1 /*- 2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 Netflix Inc. 5 * 6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 8 * are met: 9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 14 * 15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 25 * SUCH DAMAGE. 26 */ 27 28 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 29 #include "opt_inet.h" 30 #include "opt_inet6.h" 31 #include "opt_kern_tls.h" 32 #include "opt_ratelimit.h" 33 #include "opt_rss.h" 34 35 #include <sys/param.h> 36 #include <sys/kernel.h> 37 #include <sys/domainset.h> 38 #include <sys/endian.h> 39 #include <sys/ktls.h> 40 #include <sys/lock.h> 41 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 42 #include <sys/mutex.h> 43 #include <sys/rmlock.h> 44 #include <sys/proc.h> 45 #include <sys/protosw.h> 46 #include <sys/refcount.h> 47 #include <sys/smp.h> 48 #include <sys/socket.h> 49 #include <sys/socketvar.h> 50 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 51 #include <sys/taskqueue.h> 52 #include <sys/kthread.h> 53 #include <sys/uio.h> 54 #include <sys/vmmeter.h> 55 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) 56 #include <machine/pcb.h> 57 #endif 58 #include <machine/vmparam.h> 59 #include <net/if.h> 60 #include <net/if_var.h> 61 #ifdef RSS 62 #include <net/netisr.h> 63 #include <net/rss_config.h> 64 #endif 65 #include <net/route.h> 66 #include <net/route/nhop.h> 67 #include <netinet/in.h> 68 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h> 69 #include <netinet/tcp_var.h> 70 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 71 #include <netinet/tcp_offload.h> 72 #endif 73 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 74 #include <opencrypto/ktls.h> 75 #include <vm/vm.h> 76 #include <vm/vm_pageout.h> 77 #include <vm/vm_page.h> 78 #include <vm/vm_pagequeue.h> 79 80 struct ktls_wq { 81 struct mtx mtx; 82 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) m_head; 83 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) so_head; 84 bool running; 85 int lastallocfail; 86 } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE); 87 88 struct ktls_reclaim_thread { 89 uint64_t wakeups; 90 uint64_t reclaims; 91 struct thread *td; 92 int running; 93 }; 94 95 struct ktls_domain_info { 96 int count; 97 int cpu[MAXCPU]; 98 struct ktls_reclaim_thread reclaim_td; 99 }; 100 101 struct ktls_domain_info ktls_domains[MAXMEMDOM]; 102 static struct ktls_wq *ktls_wq; 103 static struct proc *ktls_proc; 104 static uma_zone_t ktls_session_zone; 105 static uma_zone_t ktls_buffer_zone; 106 static uint16_t ktls_cpuid_lookup[MAXCPU]; 107 static int ktls_init_state; 108 static struct sx ktls_init_lock; 109 SX_SYSINIT(ktls_init_lock, &ktls_init_lock, "ktls init"); 110 111 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, tls, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 112 "Kernel TLS offload"); 113 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, stats, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 114 "Kernel TLS offload stats"); 115 116 #ifdef RSS 117 static int ktls_bind_threads = 1; 118 #else 119 static int ktls_bind_threads; 120 #endif 121 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, bind_threads, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, 122 &ktls_bind_threads, 0, 123 "Bind crypto threads to cores (1) or cores and domains (2) at boot"); 124 125 static u_int ktls_maxlen = 16384; 126 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, maxlen, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, 127 &ktls_maxlen, 0, "Maximum TLS record size"); 128 129 static int ktls_number_threads; 130 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RD, 131 &ktls_number_threads, 0, 132 "Number of TLS threads in thread-pool"); 133 134 unsigned int ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct = 2; 135 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 136 &ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, 2, 137 "Max percent bytes retransmitted before ifnet TLS is disabled"); 138 139 static bool ktls_offload_enable = true; 140 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 141 &ktls_offload_enable, 0, 142 "Enable support for kernel TLS offload"); 143 144 static bool ktls_cbc_enable = true; 145 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, cbc_enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 146 &ktls_cbc_enable, 1, 147 "Enable support of AES-CBC crypto for kernel TLS"); 148 149 static bool ktls_sw_buffer_cache = true; 150 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw_buffer_cache, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, 151 &ktls_sw_buffer_cache, 1, 152 "Enable caching of output buffers for SW encryption"); 153 154 static int ktls_max_reclaim = 1024; 155 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, max_reclaim, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 156 &ktls_max_reclaim, 128, 157 "Max number of 16k buffers to reclaim in thread context"); 158 159 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_tasks_active); 160 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, tasks_active, CTLFLAG_RD, 161 &ktls_tasks_active, "Number of active tasks"); 162 163 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_pending); 164 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_pending, CTLFLAG_RD, 165 &ktls_cnt_tx_pending, 166 "Number of TLS 1.0 records waiting for earlier TLS records"); 167 168 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_queued); 169 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD, 170 &ktls_cnt_tx_queued, 171 "Number of TLS records in queue to tasks for SW encryption"); 172 173 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_rx_queued); 174 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_rx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD, 175 &ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 176 "Number of TLS sockets in queue to tasks for SW decryption"); 177 178 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_total); 179 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, offload_total, 180 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_total, 181 "Total successful TLS setups (parameters set)"); 182 183 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_enable_calls); 184 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, enable_calls, 185 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_enable_calls, 186 "Total number of TLS enable calls made"); 187 188 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_active); 189 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, active, CTLFLAG_RD, 190 &ktls_offload_active, "Total Active TLS sessions"); 191 192 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_corrupted_records); 193 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, corrupted_records, CTLFLAG_RD, 194 &ktls_offload_corrupted_records, "Total corrupted TLS records received"); 195 196 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_failed_crypto); 197 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, failed_crypto, CTLFLAG_RD, 198 &ktls_offload_failed_crypto, "Total TLS crypto failures"); 199 200 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_ifnet); 201 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD, 202 &ktls_switch_to_ifnet, "TLS sessions switched from SW to ifnet"); 203 204 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_sw); 205 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_sw, CTLFLAG_RD, 206 &ktls_switch_to_sw, "TLS sessions switched from ifnet to SW"); 207 208 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_failed); 209 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_failed, CTLFLAG_RD, 210 &ktls_switch_failed, "TLS sessions unable to switch between SW and ifnet"); 211 212 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail); 213 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_failed, CTLFLAG_RD, 214 &ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, "TLS sessions unable to switch to SW from ifnet"); 215 216 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok); 217 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_ok, CTLFLAG_RD, 218 &ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, "TLS sessions able to switch to SW from ifnet"); 219 220 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_destroy_task); 221 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, destroy_task, CTLFLAG_RD, 222 &ktls_destroy_task, 223 "Number of times ktls session was destroyed via taskqueue"); 224 225 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 226 "Software TLS session stats"); 227 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 228 "Hardware (ifnet) TLS session stats"); 229 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 230 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, toe, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 231 "TOE TLS session stats"); 232 #endif 233 234 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_cbc); 235 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_cbc, 236 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-CBC"); 237 238 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_gcm); 239 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_gcm, 240 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-GCM"); 241 242 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_chacha20); 243 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD, 244 &ktls_sw_chacha20, 245 "Active number of software TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305"); 246 247 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_cbc); 248 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, 249 &ktls_ifnet_cbc, 250 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-CBC"); 251 252 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_gcm); 253 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, 254 &ktls_ifnet_gcm, 255 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-GCM"); 256 257 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_chacha20); 258 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD, 259 &ktls_ifnet_chacha20, 260 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305"); 261 262 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset); 263 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset, CTLFLAG_RD, 264 &ktls_ifnet_reset, "TLS sessions updated to a new ifnet send tag"); 265 266 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped); 267 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_dropped, CTLFLAG_RD, 268 &ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 269 "TLS sessions dropped after failing to update ifnet send tag"); 270 271 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed); 272 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_failed, CTLFLAG_RD, 273 &ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 274 "TLS sessions that failed to allocate a new ifnet send tag"); 275 276 static int ktls_ifnet_permitted = 1; 277 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, permitted, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 278 &ktls_ifnet_permitted, 1, 279 "Whether to permit hardware (ifnet) TLS sessions"); 280 281 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 282 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_cbc); 283 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, 284 &ktls_toe_cbc, 285 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-CBC"); 286 287 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_gcm); 288 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, 289 &ktls_toe_gcm, 290 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-GCM"); 291 292 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_chacha20); 293 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD, 294 &ktls_toe_chacha20, 295 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305"); 296 #endif 297 298 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS, "ktls", "Kernel TLS"); 299 300 static void ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx); 301 static void ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending); 302 static void ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending); 303 static void ktls_work_thread(void *ctx); 304 305 int 306 ktls_copyin_tls_enable(struct sockopt *sopt, struct tls_enable *tls) 307 { 308 struct tls_enable_v0 tls_v0; 309 int error; 310 uint8_t *cipher_key = NULL, *iv = NULL, *auth_key = NULL; 311 312 if (sopt->sopt_valsize == sizeof(tls_v0)) { 313 error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &tls_v0, sizeof(tls_v0), sizeof(tls_v0)); 314 if (error != 0) 315 goto done; 316 memset(tls, 0, sizeof(*tls)); 317 tls->cipher_key = tls_v0.cipher_key; 318 tls->iv = tls_v0.iv; 319 tls->auth_key = tls_v0.auth_key; 320 tls->cipher_algorithm = tls_v0.cipher_algorithm; 321 tls->cipher_key_len = tls_v0.cipher_key_len; 322 tls->iv_len = tls_v0.iv_len; 323 tls->auth_algorithm = tls_v0.auth_algorithm; 324 tls->auth_key_len = tls_v0.auth_key_len; 325 tls->flags = tls_v0.flags; 326 tls->tls_vmajor = tls_v0.tls_vmajor; 327 tls->tls_vminor = tls_v0.tls_vminor; 328 } else 329 error = sooptcopyin(sopt, tls, sizeof(*tls), sizeof(*tls)); 330 331 if (error != 0) 332 return (error); 333 334 if (tls->cipher_key_len < 0 || tls->cipher_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE) 335 return (EINVAL); 336 if (tls->iv_len < 0 || tls->iv_len > sizeof(((struct ktls_session *)NULL)->params.iv)) 337 return (EINVAL); 338 if (tls->auth_key_len < 0 || tls->auth_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE) 339 return (EINVAL); 340 341 /* All supported algorithms require a cipher key. */ 342 if (tls->cipher_key_len == 0) 343 return (EINVAL); 344 345 /* 346 * Now do a deep copy of the variable-length arrays in the struct, so that 347 * subsequent consumers of it can reliably assume kernel memory. This 348 * requires doing our own allocations, which we will free in the 349 * error paths so that our caller need only worry about outstanding 350 * allocations existing on successful return. 