586 /*
1587 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1588 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1589 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1590 * used for resumption.
1591 */
1592 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1593 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1594 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1595 if (session_id_len > 0)
1596 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1597 session_id_len);
1598 }
1599 }
1600
1601 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1602 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1604 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1605 goto err;
1606 }
1607 /*
1608 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1609 * version.
1610 */
1611 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1612 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1613
1614 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1616 goto err;
1617 }
1618
1619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1620 if (compression != 0) {
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1622 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1623 goto err;
1624 }
1625 /*
1626 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1627 * using compression.
1628 */
1629 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1631 goto err;
1632 }
1633 #else
1634 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1636 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1637 goto err;
1638 }
1639 if (compression == 0)
1640 comp = NULL;
1641 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1643 goto err;
1644 } else {
1645 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1646 }
1647
1648 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1650 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1651 goto err;
1652 } else {
1653 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1654 }
1655 #endif
1656
1657 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1658 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1659 goto err;
1660 }
1661
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1664 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1665 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1666 size_t labellen;
1667
1668 /*
1669 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1670 * no SCTP used.
1671 */
1672 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1673 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1674
1675 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1676 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1677 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1678 labellen += 1;
1679
1680 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1681 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1682 labelbuffer,
1683 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1685 goto err;
1686 }
1687
1688 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1689 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1690 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1691 }
1692 #endif
1693
1694 /*
1695 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1696 * we're done with this message
1697 */
1698 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1699 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1700 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1701 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1707 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1708 err:
1709 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1710 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1711 }
1712
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL * s,PACKET * extpkt)1713 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1714 PACKET *extpkt)
1715 {
1716 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1717
1718 /*
1719 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1720 * should not be used.
1721 */
1722 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1723 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1724
1725 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1726 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1727 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1728 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1734 extensions = NULL;
1735
1736 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1737 /*
1738 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1739 * ClientHello will not change
1740 */
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1742 goto err;
1743 }
1744
1745 /*
1746 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1747 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1748 */
1749 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1751 goto err;
1752 }
1753
1754 /*
1755 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1756 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1757 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1758 * for HRR messages.
1759 */
1760 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1761 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1763 goto err;
1764 }
1765
1766 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1767 err:
1768 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1770 }
1771
1772 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1773 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1774 {
1775 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1776 X509 *x = NULL;
1777 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1778 size_t chainidx;
1779 unsigned int context = 0;
1780
1781 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1783 goto err;
1784 }
1785
1786 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1787 || context != 0
1788 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1789 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1790 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1792 goto err;
1793 }
1794 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1795 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1796 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1798 goto err;
1799 }
1800
1801 certstart = certbytes;
1802 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
1803 if (x == NULL) {
1804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1805 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1806 goto err;
1807 }
1808 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1809 cert_len) == NULL) {
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813
1814 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1816 goto err;
1817 }
1818
1819 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1820 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1821 PACKET extensions;
1822
1823 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1825 goto err;
1826 }
1827 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1828 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1829 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1830 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1831 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1832 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1833 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1834 /* SSLfatal already called */
1835 goto err;
1836 }
1837 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1838 }
1839
1840 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
1841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844 x = NULL;
1845 }
1846 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1847
1848 err:
1849 X509_free(x);
1850 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1851 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1852 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1853 }
1854
1855 /*
1856 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1857 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1858 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1859 */
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)1860 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1861 {
1862 X509 *x;
1863 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1864 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1865 size_t certidx;
1866 int i;
1867
1868 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1869 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1870 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
1871 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
1872 return WORK_MORE_A;
1873 }
1874 /*
1875 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1876 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1877 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1878 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1879 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1880 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1881 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1882 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1883 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1884 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1885 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1886 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1887 */
1888 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1889 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1890 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1891 return WORK_ERROR;
1892 }
1893 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1894
1895 /*
1896 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1897 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1898 */
1899 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
1900
1901 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1902
1903 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1905 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1906 return WORK_ERROR;
1907 }
1908
1909 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1911 return WORK_ERROR;
1912 }
1913 /*
1914 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1915 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1916 * type.
1917 */
1918 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1919 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1921 return WORK_ERROR;
1922 }
1923 }
1924
1925 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1926 X509_up_ref(x);
1927 s->session->peer = x;
1928 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1929
1930 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1931 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1932 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1933 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1934 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1935 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1936 return WORK_ERROR;
1937 }
1938 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1939 }
1940
tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1941 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1942 {
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1944 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1945
1946 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1947
1948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1950 return 0;
1951 }
1952
1953 /*
1954 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1955 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1956 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1957 * identity.
1958 */
1959 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1961 return 0;
1962 }
1963
1964 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1966 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1967 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1968 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1970 return 0;
1971 }
1972
1973 return 1;
1974 #else
1975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1976 return 0;
1977 #endif
1978 }
1979
tls_process_ske_srp(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)1980 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1981 {
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1983 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1984
1985 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1986 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1987 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1988 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992
1993 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
1994 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1995 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1996 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
1997 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1998 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1999 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2000 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2001 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2002 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2003 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2004 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2006 return 0;
2007 }
2008
2009 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2010 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2011 return 0;
2012 }
2013
2014 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2015 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2016 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2017
2018 return 1;
2019 #else
2020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2021 return 0;
2022 #endif
2023 }
2024
tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2025 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2026 {
2027 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2028 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2029 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2030 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2031 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2032 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2033 int ret = 0;
2034
2035 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2036 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2037 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2039 return 0;
2040 }
2041
2042 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2043 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2044 NULL);
2045 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2046 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2047 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2049 goto err;
2050 }
2051
2052 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2053 if (tmpl == NULL
2054 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2055 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2056 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2057 bnpub_key)
2058 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2060 goto err;
2061 }
2062
2063 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2064 if (pctx == NULL) {
2065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2066 goto err;
2067 }
2068 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2069 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2071 goto err;
2072 }
2073
2074 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2075 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, peer_tmp, s->ctx->propq);
2076 if (pctx == NULL
2077 /*
2078 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2079 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2080 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2081 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2082 */
2083 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2084 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2086 goto err;
2087 }
2088
2089 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2090 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2091 0, peer_tmp)) {
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2093 goto err;
2094 }
2095
2096 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2097 peer_tmp = NULL;
2098
2099 /*
2100 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2101 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2102 */
2103 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2104 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2105 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2106
2107 ret = 1;
2108
2109 err:
2110 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2111 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2112 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2113 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2114 BN_free(p);
2115 BN_free(g);
2116 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2117
2118 return ret;
2119 }
2120
tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,EVP_PKEY ** pkey)2121 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2122 {
2123 PACKET encoded_pt;
2124 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2125
2126 /*
2127 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2128 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2129 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2130 */
2131 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2133 return 0;
2134 }
2135 /*
2136 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2137 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2138 */
2139 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2140 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2142 return 0;
2143 }
2144
2145 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2147 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2148 return 0;
2149 }
2150
2151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2153 return 0;
2154 }
2155
2156 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2157 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2158 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2160 return 0;
2161 }
2162
2163 /*
2164 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2165 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2166 * and ECDSA.
2167 */
2168 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2169 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2170 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2171 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2172 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2173
2174 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2175 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2176 return 1;
2177 }
2178
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2179 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2180 {
2181 long alg_k;
2182 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2183 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2184 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2185 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2186
2187 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2188
2189 save_param_start = *pkt;
2190
2191 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2192 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2193
2194 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2195 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2196 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2197 goto err;
2198 }
2199 }
2200
2201 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2202 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2203 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2204 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2205 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2206 goto err;
2207 }
2208 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2209 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2210 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2211 goto err;
2212 }
2213 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2214 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2215 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2216 goto err;
2217 }
2218 } else if (alg_k) {
2219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2220 goto err;
2221 }
2222
2223 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2224 if (pkey != NULL) {
2225 PACKET params;
2226 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2227 unsigned char *tbs;
2228 size_t tbslen;
2229 int rv;
2230
2231 /*
2232 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2233 * equals the length of the parameters.