351 */ 352 if (tls->cipher_key_len != 0) { 353 cipher_key = malloc(tls->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 354 if (sopt->sopt_td != NULL) { 355 error = copyin(tls->cipher_key, cipher_key, tls->cipher_key_len); 356 if (error != 0) 357 goto done; 358 } else { 359 bcopy(tls->cipher_key, cipher_key, tls->cipher_key_len); 360 } 361 } 362 if (tls->iv_len != 0) { 363 iv = malloc(tls->iv_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 364 if (sopt->sopt_td != NULL) { 365 error = copyin(tls->iv, iv, tls->iv_len); 366 if (error != 0) 367 goto done; 368 } else { 369 bcopy(tls->iv, iv, tls->iv_len); 370 } 371 } 372 if (tls->auth_key_len != 0) { 373 auth_key = malloc(tls->auth_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 374 if (sopt->sopt_td != NULL) { 375 error = copyin(tls->auth_key, auth_key, tls->auth_key_len); 376 if (error != 0) 377 goto done; 378 } else { 379 bcopy(tls->auth_key, auth_key, tls->auth_key_len); 380 } 381 } 382 tls->cipher_key = cipher_key; 383 tls->iv = iv; 384 tls->auth_key = auth_key; 385 386 done: 387 if (error != 0) { 388 zfree(cipher_key, M_KTLS); 389 zfree(iv, M_KTLS); 390 zfree(auth_key, M_KTLS); 391 } 392 393 return (error); 394 } 395 396 void 397 ktls_cleanup_tls_enable(struct tls_enable *tls) 398 { 399 zfree(__DECONST(void *, tls->cipher_key), M_KTLS); 400 zfree(__DECONST(void *, tls->iv), M_KTLS); 401 zfree(__DECONST(void *, tls->auth_key), M_KTLS); 402 } 403 404 static u_int 405 ktls_get_cpu(struct socket *so) 406 { 407 struct inpcb *inp; 408 #ifdef NUMA 409 struct ktls_domain_info *di; 410 #endif 411 u_int cpuid; 412 413 inp = sotoinpcb(so); 414 #ifdef RSS 415 cpuid = rss_hash2cpuid(inp->inp_flowid, inp->inp_flowtype); 416 if (cpuid != NETISR_CPUID_NONE) 417 return (cpuid); 418 #endif 419 /* 420 * Just use the flowid to shard connections in a repeatable 421 * fashion. Note that TLS 1.0 sessions rely on the 422 * serialization provided by having the same connection use 423 * the same queue. 424 */ 425 #ifdef NUMA 426 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1 && inp->inp_numa_domain != M_NODOM) { 427 di = &ktls_domains[inp->inp_numa_domain]; 428 cpuid = di->cpu[inp->inp_flowid % di->count]; 429 } else 430 #endif 431 cpuid = ktls_cpuid_lookup[inp->inp_flowid % ktls_number_threads]; 432 return (cpuid); 433 } 434 435 static int 436 ktls_buffer_import(void *arg, void **store, int count, int domain, int flags) 437 { 438 vm_page_t m; 439 int i, req; 440 441 KASSERT((ktls_maxlen & PAGE_MASK) == 0, 442 ("%s: ktls max length %d is not page size-aligned", 443 __func__, ktls_maxlen)); 444 445 req = VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | malloc2vm_flags(flags); 446 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 447 m = vm_page_alloc_noobj_contig_domain(domain, req, 448 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 449 VM_MEMATTR_DEFAULT); 450 if (m == NULL) 451 break; 452 store[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_DMAP(m); 453 } 454 return (i); 455 } 456 457 static void 458 ktls_buffer_release(void *arg __unused, void **store, int count) 459 { 460 vm_page_t m; 461 int i, j; 462 463 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 464 m = DMAP_TO_VM_PAGE(store[i]); 465 for (j = 0; j < atop(ktls_maxlen); j++) { 466 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(m + j); 467 vm_page_free(m + j); 468 } 469 } 470 } 471 472 static void 473 ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf *m) 474 { 475 M_ASSERTEXTPG(m); 476 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[0])); 477 } 478 479 static int 480 ktls_init(void) 481 { 482 struct thread *td; 483 struct pcpu *pc; 484 int count, domain, error, i; 485 486 ktls_wq = malloc(sizeof(*ktls_wq) * (mp_maxid + 1), M_KTLS, 487 M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 488 489 ktls_session_zone = uma_zcreate("ktls_session", 490 sizeof(struct ktls_session), 491 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 492 UMA_ALIGN_CACHE, 0); 493 494 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) { 495 ktls_buffer_zone = uma_zcache_create("ktls_buffers", 496 roundup2(ktls_maxlen, PAGE_SIZE), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 497 ktls_buffer_import, ktls_buffer_release, NULL, 498 UMA_ZONE_FIRSTTOUCH | UMA_ZONE_NOTRIM); 499 } 500 501 /* 502 * Initialize the workqueues to run the TLS work. We create a 503 * work queue for each CPU. 504 */ 505 CPU_FOREACH(i) { 506 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].m_head); 507 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].so_head); 508 mtx_init(&ktls_wq[i].mtx, "ktls work queue", NULL, MTX_DEF); 509 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) { 510 pc = pcpu_find(i); 511 domain = pc->pc_domain; 512 count = ktls_domains[domain].count; 513 ktls_domains[domain].cpu[count] = i; 514 ktls_domains[domain].count++; 515 } 516 ktls_cpuid_lookup[ktls_number_threads] = i; 517 ktls_number_threads++; 518 } 519 520 /* 521 * If we somehow have an empty domain, fall back to choosing 522 * among all KTLS threads. 523 */ 524 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) { 525 for (i = 0; i < vm_ndomains; i++) { 526 if (ktls_domains[i].count == 0) { 527 ktls_bind_threads = 1; 528 break; 529 } 530 } 531 } 532 533 /* Start kthreads for each workqueue. */ 534 CPU_FOREACH(i) { 535 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_work_thread, &ktls_wq[i], 536 &ktls_proc, &td, 0, 0, "KTLS", "thr_%d", i); 537 if (error) { 538 printf("Can't add KTLS thread %d error %d\n", i, error); 539 return (error); 540 } 541 } 542 543 /* 544 * Start an allocation thread per-domain to perform blocking allocations 545 * of 16k physically contiguous TLS crypto destination buffers. 546 */ 547 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) { 548 for (domain = 0; domain < vm_ndomains; domain++) { 549 if (VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain)) 550 continue; 551 if (CPU_EMPTY(&cpuset_domain[domain])) 552 continue; 553 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_reclaim_thread, 554 &ktls_domains[domain], &ktls_proc, 555 &ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.td, 556 0, 0, "KTLS", "reclaim_%d", domain); 557 if (error) { 558 printf("Can't add KTLS reclaim thread %d error %d\n", 559 domain, error); 560 return (error); 561 } 562 } 563 } 564 565 if (bootverbose) 566 printf("KTLS: Initialized %d threads\n", ktls_number_threads); 567 return (0); 568 } 569 570 static int 571 ktls_start_kthreads(void) 572 { 573 int error, state; 574 575 start: 576 state = atomic_load_acq_int(&ktls_init_state); 577 if (__predict_true(state > 0)) 578 return (0); 579 if (state < 0) 580 return (ENXIO); 581 582 sx_xlock(&ktls_init_lock); 583 if (ktls_init_state != 0) { 584 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock); 585 goto start; 586 } 587 588 error = ktls_init(); 589 if (error == 0) 590 state = 1; 591 else 592 state = -1; 593 atomic_store_rel_int(&ktls_init_state, state); 594 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock); 595 return (error); 596 } 597 598 static int 599 ktls_create_session(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en, 600 struct ktls_session **tlsp, int direction) 601 { 602 struct ktls_session *tls; 603 int error; 604 605 /* Only TLS 1.0 - 1.3 are supported. */ 606 if (en->tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) 607 return (EINVAL); 608 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO || 609 en->tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 610 return (EINVAL); 611 612 613 /* No flags are currently supported. */ 614 if (en->flags != 0) 615 return (EINVAL); 616 617 /* Common checks for supported algorithms. */ 618 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) { 619 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 620 /* 621 * auth_algorithm isn't used, but permit GMAC values 622 * for compatibility. 623 */ 624 switch (en->auth_algorithm) { 625 case 0: 626 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12 627 /* XXX: Really 13.0-current COMPAT. */ 628 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC: 629 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC: 630 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC: 631 #endif 632 break; 633 default: 634 return (EINVAL); 635 } 636 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) 637 return (EINVAL); 638 switch (en->tls_vminor) { 639 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO: 640 if (en->iv_len != TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN) 641 return (EINVAL); 642 break; 643 case TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE: 644 if (en->iv_len != TLS_1_3_GCM_IV_LEN) 645 return (EINVAL); 646 break; 647 default: 648 return (EINVAL); 649 } 650 break; 651 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 652 switch (en->auth_algorithm) { 653 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: 654 break; 655 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: 656 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: 657 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) 658 return (EINVAL); 659 break; 660 default: 661 return (EINVAL); 662 } 663 if (en->auth_key_len == 0) 664 return (EINVAL); 665 666 /* 667 * TLS 1.0 requires an implicit IV. TLS 1.1 and 1.2 668 * use explicit IVs. 669 */ 670 switch (en->tls_vminor) { 671 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO: 672 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CBC_IMPLICIT_IV_LEN) 673 return (EINVAL); 674 break; 675 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE: 676 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO: 677 /* Ignore any supplied IV. */ 678 en->iv_len = 0; 679 break; 680 default: 681 return (EINVAL); 682 } 683 break; 684 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 685 if (en->auth_algorithm != 0 || en->auth_key_len != 0) 686 return (EINVAL); 687 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO && 688 en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 689 return (EINVAL); 690 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN) 691 return (EINVAL); 692 break; 693 default: 694 return (EINVAL); 695 } 696 697 error = ktls_start_kthreads(); 698 if (error != 0) 699 return (error); 700 701 tls = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 702 703 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1); 704 705 refcount_init(&tls->refcount, 1); 706 if (direction == KTLS_RX) { 707 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag, tls); 708 } else { 709 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, tls); 710 tls->inp = so->so_pcb; 711 in_pcbref(tls->inp); 712 tls->tx = true; 713 } 714 715 tls->wq_index = ktls_get_cpu(so); 716 717 tls->params.cipher_algorithm = en->cipher_algorithm; 718 tls->params.auth_algorithm = en->auth_algorithm; 719 tls->params.tls_vmajor = en->tls_vmajor; 720 tls->params.tls_vminor = en->tls_vminor; 721 tls->params.flags = en->flags; 722 tls->params.max_frame_len = min(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2, ktls_maxlen); 723 724 /* Set the header and trailer lengths. */ 725 tls->params.tls_hlen = sizeof(struct tls_record_layer); 726 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) { 727 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 728 /* 729 * TLS 1.2 uses a 4 byte implicit IV with an explicit 8 byte 730 * nonce. TLS 1.3 uses a 12 byte implicit IV. 731 */ 732 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 733 tls->params.tls_hlen += sizeof(uint64_t); 734 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN; 735 tls->params.tls_bs = 1; 736 break; 737 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 738 switch (en->auth_algorithm) { 739 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: 740 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) { 741 /* Implicit IV, no nonce. */ 742 tls->sequential_records = true; 743 tls->next_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq); 744 STAILQ_INIT(&tls->pending_records); 745 } else { 746 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN; 747 } 748 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN + 749 SHA1_HASH_LEN; 750 break; 751 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: 752 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN; 753 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN + 754 SHA2_256_HASH_LEN; 755 break; 756 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: 757 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN; 758 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN + 759 SHA2_384_HASH_LEN; 760 break; 761 default: 762 panic("invalid hmac"); 763 } 764 tls->params.tls_bs = AES_BLOCK_LEN; 765 break; 766 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 767 /* 768 * Chacha20 uses a 12 byte implicit IV. 769 */ 770 tls->params.tls_tlen = POLY1305_HASH_LEN; 771 tls->params.tls_bs = 1; 772 break; 773 default: 774 panic("invalid cipher"); 775 } 776 777 /* 778 * TLS 1.3 includes optional padding which we do not support, 779 * and also puts the "real" record type at the end of the 780 * encrypted data. 781 */ 782 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 783 tls->params.tls_tlen += sizeof(uint8_t); 784 785 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_hlen <= MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN, 786 ("TLS header length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_hlen)); 787 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_tlen <= MBUF_PEXT_TRAIL_LEN, 788 ("TLS trailer length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_tlen)); 789 790 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) { 791 tls->params.auth_key_len = en->auth_key_len; 792 tls->params.auth_key = malloc(en->auth_key_len, M_KTLS, 793 M_WAITOK); 794 bcopy(en->auth_key, tls->params.auth_key, en->auth_key_len); 795 } 796 797 tls->params.cipher_key_len = en->cipher_key_len; 798 tls->params.cipher_key = malloc(en->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 799 bcopy(en->cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key, en->cipher_key_len); 800 801 /* 802 * This holds the implicit portion of the nonce for AEAD 803 * ciphers and the initial implicit IV for TLS 1.0. The 804 * explicit portions of the IV are generated in ktls_frame(). 805 */ 806 if (en->iv_len != 0) { 807 tls->params.iv_len = en->iv_len; 808 bcopy(en->iv, tls->params.iv, en->iv_len); 809 810 /* 811 * For TLS 1.2 with GCM, generate an 8-byte nonce as a 812 * counter to generate unique explicit IVs. 813 * 814 * Store this counter in the last 8 bytes of the IV 815 * array so that it is 8-byte aligned. 