2234 */
2235 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2236 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2237 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2239 goto err;
2240 }
2241
2242 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2243 unsigned int sigalg;
2244
2245 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2247 goto err;
2248 }
2249 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2251 goto err;
2252 }
2253 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2255 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
2256 goto err;
2257 }
2258
2259 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2261 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2262 goto err;
2263 }
2264 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2265 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2266 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2267
2268 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2269 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2271 goto err;
2272 }
2273
2274 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2275 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2277 goto err;
2278 }
2279
2280 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2281 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2282 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
2283 NULL) <= 0) {
2284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2285 goto err;
2286 }
2287 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2288 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2289 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2290 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2292 goto err;
2293 }
2294 }
2295 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2296 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2297 if (tbslen == 0) {
2298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301
2302 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2303 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2304 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2305 if (rv <= 0) {
2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2307 goto err;
2308 }
2309 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2310 md_ctx = NULL;
2311 } else {
2312 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2313 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2314 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2315 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2316 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2318 }
2319 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2320 goto err;
2321 }
2322 /* still data left over */
2323 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2325 goto err;
2326 }
2327 }
2328
2329 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2330 err:
2331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2332 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2333 }
2334
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2336 {
2337 size_t i;
2338
2339 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2340 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2341 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2342
2343 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2344 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2345 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2346
2347 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2348 /*
2349 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2350 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2351 * we just ignore it
2352 */
2353 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2354 }
2355
2356 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2357 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2358 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2359 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2360 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2361 s->pha_context = NULL;
2362 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2363
2364 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2365 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2367 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2368 }
2369
2370 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2372 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2373 }
2374 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2375 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2376 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2377 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2378 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2379 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2380 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2381 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2382 }
2383 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2384 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2386 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2387 }
2388 } else {
2389 PACKET ctypes;
2390
2391 /* get the certificate types */
2392 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2395 }
2396
2397 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2400 }
2401
2402 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2403 PACKET sigalgs;
2404
2405 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2407 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2408 }
2409
2410 /*
2411 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2412 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2413 */
2414 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2416 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2418 }
2419 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2421 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2422 }
2423 }
2424
2425 /* get the CA RDNs */
2426 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2427 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2428 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2429 }
2430 }
2431
2432 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2434 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2435 }
2436
2437 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2438 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2439
2440 /*
2441 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2442 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2443 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2444 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2445 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2446 * client_cert_cb.
2447 */
2448 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2450
2451 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2452 }
2453
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2454 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2455 {
2456 unsigned int ticklen;
2457 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2458 unsigned int sess_len;
2459 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2460 PACKET nonce;
2461 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2462
2463 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2464
2465 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2466 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2467 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2468 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2469 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2470 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2471 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2473 goto err;
2474 }
2475
2476 /*
2477 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2478 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2479 * be 0 here in that instance
2480 */
2481 if (ticklen == 0)
2482 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2483
2484 /*
2485 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2486 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2487 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2488 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2489 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2490 * cache.
2491 */
2492 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2493 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2494
2495 /*
2496 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2497 * one
2498 */
2499 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2501 goto err;
2502 }
2503
2504 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2505 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2506 /*
2507 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2508 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2509 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2510 */
2511 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2512 }
2513
2514 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2515 s->session = new_sess;
2516 }
2517
2518 s->session->time = time(NULL);
2519 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2520
2521 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2522 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2523 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2524
2525 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2526 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2528 goto err;
2529 }
2530 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2532 goto err;
2533 }
2534
2535 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2536 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2537 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2538
2539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2540 PACKET extpkt;
2541
2542 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2543 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2545 goto err;
2546 }
2547
2548 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2549 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2550 NULL, 1)
2551 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2552 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2553 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2554 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2555 goto err;
2556 }
2557 }
2558
2559 /*
2560 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2561 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2562 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2563 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2564 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2565 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2566 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2567 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2568 * ticket.
2569 */
2570 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2571 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2572 /* Error is already recorded */
2573 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2574 goto err;
2575 }
2576 /*
2577 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2578 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2579 */
2580 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2581 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2582 sha256, NULL)) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2584 goto err;
2585 }
2586 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2587 sha256 = NULL;
2588 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2589 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2590
2591 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2593 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2594 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2595 size_t hashlen;
2596 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2597
2598 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2599 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2601 goto err;
2602 }
2603 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2604
2605 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2606 nonce_label,
2607 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2608 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2609 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2610 s->session->master_key,
2611 hashlen, 1)) {
2612 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2613 goto err;
2614 }
2615 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2616
2617 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2618 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2619 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2620 }
2621
2622 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2623 err:
2624 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2625 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2626 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2627 }
2628
2629 /*
2630 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2631 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2632 */
tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2633 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2634 {
2635 size_t resplen;
2636 unsigned int type;
2637
2638 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2639 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2641 return 0;
2642 }
2643 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2644 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2646 return 0;
2647 }
2648 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2649 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2650 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2652 return 0;
2653 }
2654 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2655 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2657 return 0;
2658 }
2659
2660 return 1;
2661 }
2662
2663
tls_process_cert_status(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2664 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2665 {
2666 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2668 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2669 }
2670
2671 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2672 }
2673
2674 /*
2675 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2676 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2677 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2678 * on failure.
2679 */
tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL * s)2680 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2681 {
2682 /*
2683 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2684 * the server
2685 */
2686 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2687 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2688 return 0;
2689 }
2690
2691 /*
2692 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2693 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2694 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2695 */
2696 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2697 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2698 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2699
2700 if (ret == 0) {
2701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2702 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2703 return 0;
2704 }
2705 if (ret < 0) {
2706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2707 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2708 return 0;
2709 }
2710 }
2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2712 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2713 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2714 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2715 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2716 return 0;
2717 }
2718 }
2719 #endif
2720
2721 return 1;
2722 }
2723
tls_process_server_done(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)2724 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2725 {
2726 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2727 /* should contain no data */
2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2729 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2730 }
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2732 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2733 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2736 }
2737 }
2738 #endif
2739
2740 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2741 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2743 }
2744
2745 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2746 }
2747
tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2748 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2749 {
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2751 int ret = 0;
2752 /*
2753 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2754 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2755 * strnlen.
2756 */
2757 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2758 size_t identitylen = 0;
2759 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2760 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2761 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2762 size_t psklen = 0;
2763
2764 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2766 goto err;
2767 }
2768
2769 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2770
2771 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2772 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2773 psk, sizeof(psk));
2774
2775 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2777 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2778 goto err;
2779 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2781 goto err;
2782 }
2783
2784 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2785 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 goto err;
2788 }
2789
2790 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2791 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2792 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2794 goto err;
2795 }
2796
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2798 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2799 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2800 tmppsk = NULL;
2801 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2802 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2803 tmpidentity = NULL;
2804
2805 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 goto err;
2808 }
2809
2810 ret = 1;
2811
2812 err:
2813 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2814 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2815 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2816 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2817
2818 return ret;
2819 #else
2820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2821 return 0;
2822 #endif
2823 }
2824
tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2825 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2826 {
2827 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2828 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2830 size_t enclen;
2831 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2832 size_t pmslen = 0;
2833
2834 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2835 /*
2836 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2837 */
2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 return 0;
2840 }
2841
2842 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2843 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 return 0;
2846 }
2847
2848 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2849 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2850 if (pms == NULL) {
2851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2852 return 0;
2853 }
2854
2855 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2856 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2857 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
2858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2859 goto err;
2860 }
2861
2862 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2863 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 goto err;
2866 }
2867
2868 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
2869 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2870 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2872 goto err;
2873 }
2874 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2875 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2877 goto err;
2878 }
2879 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2880 pctx = NULL;
2881
2882 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2883 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2885 goto err;
2886 }
2887
2888 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2889 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2890 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2891 goto err;
2892 }
2893
2894 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
2895 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2896
2897 return 1;
2898 err:
2899 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2900 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2901
2902 return 0;
2903 }
2904
tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2905 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2906 {
2907 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2908 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2909 int prime_len;
2910 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
2911 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
2912 int ret = 0;
2913
2914 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2915 if (skey == NULL) {
2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 goto err;
2918 }
2919
2920 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2921 if (ckey == NULL) {
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2923 goto err;
2924 }
2925
2926 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2928 goto err;
2929 }
2930
2931 /* send off the data */
2932
2933 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2934 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
2935 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2937 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2938 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2939 }
2940
2941 /*
2942 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2943 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2944 * as the prime.