816 */ 817 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 && 818 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) 819 arc4rand(tls->params.iv + 8, sizeof(uint64_t), 0); 820 } 821 822 tls->gen = 0; 823 *tlsp = tls; 824 return (0); 825 } 826 827 static struct ktls_session * 828 ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction) 829 { 830 struct ktls_session *tls_new; 831 832 tls_new = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 833 834 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1); 835 836 refcount_init(&tls_new->refcount, 1); 837 if (direction == KTLS_RX) { 838 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag, 839 tls_new); 840 } else { 841 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, 842 tls_new); 843 tls_new->inp = tls->inp; 844 tls_new->tx = true; 845 in_pcbref(tls_new->inp); 846 } 847 848 /* Copy fields from existing session. */ 849 tls_new->params = tls->params; 850 tls_new->wq_index = tls->wq_index; 851 852 /* Deep copy keys. */ 853 if (tls_new->params.auth_key != NULL) { 854 tls_new->params.auth_key = malloc(tls->params.auth_key_len, 855 M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 856 memcpy(tls_new->params.auth_key, tls->params.auth_key, 857 tls->params.auth_key_len); 858 } 859 860 tls_new->params.cipher_key = malloc(tls->params.cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, 861 M_WAITOK); 862 memcpy(tls_new->params.cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key, 863 tls->params.cipher_key_len); 864 865 tls_new->gen = 0; 866 return (tls_new); 867 } 868 869 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 870 static int 871 ktls_try_toe(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction) 872 { 873 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so); 874 struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp); 875 int error; 876 877 INP_WLOCK(inp); 878 if (tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 879 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 880 return (ECONNRESET); 881 } 882 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)) { 883 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 884 return (EOPNOTSUPP); 885 } 886 887 error = tcp_offload_alloc_tls_session(tp, tls, direction); 888 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 889 if (error == 0) { 890 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE; 891 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 892 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 893 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, 1); 894 break; 895 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 896 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, 1); 897 break; 898 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 899 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, 1); 900 break; 901 } 902 } 903 return (error); 904 } 905 #endif 906 907 /* 908 * Common code used when first enabling ifnet TLS on a connection or 909 * when allocating a new ifnet TLS session due to a routing change. 910 * This function allocates a new TLS send tag on whatever interface 911 * the connection is currently routed over. 912 */ 913 static int 914 ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force, 915 struct m_snd_tag **mstp) 916 { 917 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params; 918 struct ifnet *ifp; 919 struct nhop_object *nh; 920 struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp); 921 int error; 922 923 INP_RLOCK(inp); 924 if (tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 925 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 926 return (ECONNRESET); 927 } 928 929 /* 930 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if 931 * ifnet TLS should be denied. 932 * 933 * - Always permit 'force' requests. 934 * - ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0: always deny. 935 */ 936 if (!force && ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) { 937 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 938 return (ENXIO); 939 } 940 941 /* 942 * XXX: Use the cached route in the inpcb to find the 943 * interface. This should perhaps instead use 944 * rtalloc1_fib(dst, 0, 0, fibnum). Since KTLS is only 945 * enabled after a connection has completed key negotiation in 946 * userland, the cached route will be present in practice. 947 */ 948 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh; 949 if (nh == NULL) { 950 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 951 return (ENXIO); 952 } 953 ifp = nh->nh_ifp; 954 if_ref(ifp); 955 956 /* 957 * Allocate a TLS + ratelimit tag if the connection has an 958 * existing pacing rate. 959 */ 960 if (tp->t_pacing_rate != -1 && 961 (if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS_RTLMT) != 0) { 962 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT; 963 params.tls_rate_limit.inp = inp; 964 params.tls_rate_limit.tls = tls; 965 params.tls_rate_limit.max_rate = tp->t_pacing_rate; 966 } else { 967 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS; 968 params.tls.inp = inp; 969 params.tls.tls = tls; 970 } 971 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid; 972 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype; 973 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain; 974 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 975 976 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_MEXTPG) == 0) { 977 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 978 goto out; 979 } 980 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) { 981 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS6) == 0) { 982 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 983 goto out; 984 } 985 } else { 986 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS4) == 0) { 987 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 988 goto out; 989 } 990 } 991 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp); 992 out: 993 if_rele(ifp); 994 return (error); 995 } 996 997 /* 998 * Allocate an initial TLS receive tag for doing HW decryption of TLS 999 * data. 1000 * 1001 * This function allocates a new TLS receive tag on whatever interface 1002 * the connection is currently routed over. If the connection ends up 1003 * using a different interface for receive this will get fixed up via 1004 * ktls_input_ifp_mismatch as future packets arrive. 1005 */ 1006 static int 1007 ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, 1008 struct m_snd_tag **mstp) 1009 { 1010 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params; 1011 struct ifnet *ifp; 1012 struct nhop_object *nh; 1013 int error; 1014 1015 if (!ktls_ocf_recrypt_supported(tls)) 1016 return (ENXIO); 1017 1018 INP_RLOCK(inp); 1019 if (intotcpcb(inp)->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 1020 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1021 return (ECONNRESET); 1022 } 1023 1024 /* 1025 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if 1026 * ifnet TLS should be denied. 1027 */ 1028 if (ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) { 1029 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1030 return (ENXIO); 1031 } 1032 1033 /* 1034 * XXX: As with ktls_alloc_snd_tag, use the cached route in 1035 * the inpcb to find the interface. 1036 */ 1037 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh; 1038 if (nh == NULL) { 1039 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1040 return (ENXIO); 1041 } 1042 ifp = nh->nh_ifp; 1043 if_ref(ifp); 1044 tls->rx_ifp = ifp; 1045 1046 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX; 1047 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid; 1048 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype; 1049 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain; 1050 params.tls_rx.inp = inp; 1051 params.tls_rx.tls = tls; 1052 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = 0; 1053 1054 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1055 1056 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) { 1057 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS6)) == 0) { 1058 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 1059 goto out; 1060 } 1061 } else { 1062 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS4)) == 0) { 1063 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 1064 goto out; 1065 } 1066 } 1067 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp); 1068 1069 /* 1070 * If this connection is over a vlan, vlan_snd_tag_alloc 1071 * rewrites vlan_id with the saved interface. Save the VLAN 1072 * ID for use in ktls_reset_receive_tag which allocates new 1073 * receive tags directly from the leaf interface bypassing 1074 * if_vlan. 1075 */ 1076 if (error == 0) 1077 tls->rx_vlan_id = params.tls_rx.vlan_id; 1078 out: 1079 return (error); 1080 } 1081 1082 static int 1083 ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction, 1084 bool force) 1085 { 1086 struct m_snd_tag *mst; 1087 int error; 1088 1089 switch (direction) { 1090 case KTLS_TX: 1091 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, force, &mst); 1092 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) 1093 goto done; 1094 break; 1095 case KTLS_RX: 1096 KASSERT(!force, ("%s: forced receive tag", __func__)); 1097 error = ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, &mst); 1098 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) 1099 goto done; 1100 break; 1101 default: 1102 __assert_unreachable(); 1103 } 1104 1105 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET; 1106 tls->snd_tag = mst; 1107 1108 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 1109 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 1110 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, 1); 1111 break; 1112 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 1113 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, 1); 1114 break; 1115 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 1116 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, 1); 1117 break; 1118 default: 1119 break; 1120 } 1121 done: 1122 return (error); 1123 } 1124 1125 static void 1126 ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session *tls) 1127 { 1128 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_SW; 1129 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 1130 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 1131 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, 1); 1132 break; 1133 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 1134 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, 1); 1135 break; 1136 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 1137 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, 1); 1138 break; 1139 } 1140 } 1141 1142 static int 1143 ktls_try_sw(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction) 1144 { 1145 int error; 1146 1147 error = ktls_ocf_try(tls, direction); 1148 if (error) 1149 return (error); 1150 ktls_use_sw(tls); 1151 return (0); 1152 } 1153 1154 /* 1155 * KTLS RX stores data in the socket buffer as a list of TLS records, 1156 * where each record is stored as a control message containg the TLS 1157 * header followed by data mbufs containing the decrypted data. This 1158 * is different from KTLS TX which always uses an mb_ext_pgs mbuf for 1159 * both encrypted and decrypted data. TLS records decrypted by a NIC 1160 * should be queued to the socket buffer as records, but encrypted 1161 * data which needs to be decrypted by software arrives as a stream of 1162 * regular mbufs which need to be converted. In addition, there may 1163 * already be pending encrypted data in the socket buffer when KTLS RX 1164 * is enabled. 1165 * 1166 * To manage not-yet-decrypted data for KTLS RX, the following scheme 1167 * is used: 1168 * 1169 * - A single chain of NOTREADY mbufs is hung off of sb_mtls. 1170 * 1171 * - ktls_check_rx checks this chain of mbufs reading the TLS header 1172 * from the first mbuf. Once all of the data for that TLS record is 1173 * queued, the socket is queued to a worker thread. 1174 * 1175 * - The worker thread calls ktls_decrypt to decrypt TLS records in 1176 * the TLS chain. Each TLS record is detached from the TLS chain, 1177 * decrypted, and inserted into the regular socket buffer chain as 1178 * record starting with a control message holding the TLS header and 1179 * a chain of mbufs holding the encrypted data. 1180 */ 1181 1182 static void 1183 sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf *sb) 1184 { 1185 struct mbuf *m; 1186 1187 m = sb->sb_mb; 1188 sb->sb_mtls = m; 1189 sb->sb_mb = NULL; 1190 sb->sb_mbtail = NULL; 1191 sb->sb_lastrecord = NULL; 1192 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) { 1193 KASSERT(m->m_nextpkt == NULL, ("%s: m_nextpkt != NULL", 1194 __func__)); 1195 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_NOTREADY) == 0, ("%s: mbuf not ready", 1196 __func__)); 1197 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc >= m->m_len, ("%s: sb_acc < m->m_len", 1198 __func__)); 1199 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY; 1200 sb->sb_acc -= m->m_len; 1201 sb->sb_tlscc += m->m_len; 1202 sb->sb_mtlstail = m; 1203 } 1204 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc == 0 && sb->sb_tlscc == sb->sb_ccc, 1205 ("%s: acc %u tlscc %u ccc %u", __func__, sb->sb_acc, sb->sb_tlscc, 1206 sb->sb_ccc)); 1207 } 1208 1209 /* 1210 * Return information about the pending TLS data in a socket 1211 * buffer. On return, 'seqno' is set to the sequence number 1212 * of the next TLS record to be received, 'resid' is set to 1213 * the amount of bytes still needed for the last pending 1214 * record. The function returns 'false' if the last pending 1215 * record contains a partial TLS header. In that case, 'resid' 1216 * is the number of bytes needed to complete the TLS header. 1217 */ 1218 bool 1219 ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf *sb, uint64_t *seqnop, size_t *residp) 1220 { 1221 struct tls_record_layer hdr; 1222 struct mbuf *m; 1223 uint64_t seqno; 1224 size_t resid; 1225 u_int offset, record_len; 1226 1227 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb); 1228 MPASS(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX); 1229 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno; 1230 resid = sb->sb_tlscc; 1231 m = sb->sb_mtls; 1232 offset = 0; 1233 1234 if (resid == 0) { 1235 *seqnop = seqno; 1236 *residp = 0; 1237 return (true); 1238 } 1239 1240 for (;;) { 1241 seqno++; 1242 1243 if (resid < sizeof(hdr)) { 1244 *seqnop = seqno; 1245 *residp = sizeof(hdr) - resid; 1246 return (false); 1247 } 1248 1249 m_copydata(m, offset, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr); 1250 1251 record_len = sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length); 1252 if (resid <= record_len) { 1253 *seqnop = seqno; 1254 *residp = record_len - resid; 1255 return (true); 1256 } 1257 resid -= record_len; 1258 1259 while (record_len != 0) { 1260 if (m->m_len - offset > record_len) { 1261 offset += record_len; 1262 break; 1263 } 1264 1265 record_len -= (m->m_len - offset); 1266 offset = 0; 1267 m = m->m_next; 1268 } 1269 } 1270 } 1271 1272 int 1273 ktls_enable_rx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en) 1274 { 1275 struct ktls_session *tls; 1276 int error; 1277 1278 if (!ktls_offload_enable) 1279 return (ENOTSUP); 1280 1281 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1); 1282 1283 /* 1284 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option 1285 * invokes this function. 1286 */ 1287 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP) 1288 return (EINVAL); 1289 1290 /* 1291 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit 1292 * this to support rekeying in the future. 