2945 */
2946 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
2947 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
2948 if (pad_len > 0) {
2949 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 goto err;
2952 }
2953 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
2954 }
2955
2956 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
2957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2958 goto err;
2959 }
2960
2961 ret = 1;
2962 err:
2963 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
2964 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2965 return ret;
2966 }
2967
tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)2968 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2969 {
2970 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2971 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2972 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2973 int ret = 0;
2974
2975 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2976 if (skey == NULL) {
2977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 return 0;
2979 }
2980
2981 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2982 if (ckey == NULL) {
2983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2984 goto err;
2985 }
2986
2987 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2988 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2989 goto err;
2990 }
2991
2992 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2993 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2994
2995 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2997 goto err;
2998 }
2999
3000 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3002 goto err;
3003 }
3004
3005 ret = 1;
3006 err:
3007 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3008 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3009 return ret;
3010 }
3011
tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3012 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3013 {
3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3015 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3016 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3017 X509 *peer_cert;
3018 size_t msglen;
3019 unsigned int md_len;
3020 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3021 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3022 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3023 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3024 size_t pmslen = 0;
3025
3026 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3027 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3028
3029 /*
3030 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3031 */
3032 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3033 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3035 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3036 return 0;
3037 }
3038
3039 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3040 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3041 s->ctx->propq);
3042 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3044 return 0;
3045 }
3046 /*
3047 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3048 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3049 * certificate key for key exchange
3050 */
3051
3052 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3053 pmslen = 32;
3054 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3055 if (pms == NULL) {
3056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3057 goto err;
3058 }
3059
3060 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3061 /* Generate session key
3062 */
3063 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 goto err;
3066 };
3067 /*
3068 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3069 * data
3070 */
3071 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3072 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3073 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3074 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3075 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3076 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3077 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3078 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3080 goto err;
3081 }
3082 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3083 ukm_hash = NULL;
3084 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3085 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3087 goto err;
3088 }
3089 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3090 /*
3091 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3092 */
3093 msglen = 255;
3094 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3096 goto err;
3097 }
3098
3099 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3100 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3103 goto err;
3104 }
3105
3106 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3107 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3108 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3109
3110 return 1;
3111 err:
3112 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3113 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3114 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3115 return 0;
3116 #else
3117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 return 0;
3119 #endif
3120 }
3121
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL * s)3123 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3124 {
3125 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3126 return NID_magma_ctr;
3127 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3128 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3129
3130 return NID_undef;
3131 }
3132
ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL * s,unsigned char * dgst_buf)3133 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3134 {
3135 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3136 unsigned int md_len;
3137 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3138
3139 if (md == NULL)
3140 return 0;
3141
3142 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3143 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3144 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3145 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3146 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3147 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3148 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3149 return 0;
3150 }
3151
3152 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3153 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3154 return 1;
3155 }
3156 #endif
3157
tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3158 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3159 {
3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3161 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3162 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3163 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3164 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3165 X509 *peer_cert;
3166 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3167 size_t pmslen = 0;
3168 size_t msglen;
3169 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3170
3171 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 return 0;
3174 }
3175
3176 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3178 goto err;
3179 }
3180
3181 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3182 pmslen = 32;
3183 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3184 if (pms == NULL) {
3185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3186 goto err;
3187 }
3188
3189 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3191 goto err;
3192 }
3193
3194 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3195 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3196 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3198 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3199 goto err;
3200 }
3201
3202 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3203 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3204 s->ctx->propq);
3205 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3207 goto err;
3208 }
3209
3210 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 goto err;
3213 };
3214
3215 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3216 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3217 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3219 goto err;
3220 }
3221
3222 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3223 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3225 goto err;
3226 }
3227
3228 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3230 goto err;
3231 }
3232