1293 */ 1294 if (so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL) 1295 return (EALREADY); 1296 1297 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable) 1298 return (ENOTSUP); 1299 1300 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_RX); 1301 if (error) 1302 return (error); 1303 1304 error = ktls_ocf_try(tls, KTLS_RX); 1305 if (error) { 1306 ktls_free(tls); 1307 return (error); 1308 } 1309 1310 /* 1311 * Serialize with soreceive_generic() and make sure that we're not 1312 * operating on a listening socket. 1313 */ 1314 error = SOCK_IO_RECV_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT); 1315 if (error) { 1316 ktls_free(tls); 1317 return (error); 1318 } 1319 1320 /* Mark the socket as using TLS offload. */ 1321 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so); 1322 if (__predict_false(so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL)) 1323 error = EALREADY; 1324 else if ((so->so_rcv.sb_flags & SB_SPLICED) != 0) 1325 error = EINVAL; 1326 if (error != 0) { 1327 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so); 1328 SOCK_IO_RECV_UNLOCK(so); 1329 ktls_free(tls); 1330 return (EALREADY); 1331 } 1332 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq); 1333 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info = tls; 1334 so->so_rcv.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX; 1335 1336 /* Mark existing data as not ready until it can be decrypted. */ 1337 sb_mark_notready(&so->so_rcv); 1338 ktls_check_rx(&so->so_rcv); 1339 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so); 1340 SOCK_IO_RECV_UNLOCK(so); 1341 1342 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */ 1343 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 1344 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_RX); 1345 if (error) 1346 #endif 1347 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_RX, false); 1348 if (error) 1349 ktls_use_sw(tls); 1350 1351 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1); 1352 1353 return (0); 1354 } 1355 1356 int 1357 ktls_enable_tx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en) 1358 { 1359 struct ktls_session *tls; 1360 struct inpcb *inp; 1361 struct tcpcb *tp; 1362 int error; 1363 1364 if (!ktls_offload_enable) 1365 return (ENOTSUP); 1366 1367 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1); 1368 1369 /* 1370 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option 1371 * invokes this function. 1372 */ 1373 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP) 1374 return (EINVAL); 1375 1376 /* 1377 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit 1378 * this to support rekeying in the future. 1379 */ 1380 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL) 1381 return (EALREADY); 1382 1383 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable) 1384 return (ENOTSUP); 1385 1386 /* TLS requires ext pgs */ 1387 if (mb_use_ext_pgs == 0) 1388 return (ENXIO); 1389 1390 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_TX); 1391 if (error) 1392 return (error); 1393 1394 /* some ktls offload NICs require initial seqno to start offload */ 1395 tls->initial_offload_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq); 1396 1397 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */ 1398 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 1399 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_TX); 1400 if (error) 1401 #endif 1402 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_TX, false); 1403 if (error) 1404 error = ktls_try_sw(tls, KTLS_TX); 1405 1406 if (error) { 1407 ktls_free(tls); 1408 return (error); 1409 } 1410 1411 /* 1412 * Serialize with sosend_generic() and make sure that we're not 1413 * operating on a listening socket. 1414 */ 1415 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT); 1416 if (error) { 1417 ktls_free(tls); 1418 return (error); 1419 } 1420 1421 /* 1422 * Write lock the INP when setting sb_tls_info so that 1423 * routines in tcp_ratelimit.c can read sb_tls_info while 1424 * holding the INP lock. 1425 */ 1426 inp = so->so_pcb; 1427 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1428 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so); 1429 if (__predict_false(so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)) 1430 error = EALREADY; 1431 else if ((so->so_snd.sb_flags & SB_SPLICED) != 0) 1432 error = EINVAL; 1433 if (error != 0) { 1434 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so); 1435 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1436 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so); 1437 ktls_free(tls); 1438 return (error); 1439 } 1440 so->so_snd.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq); 1441 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls; 1442 if (tls->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) { 1443 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 1444 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0); 1445 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1; 1446 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL) 1447 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1); 1448 } 1449 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so); 1450 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1451 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so); 1452 1453 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1); 1454 1455 return (0); 1456 } 1457 1458 int 1459 ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep) 1460 { 1461 struct ktls_session *tls; 1462 struct inpcb *inp __diagused; 1463 1464 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1465 return (EINVAL); 1466 inp = so->so_pcb; 1467 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1468 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so); 1469 tls = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info; 1470 if (tls == NULL) 1471 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE; 1472 else 1473 *modep = tls->mode; 1474 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so); 1475 return (0); 1476 } 1477 1478 /* 1479 * ktls_get_rx_sequence - get the next TCP- and TLS- sequence number. 1480 * 1481 * This function gets information about the next TCP- and TLS- 1482 * sequence number to be processed by the TLS receive worker 1483 * thread. The information is extracted from the given "inpcb" 1484 * structure. The values are stored in host endian format at the two 1485 * given output pointer locations. The TCP sequence number points to 1486 * the beginning of the TLS header. 1487 * 1488 * This function returns zero on success, else a non-zero error code 1489 * is returned. 1490 */ 1491 int 1492 ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb *inp, uint32_t *tcpseq, uint64_t *tlsseq) 1493 { 1494 struct socket *so = inp->inp_socket; 1495 struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp); 1496 1497 INP_RLOCK(inp); 1498 if (tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 1499 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1500 return (ECONNRESET); 1501 } 1502 1503 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1504 *tcpseq = tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc; 1505 *tlsseq = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno; 1506 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1507 1508 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1509 1510 return (0); 1511 } 1512 1513 int 1514 ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep) 1515 { 1516 struct ktls_session *tls; 1517 struct inpcb *inp __diagused; 1518 1519 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1520 return (EINVAL); 1521 inp = so->so_pcb; 1522 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1523 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so); 1524 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info; 1525 if (tls == NULL) 1526 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE; 1527 else 1528 *modep = tls->mode; 1529 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so); 1530 return (0); 1531 } 1532 1533 /* 1534 * Switch between SW and ifnet TLS sessions as requested. 1535 */ 1536 int 1537 ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int mode) 1538 { 1539 struct ktls_session *tls, *tls_new; 1540 struct inpcb *inp; 1541 struct tcpcb *tp; 1542 int error; 1543 1544 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1545 return (EINVAL); 1546 switch (mode) { 1547 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW: 1548 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET: 1549 break; 1550 default: 1551 return (EINVAL); 1552 } 1553 1554 inp = so->so_pcb; 1555 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1556 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 1557 1558 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) { 1559 /* Don't allow enabling ifnet ktls multiple times */ 1560 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit) 1561 return (EALREADY); 1562 1563 /* 1564 * Don't enable ifnet ktls if we disabled it due to an 1565 * excessive retransmission rate 1566 */ 1567 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis) 1568 return (ENXIO); 1569 } 1570 1571 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd); 1572 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info; 1573 if (tls == NULL) { 1574 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1575 return (0); 1576 } 1577 1578 if (tls->mode == mode) { 1579 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1580 return (0); 1581 } 1582 1583 tls = ktls_hold(tls); 1584 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1585 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1586 1587 tls_new = ktls_clone_session(tls, KTLS_TX); 1588 1589 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) 1590 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX, true); 1591 else 1592 error = ktls_try_sw(tls_new, KTLS_TX); 1593 if (error) { 1594 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1); 1595 ktls_free(tls_new); 1596 ktls_free(tls); 1597 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1598 return (error); 1599 } 1600 1601 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT); 1602 if (error) { 1603 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1); 1604 ktls_free(tls_new); 1605 ktls_free(tls); 1606 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1607 return (error); 1608 } 1609 1610 /* 1611 * If we raced with another session change, keep the existing 1612 * session. 1613 */ 1614 if (tls != so->so_snd.sb_tls_info) { 1615 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1); 1616 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so); 1617 ktls_free(tls_new); 1618 ktls_free(tls); 1619 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1620 return (EBUSY); 1621 } 1622 1623 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1624 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd); 1625 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls_new; 1626 if (tls_new->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) { 1627 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0); 1628 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1; 1629 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL) 1630 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1); 1631 } 1632 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1633 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so); 1634 1635 /* 1636 * Drop two references on 'tls'. The first is for the 1637 * ktls_hold() above. The second drops the reference from the 1638 * socket buffer. 1639 */ 1640 KASSERT(tls->refcount >= 2, ("too few references on old session")); 1641 ktls_free(tls); 1642 ktls_free(tls); 1643 1644 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) 1645 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_ifnet, 1); 1646 else 1647 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_sw, 1); 1648 1649 return (0); 1650 } 1651 1652 /* 1653 * Try to allocate a new TLS receive tag. This task is scheduled when 1654 * sbappend_ktls_rx detects an input path change. If a new tag is 1655 * allocated, replace the tag in the TLS session. If a new tag cannot 1656 * be allocated, let the session fall back to software decryption. 1657 */ 1658 static void 1659 ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending) 1660 { 1661 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params; 1662 struct ktls_session *tls; 1663 struct m_snd_tag *mst; 1664 struct inpcb *inp; 1665 struct ifnet *ifp; 1666 struct socket *so; 1667 int error; 1668 1669 MPASS(pending == 1); 1670 1671 tls = context; 1672 so = tls->so; 1673 inp = so->so_pcb; 1674 ifp = NULL; 1675 1676 INP_RLOCK(inp); 1677 if (intotcpcb(inp)->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 1678 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1679 goto out; 1680 } 1681 1682 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1683 mst = tls->snd_tag; 1684 tls->snd_tag = NULL; 1685 if (mst != NULL) 1686 m_snd_tag_rele(mst); 1687 1688 ifp = tls->rx_ifp; 1689 if_ref(ifp); 1690 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1691 1692 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX; 1693 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid; 1694 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype; 1695 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain; 1696 params.tls_rx.inp = inp; 1697 params.tls_rx.tls = tls; 1698 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = tls->rx_vlan_id; 1699 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 1700 1701 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) { 1702 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS6) == 0) 1703 goto out; 1704 } else { 1705 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS4) == 0) 1706 goto out; 1707 } 1708 1709 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, &mst); 1710 if (error == 0) { 1711 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1712 tls->snd_tag = mst; 1713 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1714 1715 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1); 1716 } else { 1717 /* 1718 * Just fall back to software decryption if a tag 1719 * cannot be allocated leaving the connection intact. 1720 * If a future input path change switches to another 1721 * interface this connection will resume ifnet TLS. 1722 */ 1723 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1); 1724 } 1725 1726 out: 1727 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1728 tls->reset_pending = false; 1729 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1730 1731 if (ifp != NULL) 1732 if_rele(ifp); 1733 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 1734 sorele(so); 1735 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 1736 ktls_free(tls); 1737 } 1738 1739 /* 1740 * Try to allocate a new TLS send tag. This task is scheduled when 1741 * ip_output detects a route change while trying to transmit a packet 1742 * holding a TLS record. If a new tag is allocated, replace the tag 1743 * in the TLS session. Subsequent packets on the connection will use 1744 * the new tag. If a new tag cannot be allocated, drop the 1745 * connection. 1746 */ 1747 static void 1748 ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending) 1749 { 1750 struct epoch_tracker et; 1751 struct ktls_session *tls; 1752 struct m_snd_tag *old, *new; 1753 struct inpcb *inp; 1754 struct tcpcb *tp; 1755 int error; 1756 1757 MPASS(pending == 1); 1758 1759 tls = context; 1760 inp = tls->inp; 1761 1762 /* 1763 * Free the old tag first before allocating a new one. 1764 * ip[6]_output_send() will treat a NULL send tag the same as 1765 * an ifp mismatch and drop packets until a new tag is 1766 * allocated. 1767 * 1768 * Write-lock the INP when changing tls->snd_tag since 1769 * ip[6]_output_send() holds a read-lock when reading the 1770 * pointer. 1771 */ 1772 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1773 old = tls->snd_tag; 1774 tls->snd_tag = NULL; 1775 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1776 if (old != NULL) 1777 m_snd_tag_rele(old); 1778 1779 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(inp, tls, true, &new); 1780 1781 if (error == 0) { 1782 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1783 tls->snd_tag = new; 1784 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1785 tls->reset_pending = false; 1786 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1787 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1788 1789 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1); 1790 1791 /* 1792 * XXX: Should we kick tcp_output explicitly now that 1793 * the send tag is fixed or just rely on timers? 1794 */ 1795 } else { 1796 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et); 1797 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1798 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 1799 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED)) { 1800 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_socket->so_vnet); 1801 tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED); 1802 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 1803 if (tp != NULL) { 1804 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 1); 1805 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1806 } 1807 } else 1808 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1809 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et); 1810 1811 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1); 1812 1813 /* 1814 * Leave reset_pending true to avoid future tasks while 1815 * the socket goes away. 1816 */ 1817 } 1818 1819 ktls_free(tls); 1820 } 1821 1822 void 1823 ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf *sb, struct ifnet *ifp) 1824 { 1825 struct ktls_session *tls; 1826 struct socket *so; 1827 1828 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb); 1829 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX", 1830 __func__, sb)); 1831 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv); 1832 1833 tls = sb->sb_tls_info; 1834 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp); 1835 if_ref(ifp); 1836 tls->rx_ifp = ifp; 1837 1838 /* 1839 * See if we should schedule a task to update the receive tag for 1840 * this session. 1841 */ 1842 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1843 if (!tls->reset_pending) { 1844 (void) ktls_hold(tls); 1845 soref(so); 1846 tls->so = so; 1847 tls->reset_pending = true; 1848 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task); 1849 } 1850 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1851 } 1852 1853 int 1854 ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls) 1855 { 1856 1857 if (inp == NULL) 1858 return (ENOBUFS); 1859 1860 INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1861 1862 /* 1863 * See if we should schedule a task to update the send tag for 1864 * this session. 1865 */ 1866 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1867 if (!tls->reset_pending) { 1868 (void) ktls_hold(tls); 1869 tls->reset_pending = true; 1870 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task); 1871 } 1872 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1873 return (ENOBUFS); 1874 } 1875 1876 #ifdef RATELIMIT 1877 int 1878 ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session *tls, uint64_t max_pacing_rate) 1879 { 1880 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params = { 1881 .rate_limit.max_rate = max_pacing_rate, 1882 .rate_limit.flags = M_NOWAIT, 1883 }; 1884 struct m_snd_tag *mst; 1885 1886 /* Can't get to the inp, but it should be locked. */ 1887 /* INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); */ 1888 1889 MPASS(tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET); 1890 1891 if (tls->snd_tag == NULL) { 1892 /* 1893 * Resetting send tag, ignore this change. The 1894 * pending reset may or may not see this updated rate 1895 * in the tcpcb. If it doesn't, we will just lose 1896 * this rate change. 1897 */ 1898 return (0); 1899 } 1900 1901 mst = tls->snd_tag; 1902 1903 MPASS(mst != NULL); 1904 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT); 1905 1906 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms)); 1907 } 1908 #endif 1909 1910 static void 1911 ktls_destroy_help(void *context, int pending __unused) 1912 { 1913 ktls_destroy(context); 1914 } 1915 1916 void 1917 ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls) 1918 { 1919 struct inpcb *inp; 1920 struct tcpcb *tp; 1921 bool wlocked; 1922 1923 MPASS(tls->refcount == 0); 1924 1925 inp = tls->inp; 1926 if (tls->tx) { 1927 wlocked = INP_WLOCKED(inp); 1928 if (!wlocked && !INP_TRY_WLOCK(inp)) { 1929 /* 1930 * rwlocks read locks are anonymous, and there 1931 * is no way to know if our current thread 1932 * holds an rlock on the inp. As a rough 1933 * estimate, check to see if the thread holds 1934 * *any* rlocks at all. If it does not, then we 1935 * know that we don't hold the inp rlock, and 1936 * can safely take the wlock 1937 */ 1938 if (curthread->td_rw_rlocks == 0) { 1939 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1940 } else { 1941 /* 1942 * We might hold the rlock, so let's 1943 * do the destroy in a taskqueue 1944 * context to avoid a potential 1945 * deadlock. This should be very 1946 * rare. 1947 */ 1948 counter_u64_add(ktls_destroy_task, 1); 1949 TASK_INIT(&tls->destroy_task, 0, 1950 ktls_destroy_help, tls); 1951 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, 1952 &tls->destroy_task); 1953 return; 1954 } 1955 } 1956 } 1957 1958 if (tls->sequential_records) { 1959 struct mbuf *m, *n; 1960 int page_count; 1961 1962 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq, n) { 1963 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt; 1964 while (page_count > 0) { 1965 KASSERT(page_count >= m->m_epg_nrdy, 1966 ("%s: too few pages", __func__)); 1967 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy; 1968 m = m_free(m); 1969 } 1970 } 1971 } 1972 1973 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, -1); 1974 switch (tls->mode) { 1975 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW: 1976 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 1977 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 1978 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, -1); 1979 break; 1980 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 1981 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, -1); 1982 break; 1983 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 1984 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, -1); 1985 break; 1986 } 1987 break; 1988 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET: 1989 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 1990 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 1991 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, -1); 1992 break; 1993 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 1994 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, -1); 1995 break; 1996 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 1997 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, -1); 1998 break; 1999 } 2000 if (tls->snd_tag != NULL) 2001 m_snd_tag_rele(tls->snd_tag); 2002 if (tls->rx_ifp != NULL) 2003 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp); 2004 if (tls->tx) { 2005 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 2006 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 2007 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 1); 2008 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 0; 2009 } 2010 break; 2011 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 2012 case TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE: 2013 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 2014 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 2015 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, -1); 2016 break; 2017 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 2018 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, -1); 2019 break; 2020 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305: 2021 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, -1); 2022 break; 2023 } 2024 break; 2025 #endif 2026 } 2027 if (tls->ocf_session != NULL) 2028 ktls_ocf_free(tls); 2029 if (tls->params.auth_key != NULL) { 2030 zfree(tls->params.auth_key, M_KTLS); 2031 tls->params.auth_key = NULL; 2032 tls->params.auth_key_len = 0; 2033 } 2034 if (tls->params.cipher_key != NULL) { 2035 zfree(tls->params.cipher_key, M_KTLS); 2036 tls->params.cipher_key = NULL; 2037 tls->params.cipher_key_len = 0; 2038 } 2039 if (tls->tx) { 2040 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 2041 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp) && !wlocked) 2042 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 2043 } 2044 explicit_bzero(tls->params.iv, sizeof(tls->params.iv)); 2045 2046 uma_zfree(ktls_session_zone, tls); 2047 } 2048 2049 void 2050 ktls_seq(struct sockbuf *sb, struct mbuf *m) 2051 { 2052 2053 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) { 2054 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0, 2055 ("ktls_seq: mapped mbuf %p", m)); 2056 2057 m->m_epg_seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno; 2058 sb->sb_tls_seqno++; 2059 } 2060 } 2061 2062 /* 2063 * Add TLS framing (headers and trailers) to a chain of mbufs. Each 2064 * mbuf in the chain must be an unmapped mbuf. The payload of the 2065 * mbuf must be populated with the payload of each TLS record. 2066 * 2067 * The record_type argument specifies the TLS record type used when 2068 * populating the TLS header. 2069 * 2070 * The enq_count argument on return is set to the number of pages of 2071 * payload data for this entire chain that need to be encrypted via SW 2072 * encryption. The returned value should be passed to ktls_enqueue 2073 * when scheduling encryption of this chain of mbufs. To handle the 2074 * special case of empty fragments for TLS 1.0 sessions, an empty 2075 * fragment counts as one page. 2076 */ 2077 void 2078 ktls_frame(struct mbuf *top, struct ktls_session *tls, int *enq_cnt, 2079 uint8_t record_type) 2080 { 2081 struct tls_record_layer *tlshdr; 2082 struct mbuf *m; 2083 uint64_t *noncep; 2084 uint16_t tls_len; 2085 int maxlen __diagused; 2086 2087 maxlen = tls->params.max_frame_len; 2088 *enq_cnt = 0; 2089 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) { 2090 /* 2091 * All mbufs in the chain should be TLS records whose 2092 * payload does not exceed the maximum frame length. 2093 * 2094 * Empty TLS 1.0 records are permitted when using CBC. 2095 */ 2096 KASSERT(m->m_len <= maxlen && m->m_len >= 0 && 2097 (m->m_len > 0 || ktls_permit_empty_frames(tls)), 2098 ("ktls_frame: m %p len %d", m, m->m_len)); 2099 2100 /* 2101 * TLS frames require unmapped mbufs to store session 2102 * info. 2103 */ 2104 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0, 2105 ("ktls_frame: mapped mbuf %p (top = %p)", m, top)); 2106 2107 tls_len = m->m_len; 2108 2109 /* Save a reference to the session. */ 2110 m->m_epg_tls = ktls_hold(tls); 2111 2112 m->m_epg_hdrlen = tls->params.tls_hlen; 2113 m->m_epg_trllen = tls->params.tls_tlen; 2114 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) { 2115 int bs, delta; 2116 2117 /* 2118 * AES-CBC pads messages to a multiple of the 2119 * block size. Note that the padding is 2120 * applied after the digest and the encryption 2121 * is done on the "plaintext || mac || padding". 2122 * At least one byte of padding is always 2123 * present. 2124 * 2125 * Compute the final trailer length assuming 2126 * at most one block of padding. 2127 * tls->params.tls_tlen is the maximum 2128 * possible trailer length (padding + digest). 2129 * delta holds the number of excess padding 2130 * bytes if the maximum were used. Those 2131 * extra bytes are removed. 2132 */ 2133 bs = tls->params.tls_bs; 2134 delta = (tls_len + tls->params.tls_tlen) & (bs - 1); 2135 m->m_epg_trllen -= delta; 2136 } 2137 m->m_len += m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen; 2138 2139 /* Populate the TLS header. */ 2140 tlshdr = (void *)m->m_epg_hdr; 2141 tlshdr->tls_vmajor = tls->params.tls_vmajor; 2142 2143 /* 2144 * TLS 1.3 masquarades as TLS 1.2 with a record type 2145 * of TLS_RLTYPE_APP. 2146 */ 2147 if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE && 2148 tls->params.tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) { 2149 tlshdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO; 2150 tlshdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP; 2151 /* save the real record type for later */ 2152 m->m_epg_record_type = record_type; 2153 m->m_epg_trail[0] = record_type; 2154 } else { 2155 tlshdr->tls_vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor; 2156 tlshdr->tls_type = record_type; 2157 } 2158 tlshdr->tls_length = htons(m->m_len - sizeof(*tlshdr)); 2159 2160 /* 2161 * Store nonces / explicit IVs after the end of the 2162 * TLS header. 2163 * 2164 * For GCM with TLS 1.2, an 8 byte nonce is copied 2165 * from the end of the IV. The nonce is then 2166 * incremented for use by the next record. 2167 * 2168 * For CBC, a random nonce is inserted for TLS 1.1+. 2169 */ 2170 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 && 2171 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) { 2172 noncep = (uint64_t *)(tls->params.iv + 8); 2173 be64enc(tlshdr + 1, *noncep); 2174 (*noncep)++; 2175 } else if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && 2176 tls->params.tls_vminor >= TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE) 2177 arc4rand(tlshdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN, 0); 2178 2179 /* 2180 * When using SW encryption, mark the mbuf not ready. 