3233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3234 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3236 goto err;
3237 }
3238
3239 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3240 pkey_ctx = NULL;
3241 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3242 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3243
3244 return 1;
3245 err:
3246 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3247 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3248 return 0;
3249 #else
3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3251 return 0;
3252 #endif
3253 }
3254
tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3255 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3256 {
3257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3258 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3259
3260 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3261 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3262 &abytes)) {
3263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3264 return 0;
3265 }
3266 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3267
3268 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3269 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3270 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3272 return 0;
3273 }
3274
3275 return 1;
3276 #else
3277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3278 return 0;
3279 #endif
3280 }
3281
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3282 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3283 {
3284 unsigned long alg_k;
3285
3286 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3287
3288 /*
3289 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3290 * no need to do so here.
3291 */
3292 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3293 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3294 goto err;
3295
3296 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3297 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3298 goto err;
3299 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3300 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3301 goto err;
3302 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3303 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3304 goto err;
3305 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3306 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3307 goto err;
3308 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3309 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3310 goto err;
3311 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3312 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3313 goto err;
3314 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3316 goto err;
3317 }
3318
3319 return 1;
3320 err:
3321 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3322 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3323 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3325 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3326 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3327 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3328 #endif
3329 return 0;
3330 }
3331
tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL * s)3332 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3333 {
3334 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3335 size_t pmslen = 0;
3336
3337 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3338 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3339
3340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3341 /* Check for SRP */
3342 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3343 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3344 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3345 goto err;
3346 }
3347 return 1;
3348 }
3349 #endif
3350
3351 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3353 goto err;
3354 }
3355 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3356 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3357 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3358 pms = NULL;
3359 pmslen = 0;
3360 goto err;
3361 }
3362 pms = NULL;
3363 pmslen = 0;
3364
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3366 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3367 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3368 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3369 size_t labellen;
3370
3371 /*
3372 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3373 * used.
3374 */
3375 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3376 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3377
3378 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3379 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3380 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3381 labellen += 1;
3382
3383 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3384 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3385 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3387 goto err;
3388 }
3389
3390 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3391 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3392 }
3393 #endif
3394
3395 return 1;
3396 err:
3397 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3398 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3399 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3400 return 0;
3401 }
3402
3403 /*
3404 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3405 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3406 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3407 */
ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL * s)3408 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3409 {
3410 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3411 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3412 return 0;
3413 /*
3414 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3415 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3416 */
3417 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3418 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3419 return 0;
3420 return 1;
3421 }
3422
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL * s,WORK_STATE wst)3423 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3424 {
3425 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3426 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3427 int i;
3428
3429 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3430 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3431 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3432 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3433 if (i < 0) {
3434 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3435 return WORK_MORE_A;
3436 }
3437 if (i == 0) {
3438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3439 return WORK_ERROR;
3440 }
3441 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3442 }
3443 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3444 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3445 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3446 }
3447 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3448 }
3449
3450 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3451 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3452 }
3453
3454 /* We need to get a client cert */
3455 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3456 /*
3457 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3458 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3459 */
3460 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3461 if (i < 0) {
3462 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3463 return WORK_MORE_B;
3464 }
3465 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3466 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3467 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3468 i = 0;
3469 } else if (i == 1) {
3470 i = 0;
3471 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3472 }
3473
3474 X509_free(x509);
3475 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3476 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3477 i = 0;
3478 if (i == 0) {
3479 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3480 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3481 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3482 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3483 } else {
3484 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3485 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3487 return WORK_ERROR;
3488 }
3489 }
3490 }
3491
3492 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3493 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3495 }
3496
3497 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3499 return WORK_ERROR;
3500 }
3501