2181 * It will be marked ready via sbready() after the 2182 * record has been encrypted. 2183 * 2184 * When using ifnet TLS, unencrypted TLS records are 2185 * sent down the stack to the NIC. 2186 */ 2187 if (tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) { 2188 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY; 2189 if (__predict_false(tls_len == 0)) { 2190 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */ 2191 m->m_epg_nrdy = 1; 2192 } else 2193 m->m_epg_nrdy = m->m_epg_npgs; 2194 *enq_cnt += m->m_epg_nrdy; 2195 } 2196 } 2197 } 2198 2199 bool 2200 ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session *tls) 2201 { 2202 return (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && 2203 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO); 2204 } 2205 2206 void 2207 ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf *sb) 2208 { 2209 struct tls_record_layer hdr; 2210 struct ktls_wq *wq; 2211 struct socket *so; 2212 bool running; 2213 2214 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb); 2215 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX", 2216 __func__, sb)); 2217 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv); 2218 2219 if (sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING) 2220 return; 2221 2222 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */ 2223 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr)) { 2224 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc != 0) 2225 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE; 2226 return; 2227 } 2228 2229 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr); 2230 2231 /* Is the entire record queued? */ 2232 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length)) { 2233 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0) 2234 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE; 2235 return; 2236 } 2237 2238 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING; 2239 2240 soref(so); 2241 wq = &ktls_wq[so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->wq_index]; 2242 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 2243 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->so_head, so, so_ktls_rx_list); 2244 running = wq->running; 2245 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 2246 if (!running) 2247 wakeup(wq); 2248 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 1); 2249 } 2250 2251 static struct mbuf * 2252 ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf *sb, int len) 2253 { 2254 struct mbuf *m, *n, *top; 2255 int remain; 2256 2257 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb); 2258 MPASS(len <= sb->sb_tlscc); 2259 2260 /* 2261 * If TLS chain is the exact size of the record, 2262 * just grab the whole record. 2263 */ 2264 top = sb->sb_mtls; 2265 if (sb->sb_tlscc == len) { 2266 sb->sb_mtls = NULL; 2267 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL; 2268 goto out; 2269 } 2270 2271 /* 2272 * While it would be nice to use m_split() here, we need 2273 * to know exactly what m_split() allocates to update the 2274 * accounting, so do it inline instead. 2275 */ 2276 remain = len; 2277 for (m = top; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) 2278 remain -= m->m_len; 2279 2280 /* Easy case: don't have to split 'm'. */ 2281 if (remain == m->m_len) { 2282 sb->sb_mtls = m->m_next; 2283 if (sb->sb_mtls == NULL) 2284 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL; 2285 m->m_next = NULL; 2286 goto out; 2287 } 2288 2289 /* 2290 * Need to allocate an mbuf to hold the remainder of 'm'. Try 2291 * with M_NOWAIT first. 2292 */ 2293 n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA); 2294 if (n == NULL) { 2295 /* 2296 * Use M_WAITOK with socket buffer unlocked. If 2297 * 'sb_mtls' changes while the lock is dropped, return 2298 * NULL to force the caller to retry. 2299 */ 2300 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 2301 2302 n = m_get(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA); 2303 2304 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2305 if (sb->sb_mtls != top) { 2306 m_free(n); 2307 return (NULL); 2308 } 2309 } 2310 n->m_flags |= (m->m_flags & (M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED)); 2311 2312 /* Store remainder in 'n'. */ 2313 n->m_len = m->m_len - remain; 2314 if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) { 2315 n->m_data = m->m_data + remain; 2316 mb_dupcl(n, m); 2317 } else { 2318 bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t) + remain, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len); 2319 } 2320 2321 /* Trim 'm' and update accounting. */ 2322 m->m_len -= n->m_len; 2323 sb->sb_tlscc -= n->m_len; 2324 sb->sb_ccc -= n->m_len; 2325 2326 /* Account for 'n'. */ 2327 sballoc_ktls_rx(sb, n); 2328 2329 /* Insert 'n' into the TLS chain. */ 2330 sb->sb_mtls = n; 2331 n->m_next = m->m_next; 2332 if (sb->sb_mtlstail == m) 2333 sb->sb_mtlstail = n; 2334 2335 /* Detach the record from the TLS chain. */ 2336 m->m_next = NULL; 2337 2338 out: 2339 MPASS(m_length(top, NULL) == len); 2340 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) 2341 sbfree_ktls_rx(sb, m); 2342 sb->sb_tlsdcc = len; 2343 sb->sb_ccc += len; 2344 SBCHECK(sb); 2345 return (top); 2346 } 2347 2348 /* 2349 * Determine the length of the trailing zero padding and find the real 2350 * record type in the byte before the padding. 2351 * 2352 * Walking the mbuf chain backwards is clumsy, so another option would 2353 * be to scan forwards remembering the last non-zero byte before the 2354 * trailer. However, it would be expensive to scan the entire record. 2355 * Instead, find the last non-zero byte of each mbuf in the chain 2356 * keeping track of the relative offset of that nonzero byte. 2357 * 2358 * trail_len is the size of the MAC/tag on input and is set to the 2359 * size of the full trailer including padding and the record type on 2360 * return. 2361 */ 2362 static int 2363 tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, int tls_len, 2364 int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_typep) 2365 { 2366 char *cp; 2367 u_int digest_start, last_offset, m_len, offset; 2368 uint8_t record_type; 2369 2370 digest_start = tls_len - *trailer_len; 2371 last_offset = 0; 2372 offset = 0; 2373 for (; m != NULL && offset < digest_start; 2374 offset += m->m_len, m = m->m_next) { 2375 /* Don't look for padding in the tag. */ 2376 m_len = min(digest_start - offset, m->m_len); 2377 cp = mtod(m, char *); 2378 2379 /* Find last non-zero byte in this mbuf. */ 2380 while (m_len > 0 && cp[m_len - 1] == 0) 2381 m_len--; 2382 if (m_len > 0) { 2383 record_type = cp[m_len - 1]; 2384 last_offset = offset + m_len; 2385 } 2386 } 2387 if (last_offset < tls->params.tls_hlen) 2388 return (EBADMSG); 2389 2390 *record_typep = record_type; 2391 *trailer_len = tls_len - last_offset + 1; 2392 return (0); 2393 } 2394 2395 /* 2396 * Check if a mbuf chain is fully decrypted at the given offset and 2397 * length. Returns KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED if all data is 2398 * decrypted. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED if there is a mix of encrypted 2399 * and decrypted data. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED if all data is 2400 * encrypted. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_SHAREDMBUF if any mbuf points at 2401 * shared data that must not be modified in place (non-anonymous 2402 * M_EXTPG or sendfile M_EXT buffers). 2403 */ 2404 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t 2405 ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf *mb, int offset, int len) 2406 { 2407 int m_flags_ored = 0; 2408 int m_flags_anded = -1; 2409 2410 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) { 2411 if (offset < mb->m_len) 2412 break; 2413 offset -= mb->m_len; 2414 } 2415 offset += len; 2416 2417 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) { 2418 if ((mb->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0 && 2419 (mb->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0) 2420 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_SHAREDMBUF); 2421 if ((mb->m_flags & M_EXT) != 0 && 2422 mb->m_ext.ext_type == EXT_SFBUF) 2423 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_SHAREDMBUF); 2424 2425 m_flags_ored |= mb->m_flags; 2426 m_flags_anded &= mb->m_flags; 2427 2428 if (offset <= mb->m_len) 2429 break; 2430 offset -= mb->m_len; 2431 } 2432 MPASS(mb != NULL || offset == 0); 2433 2434 if ((m_flags_ored ^ m_flags_anded) & M_DECRYPTED) 2435 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED); 2436 else 2437 return ((m_flags_ored & M_DECRYPTED) ? 2438 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED : 2439 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED); 2440 } 2441 2442 /* 2443 * ktls_resync_ifnet - get HW TLS RX back on track after packet loss 2444 */ 2445 static int 2446 ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket *so, uint32_t tls_len, uint64_t tls_rcd_num) 2447 { 2448 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params; 2449 struct m_snd_tag *mst; 2450 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so); 2451 struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp); 2452 2453 mst = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->snd_tag; 2454 if (__predict_false(mst == NULL)) 2455 return (EINVAL); 2456 2457 INP_RLOCK(inp); 2458 if (tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 2459 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 2460 return (ECONNRESET); 2461 } 2462 2463 /* Get the TCP sequence number of the next valid TLS header. */ 2464 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv); 2465 params.tls_rx.tls_hdr_tcp_sn = 2466 tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc - tls_len; 2467 params.tls_rx.tls_rec_length = tls_len; 2468 params.tls_rx.tls_seq_number = tls_rcd_num; 2469 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv); 2470 2471 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 2472 2473 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX); 2474 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms)); 2475 } 2476 2477 static void 2478 ktls_drop(struct socket *so, int error) 2479 { 2480 struct epoch_tracker et; 2481 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so); 2482 struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp); 2483 2484 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et); 2485 INP_WLOCK(inp); 2486 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED)) { 2487 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_socket->so_vnet); 2488 tp = tcp_drop(tp, error); 2489 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 2490 if (tp != NULL) 2491 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 2492 } else { 2493 so->so_error = error; 2494 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so); 2495 sorwakeup_locked(so); 2496 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 2497 } 2498 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et); 2499 } 2500 2501 static void 2502 ktls_decrypt(struct socket *so) 2503 { 2504 char tls_header[MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN]; 2505 struct ktls_session *tls; 2506 struct sockbuf *sb; 2507 struct tls_record_layer *hdr; 2508 struct tls_get_record tgr; 2509 struct mbuf *control, *data, *m; 2510 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t state; 2511 uint64_t seqno; 2512 int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len; 2513 bool tls13; 2514 uint8_t vminor, record_type; 2515 2516 hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header; 2517 sb = &so->so_rcv; 2518 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2519 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING, 2520 ("%s: socket %p not running", __func__, so)); 2521 2522 tls = sb->sb_tls_info; 2523 MPASS(tls != NULL); 2524 2525 tls13 = (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE); 2526 if (tls13) 2527 vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO; 2528 else 2529 vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor; 2530 for (;;) { 2531 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */ 2532 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen) 2533 break; 2534 2535 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, tls->params.tls_hlen, tls_header); 2536 tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length); 2537 2538 if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor || 2539 hdr->tls_vminor != vminor) 2540 error = EINVAL; 2541 else if (tls13 && hdr->tls_type != TLS_RLTYPE_APP) 2542 error = EINVAL; 2543 else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len > 2544 tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 + 2545 tls->params.tls_tlen) 2546 error = EMSGSIZE; 2547 else 2548 error = 0; 2549 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) { 2550 /* 2551 * We have a corrupted record and are likely 2552 * out of sync. The connection isn't 2553 * recoverable at this point, so abort it. 2554 */ 2555 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 2556 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_corrupted_records, 1); 2557 2558 ktls_drop(so, error); 2559 goto deref; 2560 } 2561 2562 /* Is the entire record queued? */ 2563 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls_len) 2564 break; 2565 2566 /* 2567 * Split out the portion of the mbuf chain containing 2568 * this TLS record. 2569 */ 2570 data = ktls_detach_record(sb, tls_len); 2571 if (data == NULL) 2572 continue; 2573 MPASS(sb->sb_tlsdcc == tls_len); 2574 2575 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno; 2576 sb->sb_tls_seqno++; 2577 SBCHECK(sb); 2578 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 2579 2580 /* get crypto state for this TLS record */ 2581 state = ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(data, 0, tls_len); 2582 2583 switch (state) { 2584 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED: 2585 error = ktls_ocf_recrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno); 2586 if (error) 2587 break; 2588 /* FALLTHROUGH */ 2589 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED: 2590 error = ktls_ocf_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno, 2591 &trail_len); 2592 if (__predict_true(error == 0)) { 2593 if (tls13) { 2594 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data, 2595 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type); 2596 } else { 2597 record_type = hdr->tls_type; 2598 } 2599 } 2600 break; 2601 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED: 2602 /* 2603 * NIC TLS is only supported for AEAD 2604 * ciphersuites which used a fixed sized 2605 * trailer. 2606 */ 2607 if (tls13) { 2608 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen - 1; 2609 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data, 2610 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type); 2611 } else { 2612 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen; 2613 error = 0; 2614 record_type = hdr->tls_type; 2615 } 2616 break; 2617 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_SHAREDMBUF: 2618 error = EINVAL; 2619 break; 2620 default: 2621 __assert_unreachable(); 2622 } 2623 if (error) { 2624 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1); 2625 2626 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2627 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) { 2628 /* 2629 * sbcut/drop/flush discarded these 2630 * mbufs. 2631 */ 2632 m_freem(data); 2633 break; 2634 } 2635 2636 /* 2637 * Drop this TLS record's data, but keep 2638 * decrypting subsequent records. 2639 */ 2640 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len; 2641 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0; 2642 2643 if (error != EMSGSIZE) 2644 error = EBADMSG; 2645 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 2646 so->so_error = error; 2647 sorwakeup_locked(so); 2648 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 2649 2650 m_freem(data); 2651 2652 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2653 continue; 2654 } 2655 2656 /* Allocate the control mbuf. */ 2657 memset(&tgr, 0, sizeof(tgr)); 2658 tgr.tls_type = record_type; 2659 tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor; 2660 tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor; 2661 tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen - 2662 trail_len); 2663 control = sbcreatecontrol(&tgr, sizeof(tgr), 2664 TLS_GET_RECORD, IPPROTO_TCP, M_WAITOK); 2665 2666 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2667 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) { 2668 /* sbcut/drop/flush discarded these mbufs. */ 2669 MPASS(sb->sb_tlscc == 0); 2670 m_freem(data); 2671 m_freem(control); 2672 break; 2673 } 2674 2675 /* 2676 * Clear the 'dcc' accounting in preparation for 2677 * adding the decrypted record. 2678 */ 2679 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len; 2680 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0; 2681 SBCHECK(sb); 2682 2683 /* If there is no payload, drop all of the data. */ 2684 if (tgr.tls_length == htobe16(0)) { 2685 m_freem(data); 2686 data = NULL; 2687 } else { 2688 /* Trim header. */ 2689 remain = tls->params.tls_hlen; 2690 while (remain > 0) { 2691 if (data->m_len > remain) { 2692 data->m_data += remain; 2693 data->m_len -= remain; 2694 break; 2695 } 2696 remain -= data->m_len; 2697 data = m_free(data); 2698 } 2699 2700 /* Trim trailer and clear M_NOTREADY. */ 2701 remain = be16toh(tgr.tls_length); 2702 m = data; 2703 for (m = data; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) { 2704 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED); 2705 remain -= m->m_len; 2706 } 2707 m->m_len = remain; 2708 m_freem(m->m_next); 2709 m->m_next = NULL; 2710 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED); 2711 2712 /* Set EOR on the final mbuf. */ 2713 m->m_flags |= M_EOR; 2714 } 2715 2716 sbappendcontrol_locked(sb, data, control, 0); 2717 2718 if (__predict_false(state != KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED)) { 2719 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC; 2720 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 2721 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, tls_len, seqno); 2722 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2723 } else if (__predict_false(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC)) { 2724 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC; 2725 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 2726 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, 0, seqno); 2727 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 2728 } 2729 } 2730 2731 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING; 2732 2733 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc > 0) 2734 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE; 2735 2736 sorwakeup_locked(so); 2737 2738 deref: 2739 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(sb); 2740 2741 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 2742 sorele(so); 2743 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 2744 } 2745 2746 void 2747 ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf *m) 2748 { 2749 struct ktls_wq *wq; 2750 bool running; 2751 2752 /* Mark it for freeing. */ 2753 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_2FREE; 2754 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index]; 2755 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 2756 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq); 2757 running = wq->running; 2758 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 2759 if (!running) 2760 wakeup(wq); 2761 } 2762 2763 static void * 2764 ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m) 2765 { 2766 void *buf; 2767 int domain, running; 2768 2769 if (m->m_epg_npgs <= 2) 2770 return (NULL); 2771 if (ktls_buffer_zone == NULL) 2772 return (NULL); 2773 if ((u_int)(ticks - wq->lastallocfail) < hz) { 2774 /* 2775 * Rate-limit allocation attempts after a failure. 2776 * ktls_buffer_import() will acquire a per-domain mutex to check 2777 * the free page queues and may fail consistently if memory is 2778 * fragmented. 2779 */ 2780 return (NULL); 2781 } 2782 buf = uma_zalloc(ktls_buffer_zone, M_NOWAIT | M_NORECLAIM); 2783 if (buf == NULL) { 2784 domain = PCPU_GET(domain); 2785 wq->lastallocfail = ticks; 2786 2787 /* 2788 * Note that this check is "racy", but the races are 2789 * harmless, and are either a spurious wakeup if 2790 * multiple threads fail allocations before the alloc 2791 * thread wakes, or waiting an extra second in case we 2792 * see an old value of running == true. 2793 */ 2794 if (!VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain)) { 2795 running = atomic_load_int(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.running); 2796 if (!running) 2797 wakeup(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td); 2798 } 2799 } 2800 return (buf); 2801 } 2802 2803 static int 2804 ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m, 2805 struct ktls_session *tls, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state) 2806 { 2807 vm_page_t pg; 2808 int error, i, len, off; 2809 2810 KASSERT((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY), 2811 ("%p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m)); 2812 KASSERT(ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs) <= ktls_maxlen, 2813 ("page count %d larger than maximum frame length %d", m->m_epg_npgs, 2814 ktls_maxlen)); 2815 2816 /* Anonymous mbufs are encrypted in place. */ 2817 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) != 0) 2818 return (ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, NULL, 0)); 2819 2820 /* 2821 * For file-backed mbufs (from sendfile), anonymous wired 2822 * pages are allocated and used as the encryption destination. 2823 */ 2824 if ((state->cbuf = ktls_buffer_alloc(wq, m)) != NULL) { 2825 len = ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs - 1) + m->m_epg_last_len - 2826 m->m_epg_1st_off; 2827 state->dst_iov[0].iov_base = (char *)state->cbuf + 2828 m->m_epg_1st_off; 2829 state->dst_iov[0].iov_len = len; 2830 state->parray[0] = DMAP_TO_PHYS(state->cbuf); 2831 i = 1; 2832 } else { 2833 off = m->m_epg_1st_off; 2834 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, off = 0) { 2835 pg = vm_page_alloc_noobj(VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | 2836 VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_WAITOK); 2837 len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, off); 2838 state->parray[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg); 2839 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base = 2840 (char *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(state->parray[i]) + off; 2841 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = len; 2842 } 2843 } 2844 KASSERT(i + 1 <= nitems(state->dst_iov), ("dst_iov is too small")); 2845 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base = m->m_epg_trail; 2846 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = m->m_epg_trllen; 2847 2848 error = ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, state->dst_iov, i + 1); 2849 2850 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) { 2851 /* Free the anonymous pages. */ 2852 if (state->cbuf != NULL) 2853 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, state->cbuf); 2854 else { 2855 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) { 2856 pg = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(state->parray[i]); 2857 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(pg); 2858 vm_page_free(pg); 2859 } 2860 } 2861 } 2862 return (error); 2863 } 2864 2865 /* Number of TLS records in a batch passed to ktls_enqueue(). */ 2866 static u_int 2867 ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf *m) 2868 { 2869 int page_count, records; 2870 2871 records = 0; 2872 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt; 2873 while (page_count > 0) { 2874 records++; 2875 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy; 2876 m = m->m_next; 2877 } 2878 KASSERT(page_count == 0, ("%s: mismatched page count", __func__)); 2879 return (records); 2880 } 2881 2882 void 2883 ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, int page_count) 2884 { 2885 struct ktls_session *tls; 2886 struct ktls_wq *wq; 2887 int queued; 2888 bool running; 2889 2890 KASSERT(((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == 2891 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)), 2892 ("ktls_enqueue: %p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m)); 2893 KASSERT(page_count != 0, ("enqueueing TLS mbuf with zero page count")); 2894 2895 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW, ("!SW TLS mbuf")); 2896 2897 m->m_epg_enc_cnt = page_count; 2898 2899 /* 2900 * Save a pointer to the socket. The caller is responsible 2901 * for taking an additional reference via soref(). 2902 */ 2903 m->m_epg_so = so; 2904 2905 queued = 1; 2906 tls = m->m_epg_tls; 2907 wq = &ktls_wq[tls->wq_index]; 2908 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 2909 if (__predict_false(tls->sequential_records)) { 2910 /* 2911 * For TLS 1.0, records must be encrypted 2912 * sequentially. For a given connection, all records 2913 * queued to the associated work queue are processed 2914 * sequentially. However, sendfile(2) might complete 2915 * I/O requests spanning multiple TLS records out of 2916 * order. Here we ensure TLS records are enqueued to 2917 * the work queue in FIFO order. 2918 * 2919 * tls->next_seqno holds the sequence number of the 2920 * next TLS record that should be enqueued to the work 2921 * queue. If this next record is not tls->next_seqno, 2922 * it must be a future record, so insert it, sorted by 2923 * TLS sequence number, into tls->pending_records and 2924 * return. 2925 * 2926 * If this TLS record matches tls->next_seqno, place 2927 * it in the work queue and then check 2928 * tls->pending_records to see if any 2929 * previously-queued records are now ready for 2930 * encryption. 2931 */ 2932 if (m->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno) { 2933 struct mbuf *n, *p; 2934 2935 p = NULL; 2936 STAILQ_FOREACH(n, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq) { 2937 if (n->m_epg_seqno > m->m_epg_seqno) 2938 break; 2939 p = n; 2940 } 2941 if (n == NULL) 2942 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tls->pending_records, m, 2943 m_epg_stailq); 2944 else if (p == NULL) 2945 STAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m, 2946 m_epg_stailq); 2947 else 2948 STAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(&tls->pending_records, p, m, 2949 m_epg_stailq); 2950 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 2951 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, 1); 2952 return; 2953 } 2954 2955 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(m); 2956 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq); 2957 2958 while (!STAILQ_EMPTY(&tls->pending_records)) { 2959 struct mbuf *n; 2960 2961 n = STAILQ_FIRST(&tls->pending_records); 2962 if (n->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno) 2963 break; 2964 2965 queued++; 2966 STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq); 2967 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(n); 2968 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, n, m_epg_stailq); 2969 } 2970 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, -(queued - 1)); 2971 } else 2972 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq); 2973 2974 running = wq->running; 2975 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 2976 if (!running) 2977 wakeup(wq); 2978 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, queued); 2979 } 2980 2981 /* 2982 * Once a file-backed mbuf (from sendfile) has been encrypted, free 2983 * the pages from the file and replace them with the anonymous pages 2984 * allocated in ktls_encrypt_record(). 2985 */ 2986 static void 2987 ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf *m, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state) 2988 { 2989 int i; 2990 2991 MPASS((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0); 2992 2993 /* Free the old pages. */ 2994 m->m_ext.ext_free(m); 2995 2996 /* Replace them with the new pages. */ 2997 if (state->cbuf != NULL) { 2998 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) 2999 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[0] + ptoa(i); 3000 3001 /* Contig pages should go back to the cache. */ 3002 m->m_ext.ext_free = ktls_free_mext_contig; 3003 } else { 3004 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) 3005 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[i]; 3006 3007 /* Use the basic free routine. */ 3008 m->m_ext.ext_free = mb_free_mext_pgs; 3009 } 3010 3011 /* Pages are now writable. */ 3012 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_ANON; 3013 } 3014 3015 static __noinline void 3016 ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top) 3017 { 3018 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state state; 3019 struct ktls_session *tls; 3020 struct socket *so; 3021 struct mbuf *m; 3022 int error, npages, total_pages; 3023 3024 so = top->m_epg_so; 3025 tls = top->m_epg_tls; 3026 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top)); 3027 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top)); 3028 #ifdef INVARIANTS 3029 top->m_epg_so = NULL; 3030 #endif 3031 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt; 3032 npages = 0; 3033 3034 /* 3035 * Encrypt the TLS records in the chain of mbufs starting with 3036 * 'top'. 