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3502 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3503 {
3504 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3505 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3506 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3507 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3509 return 0;
3510 }
3511 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 return 0;
3514 }
3515 }
3516 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3517 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3518 : s->cert->key)) {
3519 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3520 return 0;
3521 }
3522
3523 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3524 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3525 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3526 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3527 /*
3528 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3529 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3530 */
3531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3532 return 0;
3533 }
3534
3535 return 1;
3536 }
3537
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL * s)3538 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3539 {
3540 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3541 size_t idx;
3542 long alg_k, alg_a;
3543
3544 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3545 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3546
3547 /* we don't have a certificate */
3548 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3549 return 1;
3550
3551 /* This is the passed certificate */
3552 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3553
3554 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3555 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3557 return 0;
3558 }
3559
3560 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3561 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3562 return 1;
3563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3564 return 0;
3565 }
3566
3567 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3569 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3570 return 0;
3571 }
3572
3573 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3575 return 0;
3576 }
3577
3578 return 1;
3579 }
3580
3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3582 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3583 {
3584 size_t len, padding_len;
3585 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3586
3587 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3588 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3589
3590 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3591 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3593 return 0;
3594 }
3595
3596 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3597
3598 return 1;
3599 }
3600 #endif
3601
tls_process_hello_req(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3602 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3603 {
3604 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3605 /* should contain no data */
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3607 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3608 }
3609
3610 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3611 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3612 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3613 }
3614
3615 /*
3616 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3617 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3618 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3619 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3620 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3621 */
3622 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3623 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3624 else
3625 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3626
3627 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3628 }
3629
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)3630 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3631 {
3632 PACKET extensions;
3633 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3634
3635 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3636 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3638 goto err;
3639 }
3640
3641 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3642 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3643 NULL, 1)
3644 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3645 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3647 goto err;
3648 }
3649
3650 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3651 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3652
3653 err:
3654 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3655 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3656 }
3657
ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL * s,X509 ** px509,EVP_PKEY ** ppkey)3658 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3659 {
3660 int i = 0;
3661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3662 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3663 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3664 if (i != 0)
3665 return i;
3666 }
3667 #endif
3668 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3669 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3670 return i;
3671 }
3672
ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL * s,STACK_OF (SSL_CIPHER)* sk,WPACKET * pkt)3673 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3674 {
3675 int i;
3676 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3677 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3678
3679 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3680 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3682 return 0;
3683 }
3684
3685 if (sk == NULL) {
3686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3687 return 0;
3688 }
3689
3690 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3691 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3692 # error Max cipher length too short
3693 # endif
3694 /*
3695 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3696 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3697 * use TLS v1.2
3698 */
3699 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3700 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3701 else
3702 #endif
3703 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3704 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3705
3706 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3707 maxlen -= 2;
3708 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3709 maxlen -= 2;
3710
3711 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3712 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3713
3714 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3715 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3716 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3717 continue;
3718
3719 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3721 return 0;
3722 }
3723
3724 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3725 if (!maxverok) {
3726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3727 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3728 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3729 maxverok = 1;
3730 } else {
3731 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3732 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3733 maxverok = 1;
3734 }
3735 }
3736
3737 totlen += len;
3738 }
3739
3740 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3741 const char *maxvertext =
3742 !maxverok
3743 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3744 : NULL;
3745
3746 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3747 maxvertext);
3748 return 0;
3749 }
3750
3751 if (totlen != 0) {
3752 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3753 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3754 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3755 };
3756 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3758 return 0;
3759 }
3760 }
3761 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3762 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3763 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3764 };
3765 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3767 return 0;
3768 }
3769 }
3770 }
3771
3772 return 1;
3773 }
3774
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt)3775 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3776 {
3777 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3778 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3780 return 0;
3781 }
3782
3783 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3784 return 1;
3785 }
3786