'total_pages' gives us a total count of pages and is 3037 * used to know when we have finished encrypting the TLS 3038 * records originally queued with 'top'. 3039 * 3040 * NB: These mbufs are queued in the socket buffer and 3041 * 'm_next' is traversing the mbufs in the socket buffer. The 3042 * socket buffer lock is not held while traversing this chain. 3043 * Since the mbufs are all marked M_NOTREADY their 'm_next' 3044 * pointers should be stable. However, the 'm_next' of the 3045 * last mbuf encrypted is not necessarily NULL. It can point 3046 * to other mbufs appended while 'top' was on the TLS work 3047 * queue. 3048 * 3049 * Each mbuf holds an entire TLS record. 3050 */ 3051 error = 0; 3052 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = m->m_next) { 3053 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls, 3054 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p", 3055 tls, m->m_epg_tls)); 3056 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages, 3057 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top, 3058 total_pages, m)); 3059 3060 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, &state); 3061 if (error) { 3062 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1); 3063 break; 3064 } 3065 3066 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0) 3067 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, &state); 3068 m->m_flags |= M_RDONLY; 3069 3070 npages += m->m_epg_nrdy; 3071 3072 /* 3073 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no 3074 * longer needed. Existing code depends on encrypted 3075 * records having no associated session vs 3076 * yet-to-be-encrypted records having an associated 3077 * session. 3078 */ 3079 m->m_epg_tls = NULL; 3080 ktls_free(tls); 3081 } 3082 3083 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 3084 if (error == 0) { 3085 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, top, npages); 3086 } else { 3087 ktls_drop(so, EIO); 3088 mb_free_notready(top, total_pages); 3089 } 3090 3091 sorele(so); 3092 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 3093 } 3094 3095 void 3096 ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state, int error) 3097 { 3098 struct ktls_session *tls; 3099 struct socket *so; 3100 struct mbuf *m; 3101 int npages; 3102 3103 m = state->m; 3104 3105 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0) 3106 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, state); 3107 m->m_flags |= M_RDONLY; 3108 3109 so = state->so; 3110 free(state, M_KTLS); 3111 3112 /* 3113 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no longer 3114 * needed. Existing code depends on encrypted records having 3115 * no associated session vs yet-to-be-encrypted records having 3116 * an associated session. 3117 */ 3118 tls = m->m_epg_tls; 3119 m->m_epg_tls = NULL; 3120 ktls_free(tls); 3121 3122 if (error != 0) 3123 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1); 3124 3125 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 3126 npages = m->m_epg_nrdy; 3127 3128 if (error == 0) { 3129 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, m, npages); 3130 } else { 3131 ktls_drop(so, EIO); 3132 mb_free_notready(m, npages); 3133 } 3134 3135 sorele(so); 3136 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 3137 } 3138 3139 /* 3140 * Similar to ktls_encrypt, but used with asynchronous OCF backends 3141 * (coprocessors) where encryption does not use host CPU resources and 3142 * it can be beneficial to queue more requests than CPUs. 3143 */ 3144 static __noinline void 3145 ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top) 3146 { 3147 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state; 3148 struct ktls_session *tls; 3149 struct socket *so; 3150 struct mbuf *m, *n; 3151 int error, mpages, npages, total_pages; 3152 3153 so = top->m_epg_so; 3154 tls = top->m_epg_tls; 3155 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top)); 3156 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top)); 3157 #ifdef INVARIANTS 3158 top->m_epg_so = NULL; 3159 #endif 3160 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt; 3161 npages = 0; 3162 3163 error = 0; 3164 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = n) { 3165 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls, 3166 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p", 3167 tls, m->m_epg_tls)); 3168 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages, 3169 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top, 3170 total_pages, m)); 3171 3172 state = malloc(sizeof(*state), M_KTLS, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 3173 soref(so); 3174 state->so = so; 3175 state->m = m; 3176 3177 mpages = m->m_epg_nrdy; 3178 n = m->m_next; 3179 3180 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, state); 3181 if (error) { 3182 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1); 3183 free(state, M_KTLS); 3184 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 3185 sorele(so); 3186 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 3187 break; 3188 } 3189 3190 npages += mpages; 3191 } 3192 3193 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 3194 if (error != 0) { 3195 ktls_drop(so, EIO); 3196 mb_free_notready(m, total_pages - npages); 3197 } 3198 3199 sorele(so); 3200 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 3201 } 3202 3203 static int 3204 ktls_bind_domain(int domain) 3205 { 3206 int error; 3207 3208 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &cpuset_domain[domain]); 3209 if (error != 0) 3210 return (error); 3211 curthread->td_domain.dr_policy = DOMAINSET_PREF(domain); 3212 return (0); 3213 } 3214 3215 static void 3216 ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx) 3217 { 3218 struct ktls_domain_info *ktls_domain = ctx; 3219 struct ktls_reclaim_thread *sc = &ktls_domain->reclaim_td; 3220 struct sysctl_oid *oid; 3221 char name[80]; 3222 int error, domain; 3223 3224 domain = ktls_domain - ktls_domains; 3225 if (bootverbose) 3226 printf("Starting KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d\n", domain); 3227 error = ktls_bind_domain(domain); 3228 if (error) 3229 printf("Unable to bind KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d: error %d\n", 3230 domain, error); 3231 snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "domain%d", domain); 3232 oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(NULL, SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_ipc_tls), OID_AUTO, 3233 name, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, ""); 3234 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "reclaims", 3235 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->reclaims, 0, "buffers reclaimed"); 3236 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "wakeups", 3237 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->wakeups, 0, "thread wakeups"); 3238 SYSCTL_ADD_INT(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "running", 3239 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->running, 0, "thread running"); 3240 3241 for (;;) { 3242 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 0); 3243 tsleep(sc, PZERO | PNOLOCK, "-", 0); 3244 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 1); 3245 sc->wakeups++; 3246 /* 3247 * Below we attempt to reclaim ktls_max_reclaim 3248 * buffers using vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext(). 3249 * We do this here, as this function can take several 3250 * seconds to scan all of memory and it does not 3251 * matter if this thread pauses for a while. If we 3252 * block a ktls worker thread, we risk developing 3253 * backlogs of buffers to be encrypted, leading to 3254 * surges of traffic and potential NIC output drops. 3255 */ 3256 if (vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext(domain, VM_ALLOC_NORMAL, 3257 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 3258 ktls_max_reclaim) != 0) { 3259 vm_wait_domain(domain); 3260 } else { 3261 sc->reclaims += ktls_max_reclaim; 3262 } 3263 } 3264 } 3265 3266 static void 3267 ktls_work_thread(void *ctx) 3268 { 3269 struct ktls_wq *wq = ctx; 3270 struct mbuf *m, *n; 3271 struct socket *so, *son; 3272 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) local_m_head; 3273 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) local_so_head; 3274 int cpu; 3275 3276 cpu = wq - ktls_wq; 3277 if (bootverbose) 3278 printf("Starting KTLS worker thread for CPU %d\n", cpu); 3279 3280 /* 3281 * Bind to a core. If ktls_bind_threads is > 1, then 3282 * we bind to the NUMA domain instead. 3283 */ 3284 if (ktls_bind_threads) { 3285 int error; 3286 3287 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) { 3288 struct pcpu *pc = pcpu_find(cpu); 3289 3290 error = ktls_bind_domain(pc->pc_domain); 3291 } else { 3292 cpuset_t mask; 3293 3294 CPU_SETOF(cpu, &mask); 3295 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &mask); 3296 } 3297 if (error) 3298 printf("Unable to bind KTLS worker thread for CPU %d: error %d\n", 3299 cpu, error); 3300 } 3301 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) 3302 fpu_kern_thread(0); 3303 #endif 3304 for (;;) { 3305 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 3306 while (STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->m_head) && 3307 STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->so_head)) { 3308 wq->running = false; 3309 mtx_sleep(wq, &wq->mtx, 0, "-", 0); 3310 wq->running = true; 3311 } 3312 3313 STAILQ_INIT(&local_m_head); 3314 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_m_head, &wq->m_head); 3315 STAILQ_INIT(&local_so_head); 3316 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_so_head, &wq->so_head); 3317 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 3318 3319 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &local_m_head, m_epg_stailq, n) { 3320 if (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_2FREE) { 3321 ktls_free(m->m_epg_tls); 3322 m_free_raw(m); 3323 } else { 3324 if (m->m_epg_tls->sync_dispatch) 3325 ktls_encrypt(wq, m); 3326 else 3327 ktls_encrypt_async(wq, m); 3328 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, -1); 3329 } 3330 } 3331 3332 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(so, &local_so_head, so_ktls_rx_list, son) { 3333 ktls_decrypt(so); 3334 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, -1); 3335 } 3336 } 3337 } 3338 3339 static void 3340 ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void *context, int pending __unused) 3341 { 3342 struct ktls_session *tls; 3343 struct inpcb *inp; 3344 struct tcpcb *tp; 3345 struct socket *so; 3346 int err; 3347 3348 tls = context; 3349 inp = tls->inp; 3350 if (inp == NULL) 3351 return; 3352 INP_WLOCK(inp); 3353 so = inp->inp_socket; 3354 MPASS(so != NULL); 3355 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 3356 if (tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) { 3357 goto out; 3358 } 3359 3360 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL) 3361 err = ktls_set_tx_mode(so, TCP_TLS_MODE_SW); 3362 else 3363 err = ENXIO; 3364 if (err == 0) { 3365 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, 1); 3366 /* ktls_set_tx_mode() drops inp wlock, so recheck flags */ 3367 if ((tp->t_flags & TF_DISCONNECTED) == 0 && 3368 tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL) 3369 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 0); 3370 } else { 3371 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, 1); 3372 } 3373 3374 out: 3375 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 3376 sorele(so); 3377 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 3378 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 3379 ktls_free(tls); 3380 } 3381 3382 /* 3383 * Called when re-transmits are becoming a substantial portion of the 3384 * sends on this connection. When this happens, we transition the 3385 * connection to software TLS. This is needed because most inline TLS 3386 * NICs keep crypto state only for in-order transmits. This means 3387 * that to handle a TCP rexmit (which is out-of-order), the NIC must 3388 * re-DMA the entire TLS record up to and including the current 3389 * segment. This means that when re-transmitting the last ~1448 byte 3390 * segment of a 16KB TLS record, we could wind up re-DMA'ing an order 3391 * of magnitude more data than we are sending. This can cause the 3392 * PCIe link to saturate well before the network, which can cause 3393 * output drops, and a general loss of capacity. 3394 */ 3395 void 3396 ktls_disable_ifnet(void *arg) 3397 { 3398 struct tcpcb *tp; 3399 struct inpcb *inp; 3400 struct socket *so; 3401 struct ktls_session *tls; 3402 3403 tp = arg; 3404 inp = tptoinpcb(tp); 3405 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 3406 so = inp->inp_socket; 3407 SOCK_LOCK(so); 3408 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info; 3409 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis == 1) { 3410 SOCK_UNLOCK(so); 3411 return; 3412 } 3413 3414 /* 3415 * note that t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis is never cleared; disabling 3416 * ifnet can only be done once per connection, so we never want 3417 * to do it again 3418 */ 3419 3420 (void)ktls_hold(tls); 3421 soref(so); 3422 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis = 1; 3423 SOCK_UNLOCK(so); 3424 TASK_INIT(&tls->disable_ifnet_task, 0, ktls_disable_ifnet_help, tls); 3425 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->disable_ifnet_task); 3426 } 3427 3428 void 3429 ktls_session_to_xktls_onedir(const struct ktls_session *ktls, bool export_keys, 3430 struct xktls_session_onedir *xk) 3431 { 3432 if_t ifp; 3433 struct m_snd_tag *st; 3434 3435 xk->gen = ktls->gen; 3436 #define A(m) xk->m = ktls->params.m 3437 A(cipher_algorithm); 3438 A(auth_algorithm); 3439 A(cipher_key_len); 3440 A(auth_key_len); 3441 A(max_frame_len); 3442 A(tls_vmajor); 3443 A(tls_vminor); 3444 A(tls_hlen); 3445 A(tls_tlen); 3446 A(tls_bs); 3447 A(flags); 3448 if (export_keys) { 3449 memcpy(&xk->iv, &ktls->params.iv, XKTLS_SESSION_IV_BUF_LEN); 3450 A(iv_len); 3451 } else { 3452 memset(&xk->iv, 0, XKTLS_SESSION_IV_BUF_LEN); 3453 xk->iv_len = 0; 3454 } 3455 #undef A 3456 if ((st = ktls->snd_tag) != NULL && 3457 (ifp = ktls->snd_tag->ifp) != NULL) 3458 strncpy(xk->ifnet, if_name(ifp), sizeof(xk->ifnet)); 3459 } 3460 3461 void 3462 ktls_session_copy_keys(const struct ktls_session *ktls, 3463 uint8_t *data, size_t *sz) 3464 { 3465 size_t t, ta, tc; 3466 3467 if (ktls == NULL) { 3468 *sz = 0; 3469 return; 3470 } 3471 t = *sz; 3472 tc = MIN(t, ktls->params.cipher_key_len); 3473 if (data != NULL) 3474 memcpy(data, ktls->params.cipher_key, tc); 3475 ta = MIN(t - tc, ktls->params.auth_key_len); 3476 if (data != NULL) 3477 memcpy(data + tc, ktls->params.auth_key, ta); 3478 *sz = ta + tc; 3479 } 3480